

CLEANING.

Why did Stalin decapitate his army?

Victor Suvorov (Rezun)

This book overturns our ideas about the causes and consequences of the repressions of 1937-1939, when Stalin, preparing to conquer Europe under the cover of communist ideology, ruthlessly got rid of all those who could prevent the realization of his grandiose plans. Victor Suvorov convincingly shows that Stalin's purge of the top command staff of the Red Army was not the result of a conspiracy or a power struggle between influential clans in the country's leadership, nor a consequence of the leader's paranoia, but the next stage of subduing the Soviet Union's punitive machine and restoring order in the armed forces, which made the Red Army much more combat-ready, which ultimately made it possible to win the war with Germany.

Victor Suvorov dispels numerous myths about Stalin's repressions, which for decades were created and spread by Soviet propaganda, politicians and historians in Russia and abroad, falsifying the history of key events of the first half of the twentieth century to hide the true role of the USSR in unleashing World War II.

The new, supplemented and revised edition of the book includes more than 60 photographs, including unique images from Russian and foreign archives, published in Russia for the first time.

VICTOR SUVOROV

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Dedicated to my father

IN THE MEETING.

Sobering

B n the first days of February 1945, the Red Army troops reached the Oder, forced it and captured bridgeheads on the western bank. There were 60 kilometers to Berlin. For the last rush forward it was necessary to pull up the rear, to bring hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition, spare parts, fuel and lubricants and food; it was necessary to replenish the troops, to move command posts closer to the front, to deploy new communication centers, supply bases, airfields, to relocate aviation, to restore bridges, roads, communication lines in the rear, to reshim the gauge of the main railways to a wide Soviet standard, in order to supply goods without transshipment. And it was also necessary to protect themselves from a blow from the flank - to defeat the grouping of German troops in Pomerania, using for this purpose the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, the 3rd Strike Army, the 19th, 47th, 49th, 61st, 65th and 70th Panzer Army. And this, in turn, required replenishment of these formations with personnel right in the course of hostilities, deployment of the rear without any pause following the advancing troops. All this was done clearly, quickly, decisively and courageously, and it was clear that the end of the war was near and its outcome was long predetermined.

What were the top leaders of Germany thinking in these last months, weeks and days of the war? What were Hitler and his henchmen Goebbels, Goering, Himmler, Bormann thinking about? Undoubtedly they were thinking again and again about the war from its very first day and everything that preceded the war, and each was surely looking for that fatal mistake that finally led to the defeat of the Third Reich. We know what they were thinking thanks to the fact that Goebbels kept a diary, and part of that diary did not fall into the hands of those with clean hands, hot hearts and cold heads. Almost everything that got into those clean hands did,

has disappeared into inaccessible vaults and may be discovered in two or three hundred years. But what ended up in the hands of the Germans, British and Americans was published in the West. For obvious reasons, we, the Soviet

people, were forbidden to read such things. Goebbels' diaries - neither those that fell into the hands of our competent authorities, nor those that were published in the West - were not published in the Soviet Union. It was necessary to wait for the collapse of Soviet power to make these testimonies available to our people for a short time: in the 1990s, some of Goebbels' diaries were published in Russia (Goebbels Joseph. Diaries of 1945. The Last Writings. Smolensk: Rusich, 1993)^[1].

Goebbels did not intend to publish his diary entries. That is the value of his notes. On the air, the propaganda minister of the Third Reich talked about one thing, but in his diary he wrote about something else. The value of the diaries and that Goebbels in the last months, weeks and days of the Third Reich advanced to the second place after Hitler. In the final stage Hitler removed many from power: shot, removed from office, expelled from the party, sent on vacation. Many themselves cheated Hitler, but Goebbels stayed with him to the end. In his will, signed at 4 a.m. on April 29, 1945, Hitler appointed Goebbels as Chancellor of Germany in his place. Goebbels was the only time he disobeyed his Führer by not accepting the post of Chancellor. He followed the Führer to his death and shared his fate: he killed his children and committed suicide with his wife. Goebbels is the most important witness to the collapse of the Third Reich; none of the other leaders of Nazi Germany in those days was so close to Hitler.

The entries in Goebbels' last diaries begin on February 28, 1945, and end on April 10. The ignominious end of the Third Reich was approaching. Until the very last moment Goebbels had believed in Germany's victory and fought for it. What was his greatest concern? The shortage of tanks, guns, airplanes? The advance of the Red Army? The shortage of metal, coal, oil, electricity? The dire food situation? A shortage of bread? Maybe a shortage of shells, mines and ammunition? Constant aerial bombardment?

Of course, all this worried Goebbels. All this he saw, knew, took measures, recorded in his diary. But most of all Goebbels was disturbed, worried, irritated and maddened by the weakness of the top leadership of the German army and state. In one of the first diary entries of that period Goebbels, referring primarily to Goering, wrote that the fools and some puffed-up veils covered with orders should not be involved in the conduct of the war and they should be eliminated.

But it's not just Goering we're talking about here. Goering is an example. It is about leaders like Göring, "decorated" (i.e. very authoritative), who

turned out to be fools. As luck would have it, this quality manifested itself at the very end of the war, at the curtain, at the moment when the fate of the empire and tens of millions of its subjects was at stake. And Goebbels' words resounded with the dream of purifying the army: deserving fools must be eliminated!

Ah, it was too late for Herr Goebbels to think of purification. It should have been done earlier.

The main leitmotif of Goebbels' diary entries is that Hitler has no military leaders. In the entry of March 3, 1945 Goebbels laments that Hitler cannot rely on his military advisers: they have so often deceived and failed him that now he must deal with almost every army unit.

How wild it all sounds to us! Would anyone dare to deceive Comrade Stalin!

And another thing: if the Führer (leader) does everything himself, then he is not a Führer. The art of a leader, commander, commander, commander, leader, leader, Fuhrer is to find such assistants on whom one can rely. By the way, it was because of errors in the selection and deployment of personnel in his time lost power Napoleon Bonaparte. Once he sorrowfully exclaimed: "In my absence, only foolishness is going on!" And who is to blame? His own fault: picked himself such marshals who are not capable of leading themselves. In the presence of Bonaparte they are geniuses, but in the absence of ... Here and Hitler was in a situation where there was no one to entrust the leadership of the troops, rely on no one, the order to enter the battle almost every company Fuhrer has to give personally.

For decades, Soviet propaganda has been hammering into our livers like a stake in the liver: Stalin decapitated his army and was left alone without smart generals. And you, comrade propagandists, look at Hitler! There was always enough smart generals in Germany. Hitler's task as a leader of the state and armed forces was not to command each group of armies, each army, corps (and there are dozens of them), division (hundreds of them), regiment (thousands of them), battalion and company (tens of thousands of them), but to choose smart, competent and brave among German commanders in peacetime, and then in the course of the war to elevate the worthy and remove from power those who did not live up to expectations.

Hitler failed in his duties. While everything was going fine, around him hoards of brilliant commanders, but where did these geniuses go when Germany was in crisis? Here you have a truly decapitated army: the

commander-in-chief trusts no one, does everything himself, his strategy has already brought the country to the brink of the abyss, but if you allow someone else to do things, it will be even worse.

Goebbels writes like this: there is talent, only it has to be identified. We are a couple of months away from total collapse, or even less. Isn't it too late to wake up? They fought the whole war, and now they remembered that it would be good to look for smart generals. Goebbels is in a hurry, and Hitler himself is not in a hurry to change the leaders who have proven to be completely unsuitable. On the same day, March 3, 1945, Goebbels writes that the Gauleiter ^[2]in despair at the Führer's indecision in the most important personnel issues, and they convincingly ask him, Goebbels, to encourage the Führer to make changes at least in the leadership of military aviation and in the leadership of German foreign policy. And Goebbels also writes that the Wehrmacht High Command and the General Command of the Land Forces ordered apartments in Thuringia to house their apparatus of 54 thousand (!) people. How is it even possible to command with such a huge apparatus?

And that was not all. In addition to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) and the General Command of Land Forces (OKH) in Berlin was the General Command of the Fleet (OKM) and Goering's department, the General Command of the Air Force (OKL). There, too, employed many thousands of military bureaucrats. In addition, their own bureaucracy was in the SS, Gestapo and many other organizations. So, Hitler commands himself, not trusting anyone, and he only in the OKV and in the OKH sit 54 thousand idlers in axelbands, in pants with general's stripes. What did these idlers do?

In notes made between March 5 and March 8, 1945 Goebbels regrets that Hitler cannot prevail over the General Staff, that the officers of the military conscription offices give the impression of completely incapable and tired old men (Goebbels is surprised that such types were in charge of conscription throughout the war), that the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, Keitel, instead of standing to the death, defending the country, ordered to keep 110 trains ready to evacuate from Berlin officers of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the General Command of the Army. Goebbels believed that the only hope for Germany at that moment remained Himmler, otherwise the situation was hopeless. Hitler gives orders himself, but between the commander and subordinates must be two-way communication. The commander can give orders appropriate to the situation

only if he knows the situation. But can every commander of a corps, division, brigade, regiment, battalion, and so on get-there-do-get-there-dial-dial-dial to his Führer and report the situation? Is it possible?

March 8 Goebbels asks Hitler why he does not give orders on some important matters of warfare, and the Führer admits that it is of little use - even when he gives clear orders, their implementation is constantly halted by covert sabotage.

That's the difference! We used to think of ourselves as slackers. That's right! Yes, we are slackers! But can we imagine a situation when someone did not follow the orders of Comrade Stalin? In the most difficult time, in the critical and supercritical moments of the war, when Hitler's troops stood at the gates of Moscow, when Moscow could well fall, any orders of Stalin were still unconditionally obeyed. I repeat: any! And we consider the Germans to be the most disciplined nation. Well, not exactly disciplined, but pedantic. And here's the situation: nobody he doesn't follow Hitler's orders. He doesn't even give them, knowing full well that no one will follow them anyway.

In war, you need bright heads at the very top of power and unquestionable discipline at all lower ranks. That was the difference between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht: the Germans had discipline problems at the end of the war. They had no order. Each general did what he liked, without obeying the supreme authority. Goebbels writes that Hitler intends to deal with the growing insubordination of the generals by creating flying tribunals under General Hübner, whose task will be to immediately investigate any insubordination in the Wehrmacht command, try and execute the guilty according to wartime law. (Intended! The war has already been lost, and Hitler's bringing order to the top leadership of the armed forces has not yet progressed beyond intentions.) Goebbels remarks that Hitler is still not getting to the root of the problem and that a purge of the top brass of the Wehrmacht should have been carried out.

That's right: there should have been a purge of the top of the Wehrmacht! That's right. But it's too late. It was necessary to remove a hundred or two generals from the leadership before the war, then the rest at the critical moment would not plunge the German army into the abyss of anarchy. You can't win without discipline. The order of the superior is the law for the subordinate! That's what the German army didn't have, that's where they were weak. And Hitler is good! This is really an unprecedented achievement: to

drive the most disciplined army in the world in a situation where the generals do not follow the orders of the supreme authority.

How does Hitler react to this initiative Goebbels? Hitler objects: he does not have a man who can lead the ground forces, and if you appoint Himmler to this post, the catastrophe would be even greater than the current one.

The National Socialists have had enough. A new commander of the land forces is needed, but the candidates for generals and field marshals are not even discussed. There is only one name, and it is not a military man, not a general and not a field marshal, it is Reichsführer SS Himmler, Oberpalach, head of all executioners and head of all death camps, he has no military merits. But he should not be appointed, for it will be even worse.

In diary entries made between March 13 and March 30, 1945, Goebbels paints a discouraging picture of the complete decay of the German army: The Führer has too few authoritative military advisers; the German generals give a depressing impression of a collection of tired people; the generals sent to the front are of no use; there are many instructions, but not enough energetic people; the army needs radical reform from top to bottom (we will see below what was meant by the word "reform"); the Gauleiter is too old and helpless, at the age of 60 to 70 they are no longer able to cope with their duties; Hitler has gathered around him only weak-willed people on whom he cannot rely in a critical moment; Keitel and Jodl are so tired that in a difficult situation they are no longer capable of any really big decisions; Hitler sleeps little because he has no assistants who would take on the bulk of the rough work; Guderian had to be sent on leave, because he became a complete hysteric and shaking neurasthenic

Goebbels wrote nothing about the navy - there is no navy anymore. And in the air force - complete decay. In notes made from March 5 to 28, 1945, Goebbels notes that the German Air Force is not worth a penny, that military aviation has fallen into complete disrepair and has become a disgrace to the state, that the leadership of military aviation is corrupt and can no longer perform their tasks, because corruption and disorganization here have reached unbelievable proportions, that Goering is completely incompetent and talentless, but it is impossible to find a successor.

Who is to blame for this? Goebbels answers this question as well. He testifies that Hitler, considering Goering guilty of the poor state of aviation, nevertheless can not dare to address the question of the Reichsmarshal himself, and his accusations do not entail any conclusions. Goebbels writes

that Hitler is inclined to some extent to justify Goering: he, according to him, is not technically literate enough to be able to discern in time the trends in the development of aviation technology, in addition, Goering's staff shamelessly deceives and him and Hitler himself, - for example, with regard to the speed of new fighters, slipping absolutely incorrect figures. But now, Goebbels writes, the Führer will severely punish every lie in the most important military matters, now he will mercilessly interfere in all matters and even in organizational matters of the Air Force.

You don't know what to laugh about. The end of World War II, the one with air superiority wins. Germany lost the air war. The reason: superbly trained air force with experienced and brave personnel, brilliant German aircraft designers, exemplary aviation industry, staffed by talented engineers and craftsmen of the highest class, and above them - semi-literate soldier Goering. Hitler realized that Goering was "not technically literate enough" at a time when he and his empire had only one month to live. But even after realizing that Goering was unfit for his position, Hitler did nothing to remedy the situation. On the contrary, Goering's technical illiteracy serves as justification and defense in the eyes of the Führer. Hitler knows that the Air Force Headquarters is deceiving both Goering and Hitler himself, that is, it is engaged in the most usual eyewash, scattering nonsense, spreading bullshit, noodles, but this is not an accusation against Goering, but an excuse: he, poor man, is deceived by his own headquarters. Eh, if Comrade Stalin not only found out, but simply suspected that someone is fiddling with his brain ...

In the light of these notes of Hitler's propaganda minister, it would be necessary to reconsider the statements of Hitler's air force headquarters about the brilliant organization of the German air force. Goebbels himself, the greatest (after Lenin) deceiver of the 20th century, informs us that the headquarters of the German Air Force lies without remorse.

And so Adolf Hitler threatens: I'll get you, cheaters, I'll get you....

That's the difference: Stalin never threatened anyone. I repeat: *never threatened anyone*. Stalin followed the rule: forgive or kill the guilty. A threat is a manifestation of stupidity, weakness and powerlessness. It's the offended who threaten. This is what the Fuhrer seems to have been doing: hiding in a concrete casemate, clenching bony fists and spitting saliva: now he will be the cruelest way ... Hitler was at the in power for 12 years. His time is up. The clock struck 12 times. And he got up and started to clean up his act.

Hitler himself is to blame for the collapse of aviation. He was personally responsible for the fact that he put at the head of the Luftwaffe a half-illiterate fool with orders, and for the fact that he kept Goering in this position until the very last day. Exactly until the last day: on April 29, 1945, Hitler wrote his political will and the next day committed suicide. So, in his political will, he removed Goering from all posts, deprived him of ranks and awards, and expelled him from the party.

But since Hitler reached the last day, he was responsible for everything that went on in aviation. Moreover, he was fully responsible for everything that went on in the ground forces. The chain of command was as follows: at the very top - the Fuhrer of the German people Adolf Hitler. The Fuhrer was subordinated to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. He was also Adolf Hitler. And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the ground forces. And this latter was the same Adolf Hitler.

Here is something else from Goebbels' diaries about how Hitler commanded. On March 15, 1945 Goebbels writes that the Führer should not have made long speeches to his staff, but should have given short orders and then demanded with ferocity that those orders be carried out. March 28, he admits that Hitler is usually close to the truth in his judgments, but at the same time rarely draws the right conclusions from this, with the impression that Hitler is hovering in the clouds.

And when Goebbels wrote about 54 thousand idlers in the OKW and OKH, it is a pebble in Hitler's garden. Who's the commander? Hitler himself. He personally headed both OKW and OKH. And no one dared invade his fiefdom. He's the one who personally created the bureaucratic bureaucratic generals.

All the entries of that time in Goebbels' diary - about the same thing: extremely confused subordination in the Wehrmacht, the party has no leadership, from Bormann again comes a huge number of instructions and orders, in Germany there is no strong hand. Goebbels' general conclusion is as follows: of course there are talented commanders in Germany, but no one looked for them in his time, and where to find them now?

One Goebbels is glad: the Anglo-Americans, in his opinion, proved to be exceptionally barren and inflexible in achieving their military goals, they know nothing about military psychology or military management (entry of March 20, 1945).

So what did Goebbels think of Stalin? Goebbels called Stalin a realist to the bone, who treats Roosevelt and Churchill^[3]-like silly boys (entries of March 22 and April 4). Goebbels looked at Stalin with envy and, it seems to me, with adoration. Preparation for war is composed of many elements. The most important of them - the purification of the top leadership of the country from the fools, dullards, scoundrels and scoundrels. Stalin dealt with this issue seriously, although not enough. Stalin partially cleansed the command staff of his army. And here Goebbels on the eve of defeat in the war suddenly realizes that Stalin in 1937 was right. And Hitler...

Sobering came too late. On March 16, 1945, Goebbels wrote in his diary that Soviet marshals and generals tend to be very young (almost all of them under 50), extremely energetic, and have good popular leaven. In a later entry, he admitted that German generals are too old and unable to compete with Soviet military commanders, a view fully shared by Hitler. The entry concludes with a statement about the colossal superiority of the Soviet generalship.

This record is the highest praise for Stalin's actions in 1937- 1938.

They're singing, my lovebirds. There were other songs before.

At a meeting on December 5, 1940 (I quote from the service diary of Colonel-General Franz Galder) Hitler said that the Russian man is inferior and that the Red Army has no real commanders (Galder F. Military Diary. Vol. 2. M.: Voenizdat, 1969. P. 282). And now it turns out that the Red Army has such commanders, which Hitler does not have.

On January 16, 1941, Hitler said the following to his generals about Soviet military commanders: "*The command is initiative-less. It lacks breadth of thought*" (ibid. P. 319). It turned out to be quite enough.

Sometimes sobering up occurred in a shorter period of time. On March 5, 1945, Goebbels wrote in his diary that Stalin had a number of outstanding military commanders, but not a single brilliant strategist, because if he had one, then the Soviet strike would have been carried out, for example, not on the Baranov bridgehead, and in Hungary, and if Germany was deprived of Hungarian and Austrian oil, then ... Here Goebbels was wrong. On the very day, March 5, 1945, when Goebbels wrote that Stalin did not have a single brilliant strategist, two Marshals of the Soviet Union, Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, completed preparations for an offensive operation, the main purpose of

which was to deprive Germany of its last sources of oil in Hungary and Austria.

And let us not think that the two Marshals of the Soviet Union simultaneously came up with the idea of such an operation. Not at all. Just above them stood another Marshal of the Soviet Union - Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. The idea to cut off the enemy from sources of oil was officially expressed by Stalin long ago. In his speech at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (the so-called Political Report of the Central Committee to the XV Congress) on December 3, 1927, Stalin said: "*Whoever has an advantage in the matter of oil has a chance of victory in the coming war*" (Stalin I. V. Essays. Moscow: OGIZ, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1947. T. 10. C. 277). Stalin realized long before the war that it was necessary to cut off Romania from Germany, and then Hungary and Austria. This is what his marshals were busy in early March 1945.

To repel the Soviet offensive in Hungary, the best German units were thrown in - the 6th SS Panzer Army, armed with the most powerful tanks. At its head was the best German tanker at that time, Josef Dietrich, Knight's Cross with diamonds. As part of the strike group - the elite unit "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", that is, Hitler's personal SS division: silver skulls on black caps with white edging, on the sleeves of the black cloth - silver patch with the name of the Fuhrer.

Goebbels recorded these events in Hungary with German pedantry in his diary: on the Hungarian section of the front the situation is critical, the SS troops have shown themselves very badly - not only failed to carry out the offensive, but also retreated, and partly even scattered, and as a result Himmler by flew to Hungary on Hitler's orders to take chevrons from SS units.

I read this with schadenfreude: those whom the Nazis considered "inferior" and "inferior race", the "superior race" got their faces kicked in! And if the blow to Hungary is a manifestation of strategic genius, then the genius of Comrade Stalin was manifested - at the right moment in the right place. A brilliant plan at the top - and unquestioning obedience at all lower levels. The operation is magnificent both in conception and in execution.

And all because Stalin brought in the army and the state of such order, which envied not only Goebbels, but also Hitler himself.

In a diary entry of March 5, 1945 Goebbels bitterly acknowledged that

Stalin had made timely reforms in the leadership of the Red Army and now enjoys their fruits, while Hitler was already late in carrying out similar reforms in the leadership of the Wehrmacht, the need for which became so obvious after a series of defeats.

By reforms both Goebbels and Hitler understood the purification of the army by firing squads. On March 28, 1945 Goebbels wrote in his diary an interesting remark that in 1934, in his opinion, the top leadership of Germany overlooked the need to reform the armed forces of the country, although the opportunity for this was - Goebbels was convinced, that the massacre by Hitler and his entourage of the SA ^[4]storm troopers led by Ernst Röhm on June 30, 1934 (the so-called "Night of the Long Knives") was the right moment to purify the Reichswehr, but that this moment, due to a certain coincidence, was not used by Hitler.

Even Hitler and Goebbels realized that Stalin acted correctly in 1937-1938, and our agitators today say: beheaded, beheaded, beheaded, tragedy, tragedy....

Isn't it time for us to reflect on one strange circumstance? Before the war, Stalin destroyed brilliant commanders, but ended the war with an indestructible army and a whole cohort of outstanding generals and marshals, including Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky, Dragunsky, Malinovsky, Govorov, Zhadov, Konev, Vatutin, Chernyakhovsky, Novikov, Kuznetsov, Malinin, Badanov, Bogdanov, Antonov, Meretskov, Kreiser, Rotmistrov, Rybalko, Lelyushenko, Katukov, Berzarin, Pukhov, Purkaev, Golovanov and many others - you can't list them all!

And Hitler did not decapitate his army, but finished the war with a defeated state, with a defeated and "headless" army. So why hundreds of scientific works, books and articles have been written about the "beheaded" Red Army, and nobody writes about Hitler's "headless" army?

I would like to know why everyone criticizes Stalin's personnel policy, but no one criticizes Hitler's personnel policy. But the tragedy of the German army is obvious, and it consisted in the fact that Hitler did not prepare for the war, did not shoot hundreds of generals before the war, lost the war and was forced to shoot himself.

The greatness or insignificance of strategists is judged by the results of the war. So let us judge by the final results, let us count chickens in the fall!

It's good to have trump cards at the beginning of the game. But it's better at the end. Let's assess the situation. At Stalin by the end of the war - a pleiad of

outstanding and even brilliant commanders, Hitler - no one. So who is smarter? Isn't it time to put the stupid cap on the one who really deserved it?

We are used to assessing the results of Stalin's personnel policy purely emotionally. We are accustomed to thinking the way a drunkard thinks, driven by feeling rather than reason. But is it not time to take a sober look at the events of 1937?

GLAVA 1.

Another reason

During mobilization, practically the entire command staff of the Armed Forces is promoted.
Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky

1

We were taught to think in stamps. For each problem, Soviet ideologists compiled a program of short, as if "shooting" phrases. These phrases-theses were loaded into our heads. We were supposed to think the way convicts walked in a column - uniformly. A step to the side was considered an escape: the convoy would shoot without warning.

A set of "hard truths" about the purification of the Red Army in 1937-1938 was worked out under Khrushchev and firmly hammered into our heads. It looked like this:

1. Tukhachevsky was a great commander.
2. Tukhachevsky foresaw war with Germany as early as 1935 and warned of it.
3. Tukhachevsky insisted on rearming the army, and stupid Stalin and his henchman Voroshilov rejected Tukhachevsky's proposals without understanding or appreciating them.
4. Blucher, Yakir, Uborevich, Putna, Alksnis, Vatsetis, Dybenko and other military commanders destroyed by Stalin were outstanding commanders. No conspiracy, of course, they did not plot.
5. Hitler's intelligence decided to decapitate the Red Army on the eve of the war, to eliminate Tukhachevsky and other prominent commanders. The Germans planted the document, and the morbidly suspicious Stalin believed the forgery.
6. The purge of the army took catastrophic proportions. Of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union, three were shot. Of the five commanders of the 1st rank - five. Of the two army commissars of the 1st rank - both of them. Of the twelve commanders of the 2nd rank - twelve. И

and so on. A total of forty thousand talented commanders were exterminated.

7. Stalin killed the geniuses and left the fools behind. The defeat of the Red Army in 1941 is a direct consequence of the purges of 1937-1938. In 1941, because of the purges, Soviet commanders were overwhelmingly inexperienced, for they had been in their posts for less than a year....

In this book we will examine all of these theses and see that they are completely untenable.

2

Walter Schellenberg, Hitler's underhanded spy, in his memoirs, admired the German secret services: how clever we were, how clever we were, what operations we were pulling off! Stalin himself was tricked, deceived, fooled! The Red Army was decapitated by Stalin's hands without any war!

When Hitlerites told amazing stories about planted documents, no one contradicted them. The fictions of Hitler's socialists are unworthy of a reply. The trouble is that this Hitlerian nonsense was picked up, repeated and repeatedly amplified by Soviet propaganda. And the West picked it up. And the myth about the decapitated Red Army went around the world. And many people thoughtlessly retell it. And our agitators sing along: so it was, Stalin was terribly stupid, geniuses did not appreciate. Advisor to the President of Russia, Colonel General DA Volkogonov explains the reason for the elimination of Marshal of the Soviet Union Blucher: it was a "strong military commander", he possessed "analytical mind". To this, General Volkogonov adds: "And Stalin hardly needed such people." (Volkogonov DA Triumph and Tragedy. MOSCOW: APN, 1989. Book one. CH. 2. P. 270).

From the statement of General Volkogonov unambiguously follows that Stalin was not a very smart man and did not understand anything about strategy. If he had understood, he would have done the opposite: he shot the fools and saved the geniuses. General Volkogonov has many books and publications about this: Stalin decapitated the army, Stalin didn't need thinking people, he liked fools more.

I think that such statements by Volkogonov and other historians are insulting to our people and army. The stupid cap that they try to put on Stalin, in the end we all have to wear, born under Stalin and after. I start talking about the war with any foreigner, and he will answer me: your leaders were idiots - they didn't appreciate geniuses, they were paranoid - they believed the German fake! Stories about exterminated geniuses and idiots left at the head of the army distort our history, cross out all the feats, sacrifices and sufferings

of the people. What to talk about, if it is considered that at the head of the state and the army stood the cretin Stalin, who did not need intelligent commanders?

Talking about ruined strategists, stupid Stalin and his mentally inferior associates is in a sense insulting to the peoples of Central Europe. It turns out that Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany submitted to fools who did not understand anything about strategy. But China, Mongolia, and North Korea fell under the influence of the Soviet Union.

And the Soviet propagandists did not stop: Stalin ruined the great strategists... exsanguinated... decapitated... in 1941 the commanders held their posts for less than a year....

And then one day I couldn't take it anymore.

3

I pick up the telephone receiver. I call Russian presidential advisor, doctor of historical sciences and doctor of philosophical sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, deputy of the State Duma, former deputy head of the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army (GlavPUR) and head of the Special Propaganda Directorate of GlavPUR, former head of the Institute of Military History (our military history also passed through the line of special propaganda), professor, Colonel-General Dmitry Antonovich Volkogonov. I introduce myself:

- An agent of all imperialist intelligence, an enemy of the human race, Viktor Suvorov, aka Rezun. Hello, Dmitri Antonovich!

- Hello," he says. - Are you going to overthrow me again?

- Again, Dmitri Antonovich. Here you wrote a book about how Stalin exterminated the color of the top command staff of the Red Army. But that didn't happen.

- How could it not be? And Tukhachevsky? And Yakir?

- They were destroyed by Stalin, only they were not the color of the Red Army.

- Why is that?

- They were not," I answered, "because they could not be.

He gently reminds me that he has access to all the secrets of the former Soviet Union. He was allowed to access all the special files of the Politburo. He politely asks me if I have access to the special folders, to the archives of

Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Molotov.

I thought about it, thought about it, thought about it, thought about it, looked up at the ceiling, said "uh-uh," exhaled deeply, and confessed:

- I don't have access to Politburo secrets.

- What are you going to use, sir? The usual intelligence logic?

- Let's dispense with intelligence logic. Ordinary peasant logic will suffice in this case.

- And logic can be used to refute historical facts and top secret archival documents?

- There is no need to refute facts and documents. But the conclusions... You, Dmytro Antonovich, could have misunderstood what was written, misinterpreted it.....

Something creaked. It squeaked in Moscow, and I got skewered in Bristol. One, zero.

I must give Dmitry Antonovich his due. He was a polite man. He and I got into a fight once on the newspaper pages. There was cardinal disagreement with my views in his articles, but there was no anger. There was also a willingness to listen to the enemy. I called him because I was sure that he might not agree with me, but he would listen for sure.

- Speak up," he says, "I'm listening.

And I've outlined it. The legend of the "decapitated" army, I say, consists of seven theses. Let's start with the last one, the seventh. This thesis says that by the beginning of the war, because of Stalin's purges, the Soviets the commanders didn't have time to gain experience because they'd been in their positions for less than a year. Right?

- So," he replies.

- Well, that's fine. I accept your point of view, Dmitri Antonovich. For five minutes.

4

To begin with, I agreed with Dmitry Antonovich. It's a psychological technique: to agree. As if. And then you have to dance from the opponent's position. So let's say that Dmitri Antonovich Volkogonov is one hundred percent right. Two hundred. Three hundred. Let's even imagine that Stalin in the summer of 1937, shot all the commanders. Every single one of them. From platoon leaders to Marshals of the Soviet Union. Dumped them all into abandoned quarries and machine-gunned them. And in their place he

appointed new commanders. A complete change of command staff. What should have happened in this situation? And here's what: by the summer of 1941, all newly appointed commanders should have had four years of experience.

How did it happen that the change took place in 1937, and by 1941 the overwhelming number of commanders suddenly had less than a year's experience in their positions?

I said it, and my phone squeaked again. Two - zero. But I had already foreseen this squeak - I pulled away from the receiver, recoiled. It creaked like iron on glass, but General Volkogonov does not give up: they shot not only in 1937, but also in 1938.

I agree with that, too. Totally. One hundred percent. Two hundred and three hundred. Let's assume that all the commanders appointed in 1937, the next year they also drove them into the quarries and machine-gunned them. Long bursts. And they put the third squad in command. In this case, the third staff, promoted in 1938, by the summer of 1941 should have three years of experience. With a complete change of command, most of the commanders could not grow - there was nowhere to grow. It is clear, someone for three years got drunk, someone drowned in the river. A hundred, another, third were shot in 1939, 1940, in the first half of 1941. There may have been reshuffles, reshuffles. But still the majority must remain in their places. How did it happen that the change of lineups was in 1937-1938, and the new ones have

of commanders three or four years after a change in command do not have one year of tenure?

5

There is another way to look at this problem. We have a big army. And 40 thousand for us is not very much. The number of officers in the Red Army as of February 1937 is known: 206 thousand people. The source - a member of the Politburo, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, a top secret speech at the February-March (1937) plenum of the Central Committee. The transcript was published in the "Military History Journal" (1993. No. 1. P. 60-63).

Let's say that out of 206,000, 40,000 were shot. This is less than 20 percent. The same question remains, but it can be put in a different form: how could it happen that less than 20 percent of the senior staff were shot, and in

1941 most commanders had not even one year of service in their position?

6

- So what is it? - There was interest in the general's voice, the interest of a professional, the interest of a researcher. Notes of dislike extinguished, all personal grudges forgotten, and now Colonel-General Volkogonov is looking for an answer to the question of why the Red Army commanders in 1941 did not gain a year of experience in their posts, if the purification was three or four years before the German invasion. I roused Dmitri Antonovich. And then I convinced him. If I cannot convince anyone else, I am still calm, for I confused one man with my questions, and having confused him, I prompted another decision, which he made. I am proud of that. I succeeded in persuading someone who had been allowed access to all the secrets of Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky, to the special files of the Politburo.

You can change anyone's mind, if there are examples for comparison, because everything is known in comparison. To better understand the situation, we must compare the position of the Red Army command staff... With what? At least with the situation of the command staff of Hitler's Wehrmacht. After all, the USSR and Germany had so much in common in those years. We won the socialist revolution. Lenin was a socialist. И

Hitler is a socialist. And let's not call the Nazis brown. Their shirts were brown, but the banner was red. If Lenin wore a white shirt, we won't classify him in the White camp. And Trotsky wore a gray-green coat. We don't call him gray-green. Lenin, Hitler, Bukharin, Himmler, Trotsky acted under the red banner, that's why all of them should be called red.

Calling someone red-brown is wrong. What is the fashion: to call some people by the color of their banner, others by the color of their clothes? Wouldn't it be simpler to call both by the color of their bloody ideology? If we wish to emphasize that we mean both breeds of socialists, why not call them by the names of their founding fathers? Socialist-Leninists, Socialist-Hitlerites - by this everything is expressed. The ideology of the Leninists is similar to that of the Hitlerites. And the goals are the same.

They believed that their socialism was correct and ours was distorted, but we also believed the same: ours was correct and theirs was deviant. They built everything on hatred. And so do we. Only their hatred was racial and ours was class-based. They thought they were the superior race, and we thought we were the superior class. What's the difference? And let us not forget that

Hitler's ideological father was Gottfried Feder, who called for world revolution under the very familiar slogan: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"

It will be argued: Hitler did not always remain faithful to Marx's dogmas and did not follow Marx in everything. He deviated.

I agree. But was Marx himself always faithful to his dogma? Did Marx follow his own teachings in everything? Didn't Marx contradict himself? Did he not, at the end of his life, completely deny his teachings? "I am no longer a Marxist!" - Didn't Marx say that?

We will talk about ideology in the future. Now we are only talking about an army with such a similar strategy, with such a similar red banner, with such familiar goals. What was the situation with the command staff of the Wehrmacht on the eve of World War II and in its first period before the attack on the Soviet Union?

The situation was the same as ours, only worse. The official date of the beginning of the Second World War is September 1, 1939. On that day, Wehrmacht forces entered Poland. The operation involved five armies, organized into two groups: "South" and "North". All commanders German armies and groups of armies, all their deputies and chiefs of staff with their deputies had less than a year's experience in their positions. I will say more - less than a month. If this is not enough, I will add - less than ten days.

Curious readers, pick up the biography of any notable Hitler general and check it out.

In May 1940, the invasion of France. Again, in the vast majority of cases, the top commanders and in general the entire Wehrmacht officer corps involved in the invasion had been in their posts for no more than a year.

June 22, 1941 - the attack on the Soviet Union. And the picture is the same: again, not only generals, but also the majority of Wehrmacht officers in their posts for no more than a year.

The Communists and Hitlerites taught us to laugh at ourselves. Noticing one's own faults is a commendable thing. But before laughing, why not turn your enlightened gaze to the enemy? Hitler missed such an important element of preparation for war, as the purification of the army from scoundrels and slackers, Hitler did not purify his army in those years, but his situation is the same as ours. So isn't it time to ask the question: why is it so?

And it's time to realize: it couldn't have been otherwise.

The defeat of the Red Army in the summer and fall of 1941 was the most grandiose and most shameful military disaster in the entire history of mankind. Never has any army in the world lost so many commanders and soldiers killed, wounded and captured, never abandoned on the battlefields of such a large number of the most modern weapons, military equipment, strategic reserves of fuel, food, ammunition, never surrendered to the enemy such a vast area inhabited by tens of millions of people, so many cities, villages, factories, mills, mines, power plants, railroads, bridges and stations, airfields and ports, forests, fields and rivers. And in such a short period of time.

The reason for the embarrassing defeat had to be explained.

Neither during the war, nor in the first years after the war, a clear explanation was found. A dozen years after the end of the war

the reason was finally invented. The explanation was as follows: in 1937-1938, by order of Stalin, thousands of Red Army commanders were killed, and in their place came others who did not have time to get into the business and get used to their new positions, because by the time of the German attack, many of them were in their positions for less than a year.

This explanation was favorably accepted not only by wise Soviet academicians, but also by their numerous foreign colleagues. Military historians in the United States, Great Britain and other countries wrote in their multi-volume studies on the war a simple and clear reason for the defeat of the Red Army: because of Stalin's terror, most commanders had been in their posts for less than a year.

Clarity is clarified, the question is over. Meanwhile, this explanation is designed for fools.

Let us understand. The most important conspirators led by Tukhachevsky were arrested in May 1937 and shot on June 12. Those who were appointed to replace the removed strategists, by June 1941 should have already served four years in their new positions. Why, then, on the eve of the German attack most of the commanders of the Red Army were in their posts for less than a year?

The most massive repression of the Red Army commanders and superiors took place in 1938. Then the terror waned. It would seem that those who replaced those shot in 1938, by June 1941 should have three years of service in their new positions. But no! Most of those who were shot in 1938 had been arrested in the previous year, that is, the change took place as early as 1937.

But even if the mass change of commanders had taken place in the middle of 1938, then by the middle of 1941 the new commanders should have had three years of service in their positions. And the vast majority of Red Army commanders in the summer of 1941 had only a few months of service in their new positions. This is a historical fact, which is easy to verify: take the biography of any marshal or general, who in the early period of the war commanded a division, corps, army or front. Few of them had the length of service in their new positions

will be a year or so, more often than not it will be a few months or sometimes a couple of weeks.

What is the explanation for this situation?

Anything but the Stalinist purge, which happened long before Germany attacked the Soviet Union.

I realized it when I was a cadet in a military school. The case was like this. On March 31, 1967, the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky Rodion Yakovlevich, passed away. This was a man who, not unlike Zhukov, was really respected and loved by the entire officer corps of the Soviet Army. There had never been such a Minister of Defense in the country before and there was none afterwards.

The place of the Minister of Defense was vacated. First Deputy Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union Marshal Grechko A. A. Grechko was appointed to this position. A. A. Leaving for promotion, Marshal Grechko vacated the place of Deputy Minister of Defense. Army General I. I. Yakubovsky, commander of the troops of the Kiev Military District, was appointed to this position, and he was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

In Yakubovsky's place was appointed commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army Lieutenant General Kulikov VG, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel-General.

The first deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, Major General Govorov VL Govorov was appointed commander of this army, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General.

Then everything happened in a chain, like a queue on the stairs: the door on the landing opened, the first in the queue entered, and the whole queue moved after him. Everyone stepped one step higher: the commander of the 16th Guards Tank Division became the first deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, and his deputy received a division, the commander of the 47th Guards Tank Regiment became the deputy commander of the division.

And so - lower and lower. Somewhere at the very bottom, the platoon commander received a company, making room for a young lieutenant from a military school.

So I decided to count how many commanders got promoted after just one vacancy for Secretary of Defense opened up. Thirteen! One vacancy, but there were thirteen promotions.

In those very days, my entire company was preparing for exams in the history of military art. It must be said that the lion's share of the material we studied in this subject was the history of the Second World War. All our ideas about that war were based on two pillars.

One: our country has been hard at work preparing for war.

Second: our country's unpreparedness for war was appalling, scandalous, shameful.

Mountains of books have been written and thousands of dissertations have been defended to prove the first claim.

As many books have been written and as many dissertations defended to prove the second assertion.

The first statement did not contradict the second, and the second did not contradict the first. Read the works of Soviet historians: one chapter is about the persistent preparation for war, the next - about the blatant unpreparedness for it.

That's the way we were taught. One day a lecture about how we were preparing for war in a way that no one had ever prepared for war, and the next day a lecture about our shameful unpreparedness for war. On the third day - again about our readiness: how we prepared for war!

And here we are sitting and cramming the history of military art. And I come across a figure that I know, that I have met many times, that I repeated at seminars and exams: in the years before the war (according to the Soviet periodization - from September 1, 1939 to June 21, 1941), 125 new rifle divisions were formed in the USSR.

That's when it hit me!

If thirteen commanders and military commanders were promoted after the post of Minister of Defense was vacated, how many will be promoted if an entire division is formed?

On September 13, 1939, the Soviet Union approved the staff of the Rifle Division - 18,906 men, including one general and 1,349 officers.

So, imagine we're forming a new division. We take the deputy

commander from an existing division. He has been promoted and has left for his new duty station. His seat is vacated, and as a result, seven subordinate commanders

were promoted: the regiment commander became deputy division commander, the deputy regiment commander became regiment commander, and so on, up to the platoon commander, who became company commander, making room for a young graduate of a military school.

The new division commander has been taken care of. But he needs a deputy. In some existing regiment we take a promising commander and appoint him deputy commander of the new division. As he leaves for his new duty station, he pulls a chain of new appointments: in addition to him, we remove six commanders from their previous positions and promote them.

The new division needs a chief of staff. We take the deputy chief of staff from the existing division. Once again, a wild upward pull. It's like a draft.

But a new division doesn't just need a chief of staff. It needs a whole staff! Somewhere it is necessary to recruit commanders who will prepare the division's combat plans, manage intelligence, communications, sappers, repairmen, supply. And each of them, leaving for a new division, opens the way to promotion for three, four or five lower commanders.

There are five regiments in the new division. Each regiment needs regimental commanders and their deputies. We appoint promising commanders from existing units, and when they leave, they open up a chain of vacancies.

Each regiment has a headquarters. We staff these headquarters with promising commanders, while at their old duty stations their former colleagues move up the career ladder.

The new division has 21 battalions and an artillery division, both as part of the regiments and subordinate directly to the division command. Many commanders are needed to staff them.

The division has a hundred companies and artillery batteries. A platoon commander, going up a company, leaves one vacancy. A company commander moving up creates two vacancies, a deputy battalion commander creates three.

So: in order to staff one new rifle division with officers, we have to promote thousands of officers.

On January 1, 1939, the Red Army had 98 rifle divisions. In less than two years deployed another 125 divisions. What did we get? We got an incredible

personnel "pull". The entire command staff was promoted, and several times.

How do you manage new divisions? Every two or three divisions need a corps headquarters. The deputy commander of the existing corps is appointed commander of the newly created corps. He himself and the chain of promotions behind him - nine commanders. But he needs a deputy, chief of staff, chief of artillery. Each of them, moving up, opens the way for seven more commanders. And in each corps in addition to the commander and deputy - headquarters. In addition to two or three rifle divisions - two corps artillery regiments, communications battalion, sapper battalion, anti-aircraft artillery division.

In mid-June 1939, the Red Army had 25 rifle corps, and in mid-June 1941 it became 62.

But corps must also be managed. For this purpose, we form general armored armies. The deputy commander of the existing army is appointed commander of the newly created army. Count how many commanders have risen one step after that.

But an army commander also needs deputies and a staff. And all these are general and colonel positions. Behind everyone who has been promoted, other commanders step up, as if on a ladder. At the beginning of June 1939, the Soviet Union had two general armies, at the beginning of June 1941 - 28.

But that's not all. This is only new rifle divisions were 125. In 1940, 9 mechanized corps were formed, each with one motorized and two tank divisions. This was not enough for Stalin, and in the spring of 1941 formed another 20 such corps, with 40 tank and 20 motorized divisions. In the management of the corps - four general positions, and in each division another one. Only in these new corps opened 140 general vacancies. Let's estimate what kind of upward movement will follow each appointment to a general position.

But if these corps and divisions were formed in the spring of 1941, there is no way that all the officers in them could have been in their positions for more than a year.

And five airborne corps were also formed in the Soviet Union. And again in the spring of 1941.

And ten artillery brigades.

And 79 new air divisions.

In June 1939 the Red Army had 144 artillery regiments, in June 1941 there were already 900.

And then there are military schools. The position of the head of the school is general. The deputies are colonels. The school needs teachers and commanders - platoons, companies, battalions. The creation of military schools in the Soviet Union on the eve of the war - an explosive process. They were formed at an incredible pace. I talk about this in detail in the book "M-Day".

In order to staff the new schools, it was necessary to tear commanders out of their places and put them in new positions. But after each of them left, there was an open vacancy at their previous duty station and a new chain of upward transfers, some shorter, some longer.

Mobilization deployment of the Red Army before the liberation march to Europe - this is the real reason that on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, almost all Red Army commanders were in their positions for less than a year. Stalin's purges had nothing to do with it. The defeat in the summer-autumn of 1941 did not happen at all because of Stalin's purge of the army.

The real reason was that the Red Army was purposefully preparing for war.

Only this goal had nothing to do with the defense of the country.

GLAVA 2.

On Stalin's top ten strategists

All sorts of hound writers abroad, for reasons understandable to you and me, are trying to portray the case in such a way that because you and I have destroyed a lot of trash - Tukhachevskys, Gamarniks, Uborevichs and similar scum - we do not have a good command staff in the Red Army.

Komkor Grigory Stern. Speech at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) March 18, 1939

1

The highest military rank of the Red Army, since 1935 - Marshal of the Soviet Union. A little lower - Commander of the 1st rank.

We were told that in the top ten of the top military leadership of the Red Army there were five Marshals of the Soviet Union and five commanders of the 1st rank. Of the five Marshals, Stalin eliminated three, and of the five 1st rank commanders, he eliminated all five.

And we were also told that Stalin did not beat up just anyone, but the best: three marshals-geniuses - Tukhachevsky, Egorov and Blucher went under Stalin's axe, and two marshals-unclean - Voroshilov and Budyonny remained healthy.

At first glance, it's horrible.

On the second one, not so much.

Let's imagine that during the purge, not three Marshals of the Soviet Union died, but all five. Let's imagine that along with those three "geniuses" Stalin also shot two inept men, Voroshilov and Budyonny. Would it have made the army and the country better or worse? Would it have raised the combat effectiveness of the army or fallen?

I think she would. Who would object to that? I think that such a step Stalin would have strengthened the army, not weakened it. Therefore, the conclusion is that if Comrade Stalin would not limit himself to half measures, if he would not rest on his laurels, and would not rest on his laurels, but would show

If there were a little more determination and diligence in cleansing the army, the people, the country and the army itself would be better off.

And don't reproach me for bloodthirstiness - it's not me, it's statistics that

says: Comrade Stalin didn't shoot enough of them. Three shot marshals-geniuses - bad, and five shot marshals, of which two are talentless - better. Any objections?

By the way, Stalin was not as stupid as they paint him. Comrade Stalin also removed Voroshilov and Budyonny from power. Neither Voroshilov nor Budyonny before the war did not occupy positions that required experience, intelligence and knowledge. They no longer decided anything and had no influence on the course of events. So, in fact, before the war Stalin dismissed from power all five. And rightly so.

I agree, Stalin dismissed marshals in different ways: some - a bullet in the back of the head, others - to an honorable, but unpromising promotion. In the army about such a promotion say about such a promotion: *otfotbolyli* to the attic. In the variety of methods of limiting marshal power clearly manifested steely Stalinist logic. We will come back to it.

2

And of the second five, of the five commanders of the 1st rank, all five were shot. One hundred percent extermination. What a loss! What commanders they were! What strategists! Total statistics of the purge of the top ten - three marshals and five commanders of the 1st rank. Eight out of ten. Eighty percent!

Here I have to intervene and interrupt the bitter lament. I make a correction: in fact, in the first "ten" was not ten, but thirteen top commanders. There were really five marshals and eight commanders of the 1st rank. Five commanders of the 1st rank were shot, but three remained, safely survived the pre-war purification and in 1940 were promoted: all three became marshals. Their names: B. M. Shaposhnikov, G. I. Kulik, S. K. Timoshenko. These three did not fit into the theory of mass extermination of commanders of the 1st rank, so they were simply not included in the statistics. Therefore, they kind of escaped the attention of historians.

But when they are recalled, the stories of mass extermination lose their pristine freshness.

3

But the moans do not subside: of five all five, of five all five.... When such voices are heard, I calmly say to historians: well, you have never heard anything about Timoshenko, Kulik and Shaposhnikov, but do you remember

the names of those five executed commanders?

My reader, check yourself: close your eyes and mentally repeat the names of the five commanders of the 1st rank who fell victim to Stalin's lawlessness. The ranks of the five are the same, but they held different positions. It is desirable to name first the one who held a higher position in the Red Army. Did you remember them all? No? You can't?

Yeah, you can't remember them all at once. They used to beat it into our heads: five out of five! Five out of five! Five out of five! But the names of these magnificent five were never mentioned. Among Western historians I have not met a single one who would remember all five names. Many people shout about the tragedy of the Red Army, but no one went into the details.

For some reason, we don't like to go into details either. Two pro-Soviet historians, V. Rapoport and Y. Alekseev, wrote a book about the purification of the army (Treason against the Motherland. Essays on the History of the Red Army. London: OPI, 1989). The book was published abroad ostensibly as a daring dissent. There are over five hundred pages in the book. At the end is a list of exterminated geniuses. And in that list - only three commanders of the 1st rank. Not five out of five, but only three.

Our agitators already have inconsistencies at this level. There's a big difference: five were shot or only three. So how many were shot? Actually, five, but historians are uncomfortable calling them by their names. That's why they invented a trick: they name only those who were shot in 1937-1938, and those who were shot in 1939 and later - do not count.

Why is that? Logic suggests that we should name first of all those who were shot closer to the war, because it is harder to replace them - a new commander, who got to a high post, has less time to get used to his new position.

The whole pathos of the book by Rapoport and Alekseev is the following: not only in 1937-1938, some were shot in 1939, 1940 and even in 1941. If so, let's give names. No, say the learned comrades, we name only those who were shot before 1939.

These historians have announced to the whole world that the Red Army was supposedly beheaded. It would seem to be in their interest to name more names. The more they name, the more their legends will resemble the truth. It is especially important for them to name names from the highest circle of military leaders.

But they don't name names. They are embarrassed. They have something

to be ashamed of: the highest post in the magnificent five was occupied by Commander 1st rank Frinovsky Mikhail Petrovich. Do you know this strategist?

4

At the time of his arrest, M.P. Frinovsky held the high post of People's Commissar (i.e. Minister) of the USSR Navy. The rest of the five executed commanders of the 1st rank did not hold such responsible positions: one was Deputy Commissar of Commissars, three were district commanders.

Who is he, the naval commissar of the Navy, naval commander Frinovsky? Who is he, this innocent victim of horrifying lawlessness?

Mikhail Petrovich Frinovsky had a military rank, so it seemed to the uninitiated that he had something to do with the Red Army. But he was from another department. From the Lubyanka. He was a "friend of the people"⁵, a Chekist. Frinovsky's past is as gloomy as the past of the legendary hero of the Civil War, the robber and rapist Grigory Kotovsky.

Like Kotovsky, Frinovsky came from a criminal environment. His gangster-chekist career was long and full of extraordinary adventures. After the collapse of the Russian Empire in the power in general and in the punitive agencies in particular shoal rushed to the shoal of bums and swindlers. Frinovsky - hardly the most successful of them. Both friends and enemies, some maliciously and some affectionately and flatteringly, called him a pakhan. And he was proud of this nickname.

Frinovsky passed all rungs of the ladder in the punitive department and on October 16, 1936 became Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Yezhov. He was appointed, as well as

Yezhov, right on the eve of the purification and precisely in order to expose, arrest, torture, snatch confessions and shoot. The whole process of purification of the Communist Party, the Red Army and the iron ranks of the NKVD is on his revolutionary conscience.

Since April 15, 1937, that is, from the beginning of the operation to purify the army, Frinovsky became not just a deputy, but first deputy Yezhov and simultaneously head of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) NKVD USSR. In the chain of organizers and leaders of the purge, he was the fourth, after Stalin, Molotov and Yezhov. In 1937-1938, all the cases of

People's Commissars, marshals, commanders of the 1st and 2nd ranks, flag officers⁶, komkors, kommandives and kombrigs went directly through him. Frinovsky personally participated in arrests, interrogations, torture and shootings. Memories of him are strikingly monotonous: bandit face, bandit haircut, hands painted with blue pictures of bandit romance, bandit speech and bandit soul.

Comrade Frinovsky had fun in his life. And the further, the better he lived, the merrier his life became.

But it was his turn.

Soviet People's Commissar for Maritime Affairs, husband of Alexandra Kollontai, former member of the Revolutionary Military Council, who commanded the troops of various military districts in different years; Nikolai Krylenko, People's Commissar of Justice of the USSR, former Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army after the October Revolution of 1917 and member of the Military and Maritime Affairs Committee of the first Council of People's Commissars.

The Moors have done their job, comrade Moors can go away. In August 1938, the power of Yezhov and Frinovsky ended - not yet formally, but already in fact. "Friends of the People" Comrade Stalin removed from the

6July 29, 1938 can be called the culmination of repressions against the commanding and supervisory staff of the Red Army. On this day, the most mass execution of the top command staff of the Red Army took place. Among others at the "Kommunarka" range were shot Jan Berzin, head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army; Joseph Unschlicht, who in different years held the positions of deputy chairman of the All-Russian Cheka, deputy chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and deputy Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR; Commodore Oskar Stigga, head of the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, who in 1930-1934 headed the Intelligence Directorate's residence in Austria; Nikolai Sinyavsky, member of the Military Council under the USSR Defense Commissar and head of the Red Army's Communications Directorate in 1931-1935, deputy defense commissar for aviation; Viktor Alksnis, deputy defense commissar for aviation; Commodore Pavel Dybenko, commander of the 2nd rank, first commissar of the Red Army, first commissar of the Soviet Army, and deputy commissar of the Soviet Army.

levers of power very carefully. September 8, 1938, Frinovsky went ostensibly for promotion, but it did not require special ingenuity to figure out: Frinovsky Comrade Stalin also "otfbotbolyla to the attic," as many before him. His post - People's Commissar of the Navy.

This naval commander did not know much about the navy. There is only one case when the naval commander Frinovsky stepped on the deck of a warship: it happened in 1932, when he inspected the river frontier boats on the Amur River.

The great humorist Comrade Stalin sent Frinovsky to the navy, without giving him a naval rank, and without even issuing him a calfskin and kleeshi. Perhaps on the mighty body of the pakhan Frinovsky could be found tattoos in the form of anchors, mermaids and life preservers, but if so, then, except for this he had nothing else to do with the fleet. In the corridors of the Maritime Commissariat, among the sea wolves in black, the naval commander Frinovsky walked in boots, in a bulging galifa, in a protective-colored uniform.

How could a man who had never served in the navy and knew nothing about the navy be in charge of the Navy Ministry? He didn't. He was doing what he'd been doing before, cleaning the navy of pests and spies. Until the bells rang.

Mikhail Petrovich Frinovsky is rarely remembered. His adventurous biography does not fit well with the image of a strategist-martyr. His blatant face spoils a brilliant series of portraits of brilliant military thinkers. If he is remembered, they try to soften the sound: naval commander ... uh, uh. with an insufficiently bright past. Such flattering words give the impression that earlier, in the past, Frinovsky did not do the brightest deeds, but then he reformed, changed his ways and became a militiaman. But it wasn't like that. Frinovsky was and forever remained a criminal, until the very bullet in the back of his neck, which put an end to his bloody biography. His views Frinovsky did not change, just from one criminal environment, he switched to another. Where he succeeded.

But over Pakhan Frinovsky stood a much tougher Pakhan, Comrade Stalin.

6

April 6, 1939, having finished his working day, fleet commander Frinovsky sat down in his official car and ordered to go home. But his

personal driver and faithful bodyguards took him not home, but to the jail. Yesterday's subordinates from the NKVD GUGB NKVD of the USSR brought charges against the naval commander, opened a criminal case. Frinovsky confessed to everything and on February 4, 1940 received his last, long and fully deserved sentence. On the same day was shot and the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, General Commissar of State Security Comrade Nikolai Ezhov.

And when they tell us again that five out of five commanders of the 1st rank were shot, we will cautiously object: five out of eight. And then we will wipe a stingy male tear and remember that the first in his position among the five shot commanders of the 1st rank was the great naval commander Frinovsky. Let us remember him and weep: O innocent victim of arbitrariness! O greatest strategist, if you had not been exterminated, you would have shown the talent of a naval commander in the war! You would have kicked the tail of the Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief⁷ Grand Admiral Reder!

special term: to work under cover (jokingly - under cover). The ranks of the Red Army and Red Fleet were also used as a cover. Hoards of punishers lived and worked under the mask of the highest command staff of the Red Army. The punishers were listed as commanders and naval commanders, wore military ranks and insignia up to the rank of commander of the 1st rank, but in fact they were not commanders and naval commanders.

Henceforth, turning to the statistics of the purification of the army and navy, let us be vigilant and ask: who of these innocently killed commanders and naval commanders was not an executioner and bandit?



Just below the top ten marshals and commandarms of the 1st rank were

We have mentioned one bandit, but uncovered a whole phenomenon. The scope of operations to suppress any resistance and dissent, as well as the size of the punitive apparatus in the Soviet Union, has always been concealed. There were Chekists, so to speak, overt, and there were hidden, disguised. Countless hordes of "friends of the people" did not officially belong to the punitive organs. Comrades worked in the Komsomol, in trade unions, in the national economy. There was also

commandarms of the 2nd rank. In his time, A. I. Todorsky published statistics of "innocent victims" [\[8\]](#). Among other things we read: of the twelve commandarms of the 2nd rank all twelve were shot.

This statistic has been repeated thousands of times in scientific studies. It's been around the world. And it all sounds terrible until we start to delve into the details. And as soon as we get into it, we immediately find an inconsistency: they tell about 12 shot commanders of the 2nd rank, but they name 10 names.

Let us pay attention to the writings of the same Rapoport and Alekseev, to the official lists of those killed, published in the "Military History Journal" (1993. No. 2) - and there are only ten names. What lies behind the inconsistencies? Let's try to guess.

And when we are again told that of the 12 commanders of the 2nd rank Stalin exterminated all twelve, we, suppressing a sorrowful sob, humbly ask: announce the entire list, please!

GLAVA 3.

About forty thousand shot commanders.

An orator who wishes to captivate a crowd should abuse strong language, exaggerate, assert, repeat, and never try to prove anything by reasoning.

Gustave Lebon. The Psychology of Crowds

1

In every rule I am interested in exceptions. The inviolable rule of our beloved Motherland is not to take the trash out of the house. We put it under the rug. Whatever happens, we have one refrain: all is well, fair marquise! The Chernobyl reactor collapsed, and we keep silent. The wind carried radiation to Sweden. The Swedes found us out. Then we confess: Yes, something happened. it was nothing. If the wind had blown in the other direction, to Kazakhstan and Siberia, we would have kept silent if we had not been detected.

How silent about the destruction of the virgin lands.

As they were silent about Marshal Zhukov's nuclear experiments on tens of thousands of soldiers and officers at the Totsk test site.

It was believed that there, in the decaying West, people were dying of disease and hunger, there the unemployed were languishing in queues, there society was shuddering from rampant crime, while in our country children were laughing, the sun was shining joyfully, larks were singing over our country, our rockets were going to the depths of the universe, and their rockets were simply exploding. This could not happen here. Well, it happened once, when Marshal Nedelin burned to death at the launching position, but never again.

The marshal's death could not be concealed, but how many other people burned with him, our press kept silent about it.

It was arranged in such a way that we didn't have bridges collapsing, we didn't have factories exploding, we didn't have train derailments, we didn't have crime. Actually, there was, but it was steadily declining, tending toward

zero. And everything that wasn't quite right, we tried to cover up and smooth over. We exterminated millions of men, broke the back of the peasantry, and after that we bought bread in America. They'll grow new bread in America, but they can't get their gold back. How much gold did they give back? It's a secret. What did our textbooks say about it? They said: victory of the collective farm system, progress.

And how many peasants were exterminated? A secret. How many churches were destroyed? A secret. How many nobles, merchants, engineers were exterminated? Again, a secret. In short, everything negative is a secret. The rule is this. So as not to undermine the authority of our great Motherland.

It would seem that why should the earthquake be hidden? On the contrary, it should be announced to the whole world. All our blunders and mistakes can be blamed on the earthquake. You can get foreign aid for an earthquake. But no, our earthquakes were classified. The Ashgabat earthquake of 1948 remained secret for many years. We tried to show the whole world that under socialism there is not only no crime, but even natural disasters do not occur.

In our country, every writer knew: talk about the good, praise, magnify. Don't talk about the bad! No, not even that. That's the passive way. It doesn't work that way. The bad must be actively denied. We have no bad! We don't and can't have bad things! By the very nature of socialism! That's our advantage!

That's the rule. And that's the exception to the rule.

2

Let's ask: how many Red Army commanders were shot before the war? And instantly we get the answer: 36,761 people! We don't even need to ask. We were shouted at from every podium: 36,761! From every textbook: 36,761! From every newspaper spread on the eve of anniversaries: 36,761! And that's not all. They added: more than three thousand in the Navy. Total - 40 thousand exterminated commanders!

Brothers, comrades, this is an anomaly! The number of people killed in the earthquake is a state secret, just like the earthquake itself, but the number of officers shot is somehow not a secret.

Why is that? If our native authorities had wished to conceal this figure, they would have done so. But for some reason they repeated this figure thousands of times over.

Let's ask the question: how many tanks did the Red Army have in 1941?

We get the answer: they were obsolete. We ask: how many, and we get an answer to another question. The same with airplanes: how many? The answer is: they were flying coffins. We ask about Thomas, and we get a different answer.....

This is how it was customary to answer the question about crime. Question: how many crimes were committed in the USSR each year? Answer: crime in the USSR is steadily decreasing. From year to year.

It's an amazing country we have. The number of tanks and combat aircraft in the Red Army at the time of the German invasion no one has ever clearly stated. It's a secret. And 40,000 shot commanders is not a secret.

And every writer with the delight of a discoverer shouts to the whole world: 36,761! More in the fleet!

My reader, you are a blatant exception to the rule. Therefore, before repeating this figure again - 40 thousand exterminated commanders, think: why did they reveal this figure to you? Why this figure was not hidden? Why is it being flaunted? What is the reason?

3

We were told for a long time: Stalin killed generals, killed generals, killed generals. And again: 40 thousand, 40 thousand, 40 thousand. No wonder, these messages merged into one: Stalin killed 40 thousand generals.

Let's get rid of the misunderstanding. Let's take an example. At the very end of the 20th century, the British army had three divisions. Each division had a general. There are three generals in total. Above them put the corps commander, his deputy and chief of staff of the corps - three more. To train officers there is a military school, there is one general. There is a college for training engineering staff; two generals. There is also an academy for the training of high command staff. They are strict with generals. Two at the academy. Well, we'll put a few more generals in the Ministry of Defense. We can think of something else. But no matter how we do it, we can't come up with a lot of general positions.

And we have 40,000 generals? Where can we put them?

The number of divisions in the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s was constantly changing, but roughly there were about a hundred. Accordingly, 100 division commanders were required. To coordinate the divisions, you need to have 25-30 corps. Three generals in the management of each corps. Add to this the heads of schools and military academies, add the commanders

of military districts, their deputies and chiefs of staff, add the top command staff of the central administration of the armed forces and still no way to reach a thousand. 40 thousand generals? If there really were so many of them, then for such a number in the great and mighty, truthful and free Russian language there is a special definition (pardon me): as many as there are dogs. If there really were 40 thousand generals in the Red Army, then their number should have been drastically reduced - there were too many of them.

The number of the Red Army in 1937 - 1.1 million people. If there were 40 thousand generals in the Red Army, it means that for every 27 soldiers, sergeants and officers there was a general. In other words, a general for every platoon.

Obviously, this has never happened and could never happen. So let us remember: not 40,000 generals, but 40,000 commanders.

4

There's a term in intelligence: source flattening. Where does it come from? I don't know. There's another term with the same meaning: stab the nightstand. It comes from an ancient joke:

- *Citizen Rabinovich, where do you get so much money?*
- *In the nightstand.*
- *Who puts them there?*
- *Wife.*
- *Where does she get it?*
- *I'm giving it to her.*
- *Where do you get it?*
- *Citizen investigator, I explained: in the nightstand.*

The intelligence terms "crack the nightstand" and "flatten the source" imply this: you go to a report, you report intelligently and clearly, everything fits together, everything fits. And you get a question: what nightstand is this from? Therefore, the rule is: do not report anything from the information, the origin of which is not established precisely. First get to the source.

It's a pity that our historians are not forced to stab nightstands, sources to flatten: someone somewhere rattled, someone named a number, and the world resounded: the term of thousands! Forty thousand! Forty thousand! One newspaper writes about 40 thousand exterminated commanders. Let's ask our

comrades this question: from what nightstand is this taken? From "Pravda". And where did you guys get it from? From "Ogonyok". And in "Ogonyok" where from? From "Zvezdochka". And you?

The circle closes quickly. The song goes round and round, addressed to a friend. And we're still at the same nightstand. And there's no way to break it, no way to flatten it.

Due to thousands of times of repetition, this information has become an undeniable truth. This truth is ringing, rattling and overflowing in all foreign countries.

Where's the wood from?

5

July 29, 1938 - the peak of terror. After that it went down sharply.

On September 19, 1938, Colonel Shiryaev, head of the 6th Department of the U KNS (Command and Officers Department) of the Red Army, presented to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank E. A. Shchadenko a certificate on the number of commanders dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army between the beginning of 1937 and September 1938. The document is kept in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA. Fond 37837. Inventory 10. Case 142. Sheet 93). The document was published by Major-General of Justice A. T. Ukolov and Lieutenant Colonel V. I. Ivkin in the "Military History Journal" (1993. No. 1. P. 56).

Here it is, the primary source. The figures are as follows: in 1937, 20,643 people were dismissed, in 1938 - 16,118. That's where the figure of 36,761 comes from.

But the certificate does not refer to *those who were shot*, but to those *who were dismissed*. For 54 years, this certificate was a secret document, and it was accessible to very

a limited circle of infinitely unscrupulous people. These people have committed a crime against history, against our country and our people. They reported a figure of 36,761. From this everyone drew what seemed to be such a logical conclusion: if fired, then arrested, and if arrested....

But it wasn't. Dismissal did not always mean arrest, and arrest was not necessarily followed by execution.

The reference gives additional information: of those dismissed in 1937, 5,811 people were arrested, in 1938 - 5,057. A total of 10,868 people were arrested.

Is there a difference: 40,000 *shot* or 10,868 *arrested*? Arrest and shooting are different things. Some arrestees were shot. But not all of them. For example, in 1937, the commander of the 5th Cavalry Corps, Commander Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, was dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army. But it does not follow that he was shot. He was not just dismissed, but also arrested. But even this is not yet a firing squad. He was imprisoned, then released. He fought through the war. He finished it with the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union and commanded the Victory Parade on Red Square.

Among the 10,868 arrested commanders, he was not the only one: many were released.

Here is an example of the work of Soviet propaganda. If at one time the document had been published in full - so many people were fired, so many of them were arrested, but not all of them were shot - there would have been no confusion. But people who had access to this document deliberately published only part of the information: 36,761 people were fired. But the partial truth is not true. The clarification was deliberately omitted, thus creating conditions for misinterpretation.

Then, when thousands of historians and agitators wrote in their works information about 40 thousand exterminated commanders, when hundreds of millions of people remembered this figure, the document was published in full. But this will not change anything. Who will pay attention to a small note in a magazine for specialists?

But what happened to the others who were fired but not arrested? Where did they go?

There's no mystery here. In every army there is a constant process of change, rejuvenation, and renewal of the command staff. Every year military schools supply tens of thousands of new officers. But the army is not overflowing with officers. Every year, taking some of them into its ranks, the army sends as many others into civilian life. The main reason for dismissal is seniority.

I don't impose my calculations, but imagine that there are 200,000 officers in your army. Estimate how many years an officer serves in the officer rank, add up his service for World War I and the Civil War, add up his service for the North and the Far East. Now decide for yourself how many commanders you should let go for a well-deserved retirement every year and replace them with young graduates of schools, so that you have a constant process of rejuvenation of personnel, so that you do not stagnate.

Let's take any army in the world and calculate how many officers need to be released every year simply because they have served their time, simply because it is time for them to retire. This process is always, everywhere, in all armies of the world. In the American, Polish, Bulgarian, Russian, Ukrainian and any other army every year thousands and tens of thousands of officers complete their service and leave the army. In the Red Army in 1937-1938, officers were also dismissed for length of service.

And the document submitted to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense was called: "Information about the number of dismissed room and police personnel in 1937-1938". Who would dare to assume that during those years no one in the Red Army was dismissed on the basis of seniority? Those who had passed the First World War and the Civil War, by 1937 had completed their calendar quarter. If every year of the war was counted as three years, then they had served their time and had nothing to do in the army.

It should also be remembered that not every officer reached his pension. The second reason for dismissal is the state of health. Those who had been through two or even three wars had been in different bindings. One had frostbitten feet, another had damaged hearing, a third had wounds the old ones hurt. People are discharged from the army not only because of injuries, but also because of many diseases, from flat feet to cancer.

Besides, there is such a punishment - dismissal from the army. It is not 1937, but officers are kicked out of the army. They have always been kicked

out and, I hope, will continue to be kicked out. The main reasons are drunkenness, moral decay, violation of discipline, and abuse of power. Who will dare to say that in 1937 there was no drunkenness in the army? Who will claim that in 1937 there was no expulsion from the army for drunkenness? But it does not follow at all that those expelled for drunkenness were immediately arrested and shot.

But even those who were arrested were not all victims of political repression. At all times there were crimes of military and official, property and other crimes. If the chief of the guard left the guardhouse and went for a walk, he should be caught, arrested, expelled from the army, tried and imprisoned. At all times rapists, murderers, thieves, and looters have been caught among fellow officers. The certificate speaks of all those arrested, without dividing them into political and corrupt ones. But who would dare to say that in 1937-1938 there were no thieves and swindlers among the command staff of the Red Army?

7

Let us read the memoirs of Soviet generals and be surprised at the abundance of memories of the prison. And this is proof that not all of the 10,000 arrested were shot. Comrade commanders sat for a while and went back under the banner.

On May 5, 1940, Army Commissar 1st rank E. A. Shchadenko signed the "Report of the Head of the Department for the Chief Staff of the Red Army of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR". The final sentence in the report is as follows: "*Unjustly dismissed returned to the army. Total as of May 1, 1940 - 12,461*". Let's pay attention: the number of those returned to the army exceeds the number of those arrested. And it is easy to explain: those who were arrested and those who were simply dismissed but not arrested were returned to the army.

Soviet propaganda tirelessly repeated the story about 40,000 shot commanders, but why doesn't anyone like to remember that of those "shot" 12,461 returned to service?

And this is only the beginning of the process. It is known that the bulk of those dismissed from the army returned under the banners in the second half of 1940 and especially in the first half of 1941. An example - the future army general A. V. Sandalov. There are many such examples.

It is amazing how history is written in our country. One report by

Shchadenko on the dismissal of commanders we quote extensively, and his other report on the return of those dismissed we do not even remember.



The task of Soviet propaganda was to conceal the role of the Soviet Union in unleashing World War II. For this purpose, we were forced to play the fool: our tanks were obsolete, our airplanes were coffins, our army was decapitated.

We were charged with these "truths," acting not on our minds but on our emotions. Instead of comprehensible statistics, we were presented with vivid examples and images.

Many books have been published on the purification of the army, but they are all heartwarming dramas, nothing more. There are no statistics in these books, except for the mention of those forty thousand. Such statistics are designed for morons.

I'd like to know: why isn't there another one?

GLAVA 4.

Also warlords

Soviet power relies on opportunistic elements, passionately clinging to life and willing to do anything.
Andrei Platonov. 1932. Wooden plant. From notebooks (Moscow: Pravda, 1990. Library of the magazine "Ogonyok")

1

We will not understand anything until we deal with military ranks. After the October coup, the Bolsheviks abolished military and civilian ranks, orders, ranks and titles, abolished officers, generals, admirals, ambassadors, ministers and diplomats. Everyone became comrades. All were equalized like boards in a prison fence.

But it was soon seen that the equality for which the whole thing was intended was unattainable. It was observed, for example, that in the army some men must give orders, and others must carry them out. And there was the first stratification of a single mass of comrades into fighters and commanders. Comrade commanders began to be distinguished from comrade fighters by bows, red rags and other identifying signs.

But here's the trouble: one loudmouth commands, and the other commands. And who is to obey? One says one thing, the other another. Know all the commanders by sight? It would be nice, but how can you see every clear sun in the face, how can you remember every sun? But everything flows, everything changes. Yesterday he was a regimental commander, everyone remembered him, and today he was demoted to private. Soldiers remember him in one capacity, and he is already in another. We should write on his forehead that he's been demoted.

So they began to distinguish commanders with triangles, squares, rectangles and rhombuses. If you are promoted, an extra rhombus will be pinned, if you are demoted, the rhombus will be torn off. But the problem is that the command staff consists of more than just commanders

regiments and battalions. Here's the Chief of Staff of the army. How do we address him? We came up with the following: nachashtarm. The head of the

operational department of the army became known as nachoperodstarm, and his senior assistant - staropomnachoperodstarm. At the front headquarters, respectively - Sr. Nachopoperodstafront. There were also such positions: deputy commander for maritime affairs - zamkompomordel. This is not an anecdote. Such a position, for example, at the end of 1918 was given to Fyodor Fyodorovich Raskolnikov. He was not called other than "Zamkom on the muzzle".

They wanted what was best, but it turned out to be... In the past, the rank of each officer was written on his epaulettes: this one was a captain and this one was a captain. If you looked at the epaulettes, you could treat them accordingly. And if there are no military ranks, then we have to address by position: Comrade First Assistant to the Head of the Organizational and Mobilization Department of the District Headquarters! Abbreviated: Perpomnachorgmobuprstaokr. Uncomfortable. Not everyone will remember it. Not everyone can pronounce it. And a military secret is revealed. It's one thing to be called a colonel, another - the head of army intelligence. That's why the Bolsheviks spit on universal equality and introduced military ranks.

2

In the mid-1930s, the system of ranks in the Red Army was almost finalized. More precisely, it returned to its original position. They danced to the same stove. There were no epaulettes and stripes yet, commanders were not called officers and generals (it sounds too counter-revolutionary), but in 1935 personal military ranks were introduced. Insignia - on the buttonholes. Sergeants and petty officers - triangles. Lieutenants - cubes. Senior officers - rectangles (popularly known as "sleepers"). Captains (they were referred to the senior command staff) - one sleeper, majors - two, colonels - three.

On September 1, 1939, a new rank was introduced - lieutenant colonel. (It was as if the comrades in the Kremlin knew ahead of time that World War II would begin on that day, and they prepared the decision in advance.) The lieutenant colonel received three sleepers, and the colonel began to wear four.

The highest command staff could not be called generals. Therefore, they were called kombrigs (one rhombus), kommdivs (two

diamond), komkors (three diamonds), commandarms of the 2nd rank (four diamonds) and commandarms of the 1st rank (four diamonds and a star). And above are the Marshals of the Soviet Union with large stars in their buttonholes. For convenience, the higher commanders I will sometimes call

generals, remembering that purely formally they have not yet been called generals. A general is a contrarian. Generals are there where inequality is rampant. And the title of marshal did not sound counter-revolutionary, because before the October coup there were no marshals in Russia. There was something similar, but it sounded different.

3

Let us also remember: the title of "kombrig" did not mean that the bearer of the title held the position of brigade commander. The rank of "kommandiv" did not mean that the holder of the rank held the position of division commander. Ranks did not always correspond to the positions held. To be more precise, they rarely corresponded to them.

The point was that there are many positions that are not directly related to the command of divisions, corps and armies: deputy corps commander, chief of the 4th Directorate of the General Staff, chief of staff of the army, military attaché in France, and so on. This is first of all.

And secondly, commanders were moved from post to post, promotion and demotion very quickly, and the awarding of ranks was deliberately delayed: if you coped, we would award you a rank.

Therefore, usually divisions were commanded by brigades and corps by commanders. It happened the other way around. Kommdiv Dmitry Arkadyevich Schmidt commanded the 8th Mechbrigade. He was moved down from his high position, but his rank was not reduced in the hope that he would be corrected. Commander Georgy Zhukov commanded a corps, then, remaining in the rank of commander, was deputy commander of the Belorussian Military District for cavalry, then, still remaining a commander, was given command of the 57th Special Rifle Corps in Mongolia. The corps was deployed into an army group, and Kommdiv Zhukov was promoted to the rank of kommkor.

Another detail. In addition to the purely command ranks of kombrigs, commanders and so on, there were special ranks. The rank of kombrig, for example, corresponded to brig commissar, brigvoenjurst, brigengineer, brigvoenvatcher, brigintendant. This system existed for less than five years. In 1940, Stalin introduced general ranks - though still without epaulettes. He planned to introduce epaulettes after the first victories in the Great War of Liberation. The liberation of Europe failed, so Stalin introduced epaulettes after Stalingrad.

It should be emphasized that there was no connection between the old ranks of komkors and commandarms and the new general ranks. First of all, because before there were five military ranks between a colonel and the Marshal of the Soviet Union - from a kombrig to a commander of the 1st rank, and under the new system only four military ranks were introduced between a colonel and the Marshal of the Soviet Union: major-general, lieutenant-general, colonel-general and army general. So there was no direct analogy between the old and new ranks.

In 1940, when the general ranks were introduced, a complete recertification of the top command staff was carried out, the old ranks were canceled and forgotten, everyone was personally assigned a new rank, in no way related to the old rank. For example, commanders of the 2nd rank I. S. Konev and M. P. Kovalev became lieutenant generals, Komkor F. N. Remizov also became a lieutenant general, Komkor G. M. Stern became a colonel general, and Komkor G. K. Zhukov became an army general, and so on.

4

With this in mind, let us return to the lists of murdered military commanders. The first feature that catches the eye is the abundance of commissars and lawyers in these lists. Example: the rank of commander of the 2nd rank corresponded to an army commissar of the 2nd rank and an army lawyer. In the lists of those shot:

- commanders of the 2nd rank - 10;
- army commissars of the 2nd rank - 15;
- armwenurist - 1.

A total of 26 men wearing four rhombuses each were shot. Of these, only ten were commanders - less than 40 percent. The rest - more than 60 percent - were not commanders. The rest were.

ballast. Their loss did not reduce the Red Army's combat effectiveness in any way. It only increased it.

At other levels, the picture is the same: fat herds of commissars. Therefore, when we are given horrifying figures of purification, let us mentally subtract the corresponding share of commissars and lawyers, and the figures will immediately become not so terrible.

If someone says that the commissars are innocent victims of Stalin's

arbitrary rule, we object: it was on their mighty shoulders that Comrade Stalin built the unbreakable pyramid of his power. Comrade Commissars crushed any opposition in the army, or rather - any manifestation of free thought. When free thought was suppressed, when the murmurings subsided, then Comrade Stalin moved to openly purge the ranks of his minions. The suppression of any and all opposition is the prelude to purification. Without this introductory part, the purge would have been impossible. This introductory part was brilliantly realized by the comrade commissars. It was they who shut the throats of the army and the people, thus making the purification possible. Without the help of the comrade commissars, Stalin would not have been able to keep his peasant army in subjection during collectivization. But he did. Thank you, Commissars. You've done a good job. Now it's your turn. One on the right, one at a time, to the firing cellar, march! Against the wall.

5

Besides, so to speak, there were also commissars in disguise. Here is Kommissar Maksim Petrovich Mager. We think that, having a purely commanding rank, he commands, but he is a member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Military District. That is, a commissar who looks after the commander, who lectures about Marxism-Leninism and the world revolution. During the Civil War Mager was assistant commissar and commissar of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division, the 65th Cav Regiment, the 3rd Brigade of the 11th Cav Division, and the Punitive Cav Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Army. After the war he was also commissar of the 2nd Cavdivision, 3rd Cav Corps and so on. His rank was kommkor, but he never commanded a corps. He never even commanded a division. And now Kommissar Magera was shot, but the Red Army was not cold,

or hot. The army's fighting ability does not fall from the loss of such a "commander".

Here is another commander - Grigory Davydovich Khakhanyan. The rank is purely commanding, and he is not a commander at all. He's a member of the Military Council of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. A commissar, that is. At lower levels, the same picture is the same: Kommandives and Kombrigs are not always commanders. Many of them were commissars, that is, they told stories about how well their descendants would live in the year 2000.

If they tell me that the extermination of commissars weakened the army, I will not agree. Hitler's army somehow managed without commissars. It reached Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad without commissars. And the Red Army ran away with commissars for some reason.

So it's probably because the young commissioners nominated after the purge haven't had time to gain experience? I don't think so. How much experience do you need? Does it make much difference whether you're at the battalion level or the army level?

But then the Red Army did get to Berlin! That's right. Only without commissars. They were canceled at the beginning of 1943. Instead they introduced deputy police officers. Is there a big difference? It is. The deputy police officer had no right to poke his nose into operational plans, but the commissar did. Some kind of an accident: the commissars were abolished, and after that there was not a single major retreat.

Not only were commissars of no use, but many of them did not serve in the Red Army at all. Example: Divkommissar Meysak Sylvester Yakovlevich. His position was deputy head of the political department of the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Guard of the NKVD of the USSR. He's not a military commissar, but a Chekist commissar. He looked after the gulag guards.

Those commissars who had served in the army had at least seen guns and tanks, had been on exercises. And commissars-chekists sat in Moscow offices, checking statistics and publishing wall newspapers. These people have never even been on exercises. And they're all listed among the talented commanders. Those forty thousand.

If someone says that our military lawyers are innocent lambs, I will object here too. Only one military lawyer was shot - Naum Savelyevich Rozovsky, who held the position of chief military prosecutor of the Red Army. He was sentenced to execution on June 16, 1941, just before the German attack on the USSR.

First of all, let us note that military lawyers in the Red Army, as well as lawyers, prosecutors, judges and defense lawyers in the Soviet Union, are at the very least *darmozy*. They are parasites. The Soviet Union stood not on laws, but on the decisions of the party instances. As they decided, so it would be. Did Comrade Rozovsky realize that he was a freeloader, that he was doing nothing, that he was only devouring what others had produced? Did he realize that nothing depends on him at all? Of course he did. Otherwise he would not have reached such heights.

Not only were military lawyers parasites, they were also the most active creators of crimes. The entire top command staff of the Red Army and Navy, everyone, guilty and innocent, passed through the hands of Comrade Rozovsky. Under all the verdicts is his signature. He was obliged by his position to be present at the executions.

And Rozovsky was present. But his name was published in the "Military History Journal" under the mournful title: "Died in the years of lawlessness". Well said! Let's take a breath. Comrades, what should a military prosecutor do? To monitor the observance of the law. It is interesting how we are organized: we curse the lawlessness created by the prosecutor's plowman Rozovsky and his gang, and at the same time we mourn Rozovsky as an innocent victim who died from his own lawlessness.

They tell us: they shot Comrade Rozovsky and thus weakened the Red Army. Let them say that. But let us imagine that he was not shot. Let us imagine that he remained alive, remained at his combat post and worked tirelessly throughout the war in such an important field as the observance of law in the Red Army. In this case, the lawlessness of 1937-1938 would have continued. In order to restore any semblance of legality, it was necessary to shoot Comrade Rozovsky and all his gang. Like rabid dogs.

So, while Rozovsky was there - lawlessness was rampant, when they slapped him - lawlessness decreased.

And the conclusion is the same: Comrade Stalin didn't shoot them enough. Unforgivably few. One army lawyer. One *korvoen*-lawyer, military prosecutor of the Moscow Military District, Comrade Plavnek Leonard

Yanovich, and four divvoen-lawyers, and more brigvoen-lawyers. The list is frustratingly short. And all to blame inexcusable and even criminal Stalin's kindness. It was it that prevented the establishment of real order in the country and the army.

7

One day I came across a photograph of the leader of Hitler's trade unions, the head of the Gigler Youth, a Nazi diplomat and an SS Gruppenführer standing in a row. I honestly confess: I could not recognize their uniforms, who was who - all in black, all with armbands, with swastikas and crosses. But here is another old photo in "Ogonyok": Yagoda, Kosarev and other comrades - from the NKVD, Komsomol, trade unions. I know each of them by sight, but you can't tell them apart by their uniforms. All in boots, in galifes, all belted with belts. This happened here's why: our proletarian state was militarized beyond all reasonable limits, crowds of officials not just went in uniform, but had military ranks and were listed in the Red Army, although they worked far beyond its borders. Stalin cleaned the state apparatus, bureaucracy, but many officials had military ranks. Therefore, it seems: a crushing blow to the army ranks. In fact, it was not a blow to the army.

And there are plenty of examples of this.

Komkor Tkachev Ivan Fedorovich (arrested on January 29, 1938 on charges of organizing a conspiracy, shot on July 29 of the same year) was the head of the Civil Air Fleet in 1935-1937. It would seem that the fleet is civilian, so let it be commanded by a civilian. But no, the civilian fleet was commanded by the military. Tkachev's deputy was commander Ivan Fyodorovich Shiroky. And below that - kombrigs, colonels and so on. They were struck a blow: they were imprisoned or shot. It's sad, it's unfortunate. But let's say that the blow was dealt to Aeroflot, not to the army.

Brigkommissar Shapiro Samuel Grigorievich was the head of the Special Construction. Construction Special - that's how they spell it with a capital letter. Why special? Because the construction site is fenced with a high fence with barbed wire. Some strange builders are digging in the pit. For some reason, under escort. Are they building an underground command center in case of war? No. The Central Theater of the Red Army. Why should the commissar be in charge of construction? What does a commissar know about construction? What about strategy? Theater, that's all...

We will look into large publishing houses, into the editorial offices of

leading newspapers, into construction offices, into the People's Commissariats of Finance, Health, Heavy Industry, we will visit sea and river steamship companies, construction of dams, canals, railroads, and there - divkommissars, briginzheners, commanders, corinthandants and kombrigs, brigvoenvrachy and others, and others.

Brigkommissar Frumin Semyon Mikhailovich was the head of the State Central Institute of Physical Culture - not military, but civilian. And the innocently killed Divkommissar Kalpus Boris Alexandrovich was deputy chairman of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sports under the USSR Council of People's Commissars. He was sentenced to death on August 29, 1938. I wonder, if he had not been liquidated, what personal contribution to the victory he would have made? Would he have traveled to the fronts and in between battles demonstrated to soldiers and commanders how to lift arms and legs, to twirl his head and other body parts? Did this man realize that he was included in the highest command staff of the Red Army in vain? Did he realize that it was possible to lead physical training without the rank of general? Maybe his destruction was a blow to the Soviet physical training, but not to the defense capability of the USSR.

Of the four executed divvoyenurists, three (75 percent) had not served in the army. Here they are:

- divvoyenurist Homerov Nikolai Nikolaevich, prosecutor of the border and internal guard of the NKVD troops of the Ukrainian SSR;
- Divvoyenurist Maller Lazar Israelievich, chairman of the military tribunal of the border and internal guard of the NKVD of the Far Eastern Territory;
- divvoenurist Grodko Aron Samuilovich, Deputy Commissar of Justice of the USSR. (Here is another "innocent victim" of Stalin's terror. In 1937-1938 he was the one who administered justice in the country. The case is done - get out. He was no longer needed. Sentenced to capital punishment on June 9, 1941).

They were all shot a couple of weeks before the German attack on the Soviet Union. I don't know whether they were good lawyers or bad, whether they stood for socialist legality or flouted it, but they had nothing to do with the army, except for their participation in crimes against the army. When and where did they learn strategy and tactics? I agree: their untimely tragic deaths were a blow to our fairest and most humane justice, but they were not a blow

to the Red Army's fighting ability.

Brigvoenurist Kitin Ilya Grigorievich was chairman of the military tribunal of the East Siberian railroad, and Brigvoenurist Lapidus Ruvim Borisovich was military prosecutor of the Amur railroad. Why does the railroad need its own military prosecutor? Why does it need its own military tribunal? The great river Yenisei flows across Siberia. One way is taiga for thousands of kilometers. The other way, too. There are steamboats on the river. Once a week. There's no one here but bears. There's never been an enemy invasion. There never will be. Mosquitoes will eat any alien. But the military prosecutor's office oversees the shipping company. And sitting in the prosecutor's office is a military lawyer, whom the Soviet historians enlisted in the pleiad of brilliant commanders. And also sits at the table stern military tribunal: cloth cloth, green, a carafe of murky water on the table. The generals sit in the tribunal. And on all the railroads, and in all the shipping companies of sea and river - there are generals, generals, generals everywhere. Forty thousand commanders alone.

But a Soviet military lawyer could not be a good man. If they give an order from the Central Committee to pardon - he will pardon, if they order to shoot - and he, guided by the articles of such and such, will pass the appropriate sentence. If they order to shoot a hundred people, he will shoot a hundred. If they order to shoot two hundred, he will shoot two hundred. The defendant clearly, clearly and intelligently reports that he is not guilty of anything, and the prosecutor says.

and the members of the tribunal were instructed before the trial. Without these instructions, they will not sit down at the table. And they will act not as dictated by reason, conscience and law, but as directed by the appropriate authority. And no normal person could work at such a job. It's not a job at all. A man with a normal psyche couldn't do such a job. The same army jurist Rozovsky used to paint his lips before pronouncing sentences. He wanted to please those he sent to their deaths. And the whole Red Army knew the omen: if the chief military prosecutor of the Red Army, the army lawyer comrade Rosovsky, had his lips painted, it meant a bail, and if they were not painted, it meant a full sentence.

The newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" (March 24, 1989) describes Yakov Abramovich Kazarinsky, Rozovsky's deputy, a military lawyer. He was an arrogant nobleman, a friend of Mekhlis and Vyshinsky. But now he too fell under the life-giving stream of purification. He wasn't shot, but simply

imprisoned. And in the camp there is an instant transformation: "*When he began to speak, on his face appeared an ingratiating smile, brown little eyes ran wary and cunning.*" In the camp he immediately sold an expensive overcoat, and a uniform of the finest cloth, and dandy boots. He himself, without an order, got a little overcoat and cotton pants, shaved his head - like a convict. The commanders sitting with him spat: he had changed his clothes, you bastard! "*The criminals exterminated people like him mercilessly. As a rule, they strangled them under a blanket at night. Sometimes they sawed off their heads with a crosscut saw. Kazarinsky knew this custom of the criminal world, which no one could abolish, so he began to "re-breed" back in Nakhodka.*"

How did it happen that a haughty official turned into an obliging camp six? It didn't happen. He was a six. A very obliging one. Only in the military prosecutor's office of the Red Army, sixes in general's uniforms were supposed to walk around with a haughty look, belly out, and in the camp - to sit under the bunk. Purification - this is the time when Stalin decided to change the team of legal and political sixes. However, Stalin did not saw off their heads, but sent them to camps where others would do it.

Comrades Rozovsky, Grodtko, Kazarinsky and all the other Stalinist "military lawyers" chose their own profession of licking their own hands and obey his every whim and caprice. But they had to remember that any prostitute at first, in her youth, flies high, and then sinks lower and lower. Pakhan Stalin, having used himself, sent these "lawyers" where fate and the logic of the profession led them - to lick the heels of lower-ranking pakhans.

It sounds terrible: forty thousand. But you begin to exclude from this number commissars, lawyers, physical trainers, vertukhayevs, bosses of the People's Commissariat of the Forest Industry, builders of the great canals, Komsomol leaders, editors of central newspapers, and you find that there are few real commanders here.

GLAVA 5.

Lubyanka's "warlords"

I often have conversations with Comrade Yezhov's organs.

Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), People's Commissar of Defense. Speech at the February-March (1937) Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b)

1

There was another special system of military ranks - for the senior staff of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. This system originally included ten ranks: sergeant, junior lieutenant, lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major, senior major, commissar of the 3rd, 2nd and 1st rank. To each rank two words were added at the end - "State Security". These were weighty words. The extermination of one's own people was considered a much more important and honorable task than the seizure of foreign lands, so the ranks of the State Security had quite a different weight.

In state security - no petty officers, junior sergeants or senior sergeants. The first rank is sergeant GB. Strange as it may seem, the sergeant GB belonged to the middle command rank. Translated into modern language - to the officer's staff. A GB sergeant wore two cubes in his buttonholes, like an army lieutenant, received twice as much as an army senior lieutenant, and in addition, had many privileges - for example, access to the special trade, a system of closed stores where things of people killed by the Chekists were sold at bargain prices.

All higher ranks of the GUGB wore insignia two steps higher than the insignia for the corresponding army rank.

GB junior lieutenant - three dice, like an army starlet. Captain GB - three sleepers, like a colonel.

Major GB is already the highest command staff. It's already one rhombus, like the Kombrig.

Commissars of the GB of the 3rd, 2nd and 1st ranks corresponded to komkor, commanders of the 2nd and 1st ranks.

A little later, the highest Chekist rank was introduced: General Commissar of the GB. These are big stars, like those of the Marshal of the Soviet Union, only not on scarlet buttonholes, but on blue ones.

I'm not telling you all this for nothing. Now I'm going to show you where the main dog is buried.

2

Here's the thing: in those days, the NKVD was the largest and most powerful organization in the world. In addition to the GUGB, the NKVD had many other divisions:

- GURKM - Workers' and Peasants' Militia,
- GUPVO - border and internal protection,
- GUPO - Fire Department,
- GUSosdor was an organization that hit the roadlessness and slackness with free labor,
- Gulag - no translation required,
- GEU - Economics,
- GTU - transportation, and so on.

The Militia carried their militia ranks, the GUGB carried their State Security ranks, and all other NKVD units carried exactly the same military ranks as the army.

This circumstance had serious consequences. Stalin's purge was directed primarily and mainly not against the army, but against the punitive apparatus. When we are given figures, we get the impression that the army suffered more than the NKVD. However, the statistics of the purge of the NKVD take into account mainly those Chekists who bore special Chekist ranks, that is, employees of one NKVD unit only - the GUGB. But the vast majority of Chekists did not have special Chekist ranks, but ordinary army ranks. That's what they were recorded in the statistics of the Red Army. Because of this, the statistics of purification of the NKVD turned out to be clearly understated, and the statistics of purification of the Red Army - overstated.

Let's say, for example, some military leader with lozenges in his buttonholes was arrested - and he was put up against the wall. We cry - Stalin has ruined a military leader! And this may not be a commander at all. Yes, the comrade had a military rank, but he never served in the Red Army, had no idea about strategy and tactics. He is no commander. Let's move on to examples.

The list of the innocently killed includes, for example, Senior Major Semyon Grigorievich Firin-Pupko. Clearly - a pure-blooded Chekist. He is recorded in the Chekist statistics.

And here is Divintendant Berzin Eduard Petrovich, slandered, arrested and shot during the years of lawlessness. (This is not the Berzin who was the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, this is another one.) Divintendant in translation to later concepts is something like a lieutenant-general of the Intendant Service. Judging by his rank, he must have been a high ranking logistics officer. And he must have held a corresponding position - something like chief of rear of a large military district, Moscow or Kiev. Let's check: is it so?

No, it's not. No, you didn't. We made a mistake. Divintendent Berzin E. P. - director of the trust "Dalstroy". Let's open the "Gulag Handbook" by Jacques Rossi (Moscow: Prosvet, 1991) and check the correctness of our understanding of the term "Dalstroy". Frenchman Jacques Rossi served a full term in Soviet penal institutions, served in those very years, was under investigation in the most central institutions and even sat in the same cell with Nogtev, former head of SLON, Solovetsky camp of special purpose, the most famous Soviet concentration camp. Here is what the handbook says about the organization we are interested in:

Dalstroy is the most powerful and almost autonomous kingdom in the Gulag empire. Dalstroy was founded in 1932-1933 on the shore of the Sea of Okhotsk, at the head of the Kolyma River. The main task was gold mining. Local forests, coal, etc. are exploited only for Dalstroy's own needs. All works are carried out by convicts,

This included the construction of settlements and towns for freemen (see Magadan), the construction of hundreds and thousands of kilometers of highways, barracks for prisoners, etc., as well as the construction of a number of other projects. By the beginning of the 40s Dalstroy stretched for 1300 km from south to north and 1700 km from east to west, covering the western part of Kamchatka and eastern Yakutia. Dalstroy was not subordinate to the local administration (see Gulag). From the late 30s to early 50s 400-500 thousand prisoners were brought to Dalstroy annually (see Vanino, Djurma), but due to high mortality rate the total

number never exceeded 2-3 million. The first chief of Dalstroy, E. P. Berzin. His deputy and chief of the USVITLag Garanin (see Garanin shootings). Berzin was arrested and shot as an enemy of the people in 1937, Garanin - in 1939.

This is such information. For those who want to know more about "commander" Berzin, I strongly recommend "Kolyma Stories" by Varlam Shalamov. Shalamov observed Berzin and similar "strategists" in natural conditions. From an extremely close distance. He showed our gulag "commanders", owners (slave owners) and masters of millions of souls in all their glory.

Comrades Berzin and Garanin innocently died in the years of arbitrariness and lawlessness. And if there was a war, strategist Berzin and strategist Garanin would have shown Hitler! They would have. And they are now listed as combat commanders. And "Military History Journal" publishes their names in the general lists of innocently killed commanders of the Red Army and names their positions. Without being embarrassed. Eternal memory to the innocent victims!

4

Here is one more divintendant, comrade Peterson Rudolf Augustovich, former commandant of the Moscow Kremlin. This position is not army, but purely Chekist. UKMK, the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin is one of the most important divisions of our competent bodies. Dvintendant Peterson was shot on 21

August, 1937. And let us not cry over this "innocent victim", over this "great commander". How he performed his duties, we shall see a little later. Under him, some scoundrels could freely break through to the leadership of the country and beat our leaders on the back of the neck, and the Kremlin guards subordinate to Comrade Peterson, in violation of all the instructions and statutes, freely let the intruders into the guarded objects. If comrade Peterson remained on the post, then, look, during war German spies and saboteurs on the Kremlin would move by short runs, breaking gates and dispersing sentries from fighting posts.

One more shot commandant of the Kremlin - comrade Tkalun Peter Pakhomovich. His rank is purely commander's - commander, and he is listed under the category of commanders of the Red Army, and his work is chekist.

But we're still dealing with the provincials.

Divintendant Ivanov Boris Nikolayevich. He is from the Air Defense Department of the USSR NKVD. We think that air defense is air defense, but we were fooled again. This is not air defense at all, but border and internal security, i.e. vertukhay service.

He's a divintendent again. Also listed as Red Army. Strategist. Pliner Israel Israelievich. Position - Head of the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR. What a time! At its peak. He was removed from his post on November 14, 1938 and arrested. This is when Yezhov, Frinovsky and his comrades rolled from their posts, dragging the lower-ranking ones with them. Dvintendant Pliner received his bishak on February 22, 1939, just in time for the anniversary of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, in which he had never served. On a holiday.

And here's divvoenvrach Barkov Alexander Nikolaevich, head of the sanitary department of the NKVD GUPVO of the USSR NKVD. Provided the Vertukhai health care. A necessary thing, but it had nothing to do with the army.

These lists are like a telephone book - a lot of names and surnames in them. When we are given the figures of innocently killed commanders, let us remember that these figures are, first, monstrously perverted and inflated, and secondly, one third of the innocently killed were commissars nobody needed, and another third were prison guards of high rank.

I'll tell you more. Even in the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR itself, many employees had ordinary army ranks. Example: the head of the GUGB himself, the already mentioned Frinovsky, had the army rank of Komkor, and then - Commander. And Comrade Frinovsky is not on the NKVD lists, but on the army lists. In the "Military History Journal" was a permanent column "Executioners and victims. Died in the years of lawlessness." This rubric confuses anyone: who is the victim here? The editorial staff should have at least singled out at least one of them with an asterisk: here it is, they say, a victim. But we can't find any victims in these lists - only executioners.

Nikolai Nikolayevich Fedorov, the chief of the most important of all GUGB units, the Directorate of Special Divisions, also held the ordinary military rank of kombrig. This is not some intendant or lawyer. A commander. Young and handsome. The age of the century. At the age of 37 years, since July 1937 - the head of the NKVD Department in Odessa region. Clearly, he coped with his position. Therefore, since February 1938 he became the head of the NKVD Department in Kiev region. He coped here too. Therefore, in May 1938, Kombrig Fedorov was appointed head of the Office of Special Divisions of the NKVD of the USSR.

The NKVD is the secret police.

Inside the NKVD is the GUGB. It's the secret police inside the secret police.

And inside the GUGB is the Directorate of Special Divisions. It's a secret police within the secret police and once again within the secret police. That's what Kombrig Fyodorov commanded.

This young "commander" died innocently before his fortieth birthday. That he was an experienced Chekist is beyond doubt. At the age of 37, not only to head the NKVD of Odessa, but to master *such a* position in an extremely short period of time, and to hold on and be promoted - this is the highest class.

But where could Kombrig Fyodorov gain military experience? Commander's experience? During the Civil War, he was a clerk in the Cheka: he wrote the names of the executed in special books, made interrogation reports. When the Civil War ended, clerk Fyodorov was twenty years old. And he did not serve in the Red Army for a single day, even as a private soldier. He unraveled conspiracies. And he's on the list of repressed military leaders.

American communist historian M. Steinberg once announced that there

were intelligent people in the Red Army, however, all of them were wiped out: *"Stalin killed and removed before the war almost 40 thousand! And these were the best, most experienced generals and officers. They were replaced by people incompetent and without combat experience"* (New Russian Word (New York), June 17, 1996).

I was gonna be outraged. I wanted to argue. I was out of control. Then I waved my hand: Okay, so be it. Let's agree. Let's consider that Comrade Frinovsky, commander of the 1st rank, was the best, the most experienced chief of the NKVD GUGB of the USSR. He was so good! He was so competent! And after him came incompetent Beria, Merkulov, Goglidze, Ryumin, Tsinaeva, Rapava, Kobulov. Were they capable of such feats as their great predecessor?

Let's agree: combrig Comrade Fedorov was the best chief of the Special Divisions Department of the NKVD GUGB of the USSR. He was gentle and affectionate. Eyes smart, a little tired. And immense combat experience.

Let us not argue with the fact that Comrade Pliner was the best chief of the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR. Apparently, as soon as he was removed, the Gulag fell into disrepair. After him in the camps there was no such order, such care about people as in 1937-1938. After him, the camps were ruled by people who were illiterate, inexperienced, without combat experience. But Comrade Pliner had plenty of combat experience. And he was terribly competent. And his eyes were kind and kind.

ГЛАВА 6.

Why did Sailor Dybenko become a revolutionary?

A drunken mob yelled.

The mustache is twisted in a force.

*You drive gray-haired admirals upside their heads with rifle butts.
from a bridge in Helsingfors.*

B. Mayakovsky. Ode to the Revolution

1

On February 23, 1938, the entire Soviet people and all progressive humanity solemnly celebrated the 20th anniversary of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. 20 years before that, on February 23, 1918, the Red Guards won their first victories near Pskov and Narva over the regular troops of Kaiser's Germany. These first victories became the birthday of the Red Army. At numerous rallies and solemn meetings that took place all over the country in February 1938, many warm words were said to our native army. The only thing that was not mentioned was the name of the one who led the first red squads to glorious victories.

A month before the anniversary, on January 24, 1938, the first Soviet medal "20 Years of the Red Army" was established. The medal was awarded to those who particularly distinguished themselves in battles, who paid for the first victories with their blood, who led the Red Army from victory to victory. Many people were awarded. But the Deputy People's Commissar of the Forestry Industry, commander of the 2nd rank Pavel Efimovich Dybenko did not receive the jubilee medal. But it was he who led the Red Army in the battle of Narva on February 23, 1918.

Soon the legendary commander was arrested. He was accused of espionage in favor of the United States, his trial lasted 17 minutes.

The sentence is standard: execution without delay.

The irony of fate is that the Deputy Commissar of the Forest Industry, Commander of the 2nd rank Dybenko, remained in the Red Army cadres until

his arrest; his last position in the Red Army was commander of the Leningrad Military District. On the way of the enemy, which is coming to Peter - a huge Lake Peipsi. It can be bypassed to the north, through Narva, or to the south, through Pskov. If commander of the 2nd rank Dybenko had not been promoted to the People's Commissariat of Forestry Industry, and then demoted to the Lefortovo cellar, if he had remained in the post of commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, in 1941 he would have stopped and defeated the Germans near Pskov and Narva as he defeated them in 1918.

2

We're gonna stop here for a minute. Let's get our thoughts together. What is the People's Commissariat of Forestry? It's the People's Commissariat of Forestry. Our country is the largest, we have more forests than anyone else in the world, the forest was felled on thousands of square kilometers and millions of cubes were exported. But it is not clear why the hard labor of hundreds of thousands of loggers should be led by a man in a military uniform, in the high rank of commander of the 2nd rank?

Before Pavel Dybenko, the post of deputy Commissar of Forestry was held by commissar of the 2nd rank Lazar Iosifovich Kogan, the first chief of the Gulag, and after Dybenko - by commissar of the 3rd rank Solomon Rafailovich Miliptein from the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.

That's where the illustrious commander went. In the wrong steppe. Wrong suit. Or maybe it was the right one after all. Comrade Stalin had logic in everything. And if the loggers were commanded not by some bureaucrats, but by the most responsible fighters of the secret front, fearless knights of the GB, the best administrators of the Gulag and legendary commanders of the Civil War, then it made sense.

However, the knights did not stay long at those posts. They were taken under their white hands and sent to the right place. Comrade Dybenko was also taken. And now the legendary hero of the Civil War, deputy commissar of the timber industry, commander of the 2nd rank Comrade Dybenko is sitting. Sitting and writing.

Dybenko writes a letter to Comrade Stalin. And in the letter he logically and simply proves that the accusations against him are nonsense, that he is not an American spy. He proves it with a simple and clear formula, one sentence: *"After all, I do not speak the American language..."* (Volkogonov D. A.

Triumph and Tragedy. Moscow: APN, 1989. Book 2. P. 269).

Forgive the strategist's ignorance of the American language, but we will take his argument to heart. I, for example, have been accused of being an agent of every intelligence agency in the world. Now I can proudly argue that I am not an Argentine spy, because I am not very good with the Argentine language. Nor am I a Brazilian spy - I don't know Brazilian, you can check. Not Bolivian, not Peruvian, not Paraguayan, not Colombian, not Ecuadorian. And I haven't learned Algerian yet either.

One phrase of Comrade Dybenko reveals quite a lot to us. At one time he commanded the Baltic Fleet, and under his command was the intelligence of the Baltic Fleet. Then he was the Commissar of the Navy, and under his command was the entire naval intelligence. Later he commanded a number of military districts, and each time he had a powerful intelligence apparatus with its own foreign agent networks under his command, which Comrade Dybenko had to manage.

We will soon see how Dybenko commanded regiments and divisions, squadrons and fleets, but for now we will note that he had a vague idea about the actions of intelligence. I hope that every fan of the detective genre knows: to pass secrets to Mexican intelligence, it is not necessary to know the Mexican language. And you don't have to know English to pass secrets to American intelligence. If they are interested in receiving information, then let their spies learn our language. And our spies should learn their languages. An American intelligence officer, if he intends to recruit Russians, is obliged to speak Russian. With Comrade Dybenko the American spy could quite easily explain himself without resorting to English.

Did Comrade Dybenko not understand such things? And isn't it time to take a closer look at this hero?

3

Pavel Dybenko was a sailor in the Baltic Fleet. He began his service on the penalty ship "Dvina" (Krasnaya Zvezda. February 26, 1989). Our favorite army newspaper does not say what Sailor Dybenko was guilty of. But he was obviously not sent to the penalized ship because of his revolutionary activity, otherwise it would have been reported.

At the height of World War I, Sailor Dybenko became one of the instigators of the anti-war speech on the battleship "Emperor Paul I". This interesting peculiarity will manifest itself many times later: our "brilliant commanders" in their youth were mostly pacifists who did not want to fight.

The Baltic Fleet was inactive, the ships stood on bases, sailors were sitting in warm cabins, playing cards and rioting out of boredom. At all times in all fleets of the world ship rebels were hanged on rails, especially during the war. But the Russian Empire was too liberal, that's why it collapsed. The rebel and instigator Pavel Dybenko was not shot, not hanged, but dressed as a soldier and sent to the front.

"Soviet Military Encyclopedia" (in 8 volumes. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980. Vol. 3. P. 277) reports that and at the front, Comrade Dybenko continued to engage in the same thing - anti-war agitation. Here he was arrested again. They should hang such people, but they did not. And then the fall of the monarchy. And immediately Dybenko became the head of the Baltic Fleet.

The drunken sailors went wild. Under the leadership of Dybenko and Raskolnikov (about him we will speak ahead), a monstrous violence was committed against the fleet officers and their families. Following the officers, the victims of the massacre were all those who could be called "kontroi". And anyone could be called that. Wild scenes of sailors' rampage are described many times. One of the evidences is A. Olshansky's book "Notes of an Agent of the Intelligence Service" (Paris, 1927). What for decades was declared a slander, is now recognized by "Krasnaya Zvezda" (October 4, 1997), telling about the mutiny on the battleship "Emperor Paul I":

Lieutenant Savinsky was killed by a sledgehammer blow on the back of his head by stoker Rudenok, who had crept up from behind. With the same sledgehammer the stoker

Rudenok also killed Ensign Shumansky. He also killed Ensign Bulich. The senior officer, who was trying to talk sense into the crew on the upper deck, was seized by them, beaten with anything, then dragged to the side and thrown out on the ice.

Officers were killed just for being officers. And drowned in ice-holes. And some were not drowned. Dybenko and Raskolnikov's overdrunk, blatant brothers rode on trotters over officers' corpses, trampling them into the snow and dung.

It is etched from our memory, but that massacre of officers had far-

reaching consequences. At that time, the Baltic Fleet was based in Helsingfors (now Helsinki, Finland). In World War II, big and strong countries surrendered to aggressors without long resistance, but little Finland suddenly showed such steadfastness that surprised Stalin himself. One of the reasons for this resilience was the bodies of Russian officers crushed by the sledge of a drunken revolutionary. Those officers Finland remembered. The people of Finland knew that if the Red Army conquered their country, the liberators would do everything that the drunken Dybenko did. Therefore, despite all the losses and sacrifices, Finland did not surrender. Finland remembers the Red Army, the liberator, well even now - go to any Finnish historical museum.

4

And Dybenko, having had enough of tobogganing, headed the Tsentrobalt - an organization that became the head of the fleet ^[9]. Here fate brought him together with a fiery revolutionary, the general's daughter Alexandra Kollontai. Revolutionary young lady irresistibly drawn to the fleet, in the emptied admiral's quarters, in sailors' cabins. Sasha Kollontai called for world revolution and free love. Her passionate call did not go unanswered, her appearance on the ships sailors always waited impatiently. Her appearances were always a holiday for sailors.

In the October days of 1917, Pavel Dybenko played a decisive role (to say the least) in the armed uprising in Petrograd.

On his orders, the cruiser Aurora and ten other ships entered the Neva. Ten thousand armed sailors became the decisive force that carried out the coup d'état.

The night of the coup is Dybenko's finest hour. He - as part of the first Soviet government. There is also his girlfriend Alexandra Kollontai. She is also a member of the Soviet government, People's Commissar of State Welfare.

It was like a magical fairy tale. Him and her. Both in government. The marriage of Pavel Dybenko and Alexandra Kollontai was recorded in the first civil status book of the young Soviet republic. The first marriage was a failure: both too much appreciated the charms of free love. Their marriage began all Soviet marriages. By their divorce - all divorces.

It was no time for marriages. Revolution!

5

The first and main opponent of the victorious communists was the Russian people. After the fall of the monarchy, a Provisional Government was formed. A provisional government. It didn't need to be overthrown. It did not intend to rule Russia for long. The fate of the country was to be decided by a popularly elected Constituent Assembly: to establish such a form of government, such a political, economic and social order that would be acceptable to the majority of the population. The peoples of Russia elected their deputies and sent them to the capital to carry out what the majority wished. This is what Lenin and Trotsky could not allow. The Bolsheviks had already overthrown the Provisional Government. Now it was necessary to prevent the people from expressing their will. Lenin and Trotsky made a simple decision: disperse the Constituent Assembly and shoot the workers' demonstrations.

Prominent Russian historian Y.G. Felshtinsky writes:

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were trying to find a less risky solution to the problem than dispersal. On November 20, at a meeting of the SNK, Stalin proposed a partial postponement of the convocation. (Felshtinsky Y. The Collapse of the World Revolution.

The Brest Peace. October 1917 - November 1918. M.: Terra, 1992. C. 192).

Stalin's proposal: not to disperse the Constituent Assembly, but to delay its opening. But who listened to the voice of reason? At that time, the Bolshevik Party was indiscriminately dominated by political extremists.

It was decided to prepare for the dispersal. The Sovnarkom obliged the Commissar for Maritime Affairs P.E. Dybenko to concentrate up to 10-12 thousand sailors in Petrograd by November 27 (ibid.).

Dybenko and Raskolnikov did everything as they were ordered: the workers' demonstrations were shot, the constituent assembly was dispersed. And here it is time to ask a fundamental question: why did Sailor Dybenko become a revolutionary?

I was only able to find two possible answers to this question.

First: to give the people freedom and happiness.

The second: to get to the power himself and get drunk on it. The first option does not pass. Dybenko not only did not want to fulfill the will of the people, he did not even want to hear it. He was in a hurry to disperse the people's elected representatives even before they began to speak. He was in a hurry to pacify the people with machine-gun fire. So the first answer's out. What's left?

6

The same question would be good to ask comrades Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov and all the others who seized power in October 1917: Why did you seize it? To bring happiness to the people? So nobody chose you for this role, nobody authorized or asked you. The people chose the Constituent Assembly. You should listen to it.

And then there are the people in the streets. In St. Petersburg, peaceful demonstrations in support of the Constituent Assembly chosen by the people. But the Communists have thrown this assembly out. And on the people - from

machine guns. The revolution was made not for the nobility, not for the landowners, not for the merchants, not for the industrialists, not for the peasantry, not for the priests, not for the large property owners and not even for the small ones. But for whom? For the proletariat! And it was on the proletariat that Dybenko's sailors first struck with machine guns. So the revolution is not for the proletariat. Then for whom?

We are told a lot about the idealist Bukharin. He believed in ideals. He wanted the people to be better off. When they put machine guns into the people, is it better for the people? What was the idealist Bukharin's opinion on this matter? What was he thinking, looking from his balcony at the shooting of workers?

At the moment when the first drops of labor blood fell on the cobblestones of Liteiny Prospekt, the system of power that had existed in Russia for more than 70 years was fully and finally established.

For the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, for the shooting of the workers' demonstrations, any new power would have tried Lenin, Trotsky, Dybenko, Raskolnikov and all the other "heroes of October". Because from that very moment Lenin and Trotsky simply could not give power to anyone. Therefore, from that very moment, no elections could be allowed except those

in which they would be guaranteed an overwhelming majority of votes.

From that point on, they could not tolerate the existence of a free press.

From then on they should have crushed all parties, including their own.

They should have strangled the unions from then on.

From then on, they should have continued to shoot workers' demonstrations, or better yet, prevented them by identifying the instigators and eliminating them.



No one elected the party of Lenin-Trotsky, therefore, the power of this party was illegal. Illegal power can only be held by force. Only by terror.

And it was not Stalin who started the terror in 1937, but Sailor Dybenko in 1917. More precisely, Lenin, Trotsky and all their brethren, including Sailor Dybenko.

Dybenko, the perpetrator of their criminal schemes.

GLAVA 7.

As People's Commissar Dybenko crushed the Germans at Narva.

Dybenko's detachment was full of suspicious "brothers" and did not inspire me with confidence; it was enough to look at this sailor's liberty with mother-of-pearl buttons stitched on wide kleshi, with dissembling manners, to realize that they could not fight with regular German units.

Lieutenant General Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich. All Power to the Soviets. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957. C. 260

Millions of jackals rushed into this network of power. And if it were not for Stalin's superpower, they would have devoured the whole society, plundered everything, ruined it.

Alexander Zinoviev. Our youthful flight. Lausanne. 1983. C.35

1

The dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, the shooting of workers' demonstrations in the streets of St. Petersburg had consequences. Russia was still in World War I, but no one was willing to defend the new government that was shooting at the people. The Germans moved forward on Petrograd. In their path is Lake Peipsi. It can, as we know, be bypassed from two sides. South through Pskov, north through Narva.

And Russia has no army. The Communists decimated the army. Dybenko distinguished himself in this field and became famous. Only Baltic sailors could save the new power at the beginning of 1918. Well, People's Commissar for Maritime Affairs comrade Dybenko, take your sailors, lead them to Pskov and Narva, save the revolution! Stop the Germans!

And Dybenko led the sailors. It was his actions on February 23, 1918 and became a national holiday - the Day of the Red Army and Navy [\[10\]](#).

2

On February 23, 1968, I received my first medal "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR". Our entire nation and all progressive mankind celebrated the glorious anniversary of those first victories, which became the birthday of the invincible and legendary Soviet Army. I am a passionate fan of orders and medals. I dreamed about my first medal in guardhouses and outfits,

secretly wrote poems about it. At that time I was completing my tenth year in epaulettes: seven years - in scarlet of Voronezh and Kalinin Suvorov schools, three years - in crimson of Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School.

And here was the first medal. It was magnificent: big, shining, with red enamel on the star, on a satin blue ribbon with white and red stripes in the middle. I didn't wear it on my chest. No. I held it in my fist the whole time, not believing my good fortune. That day, I decided to study even harder. And I decided to start now. The holidays would pass, and immediately afterward, a seminar on Lenin's work, "A Hard but Necessary Lesson."

We have studied this work countless times. Comrade Lenin taught us that the enemy must be fought. One must know how to fight him! The lecturers usually pronounced these words with an emphasis on the word "know how". I didn't have to prepare for the seminar. I knew this work almost by heart. And then I decided: why almost? Let me learn it by heart. I opened Lenin's volume, and I'm sitting here learning: *"This week was a bitter, hurtful, hard, but necessary, useful, and beneficial lesson for the Party and the entire Soviet people."*

I learn not only Lenin's article, but also the notes to it: the article was first published on February 25, 1918 in the evening edition of Pravda. This should be remembered especially. I have noticed: such minute details are valued extremely highly by any examination committee. If by the way you drop as something insignificant: "February 25, 1918 in the evening edition...", then any examining hand will immediately draw a big fat plus to the five. And a small discovery warmed my soul: here would be a seminar, and hardly anyone paid attention to the fact that we are discussing Lenin's work exactly 50 years after its first publication.

That's when it hit me. That's when I choked on air. I realized something at first, but I didn't know what it was, I didn't have time to realize it yet to express what I understood for myself in words and images. Only after I had a breath did I begin to comprehend: 50 years ago, on February 23, 1918, the Red Army at Pskov and Narva won its first brilliant victories, which we have been amicably celebrating for 50 years, for which we, the descendants who have never fought, receive medals. Almost simultaneously with this historic event, also 50 years ago, February 25, 1918, in the evening edition of the newspaper Pravda...

In the evening edition. There was an afternoon edition, but there was no Lenin article there yet. Lenin's article was just being typed during the day....

Consequently, Lenin wrote it on February 24 or on the night of February 25, 1918. February 23 - great victories, and on February 24, having learned of the victories, Comrade Lenin, swearing and biting his nails, writes that the entire past week was for the entire Soviet people "a bitter, hurtful, hard lesson." Comrade Lenin dispenses the most valuable advice: the enemy must be fought! One must know how to fight the enemy! With emphasis on the word "know how".

How profound Leninism is! Without Lenin's volumes, we would not have known that the enemy must be fought. Not only must we fight, but we must also know how to fight. Comrade Lenin, without mentioning by name, criticizes someone who does not know how to fight: *"agonizingly shameful reports about the regiments' refusal to keep their positions, about their refusal to defend even the Narva line, about their failure to carry out the order to destroy everything and everyone during the retreat; not to mention the flight, chaos, short-sightedness, helplessness, slackness."*

Tens of millions of people served in our army for fifty years. "A hard but necessary lesson" is in the golden ten of Lenin's obligatory works, which every military man was supposed to know, if not by heart, then very close to the text. Did no one pay attention to this proximity of dates? There's nothing to discover. But why do I see this proximity and nobody else does? And Lenin wrote not about some mysterious section of defense, but called Pskov and Narva by their own names. Am I going crazy?

And it is not clear: did the big bosses from the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army, those who strongly recommended these works to us, not notice that in a simple comparison of dates the Leninist article by its title alone refute any accounts of great victories supposedly won on February 23, 1918?

What's the lesson? Each of us has been in a situation where we have done something wrong and there is no excuse. And then, for lack of anything better, we turn to the general meeting of the team: this will be a lesson for me.

Comrade Lenin ruined the army and the navy with his anti-war agitation, the Germans pressed, the front collapsed, and Comrade Lenin has to answer to the whole of Russia. And he mumbles: it's a lesson. And he advises: the enemy must be fought.... Lenin's genius is that he mumbled nonsense that can't be argued with. Who would think of arguing otherwise? Who would argue that you don't have to fight the enemy? That it is not necessary to know how to fight?

My point? I mean that if Pavel Dybenko had won great victories at Pskov

and Narva on February 23, 1918, Comrade Lenin, having learned about it on February 24, would have written a completely different article during the day and night, and something completely different in content would have appeared in the evening issue of Pravda on February 25, 1918.

But it was a hurtful and bitter lesson. And, understandably, a very necessary one. Until the thunder rumbled, Comrade Lenin, like a typhoid louse, decimated the army with "Trench Truth" and other abominations published with German money. But the Germans taught Comrade Lenin a lesson, and he became concerned about the defense of the country.

3

Since that day, the great victories at Pskov and Narva became a subject of special and somewhat unhealthy interest for me, and the name of the great commander Dybenko, too. We have a lot of books about the war and all libraries are full of those books. And here I am reading "Reflecting on the past" by Lieutenant-General S. A. Kalinin. A. Kalinin. In 1918, a soldier Kalinin, returning from the front, created a revolution in Samara. Famine. Ruin. The position of the Communists is precarious. People were in short supply.

I don't remember now exactly, at the end of March or the beginning of April, an event occurred in Samara that excited the entire party leadership

organization. Suddenly, without any warning, an echelon of Baltic sailors headed by P. E. Dybenko arrived in the city. At first we rejoiced at the new addition. But on the same day a telegram signed by M. D. Bonch-Bruевич came to the Governorate Committee. The telegram suggested that Dybenko should be immediately detained and taken to Moscow for the unauthorized abandonment of the fighting position near Narva together with the detachment (Kalinin. A. A. Reflecting on the past. P. 71).

We were told that there were great victories at Narva, but for some reason the victor himself escaped and is being caught all over the country. So the Samara Bolsheviks decided how to deal with the sailors. They decided:

Kalinin alone is going as a delegate, without guards and without weapons.

As soon as I appeared on the station platform, the sailors took me into custody and, as a "contra", brought me to Dybenko's carriage. At the table sat a bogatyrsky-looking sailor..... (Ibid.)

Communist Kalinin shamed the revolutionary Dybenko, he repented and decided to return to Moscow.

I learned the end of this story 21 years later. On February 26, 1989 "Krasnaya Zvezda" placed a large article about the great commander Dybenko, in which a couple of lines said:

For withdrawal from Narva and unauthorized departure from the front, Dybenko was expelled from the Party. (He was reinstated only in 1922.) He was tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal.... The Council of People's Commissars made a decision - to remove Dybenko from his post. Pavel Efimovich had already prepared himself for this: "Of course, I am to blame for the fact that the sailors ran to Gatchina..."

Here's what happened. Comrade Dybenko, a member of the first Soviet government, and his valiant sailors were ordered to stop the

German troops at Pskov and Narva. The fiery revolutionaries did not win any victories at Pskov or Narva, did not stop anyone, and did not cover their banners with unfading glory. On the contrary, at the first encounter with the enemy, the pampered sailors, who had sat through the whole war in the ports, trembled and ran away. And our hero with them. Or maybe ahead of them.

The defenders of the revolution ran all the way to Gatchina. Here it is necessary to open a map to estimate their heroic way. 120 kilometers ran the defenders of the socialist fatherland. Three marathons in the deep February snow. In Gatchina they seized an echelon and ran across the country to save their revolutionary skins. In pursuit of the rescued the head of the Supreme Military Council Bonch-Bruевич sends telegrams across the country: to catch the heroes and bring them under escort to Moscow. The heroes were

supposed to stop the enemy, but they themselves must be stopped. If they can be found.

The heroes were found as far away as Samara. Beyond the Volga. Now it is necessary to take a globe and estimate this heroic departure. The Baltic heroes appeared in Samara at the end of March or at the beginning of April. And who knows where for a whole month after the great victories they still had time to visit. Maybe they ran to Lake Baikal, made sure that nobody was chasing them, and came back? Here, deep in the rear, they are defending the revolution: they grab the first man they see and ask him if he is a counter-attacker. Here they are brave enough.

I am only interested in one question: what did revolutionary Dybenko feed his revolutionaries all this time after fleeing from Narva? Another question: from whom did the revolutionaries flee? They ran from the German army. And the notion of this army is very broad. At that time, German sailors were also rioting in their ports. At that time, Germany was already starving. At that time, the German army was already completely and utterly exhausted by the war. The German monarchy collapsed in November 1918. It lasted until November only because Comrade Lenin signed the Brest Peace with the Kaiser in March 1918 and gave the Kaiser the Ukraine all the way to Kursk and Rostov, together with ore, coal and steel industry, together with bread and meat. Lenin gave the Kaiser Poland and the Baltic States, paid huge reparations in gold and bread. That's how the Kaiser's army got to the point in the fall. But in February 1918, all this Leninist help to the Kaiser was not yet there, so Germany was on the very edge, standing over the abyss. Yuri Felshtinsky writes:

But the most surprising thing was that the Germans were advancing without an army. They acted in small scattered detachments of 100-200 men, not even regular units, but assembled from volunteers. Because of the Bolshevik panic and rumors about the approach of mythical German troops, towns and stations were left without a fight even before the enemy arrived. Dvinsk, for example, was taken by a German detachment of 60100 men. Pskov was taken by a small detachment of Germans who arrived on motorcycles. In Rezhitsa, the German detachment was so small that it could not occupy the telegraph, which worked for a whole day (Felshtinsky Y. The Collapse of the World Revolution. P. 259-260).

The People's Commissar for Maritime Affairs, a member of the Soviet government, commissar for naval affairs, commander and naval commander Dybenko and his soldiers fled from this army. He abandoned Petrograd without any defense, but the Germans simply did not have the strength to capture it.

The Germans never reached Petrograd. And Dybenko, having run unnoticed past Moscow, fled across the Volga.



They will ask: why are we talking about Dybenko and Dybenko?

I answer: among the 1st rank commanders shot by Stalin, the most famous and high-ranking is Frinovsky. And among the commanders of the 2nd rank the most famous is Dybenko: he alone was a member of the Soviet government. The other commanders of the 2nd rank did not have such experience and did not have such brilliant victories.

But there were other generals! Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Blucher! They won victories!

We did. We'll reach them too. But I warn you at once: those others are not as "brilliant" as Dybenko. What Dybenko did on February 23, 1918, we have been celebrating for ninety years. And the victories of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Blucher, Uborevich, Putna, Vatsetis are not so brilliant and grandiose. We do not celebrate their victories.

There's nothing to celebrate.

GLAVA 8.

Was Commander Dybenko an American spy?

*I am in awe of New York City,
But I won't pull the cap off my temple.
The Soviets have their own pride:
We look down on the bourgeois.*
B. Mayakovsky

1

It is interesting how Dybenko's trial ended. Taking into account his proletarian origin and great merits, the Soviet court acquitted the deserter Dybenko. The justification is this: he was not ready to fight.

That's right. To break, not to build. Dybenko was ready to decompose the army and navy. He was ready to smash officers' heads with a sledgehammer. He was ready to shoot workers' demonstrations. To disperse the nationally elected Constituent Assembly - always ready. But not ready to fight at the front. A little danger - and the revolutionary Dybenko ran far and fast. They barely caught him.

Having caught him, he was kicked out of the Lenin-Trotsky government and the Communist Party, but he was not shot or even imprisoned. And here after the trial begin quite amazing adventures. "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" (Vol. 3. P. 277) reports that since the summer of 1918 Dybenko was on underground work in Ukraine.

That's strange. He was kicked out of the Party, and now where is he going? To work underground! Expelled for slackness and cowardice, for desertion, and after that... Only such people are needed in the underground. Dybenko himself got scared and ran away across the Volga.

thus resigning from the Trotskyist-Leninist government, self-effacing. And what if he escapes from his underground work as well?

And what underground are we talking about? The underground was party-based, each party had its own: the anarchists had their own passwords, addresses and hiding places, and the Left SRs had their own. To which underground was Pasha Dybenko sent, if he was non-partisan? Let's imagine that the underground leader Dybenko arrived at the safe house with this certification: he is no longer a Communist, he was kicked out for cowardice, now he will work with you. And who would want him like that?

Let's imagine that during the war Hitler, for cowardice, threw out of his government and the Nazi army, let's say, Göring, and threw him into the Soviet rear - to draw swastikas on fences, to paste leaflets, and at night to secretly hang Hitler's red banners on factory chimneys. The inconvenience is that Goering was a man large, conspicuous, like Pavel Dybenko. Besides, all Russia knew Gering from his caricatures, and he would have been quickly caught. But at that time Pavel Dybenko was better known in Russia and Ukraine than Goering was in Germany in the last years of the Third Reich: chairman of the Central Balt, member of the first Soviet government, Trotskyist-Leninist Commissar, executioner of people's demonstrations and destroyer of the Constituent Assembly. His pictures were printed in all the newspapers. Having attained power, the People's Commissars printed their portraits on every occasion: here we are, your rulers, Dybenko, Kollontai, Raskolnikov - admire us. And orders-decrees were written by comrades often only for the sake of decorating them with their signatures, so that Russia would know its rulers. And every Baltic sailor knew Pavel Dybenko by sight, while they were scattered all over the country, anyone could recognize him. And the underground leader Dybenko would have failed, and the whole underground organization would have failed.

So who sent him to work underground? Here the biographers of the glorious revolutionary are silent. No one sent him to the underground. He went underground himself. In the terrible hour, when the fate of Soviet power hung in the balance, Dybenko so secreted himself that no one knew where he had gone.

Then Dybenko surfaced. The Bolsheviks seized Crimea, and Dybenko became People's Commissar for Military and Maritime Affairs of the Crimean Soviet Republic. He was in this position for a short time. Knocked the Reds out of the Crimea. And found there indelible traces of terrible atrocities.

In March 1921, Baltic sailors raised the Kronstadt Uprising. This uprising among others was suppressed by Comrade Dybenko, a former Baltic sailor and former chairman of the Tsentrobalt. He commanded the Consolidated Division. And here it is necessary to explain what a combined division is.

In Kronstadt, the garrison of the city and the crews of some ships of the Baltic Fleet rebelled against the Bolsheviks. Few Communists were willing to shed the blood of the sailors who had given power to Lenin and Trotsky. They were their own. There's no one to crush the mutiny. No loyal units. And that's when the Party sent its commanders to suppress it. Here Trotsky, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Fedko, Voroshilov and Khmelnitsky, Sedyakin, Kazansky, Putna, Fabritzius and others. Let's look into the biography of any strategist of that time and almost certainly we will find him among the Kronstadt heroes. The impression is that at that moment no one threatened the young Soviet Republic - except the peoples of Russia.

The uprising in Kronstadt could have been the detonator. The whole of Russia could have gone up in flames. Peter had already gone on strike. Already the Tambov men had put the brutal commissars on a pitchfork. The Communists had to crush Kronstadt. Urgently. That's why, having abandoned everything, they brought here the whole command staff: the rank and file could not be raised for such a task. But commanders alone were not enough. And then the Communist Party sent delegates of its X Congress. They could not go anywhere - if it goes up in flames, the delegates will be punished by the Russian people as only we know how to punish. Trotsky promised commanders and delegates a huge number of orders.

But there were not enough punishers. And then the major party members were thrown to suppress the rebellion. Here and Kalinin, and Bubnov, and Zatonsky. They threw novice writers: go, we'll declare you a classic. There, by the way, and bought himself the title of classic, the future Secretary General of the Union of Writers of the USSR, Alexander Fadeev.

But there were not enough future classics of socialist realism. They sent cadets. Most of them were careerists who had consciously chosen the Soviet regime and intended to make a career by spilling rivers of people's blood. If so, here was an opportunity for you guys to distinguish yourselves.

In addition to all that, they formed the Combined Division. It was also

called the Sbrodnaya Division. The Communists gathered into this division all the scum that existed in the country and abroad. They gathered those Communists who had done wrong, stolen, drunk, sold out, they gathered here Communist marauders and Communist rapists. Dybenko, who had fled from the battlefield, who had been expelled from the Party for cowardice, who had emerged from some unknown underground, stood at the head of the Sbrodnaya Division: forward, comrades! He was not a member of the Party, he could not have been involved in this case. But he did. And again the Kronstadt ice. Again ice-holes. And corpses under the ice. Only now it's not the officers' corpses, now it's the sailors themselves. When Dybenko revolted, he was sent just to fight at the front, and when they revolted against him, he drowned sailors.

Dybenko's bravery was reported by Yudin, deputy head of the Special Branch:

The 561st regiment, having withdrawn one and a half versts to Kronstadt, refused to go on the offensive. The reason is unknown. Comrade Dybenko ordered to deploy the second chain and shoot at those returning. Kompolka 561 took repressive measures against his Red Army men in order to force them to go on the offensive (Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Fond 114728. Volume 3. Sheet 30).

They shot their own Red Army men to make them shoot at their own sailors. Firing squad on firing squad and firing squad after firing squad. Captured sailors are to be tried. Our native proletarian court examined each case individually and passed 2103 death sentences (Military History Journal (hereinafter - VIJ). 1991. №7. C. 64).

It is not easy to pass sentences either. If one minute is spent on each case and on passing sentence, then in ten hours of hard work without interruption, only 600 death sentences can be passed. Twenty hours of labor without a single interruption would result in 1,200 death sentences. And to carry it out. Try shooting 2,000 people yourself. That's right.

From this heroic moment Dybenko's career went up again, though not as

steeply as before. He had three orders. A hero of heroes in those days. But for the entire Civil War he did not earn a single one. He didn't prove himself anywhere in the war. The first order was for Kronstadt, for the punitive expedition. For the shootings. No war happened there. The ships were frozen in the ice, and they were useless. The cannons on those ships were heavy-duty. Those guns can be used to fire at great distances at battleships with impenetrable armor. It's like shooting sparrows at infantry with those guns. There were small and medium caliber guns on ships, there were machine guns. But the Civil War was one continuous series of crises. Every time a crisis arose, carts and shells were taken from the ships and inactive forts of Kronstadt by carts, barges, sledges, trucks and echelons, they were driven to Tsaritsyn, to Voronezh, to Rostov and Bataysk, to Warsaw. So the rebellious sailors had no cartridges and shells. And a sailor is not entitled to a rifle. On ships, rifles are only for guards.

And another thing: there was no food in Kronstadt. The Communists had established such a power that for some reason the bread was gone. And butter and sugar, too. Peter starved. That's why from time to time Kronstadt's stocks were transferred to the city for eating. In 1919 the stocks of the Baltic Fleet and Kronstadt fortress were completely taken out and eaten. Then Kronstadt was tossed in from time to time. But little by little. Hunger was precisely one of the reasons for the uprising. If it was possible to be patient, the uprising should have started two or three weeks later, when the Gulf of Finland would open up. Then the insurrectionary fleet would have been safe from anyone. Then the fleet would have been a real force, and the fortress on the island would have been impregnable. But it was impossible to wait.

In the punitive operation against hungry sailors, who had nothing to shoot, and distinguished all our commanders, great strategists, and Dybenko among them. Having created a tenfold superiority in manpower and overwhelming in armament, defeated the unarmed sailors and carried out the massacre. For these exploits all those expelled from the Party began to be reinstated in its ranks. After a year of deliberation and doubts returned to the party and Pavel Dybenko. And the position he was given: commander of the division. Punitive.

The civil war was over, but the people still did not want to recognize the power of the people. And here Dybenko proved himself. And earned two more orders. In peacetime. On the punitive front. And became a legendary hero. With three orders.

1937 found Commander Dybenko in Kuibyshev as commander of the Volga Military District. His deputy was Komkor Kutyaikov. The same one who, after Chapaev's death, commanded the Chapaev Division.

The order came: Kutyaikov to take. Dybenko did not object. On the contrary, he was ready to help the Chekists organize the arrest of his deputy right in his office. Kutyaikov was taken on May 13, 1937.

By some diabolical coincidence, it was on this day, May 13, in the Kremlin, Stalin received Tukhachevsky, about which the corresponding record in the registration book. What Stalin talked to Tukhachevsky, will forever remain a mystery. But from the Kremlin, from Stalin, Tukhachevsky headed to Kuibyshev to occupy the office of Dybenko, in which Kutyaikov had just been arrested.

Tukhachevsky arrived in Kuibyshev and allegedly accepted the Volga Military District, and Dybenko allegedly surrendered it. But, having surrendered the district, Dybenko for some reason was in no hurry to leave. Dybenko for some reason stayed in Kuibyshev.

In the light of further events, this delay is understandable. Stalin expelled Tukhachevsky from Moscow in order to tear him away from his associates and subordinates and from power in Moscow. But Comrade Stalin was not so simple as to give Tukhachevsky power in Kuibyshev even for a short time.

Therefore, Dybenko, allegedly having surrendered the district to Tukhachevsky, did not hurry anywhere. He stayed where he was. To back him up. Tukhachevsky in the Volga District - only formally commander. And the power over the district actually remained in the hands of Dybenko.

If something obscene had struck Tukhachevsky in the head, it would not have been possible to realize it: the keys to power over the Volga Military District were not in his possession, but in Dybenko's.

And so Tukhachevsky was arrested and sent back to Moscow. Following him, Dybenko rushed to judge Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Putna, Primakov and others. And he did. Together with Blucher, Alksnis, Belov and others, he incriminated, exposed, stigmatized, passed judgment. And was proud of the trust. And boasted of his participation. I. V. Dubinsky recalls:

Dybenko came from Kuibyshev.... He boasted how he, Dybenko, invited his first deputy Kutyaikov to his office, and there, hiding behind

the drapes, were already waiting for NKVD workers (Dubinsky I. V. Special Account. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 201).

4

As a military theorist Pavel Efimovich Dybenko did not prove himself. He wrote many books: "In the bowels of the tsarist fleet", "Rebels", "October in the Baltic", "From the bowels of the tsarist fleet to the Great October", "Revolutionary Baltic". All these creations are not about strategy and tactics, but about the heroic deeds of the great revolutionary Dybenko.

And ended the career of a military leader, thinker and organizer of percussive lumbering in a prison cell. Among other things, Comrade Dybenko was accused of drunkenness and decomposition. The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 25, 1938 said:

Dybenko instead of conscientious fulfillment of his duties on the leadership of the district systematically drunk, decayed in moral and domestic attitude ...

(Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) "On Vol. Dybenko". Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. Fund 3. Inventory 24. Case 330. Sheet 113.)

In a letter to Stalin, Dybenko denied drunkenness:

The notes of the employees of the hotel "National" contain a certain amount of truth, which consists in the fact that I sometimes, when acquaintances came to my hotel, allowed to drink with them. But there were no drunkenness (Volkogonov D. A. Triumph and Tragedy. Book One. Ch. 2. P. 269).

The revolutionaries knew where to drink. The places of their friendly

entertainment were the National and Metropol hotels. Dybenko did not deny the moral and domestic decay. This term in the Soviet Union was understood as love for other people's wives beyond the bounds of decency. For the information of those born after all this: in the Soviet Union, the most fantastic charges could be made, from spying for Alaska to hell knows what. But there were two charges that were never brought in vain: those who didn't drink and didn't mess around with other people's wives were never charged with drunkenness and domestic violence. And if they did, it meant there were grounds for it.

Also, revolutionary Dybenko was declared an American spy. Espionage in favor of America is a bit steeply taken. But Comrade Dybenko is not completely clean here either. He had a sister living in the United States for some reason. Dybenko had official meetings with American military representatives and in private conversations asked for assistance in obtaining an allowance for his sister. And he succeeded. The poor commander's sister received the allowance in the USA.

Taking care of your sister is a sacred thing. But one must choose one of two things: to organize a coup d'état in Russia and stir up a world revolution in the hope of exterminating all the bourgeois, or to beg money from those same bourgeois. Dybenko combined these things: he hated landlords, capitalists, officers and all other oppressors with all his soul, considered them bloodsuckers, exterminated them mercilessly in very unusual ways. He devoted his life to the struggle against them,

he angrily denounced them in his immortal works, he prepared his troops for a war of liberation on a global scale. At the same time, he was begging these vampires for money to feed a relative.

Dybenko drenched Russia in blood to make life good for everyone, but he got to the point where, being a Commissar of People's Commissars, district commander, deputy Commissar, he could not (or did not want to) help his sister himself. Take her away from the capitalist hell to our prosperous paradise, and that would be the end of it!

5

Now let's imagine ourselves as American intelligence officers and look at the request for the poor sister's allowance with a shrewd intelligence eye.

The hardest part of intelligence is finding the person who has access to the

secrets. People are pouring past you in droves, but who among them has access to secrets? In this case, there was no such question. If we were American intelligence agents, and we were facing the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Commander 2nd Rank Commander Dybenko, then the main difficulty would disappear: he has access.

But how to address him if he whizzes by in a long black car surrounded by bodyguards? If he lives in a special apartment in a special house? If he spends his commander's leisure time in a special house? If he eats and drinks in special restaurants? If he does not visit stores and everything is delivered to his house? (And if he does, he visits special stores.) And where to catch him if he restores his revolutionary health in special sanatoriums? If he travels in a special train? If he fishes in special reservoirs and shoots deer in special reserves? If he is always under guard?

The occasion presented itself: an American military delegation met with Comrade Dybenko. There is contact. But how can a scout (if he was included in the delegation) in the course of official negotiations to jump to personal topics? How to find out from the red commander his inclinations, interests and hobbies? If we catch a squirrel, we should give it some nuts, a bird - some grains, a monkey - a banana on a string. The task of the scout is to

to find out who to bait: a philatelist - an extraordinary stamp; a numismatist - a wiped-out nickel. And how to find out what comrade Dybenko needed? And there were no problems: he told them himself. He himself announced to the capitalist delegates: American money is required. Shells. Green ones. Dollars. Bucks!

When recruiting, it is necessary to put the bait so that not to offend, not to frighten, not to lead to suspicion. After all, if a stupid bream with its fish brain realizes that it can swallow the hook with a worm, it will not take the worm.

And there was no problem with Comrade Dybenko here either. He not only told me himself what bait to take - he said that he would take any bait. And there is no need to be careful with him, no need to be afraid of offending him. He asks for it himself: give it to me!

That's why the American generals were surprised: a hero of the revolution, Lenin's People's Commissar, commander of the Leningrad District, and he couldn't help his sister. One hundred thousand percent guarantee - the Americans did not take advantage of such an opportunity for recruitment. Eh, if my resident's deputy, Junior Leader, a virtuoso of mining, had been there, he would have recruited her with a light jerk. Right in the same

office. Right in front of security and interpreters. He would have done it the way a good pickpocket removes a thick pocketbook from his inner pocket - with a gentle touch. No one would have even recognized the recruitment. Including the recruit himself. Then he'd be fluttering around, swallowing the hook.

6

The point is not whether Commander Dybenko was an American spy or not. It's that Dybenko was fully matured as a recruitment target. And even overripe. He could be recruited by any foreigner who accidentally came into contact with him.

Behind the financial aid to the poor revolutionary's sister, the abyss opens up. In October, 1917, the mob came to power. "Great strategists" like Dybenko had no concept of honor. They had neither revolutionary, nor class, nor proletarian, nor national pride for a penny, not a pound, not a dollar. It cost nothing for such people to make a humiliating request to the enemy.

And they did. And pestered every foreigner: get this, get that. But you can't ask. A petitioner reveals his weakest side. A high-ranking petitioner who has access to state secrets is a real catch for a spy.

And almost all our middle-class leaders turned into beggars. They arranged their economy so that it produced nothing good but tanks and airplanes, they had no conscience, and they asked foreigners for shoes for their wives and someone else....

There is an ironclad rule: don't believe, don't be afraid, don't ask! But our strategists did not know the principles and rules.

And Stalin was preparing the country and the army for war. And it should have been made clear to all the leading crowd that such behavior will be regarded as espionage. With appropriate consequences.

Comrade Stalin on the example of Dybenko and other petitioners showed the top command staff that it is not good to do so. And everyone understood Comrade Stalin.

The result of the purge: Stalin exterminated not only spies and potential spies among the top military leadership, but also so suppressed unauthorized personal contacts that the Soviet Union became the most difficult country for enemy intelligence to work in.

We have a whole bunch of them like Dybenko ahead of us. But there was one who was almost a twin to Pavel Dybenko. His alias was Raskolnikov. Dybenko and Raskolnikov together went through the Center-Balt, they two brutalized in Kronstadt and Helsingfors. They rose to dizzying heights, both had brilliant wives and were abandoned by their wives, not holding on to the heights of power. "Literaturnaya Gazeta" (March 25, 1992) describes Raskolnikov this way:

A hapless literary man who chose the name of the notorious hero of Dostoevsky as his party nickname, a leader of revolutionary sailors who were maddened by permissiveness and an impeccable executor of Lenin's secret Lenin's

Raskolnikov was a "man of ideas" and a soldier of the party. Not prone to either humor or reflection, he brought fanaticism to any task and was ready without a second thought to lead a squad of sailors robbing the houses of the clergy, and personally search the editorial office of the "liberal-professor" newspaper "Russian Vedomosti", despised by the Bolsheviks, to disperse the Constituent Assembly and sink the Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk, to command the Baltic Fleet, to direct a magazine, publishing house and, finally, art in general....

Stalin knew who to put where. Fleet Commander Raskolnikov - to lead the art. Chekist Frinovsky to command the fleets. It's not just Stalin's humor, but a test. Willingness to lead anything, as long as to lead, gave away the inexorable desire for power. Stalin sought out the most unscrupulous, the most greedy for power, and shot them. No would Frinovsky to refuse: never been on a ship, I can not pull. But no, Frinovsky clung to the chair, under himself the position rowed. And then, three months later, Comrade Stalin said: you are very high, you can not cope.

And Dybenko is of the same breed: anything to command. That's why Comrade Stalin gave Dybenko another test. The same as Frinovsky, but in the opposite direction. Chekist Frinovsky - to command the fleet, and the first naval commissar Dybenko - the lumber camp. To rule over the convicts.

And Dybenko's lackey caught the position thrown by the baron with his teeth on the fly: wherever he wanted to go, even to rule the camps, even to

shoot people, as long as the position was higher.

He started out as a bandit and ended up as a convoyer. He thought he was a rebel, but he died a guardsman.



It is said that if Dybenko had lived until 1941, he would have had a remarkable talent as a strategist and commanding the troops of the Leningrad Military District, would have stopped the 4th German tank army of Colonel-General Göpner near Pskov and Narva.

I will not argue with such statements. In any case, Dybenko had experience of fighting in those places. The places are familiar.

GLAVA 9.

About worms and first-worlders

As soon as people stop fighting, compelled to fight by necessity, they immediately start fighting, driven by ambition.

Niccolo Machiavelli. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy

1

We are often told that Stalin focused on cavalrymen, while Tukhachevsky was supported by representatives of the technical branches of the army - tankers, artillerymen, pilots.

That's not really true. Or rather, not at all. Tukhachevsky also relied on cavalrymen. Only on other cavalrymen.

The Civil War was a war of maneuver, and the main striking and maneuvering force was the cavalry. There was no solid front, and even if there was, it could almost always be bypassed and struck in the rear. Cavalry squadrons, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and entire mounted armies were engaged in this. The infantry could not be the first in occupied towns and villages. And when retreating, for example, from Warsaw, it was much easier for a cavalry division to get away than for a rifle division.

Infantry commander lost men in the forests and swamps, left guns and machine guns in the encirclement, and the cavalryman rode on a dashing horse and took his division. That's why cavalrymen were the first to receive orders, that's why they got more.

A natural consequence of maneuver warfare was that cavalry commanders had more opportunities to distinguish themselves. Therefore, after the Civil War, it was they who occupied the commanding heights in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Like tankers after the Second World War^[1].

But the Red Cavalry, like any other formation, was heterogeneous. This is the case everywhere and always; within any movement there are warring groups: Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, SS and SA (storm troopers), blatniks and bitches, Stalinists and Trotskyists.

During the Civil War, three super-powerful cavalry units emerged in the

Red Army:

- 1st Cavalry Army;
- 2nd Cavalry Army;
- the Chervon Cossacks.

Accordingly, there were three groupings of cavalry commanders. If you like, you can call them three cavalry clans. You can also think of another name, but the essence remains the same: there were three groups of commanders who divided people into their own and strangers. All three groups had the same thing going on: the struggle for power within the group and at the same time the struggle of each group against the others.

The grouping of the 2nd Cavalry Army was kicked out of the game, its leaders were declared enemies and liquidated [\[12\]](#). Two clans remained: the Pervokonniki and the Chervontsy. Some of the commanders of the 2nd Cavalry Army after the defeat of their grouping re-baptized and joined the Pervokonniki or the Chervontsy, and never remembered their service in the 2nd Cavalry Army.

2

It happened that Comrade Stalin in the Civil War visited the places where the 1st Cavalry Army operated. With its leadership Stalin became acquainted even before the 1st Cavalry. With Budyonny they fought together in 1918 in Tsaritsyn, the future Stalingrad, and Voroshilov Stalin knew even before the October coup. People of the 1st Cavalry Army were not just familiar to Stalin, but for the most part he selected, supported and nominated.

The 1st Cavalry responded to Comrade Stalin with mutual love. In 1922, Stalin took a position with a strange name: General Secretary. Not president, not chairman, but secretary, and even, as Stalin himself wrote in letters to his daughter, secretaryishka. True, Comrade Lenin quickly realized that, "*by becoming General Secretary, Comrade Stalin concentrated in his hands*

an immense power." This power also had a strange name: Uchrasred, the Department of Accounting and Distribution of Executive Personnel. Comrade Stalin taught that personnel decide everything, and was engaged in what we called the term "selection and placement of personnel.

It happened so that very soon the veterans of Stalin's favorite 1st Cavalry Army took the highest ranks in the military hierarchy of the Soviet Union. They stayed together and did not like to let strangers near the commanding heights. The power of the grouping of the 1st Cavalry Army can be judged by

the life path of its members. From its ranks came Marshals of the Soviet Union KE Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, S. K. Timoshenko, G. I. Kulik, K. S. Moskalenko, K. A. Meretskov, AI Yeremenko, Air Chief Marshal PF Zhigarev, Marshal of Armored Forces Ya. N. Fedorenko, Army Generals I. R. Apanasenko, AV Khrulev and many others. The Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko is from the same company. He was Minister of Defense of the USSR until 1976. Thus, from the mid-1920s to the mid-1970s, this clan had great power in the army.

The Chervontsy also had a large number of members. From the ranks of the Chervontsy came Marshal of the Soviet Union PK Koshevoy, Marshal of Armored Forces P. S. Rybalko, Marshal of Communications I. T. Peresypkin, Air Marshal SA Khudyakov, Army General A. V. Gorbato, Colonel-General F. F. Zhmachenko and many others. V. Gorbato, Colonel-General F. F. Zhmachenko and many others. But it should be remembered that it was a young generation. The main leaders of the Chervona Cossacks were cut down. There remained those who occupied lower positions, who submitted to the onslaught of the pervokonniki and humbled themselves.

The 1st Cavalry group has won. This is clear to us now. But then, in the 1920s and 1930s, the outcome of the struggle was difficult to predict. There was a struggle, the First Cavalry was wiping out all the others. That's what the Chervonets didn't like.

3

Where the Chervon Cossacks fought, so did Comrade Trotsky. And Tukhachevsky. And Yakir. The leaders of the Chervon Cossacks were mostly chosen, supported and arranged by Comrade Trotsky.

The struggle of commanders from the two cavalry groups was fought on many fronts, including the ideological front. Veterans of the 1st Cavalry proved that they were the ones who won all the battles and battles. The Chervona Cossacks had their own opinion on this matter.

The chervonniki believed that Comrade Stalin, the wisest of Soviet leaders, had organized all the victories on the Civil War fronts. The chervonts had their doubts. These battles were fought not for glory, but for power.

The pervokonniki, having obtained power, thought that they should calm down for the time being and deal with the internal affairs of the country, while the unsatisfied chervonts were rushing into battle for awards and positions: the revolution is not over! Forward!

Historical parallel: In February 1933, the socialist revolution won in Germany. The working class party led by Adolf Hitler came to power. However, there was no unity in the ranks of the German proletariat. The revolution could not give all its leaders the highest government posts. There are always more victorious revolutionaries than ministerial chairs. Any revolution always produces aggrieved fighters.

Those leaders of the German working class who had been given the highest offices in the state believed that the revolution was complete. Their leader was Hitler himself. And the aggrieved declared that the goals of the revolution had not yet been achieved, that the revolution had to be developed, continued, or even a second revolution. The leader of the aggrieved was Ernst Röhm.

In June 1933, Röhm wrote an article in the pages of the proletarian journal *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* about the need for a second revolution. Hitler immediately responded to Röhm. From July 1 to July 3, 1933, a meeting of the top leadership of the SA and SS took place. At this meeting Hitler stated categorically that the socialist revolution in Germany was complete. On July 6, 1933, at a meeting of imperial viceroys in Berlin, Hitler repeatedly announced that the socialist revolution was complete and that "it is necessary to transfer the free flow of the revolution into the solid course of evolution."

But Röhm persisted. The masses of revolutionaries stood behind him. No one wants to stay where he is, everyone hopes for promotion, so most revolutionaries liked the slogan of the continuation and development of the revolution. Hitler had to curb this mass of dissatisfied revolutionaries rushing to power. The revolutionary fervor had to be cooled. Hitler had to destroy the leaders of the dissatisfied, for if they had won, there would have been others who were offended and would have demanded that the revolution continue. Someone had to put an end to the process.

The same thing was happening in our country. People's needs cannot be satisfied. As soon as some of them are satisfied, others arise. The revolution is over, but the crowds of its participants are not satisfied with their situation.

Someone ended up as a division commander by the end of the Civil War, but wanted to be a corps commander. Someone ended the war as a corps commander, but thought he deserved more. Someone ended the war as People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, but this position clearly did not satisfy him. Such a man was Lev Trotsky. He declared that the

revolution must continue, the revolution must be permanent. And all those nominated by Trotsky, from Tukhachevsky, Primakov and below, enthusiastically supported this slogan.

Ilya Dubinsky, one of the ideologists of the Chervon Cossacks, wrote many books about the Chervon Cossacks: "Iron Fighters", "Armor of the Soviets", "Cavalry Raids", "Perelom" and others. Among his works there is also a book called "India Rising". The Chervona Cossacks-Trotskyists could not wait to rush into battle for oppressed India. They did not have enough problems of their own. They wanted to help someone, to liberate someone. The ideas of the Chervon Cossack commanders coincided with Trotsky's ideas. In every detail. Trotsky also suggested the same thing: to form a cavalry corps and throw it to the aid of the rebellious Indian brothers. And Comrade Tukhachevsky was very close to it. And Yakir.

We will understand nothing of the Tukhachevsky case if we forget that Tukhachevsky was nominated by Lenin and Trotsky. Like all Trotskyists in general and the Chervon Cossacks in particular, Tukhachevsky considered himself offended, rubbed out and pushed aside. In the struggle for power, Tukhachevsky relied on the aggrieved.

Stalin should one day do to the offended what Hitler did to Röhm and his extremely revolutionary followers.

4

Let's get to know some of the Chervon Cossacks.

Vitaly Primakov. He was born in 1897 into a wealthy family. In 1915, the gymnasium student Primakov reached the draft age, but did not want to go to war. He found an original way to evade: he began to defiantly distribute leaflets of anti-war content. This "strategist" is a pacifist, like Dybenko. Under Comrade Stalin, he would have been shot for such things, and the brutal tsarist regime limited itself to expelling the gymnasium student Primakov to the deep rear. Siberia. After the fall of the monarchy, sitting in the rear Primakov returned in the halo of the fighter and revolutionary. In October 1917, he commanded one of the detachments of the Red Guards, who seized the Winter Palace. In January 1918 Primakov formed a regiment of the Chervona Cossacks and headed it. Now he was no longer a pacifist. The regiment of the Chervona Cossacks became a brigade, then a division, then a corps.

Primakov successively commanded a regiment, a brigade, a division, and the 1st Cavalry Corps of the Chervona Cossacks. "Krasnaya Zvezda" (October 1, 1988) reports: "*He was strict, when required - ruthless*". The next

sentence implies that when not required, he was also ruthless: "*He was on trial by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the unauthorized shooting of bandits*".

We know whom our native authorities regarded as bandits. But in order to be put on trial by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for such trifles, one had to show a special passion in this case. Primakov did. The native authorities forgave the fighter Primakov for the lawless shootings.

In 1922, the Genoa Conference was held. Soviet Russia was in a very bad situation: the world revolution had failed, the country lay in ruins, and it was necessary to establish, as Comrade Lenin put it, "peaceful cohabitation" with the bourgeoisie. Lenin thought it possible to personally go to Genoa with an outstretched hand and ask the bourgeois for money. To this Primakov's Chervon Cossacks

replied with a telegram: "Comrade Lenin can go to Genoa, but only after the Red Army enters there."

After the Civil War, Primakov held a number of military and military-diplomatic posts, was a corps commander, military attaché in Afghanistan and Japan. In 1930, returning from a long journey, he published the book "Afghanistan on Fire". The main idea of the book: the moment is overdue, procrastination is like death, it is necessary to provide international assistance to our class brothers, it is urgent to introduce a limited contingent, otherwise we will be attacked.

Primakov considered the famine and death of millions of Ukrainian peasants to be a fabrication of class enemies. He responded to reports of famine with a cycle of poems:

*And now, out in the open.
By the vast sea
Free labor on the prairie thrives,
The working people live, Singing songs...*

And further in the same vein: life became better, life became more cheerful. In addition to poems, Primakov wrote memoirs. Their main motive: the Civil War was won by the Chervona Cossacks and Comrade Primakov, their commander and brilliant strategist. Primakov left no works on strategy and tactics. In 1935, Komkor Primakov was appointed deputy commander of

the Leningrad Military District.

5

Here is a portrait of another Chervona Cossack. Official propaganda describes him as follows:

Dmitry Schmidt fought dashingly at the fronts as a member of the Black Cossack Corps, and after the war he commanded a division in it. In the twenties he was an active Trotskyist. A former partisan, a man of desperate courage, Schmidt attached little value to the

idols and authorities. Provocative expulsion of Trotsky from the party just before the XV Congress made him furious. He came to Moscow and found Stalin somewhere between meetings. Clad in a Circassian, with a papakha on his head, he approached the General Secretary, swore obscenely and, pulling out an imaginary saber, threatened: "Look, Koba, cut off the ears!" Stalin had to swallow this insult (Rapoport V. and Alekseev Y. Treason to the Motherland. P. 293).

This was by no means Schmidt's only prank. It passed, as well as all others like it, without consequences. On the contrary, in 1935 Dmitry Schmidt was promoted to the rank of commander.

Ilya Dubinsky, a singer of the Chervona Cossacks, commanded the 4th Tank Brigade in Kiev in the 1930s, while Dmitry Schmidt commanded the neighboring 8th Mechanized Brigade. Dubinsky tells how the proletarian commander Schmidt lived:

I was assigned an apartment in a building near the Franko Theater, one floor above Schmidt's place. The Kiev nobility used to live in these luxurious apartments with patterned parquet, stucco ceilings, and tiled Dutch ovens (Special Account. p. 120).

Clearly, that's not enough for Schmidt. "*He considered himself offended.*" (Ibid. p. 208.)

There was a camp nearby, in Vyshgorod, where the Red Army men of the offended Schmidt's brigade lived in tents and the commanders lived in wooden houses. Dubinsky got a wooden hut. *"This shack was not in any comparison with Shmidt's log cottage, which had all the comforts - running water, a balcony on the second floor, and even its own small shooting gallery."* (Ibid. p. 120.)

By the way, wherever the chervonny Cossack Dubinsky gets, everywhere his offended friends live large in the truest sense. Here he is in the apartment of the divisional engineer S. Bordovsky. Moscow. Arbat.

"Our host opened the door. He led us into a sitting-room, which would have been quite suitable for an arena." (Ibid. p. 124.)

I have nothing against luxury apartments and summer residences with balcony and shooting gallery. I myself am a great lover of large and beautiful apartments. Have, comrade commanders, swimming pools and baths in your apartments, as comrade Vatsetis liked, have gardeners and kennels, as comrade Tukhachevsky did. But if you do, don't pretend to be fighters for universal equality.

6

The biographies of the Chervona Cossacks can be continued, but the picture is the same: they are the offended. They loved power and beautiful life. They were pushed out of the first roles, and in impotent anger they did great foolishness. To wave an imaginary saber in front of Stalin's nose, swearing and promising to cut off the general secretary's ears, it does not take much intelligence. On the contrary, this case shows Schmidt's complete lack of intelligence. If you can cut off Stalin's ears, cut them off. Why threaten him?

And now let's pull on Stalin's boots, button up all the buttons, adjust the cartouche, smooth the mustache, puff a pipe and assess the picture that opens up to us from the Kremlin bell tower. There is a struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. This is a struggle in the highest spheres of political power. In this situation it would be good for the army to mind its own business, to strengthen defense, and not to stick its nose into the political spheres. Do you want to be a politician, Comrade Schmidt? Go ahead. But then cut off the buttonholes with lozenges, surrender the brigade and join the political struggle. And if you want to command the brigade, command it, but stay out of politics.

Stalin pursued his line without threatening anyone, but Stalin was

threatened by the offended commander of the 8th Mechbrigade. Threatened publicly, publicly insulted. Schmidt threatened the supreme ruler of Russia, who during the war will be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Threatened in peacetime. What will happen in time of war? What will happen in times of crisis and panic? What will the offended Schmidt allow himself then? And who is behind his back?

7

Behind Schmidt's chervonets are Yakir and Tukhachevsky.

Here is the reception room of 1st rank commander Jonah Yakir, commander of the Kiev Military District, the most powerful military district in the Soviet Union. *"Schmidt entered the reception room, wearing high hunting boots, a civilian jacket down to his knees, and a greenish felt hat."* (Special Account. p. 101.)

Maybe I am spoiled by the times in which I served, but in my years a brigade commander wearing a hat with a pheasant feather would not dare to enter not only the reception room of the district commander, but would be ashamed to appear in such a form near the district headquarters, especially during working hours. And the division commander would not dare to do such a thing. And a corps commander. And even an army commander would not allow himself such a thing.

Wasn't it too much for Commander 1st Rank Yakir to disband his beloved Chervona Cossacks? And isn't it time to tighten the screws a little in anticipation of the coming war? And were not the relations between Commander 1st Rank Yakir and the commander of the 8th Mechbrigade, who publicly threatened to cut off Stalin's ears, too friendly?

Or here, for example, in Moscow, the brigade commander Schmidt was at the reception of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov. Obviously, they had a fight. To quarrel the offended brigade commander with the People's Commissar of Defense - a matter of habit. Schmidt comes out of the high office, met Marshal of the Soviet Union MN Tukhachevsky: *"What, Mitya, does not like you Commissar of Defense? Do not grieve, he does not tolerate me either."* (Ibid. P. 102.)

Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevsky calls the brigade commander Mitya. Isn't that too much?

Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevsky right in the corridor of the People's Commissariat of Defense complains that he is not loved by his

superior.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevsky complains about the bitter fate of his subordinate, who is separated from him by many rungs of the ladder: you know, Mitya, I am not loved here. Ah, poor me!



The offended Chervona Cossacks wanted a sweet life and power for themselves, but they did not recognize authority over themselves and would not obey anyone.

wanted. Stalin, as the future Supreme Commander-in-Chief, could not allow the existence of super-powerful unruly clans in his army. Therefore, preparing for the war, Stalin defeated the Chervona Cossacks, who were corrupting the Red Army with exorbitant claims, outright disobedience and hooliganism.

Tukhachevsky himself joined the ranks of the offended. Tukhachevsky himself went into rapprochement with those who threatened Stalin's political line. Tukhachevsky himself went to make friends with those who threatened Stalin. Tukhachevsky himself established with the offended relations such as "vas-vas" and "mit-mit". And by doing so, he signed his own judgment.

But there was a more serious reason for the defeat of the worms.

GLAVA 10.

What is partisanship, go how Yasha Okhotnikov guarded Comrade Stalin.

Our society is breeding a new, more flexible, more adaptable, though immeasurably more repulsive type of human being.

Alexander Zinoviev. *Our Youth's Flight* (Lausanne, 1983. p. 130)

1

In 1927, the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky reached the highest heat. Stalin created the apparatus of power and management of the country, Stalin relied on this apparatus. Trotsky failed to create his power base, he relied on former glory, loud slogans and few gangs of adherents.

In essence, the struggle was not between two leaders, but between two tendencies in the development of socialism. Trotsky was a clear Marxist; he demanded a socialism purely Marxist, that is, barracks socialism. Trotsky demanded to act as Marx wrote in the "Manifesto of the Communist Party": to create labor armies. Trotsky demanded the militarization of labor. Labor was to become coercive, where the main levers and incentives were orders and punishments. The central demand of Marxism: to divide people into classes - into masters, whom no one chooses, and the oppressed. This is exactly what Trotsky wanted, he demanded open slavery: you will work, I will command.

Trotsky demanded the complete enslavement of the people into labor armies. The difference with serfdom is that the peasant worked part of the time for the landlord and part of the time for himself, while in the Marxist-Trotskyist labor armies labor was intended only for the lords. The serf could buy off the landlord, but the Trotskyists

such a possibility was sought to be prevented by the complete abolition of private property and money.

So, in the 1920s, two forces clashed in mortal combat: the supporters of slave-owning barracks Marxism, led by Trotsky, and the supporters of a softer socialism, led by Stalin. Understandably, the sympathies of the country were on Stalin's side. Who wants to be a slave of a Marxist labor army and

mindlessly follow the orders of overseers that Trotsky will appoint at his will?

The year 1927 is the tenth anniversary of the October coup. By the way, it was in this year that the term "Great October Socialist Revolution" was coined and used for the first time. Before 1927, the events of October 1917 were officially called a coup.

On the eve of the tenth anniversary, passions were running high. The nimble Eisenstein made a movie about the storming of the Winter Palace - an assault that never happened. Then, for decades, communists around the world Eisenstein's tufta passed off as a newsreel. Mayakovsky wrote the poem "Good!". Trotsky was proving that he had organized and won everything, and now he should be the leader. Celebrations were being prepared in all towns and villages. The most important - in Red Square: a military parade and a grandiose multimillion demonstration. The Trotskyists were also to appear.

Now we know what happened that day. But at that time one could expect anything - from street demonstrations of militant Trotsky lovers to an assassination attempt on the leaders, from clashes with hooligan crowds of Trotskyists to a coup d'état. Additional security measures were taken - the leaders were guarded not only by their guards, but also by students of military academies. The best military academy in the country, the Frunze Military Academy, was chosen to strengthen Stalin's security. Frunze Military Academy. The head of the academy Eidemann chose the three most worthy. Among them was Yakov Okhotnikov.

If a crime is told by the criminal, it will be one story, and if it is told by the victim, it will be quite another. In order not to be suspected of bias, I am telling this story not in my own words, but quoting historians who love Trotsky with all their souls, love the bureaucracy that Trotsky imposed, love the laborers, and love Trotsky's work.

They love barracks and bunks for the whole population of the country, they love slavery. True, they themselves do not want to be soldiers of labor armies. So, a quote from the book "Treason against the Motherland" by V. Rapoport and Y. Alekseev (P. 292):

On the morning of the festive day, the head of the Frunze Academy, R. P. Eidemann, handed three of his students special passes and ordered them to leave immediately. On the morning of the holiday R. P. Eidemann handed three of his trainees special passes and ordered them to leave immediately for the mission. The trainees - together with

Okhotnikov were selected Vladimir Petenko and Arkady Geller - with all their feet rushed to Red Square. On the territory of the Kremlin they penetrated unhindered, but at the wooden tunnel gate leading to the Mausoleum tribune, there was a hitch. A Georgian guard refused to let them through. The hot guys, participants of the Civil War, did not give in to the Chekist's insolence. They threw him off, breaking the gate in the process, and rushed forward. In a few seconds they were behind the backs of those standing on the podium. The guards pounced on the newcomers. Okhotnikov, who escaped, jumped up to Stalin, whom he considered the culprit of this provocative confusion, and hit him on the back of the head with his fist ... Eidemann managed to keep the matter quiet.

2

Let's start with Robert Petrovich Eidemann. The head of the Frunze Military Academy. Frunze received an order from a higher authority to allocate three students of the academy for a responsible task. Eidemann was obliged not only to choose the really best, but also to instruct them: guys, you have the honorable task of guarding the man who leads our country. So don't hit him. And if you do, at least hit him in the face; to hit a man in the back of the head, especially suddenly, is a great meanness. If you make a fool pray to God, he will break his forehead. Okhotnikov was sent to guard Stalin. Okhotnikov guarded Stalin so well that he smashed the back of his head.

Rapoport and Alexeyev's story doesn't add up.

First, the hapless guards were too late: the leaders had long been on the podium, and they were just running. The reaction of the Kremlin guards is understandable:

We'll do without you, comrades, we have to come early.

Secondly, Rapoport and Alexeyev are confusing something. And deliberately. If there was a scuffle behind Stalin's back, Stalin would have turned his face to the noise and fuss. But Okhotnikov hit Stalin in the back of the head, that is, approached Stalin unnoticed and struck suddenly.

It is impossible to see anything but meanness and stupidity in this act. Let's assume that Yakov Okhotnikov was a Marxist Trotskyist, he wanted to drive all people into labor armies, and to be a slave owner himself. It is clear

that Stalin prevented this, and Okhotnikov hated him for it. In this case, Okhotnikov had to fight against Stalin. With weapons in his hands. But Okhotnikov had neither the intelligence nor the courage to do so. His rage as a failed slave owner is embodied in a treacherous fist blow to the back of the head. Such an act requires no intelligence. It requires only blind madness.

3

In the summer of 1969, in the 145th Guards Motorized Rifle Training Regiment of the 66th Guards Motorized Rifle Training Division of the Precarpathian Military District, an extraordinary incident occurred: a sentry killed a man. He killed with a short burst - two bullets. The place of action - Western Ukraine, Chernivtsi-25. Warehouses outside the city, in Sadgor. The situation is extremely simple: a huge territory of military warehouses, all surrounded by barbed wire, night, flashlights swinging. There's a path. The deaf-mute decided not to go around, but to shorten his way, to cut a corner. He ducked under the barbed wire. That's where a short queue got him. He shortened his path.

Investigators from the military prosecutor's office, forensic experts and others who immediately show up in such cases immediately rushed in. First question: how many shots were fired? Answer: three. You can't hide anything: the sentry had 60 cartridges, as it should be, and there were 57 left, and here were three fired casings. It was impossible to twist: when we were on guard duty, we received special guard cartridges. Unlike ordinary cartridges, which our division burned by the millions, the guard cartridges had a very special series on the bottoms of the cartridges, and the cartridges themselves were colored. We spent tens of thousands of cases of ordinary cartridges, cartridges from Storozhinetskyi

The missing one green guard cartridge was discovered immediately - they were received and handed over against receipt every day, and it was impossible to find such a cartridge somewhere on the side. That's why it was impossible to cover up any case of shooting in the guardhouses. It was impossible to conceal one, even an accidental shot in the guardhouse.

The investigators dealt with the shell casings at once, and the picture became clearer. We still had to find the bullets. They found two out of three. Now the main question is: are they the same ones that pierced through the man? They are. Are there any carbon deposits on them? There's soot. That's it. After that - a delicate moment of distribution of personal responsibility and

distribution of elephants.

The division commander, Major-General Nilga, in his divisional order, commended the head of the guard and the watch commander who had posted the sentry at the post. The sentry himself received something that a cadet of the training division had no right to dream of: the commendation of the division commander and ten days of vacation, not counting the trip home and back.

4

Why is that? Because a sentry is an inviolable person. The inviolability of a sentry is

- in the special protection by law of his rights and personal dignity;
- in a sentry's subordination to a strictly limited circle of persons: to the sentry commander, the assistant sentry commander and his guard;
- the duty of all persons to obey without question the sentry's orders as determined by his service;
- in authorizing him to use arms in cases provided for by statute.

Our sentry acted accurately, correctly and decisively: "Stop, who is coming?", "Stop, I'll shoot!", a warning shot upward, and afterward a

The investigation is unable to determine whether there were two warning shouts. But was there a warning shot? There was. Two bullets penetrated the man, and it is easy to find them: here is the position of the sentry, here is the position of the corpse, the two points are determined by the

the direction of fire and the bullets are found. But one bullet was never found. It's evidence that the sentry sent it upwards. A bullet on an inclined trajectory could go up a kilometer and fly very far. There's no way to find it. But here's the question: could the sentry have killed the man first with a short burst and then fired it into the air? It was to answer that question that the bullets were examined. Here's the thing. The preparation of the platoon going on guard duty is conducted by the company commander. One of the main elements of training - check the condition of weapons: it must be clean. Then arrives the platoon commander, who takes over the guardhouse. He himself personally checks the readiness, including the readiness of weapons. Then, at dressing, the weapons are checked by the incoming regimental duty officer or guard duty officer. A dirty weapon will not be allowed into the guardhouse.

After a man is killed, forensics checks the bullets. The first bullet should be a warning bullet. It shouldn't hit the person. The first bullet goes down a

clean barrel, there should be no soot on it. If one of the bullets that killed a man is clean, then the soldier will be court-martialed. The other bullets go down a dirty barrel. They should have carbon deposits on them. The soot is evidence that the two shots that killed the man were preceded by another one, i.e. a warning shot.

In our case, all the bullets that hit the man had gunpowder residue, which means that they were preceded by a warning shot. So the soldier acted correctly. So, he should have been rewarded for his vigilance, for his determination, for his knowledge of the Charter and exact compliance with its requirements.

They object: but the deaf-mute did not and could not hear either the warning shouts of the sentry or the warning shot. That's right. But there was a lighted barbed wire and a sign that said, "Stop! Forbidden zone." No reservations, no allowances are made by the Charter for the blind, the deaf, the drunk, or the insane. This is the first guarantee of a sentry's inviolability: the law specifically protects his person and his actions, if these actions were in accordance with the articles of the Charter of Garrison and Guard Service.

At all times, the sentry has been in a special position. It is believed that the notion of the inviolability of the sentry was introduced in our country by the Articles of Peter the Great. However, there are indications that The inviolability of a sentry was recognized before Peter, and not only in tradition, but also in written regulations.

And now let us return to Moscow in 1927. What should a serviceman do who has been sent by his commander to a higher authority, no matter which one - the Kremlin or the battalion headquarters - and has not been allowed to go there? It's simple. It is necessary to testify his arrival at a given place at a given time: I was here, and exactly at the time at which I was ordered to be here. After that I have to contact my commander and report: I can't fulfill the order, because I'm not allowed here. That's it: I did what I was ordered to do, the rest is not up to me.

In our country every day millions of people pass into secure facilities, and it happens that someone is not allowed in. It happens a lot. Let's imagine that the janitor did not let us into the factory. If he didn't let us in, it means that there is a reason for that: the pass is not in order, or he has some suspicion, or there is a breakdown in the long chain of command. Someone didn't warn someone, and he just wasn't told to let us in. So what do we do? We're gonna punch the janitor in the face? Break down the door of the gatehouse and force our way in? Or let's track down the Minister of Industry, sneak up on him and

slam our fist on his ass. Get him off his hooves!

Rapoport and Alekseev consider the behavior of the Kremlin guard as impudence. If he didn't let Okhotnikov through, he must be insolent. And who is he, this Okhotnikov? For what merits should he be allowed to pass? If a sentry has even the slightest doubt, he is obliged not to let him pass. In September 1941, a soldier sentry did not let in the headquarters of the Leningrad Front, who arrived from Moscow, the new commander of the front, a member of the VGK Stavka, Army General G. K. Zhukov. K. Zhukov. And the sentry was right. And if Zhukov were anyone, had any rank, the sentry was still not subordinate to him and had no right to carry out anyone's orders and instructions, except for three persons: the head of the guard, his assistant and his watchman.

I emphasize: his own. Another guard from the same guardhouse has no right to order a sentry. And what was Army General Zhukov supposed to do? Break down the door of the front headquarters? Break through, pushing the sentry away? This would be an attack on the post, and the sentry in this case was obliged to shoot Zhukov. Obviously, that's not happened, because Zhukov realized that the sentry was right. Zhukov realized that he had no power over the sentry. Even with five stars in his buttonholes, he was still not the sentry's boss. Even with a paper in his pocket, signed by Stalin, that he was henceforth in command of the front, still, even in the headquarters of his front, Zhukov had no power over the sentry and did not rush at him.

5

The attack on Stalin on November 7, 1927 shows us to what extent Stalin did not value his life, how little he paid attention to his safety. Any lunatic could break straight into the Mausoleum unhindered and hit him on the back of the head.

Yakov Okhotnikov was clearly not in control of his actions. If a knife or a gun had been in his hands, the irreparable would have happened. It is difficult to imagine what would have happened to our country, to Europe and the world if Stalin had been killed and his place would have been taken by maniacs - Trotsky, Bukharin, Tukhachevsky and others. We can judge what awaited Russia by the behavior of the same Yasha Okhotnikov: a student of the academy was not allowed on the Mausoleum, and he immediately sentry - in the face, and Stalin - a fist on the back of the head. Without scrutiny. He is a hundred floors below Stalin in position, and if he climbs higher, what will he

allow himself? And his friends are the same.

In 1927, Russia, Europe and the world were very lucky. There was no weapon in Okhotnikov's hands. And it is impossible to imagine what would have happened if Stalin had been assassinated, if the mildest strand of socialism had been crushed by the brutal Marxism of Trotsky, Bukharin, and Tukhachevsky. Their power would have eclipsed everything we know about Hitler and Pol Pot.

But it didn't.

6

Okhotnikov and his friends kicked the sentry, broke the gate and rushed to the guarded object. How do we qualify such actions? Assault on the post. This is precisely the situation in which the sentry at the post not only has the right, but is obliged to use

weapons, and without warning. Attacking a sentry, breaking into a guarded facility is a crime.

Any first-year soldier, taking guard duty a week after being sworn in, knows that an attack on a post must be repulsed by force of arms, that criminals who dare such an atrocity deserve death without trial and must be killed on the spot. It does not matter whether the soldier is guarding regimental headquarters or a warehouse of boots. If he is posted, it means that there is something to guard, and then he obeys the regulations.

How come the guard at the most important post of the country did not shoot three crooks who were breaking through to the top leadership of the country? What if these are foreign mercenaries with the task of destroying the government? And what if it is Trotskyist terrorists carrying out a coup d'état? Who put such a moron in office? Who instructed him? Clearly, the sentry deserved the harshest punishment, but who trained him? And who was behind his back? Who benefited from such a slack attitude to guard duty?

Earlier in the lists of shot in 1937-1938 we saw people who occupied a post of commandant of the Kremlin. Now we understand that they were shot not at all in vain. If they so treated to the duties, if showed criminal negligence, it could end only by shooting.

7

The behavior of the head of the Frunze Military Academy, Comrade Eydemann, is surprising. Comrade Eidemann managed to cover up the

incident. Oh, how kind! It's not about Stalin, it's about the attack on the sentry. That's why the academy should have been built, and three bound scoundrels should have been brought to the training ground. Eidemann was obliged to appear in front of the formation on a rousing raven stallion, to tell the students of the academy about what had happened, to take his saber out of its sheath and chop the scoundrels into cabbage. He should have reasoned as follows: let me be reprimanded for abuse of power, but I will not keep criminal offenders who deserve death in my academy.

You're gonna say that's too cool? No, it's not. Hunters and men like him didn't understand any other language. The sentry at the post in front of them that's not his fault. And they punched him in the face. Without a care in the world. A sentry is a public man, specially protected by the law. And they don't care about the law. Even if the sentry is wrong, anyone, especially a serviceman, is obliged to comply with the sentry's demands. No one has the right to deal with the sentry either - deal with the head of the guard. And get away from the sentry immediately, if he said he would not let you in, do not distract the sentry from his duties. The sentry has no right to talk to anyone: "Stop! Get back!" - and no unnecessary words.

Okhotnikov beats up the sentry, who is not guilty of anything. Okhotnikov also throws himself at Stalin, who is also not guilty of anything: Stalin did not put the sentry on duty, and the sentry in this situation is not subordinate even to Stalin. But innocent Stalin - in the neck. In this case, how to talk to the criminal and war criminal Okhotnikov, who is guilty of attacking the post and attacking the supreme ruler of the country?

8

During the Civil War, the country's leadership struggled with a phenomenon that was officially called *partisanship*. For a long time I could not understand why this term was given a negative meaning. Why should partisanship be fought?

And the answer is simple. The point is that the meaning of words was distorted. We didn't call everything by its proper name. We're not talking about partisanship, but *banditry*. The Red Army grew out of small and large gangs, whose leaders did not want to obey anyone. Bring them to obedience, make them obey - that is the task that Stalin set for himself and brilliantly accomplished it.

Yakov Okhotnikov and his two friends are typical representatives of

unbridled partisanship, that is, banditry. They are students of a military academy, but they do not want to learn, they know nothing about the army, they do not know even what any first-year soldier who has just completed the course of a young fighter should know. If these are the best students of the best academy, what are the worst? And what does the head of the academy do? And who needs the graduates of such an academy?

1937 was Stalin's fight against banditry and insubordination in the army. You can call it the fight against partisanship.

Until 1937, Stalin could not seriously deal with this problem. There were many other problems. And until Stalin personally began to restore order in the academies, they simply produced rejects, stamped semi-literate and completely illiterate commanders, for whom studying at the academy was just a form of recreation.

It is said that during the purge, many commanders with academic education were exterminated and those with no education took their place. That's right. But such academic education was worthless. Students of the Frunze Military Academy. Frunze, who were trained by Tukhachevsky, then Eidemann, then Cork, were at the level of Okhotnikov, and maybe even lower.

I don't feel sorry for them.

But what does that have to do with Tukhachevsky? What does that have to do with Yakir?

Here's the thing.

Frunze Military Academy in those glorious years. Frunze Military Academy in those glorious years reported directly to Tukhachevsky, Chief of Staff of the Red Army. Eidemann was obliged to report to Tukhachevsky about what had happened. And Tukhachevsky was obliged to sort it out and take action. As his immediate superior, Tukhachevsky had to ask questions. A lot of questions. There was an attack on the sentry. How did it end? What was the punishment of the criminals? Who sent the criminals to the best academy in the country? Who and why chose them to perform a responsible government task?

What did Tukhachevsky do? He has done nothing. State and war crimes are committed in his subordinate structures, and he does not know about it or does not want to know.

What's that got to do with Yakir? Yakir has to do with the fact that Yakov Okhotnikov was his adjutant, the closest person, the executor of Yakir's most

secret assignments. On Yakir's recommendation, Okhotnikov got into the academy.

And here we have a very strange chain of facts. Yakir was an ardent Stalinist. In his words. Even too ardent. But in deed. Yakir's close friend, his confidant, Kommdiv Schmidt publicly insulted Stalin, swore at him and promised to cut off Stalin's ears.

Yakir's adjutant, his most trusted person, gave Stalin a sudden blow with a fist in the back of the head. And how will Yakir's subordinates behave in a critical situation? During the war?

One has to marvel at Stalin's restraint. Stalin did not demand that Yakov Okhotnikov be punished. Stalin simply looked at his subordinates and waited for their reaction to what had happened. And they did not react. Three attacked the sentry - and nothing. It happens. Someone hit Stalin on the head. It happens. Serve, Yasha Okhotnikov.

Eidemann, Yakir and Tukhachevsky kept the matter quiet. They pretended that nothing had happened.

A year passed, everything was forgotten. Eidemann, Yakir and Tukhachevsky promoted Yakov Okhotnikov. He was a good man, but he had a little trouble once.

Stalin was also silent. For the time being. But the fate of Eidemann, Yakir and Tukhachevsky was decided. They planted banditism in the army, and the country and the army did not need such people. The army had to be cleansed of this filth. But at that time, Stalin did not yet have the opportunity to restore order in the army.

Comrade Stalin remembered about Yakov Okhotnikov eight years later.

GLAVA 11.

Was Commander Yakir an enemy of the people?

In Russia. our success is even greater. We have there. a central committee of terrorists.
Karl Marx. Letter to F. A. Sorge dated November 5, 1880

1

On May 27, 1937, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKP(b)), commander of the troops of the Kiev Military District, Commander 1st rank Jonah Emmanuilovich Yakir received an urgent summons to Moscow. In those days, leaders of such caliber traveled around the country in their own trains or cars. It's convenient. In any corner of the country with you always a piece of your home, you are always surrounded by things dear to your heart, your favorite books, with you always not some stranger, but your personal doctor, who for many years has studied your ailments. With you always your favorite cook, who knows your tastes and knows how to please. You don't need to explain your understanding of beauty to a Kremlin hairdresser: you can take the best of your personal hairdressers with you on the road. The Communist coup abolished servants. Communists didn't have servants. There were servants. So, conquering the expanses of an endless country in the familiar comfort of your own car or train, you have your own personally selected and trained servants and guards by your side.

Far past midnight the courier train "Kiev - Moscow" stopped according to the schedule in Bryansk. Standing for ten minutes. During this time, the personal car of Commander 1st Rank Yakir was carefully detached from the courier train and attached to a shunting locomotive. This is not such a simple operation as it may seem. At the stops, from the chiefs' cars on both sides of the train.

the guards come down - no one will be allowed near the couplers. However, the car was unhitched without noise and without shooting. The shunting locomotive picked up the personal car and drove it to the dead end. Comrades

in gray entered the car, showed their documents to the guards and conductors. The door to the commander's bedroom was cautiously opened. One of the comrades extracted a pistol from under the sleeping man's pillow.

This detail has always amazed me. "Red Star regiments of steel brought happiness to the people," and here in the country blessed by them, proletarian commanders, favorites of the people, sleep in armored cars, under the watchful guard of bodyguards, with pistols under their pillows. Like urks.

Now the commander was splashed with the light of a lantern in his eyes and, without giving him a chance to wipe them, was announced: "You are under arrest!" Citizen Yakir was taken out of the carriage, put into a black car and taken to the proper place. Yakir was tried in Tukhachevsky's group. On June 11, 1937, he, like everyone in the group, was sentenced to capital punishment. The next day the sentence was carried out.

The next day is a strong word: the verdict was announced at 23 hours and 35 minutes. While the verdict was being read, it was midnight, the 24 hours had changed, so the impression is that they were given a whole day of life after the verdict. No, they didn't. Why drag it out? Two weeks from arrest to sentencing. And the execution is immediate.

2

A quarter of a century later, KGB Chairman Alexander Shelepin reported to the XXII Congress of the CPSU that, while under investigation, Yakir had written a letter to Stalin: "I will die with words of love for you." Shelepin reported:

On this letter Stalin scrawled a resolution: 'Scoundrel and prostitute'. Voroshilov added: "An absolutely accurate definition." Molotov signed it. And Kaganovich added: "To a traitor, a bastard and (then follows a profane word) one punishment - the death penalty" (A. Shelepin. Speech at the XXII Congress of the CPSU. October 26, 1961).

And it has rung over the world since that day: a scoundrel and a prostitute, a perfectly accurate definition....

As far as I was able to ascertain, the profane word also meant prostitute, but not a professional, but an amateur. At that time, during the XXII Party Congress, our battalion was in Moscow. Preparing for the parade. Presnya. The military transit center, WFP. It's right next to the prison. On the runway -

us, Voronezh Suvorovtsy, next to us - Leningrad Nakhimozes. They called themselves Pythons for some reason. A battalion of them, too. And training - at the Central airfield. Right under the empty windows of the "Aquarium" under construction - the main building of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. Training - for a month and a half before each parade. Four hours a day. And four hours of lessons, two hours of self-training. And on weekends - the Tretyakov Gallery, the Diamond Fund, the Bolshoi Theater, the Gorky House Museum.....

There was a lot to marvel at in Gorky's house-museum. One can't help but wonder: if this was only one of the residences of the proletarian writer who glorified the coming universal equality of people, how did his patrons, the Soviet leaders, live?

And there was a visit to the deceased leaders themselves. It so happened that we were the last visitors to the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum. After us, the Mausoleum was closed for a few days. And then during the night training on Red Square the whole rhythm of parade preparation was broken. A lot of troops were kept in the adjacent streets, delaying the beginning of the night rehearsal of the parade. And the morning it was announced that Stalin had been taken out of the Mausoleum.....

3

That fall of the XXII Party Congress was a time of discovery for us. In those days we read "Komsomolochka" to the last line. We listened to the radio with our mouths open. And they told us such stories... "A scoundrel and a prostitute!" It turns out that the genius of all times

and peoples, the leader of the world proletariat expressed himself in the same syllable as the guards of the Presnensky prison. From that time on, whenever one of us received a new nickname, everyone confirmed it with a chorus: "Absolutely the exact definition!"

At that time, during the congress, the names of leaders and strategists who were killed, unknown to us, were heard. I must say that the names were quickly and forever etched in our memory: Putna and Stuchka, Podlas and Tukhachevsky, Bukharin and Alksnis, Uborevich, Dubovoy, Dybenko and, of course, Blucher.

And it was incomprehensible: why among all these enemies of the people only Yakir deserved such a scathing definition of Stalin? Why was he a scoundrel and a prostitute?

Iona Yakir was born in 1896 in Kishinev. He was an undergraduate student. During the First World War he evaded mobilization to the front - through useful acquaintances he got a job at a military factory, and workers of military factories were not taken to the front. This is another "strategist" from the breed of pacifists. After the February Revolution, when revolutionary activity was no longer persecuted, he decided to become a revolutionary. Having no experience of work in the underground and no merits in the overthrow of the monarchy, he immediately got to the leading positions in the Bessarabian guberrevkom and Odessa guber-partkom, and then the most interesting thing begins.

Comrade Lenin valued his life very highly. And he didn't trust it to just anyone. Lenin took his life very carefully. If not for syphilis, he would have lived a long time, and he had a strong guard. Soviet propaganda reported that there were only four people in Lenin's guard. But the propaganda forgot about the Kremlin cadets. And they are very proud of their role as guards of the leader. And the Dzerzhinsky Division, which traces its history back to the Sverdlov Armored Detachment, is proud of its role as Lenin's guards. And the Latvian riflemen. All ten full-blooded regiments.

But it's the Chinese who are most proud. And there's a reason for that. The very first circle of Lenin's security were 70 Chinese bodyguards. Information about this was published not only in China, but also in the Soviet Union (Ming Ping. History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship. Moscow: Publishing House of Social and Economic Literature, 1959). The Chinese also guarded Comrade Trotsky. And Bukharin. But now it is not customary to be proud of it.

What's Comrade Yakir got to do with it? It has to do with the fact that he gave the idea. Yakir was the first organizer of Chinese units in the Red Army.
B

At the height of the Civil War, there were over 40,000 Chinese mercenaries in the Red Army. The first commander of the very first Chinese battalion was Jonah Yakir. It was he who set an example for Lenin and Trotsky.

In the Civil War, the one who showed more brutality won. With a Chinese battalion under his command, Yakir could not worry about his career. The Chinese provided him with the necessary level of brutality in abundance. Yakir's book "Memories of the Civil War" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957) begins with the first line with the confession: *"I have never been a military man, and nothing before in military affairs did not understand."* And immediately -

about the Chinese, whom he commanded. Yakir does not say what these Chinese were doing, but he does talk about incentives.

The Chinese took wages very seriously. They gave their lives easily, but pay on time and feed well. Yes, that's it. Their authorized representatives came to me and said that there were 530 people hired, so I had to pay for all of them. And how many are missing, that's all right - they will divide the rest of the money due to them among all of them.

I talked to them for a long time, convincing them that it was wrong, not our way. But they got what they deserved. They gave us another argument: they said that it was necessary to send the families of the killed to China. We had a lot of good things with them on our long long and long-suffering journey through the whole Ukraine, the whole Don, to Voronezh province (P. 13).

In this phrase, let us pay attention to the word "hired". We have been told about Soviet-Chinese friendship, about internationalist soldiers, about selfless service. The word "hired" alone disproves all these fairy tales.

It's about mercenaries.

Let's pay attention to the following touch: Yakir says that he himself, personally, had to pay the Chinese "volunteers". Not any financial structures or higher authorities - he himself hired 500 Chinese, kept them himself and fed them well.

It could not be otherwise. Yakir began his military career in Bessarabia, beyond the Dniester. He had no connection with the central government, and he could not receive any funds from the center. Therefore, Yakir could only take money from his own "nightstand".

It was a capacious "nightstand" of an uneducated student. Can any criminal authority today maintain a gang of Chinese thugs numbering 530 guns? But Yakir managed.

Another point. The Chinese demanded that Yakir pay wages to all those who were hired by him, including those who were killed. They would send to the families of those killed. During the Civil War? During general anarchy and massacres? From Odessa to Sichuan Province? They'll write the address in hieroglyphics, seal the money in an envelope and put it in the mailbox? But

Comrade Yakir is kind. The families of the murdered must be helped. So he pays the wages of those killed.

The Chinese gave Yakir arguments that exclude each other: a) we will divide the money of the murdered among ourselves, and b) we will send the money to China to the families of the murdered. Comrade Yakir agreed with the arguments. He paid his salary. And he fed them well. As long as the revolutionary internationalists were happy and fed.

Yakir's experience was immediately appreciated and intercepted by Comrade Lenin, Trotsky, Blucher, Chapayev, and Tukhachevsky. And other comrades. After all, it is so simple: pay revolutionaries-internationalists well, dress and clothe them, reward them generously, give them a rifle in their hands. The Yakirov Chinese reveal to us the simple mechanism of that inestimable international aid which the proletarians of the whole world have rendered to our revolution.

Yakir had never been a soldier, had never been a junker or a cadet, had never been a non-commissioned officer. He had not had the lowest experience of army life. He had no military education. And he had no experience of war. But he immediately broke through into a commander. Let's agree: Yakir was a genius. It's not easy at all - it's good to feed at your own expense half a thousand voracious Chinese in a hungry ruined country. It's good if they ate rice with chopsticks. What if they ate it with spoons? But Yakir managed to feed them! A genius, a true genius. And somehow I don't believe that revolutionary Yakir, who fed the Chinese well, starved himself.

Five hundred Chinese thugs is not much. But in the midst of general disintegration and anarchy, this united, ruthless, fierce force was leading its leader to power.

5

In the most difficult period of the formation of the communist dictatorship, Ion Yakir did not seek a command position. The year 1918 and the beginning of 1919 did not promise loud victories. Therefore, Yakir did not ask to be a commander. He commissaril - controlled the work of others. He was more and more on the political side: commissar of the brigade, head of the political department of the Southern section of the curtain units [\[13\]](#), a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 8th Army. And the Chinese are around. Through the entire book Yakir so and glimmers golden thread: *"Arrived at the station - headquarters echelon and with him a half company of Chinese."* *"My Chinese all melted away. Many were lost, but new ones were*

recruited along the way."

And slipping through Yakirov's story is some special dislike of the people for these revolutionaries-internationalists: "*The Chinese - those were not merciful. The Chinese were not merciful, they say, they were unchristian, German spies. These almost all of them were killed.*" The good thing is that there are a lot of them, the Chinese. You can't chop them all. Again and again Yakir got more and more Chinese. If they were well fed and paid for the killed, they came to him from all over the world.

On how the war was fought, what strategy-tactics were used, Yakir only rarely reports:

When marching past Odessa from all available artillery to open fire on the bourgeois, capitalist and aristocratic part of the city, destroying it and supporting our valiant heroic fleet in this endeavor. To leave intact one beautiful palace of the proletarian city theater. (Ibid. p. 17.)

Such an order was given by the Communist commander-in-chief Muravyev. Yakir proudly reports that he did not follow this order of the commander-in-chief. But what orders he himself gave, so he does not write about it.

6

In the same Odessa, after the Reds were knocked out, there was an investigation into the crimes of the Soviet authorities. Something about that heroic period is told in Melgunov's book *Red Terror in Russia* (Berlin, 1924. M.: Iris-Press, 2008). Here is what this book tells us about the mores of the Bolsheviks:

Each locale during the Civil War had its own particular characteristics in the realm of human atrocity.

In Voronezh, the tortured were put naked in barrels pierced with nails and rolled around. A pentagonal star was burned on their foreheads. Priests were put a wreath of barbed wire on their heads.

In Tsaritsyn and Kamyshin - sawing bones.

In Poltava and Kremenchug all priests were put to the stake.

In Yekaterinoslav both crucifixion and stoning were preferred.

In Odessa, officers were tortured by being chained to boards, slowly inserted into the furnace and roasted, others were torn in half by winch wheels, others were dropped one by one into a cauldron of boiling water and into the sea, and then thrown into the furnace.

But it was not Yakir who personally roasted people in steamer furnaces! He didn't personally drown people by tying grates around their necks! Maybe not him personally. People were drowned by the authorities, which he defended with his Chinese thugs.

The Red Communist atrocity in the Civil War eclipsed everything humanity knew about cruelty and sadism. All psychopaths, all sadists and murderers gathered under the red banners. It was their superiority in brutality that ensured the Communists' victory. No one could compete with them in brutality. Yakir found himself in the very environment where his talent could fully develop.

7

Yakir's personal participation in the bloody orgies is documented - not in Odessa, but on the Don, where he brought his Chinese. Yevgeny Losev first published in the magazine "Moscow" (1989. No. 2) a secret directive of Yakov Sverdlov:

Carry out mass terror against the rich Cossacks, exterminating them wholesale, and carry out mass terror against all Cossacks who took any direct or indirect part in the struggle against the Soviet power.

Indirect participation? What do you mean by that? Anything. Sverdlov ordered the extermination of whoever he wanted.

But even such a directive from Sverdlov seemed too soft and liberal to Yakir. So he issued his own directive on the "percentage extermination of the male population". He set the percentages himself.

Yakir was an enemy of the people. Is it possible to call someone who, at his whim, at his will, sets the percentage of extermination of people a friend of the people? Yakir is one of the most terrible executioners of the XX century.

And he did not repeat someone else's experience, but gave an example to his followers. When Yakir at his whim set the percentage of extermination of people, Hitler was still serving in Munich in the rank of a non-commissioned officer.

But was Yakir a traitor? A traitor to the Motherland?

Uh, sure.

In 1917 the people of Russia were given the opportunity to choose for themselves the form of government that meets the aspirations of the majority and the political organization that pleases the population. In this environment, Yakir bribed foreigners and with their bayonets set up orders that please him, not the people.

Is it possible to call the extermination of this very people by a percentage or by the whole population a service to the people? And if the extermination is carried out with the help of bribed foreigners, this is betrayal of national interests, this is treason against the Motherland.

We were told that the people were opposed by the White Guards and foreign invaders. But the opposite was the case. The people were opposed by the Red Guards and foreign soldiers

interventionists. Example: Chinese military intervention led by Yakir and other traitors.



And so the Kremlin nightingales, children of the 20th Congress, sang that under Khrushchev a thaw had almost begun.

But let's turn to the facts.

Under Stalin, some enemies of the people - Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Putny, Yakir - got what they deserved. Traitors to the Motherland were not put on the stake, they did not saw their bones and did not roll in barrels with nails. But still, under Stalin, some traitors, albeit mildly, but punished.

And after the XX Congress, during the rampant Khrushchev liberalization, all these leaders of foreign invaders, enemies of the people, traitors and executioners of Russia were declared heroes.

For what kind of merit? For the very percentages Yakir set?

GLAVA 12.

The All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as a mafia clan

After these unheard-of rapes, the Bolsheviks had no way back - to the very people they had betrayed, condemned to starvation and extinction. What remained was a swift run to their own grave - under the party banner, under the leadership of Stalin.

B. Rapoport, Y. Alekseev. Treason against the Motherland

1

By the middle of 1919, the situation on the fronts became clearer. The smell of victory. And now Yakir stops making a career as a commissar, executioner and punisher. Now he is eager to become a commander. The highest commanding positions, as usual, are occupied. There is only the position of division commander. To leave the post of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the army to the post of division commander - it is a fall. But Yakir agrees to the demotion, only to command now, at the victorious end of the Civil War. He receives the 45th Infantry Division. In May-August 1920 Yakir commanded Fastovka, then Lvov group of troops of the South-Western Front. He never parted with his loyal Chinese. They always stayed with him.

And so in 1920 Yakir and his punishers for the first time met a real enemy - not men armed with axes and scythes, but a stripped, stripped, armed with antique rifles, but still a regular Polish army. From this meeting the remnants of Yakir's 45th Division and the entire Lvov group of troops fled. Lucky were those with long legs. And also those who had a personal armored train with a Chinese driver.

What is interesting is this: the great commander Yakir in his memoirs remembered many things - how he commanded a Chinese battalion, how he calmed the popular uprisings (with a kind word, persuasion, Lenin's truth), but he did not remember how he commanded the Lviv group of troops on the South-Western Front.

Here is the question: can Yakir be declared a military leader if he himself is embarrassed to recall this so brief and so shameful period of his life?

2

After the Civil War, Yakir was the supreme military authority in Ukraine almost indefinitely. Yakir was complicit in one of the worst atrocities in all of human history. I have no right to describe the Communist-organized famine in Ukraine and the death of millions in one chapter. That tragedy cannot be described in any volumes. But I piously believe: the people of Ukraine will not forget their executioners. Yakir is among them. In the top five. Formally. But that savage crime was committed by force. By the Red Army. Chekists alone were not enough. And the Red Army in Ukraine was subordinate to Yakir. That's why it was in his hands that the power was in his hands. In fact, during collectivization Yakir was the first number one in Ukraine.

"Krasnaya Zvezda" (February 4, 1989) puts it mildly on this subject: "*In 1933, famine broke out in Ukraine*". Just like that: it broke out by itself.

And it did not break out by itself. The famine was organized by the Soviet authorities. In their most important theoretical work "The Manifesto of the Communist Party" Marx and Engels demanded the creation of labor armies, especially in agriculture. But in our country it was impossible to realize Marx's bloody plans in full. Therefore, not Marxist-Trotskyist labor armies were created, but much milder and more humane collective farms. But our people, accustomed to freedom, did not want to go to collective farms either. That is why the Marxists organized a famine: whoever did not go to the collective farm would be doomed to die of hunger.

Instead of the gruesome statistics of collectivization, I will quote just one fragment from Anatoly Kuznetsov's Babi Yar:

We told them: collective farms or death. They say: death is better...

We Communists were given a little bit of food stamps to keep us alive, and so were the village activists, but what THEY eat is beyond comprehension. There are no frogs or mice anymore,

There are no cats left, grass and straw are cut up, pine bark is stripped, ground to dust and baked into tortillas. Cannibalism at every turn....

We were sitting in the village council, and suddenly a village activist came running, denouncing that a girl was being eaten in a certain house.

We pack up, take our weapons and go to that house. The whole family is at home, only the daughter isn't there. They're sleepy, fed up. In the house smells delicious boiled food. The stove is hot, pots are in it.

I'm gonna start interrogating:

- Where's your daughter?

- I went to town.

- Why did you go?

- Material on the dress to buy.

- What's in the oven in the pots?

- Ta kulish.

I turn this "kulish" out into a bowl - meat, meat, meat, hand with nails swimming in fat.

- Pack up, let's go.

Obediently they gather like sleepy flies, completely insane. They're coming. What should we do with them? Theoretically, they should be tried. But there is no such article in Soviet laws - cannibalism! You can - for murder, but it's a lot of fuss in the courts, and then hunger - is it a mitigating circumstance or not? In general, we were instructed to decide locally. Let's take them out of the village, turn somewhere in the field, in a gully, slap them in the back of the head with a gun, cover them with earth - then the wolves will eat them.

3

What could Yakir do? He could do whatever he wanted. Collectivization was possible only under the machine-gun fire of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The famine was organized by the bayonets of the same liberator army. It was its combat detachments that seized everything that could be considered food and mercilessly destroyed it. We are not talking about Yakir alone. All of them, "strategists", had a hand in those atrocities. Yakir is just an example. And on the basis of that

For the reason that he was in the very center of the tragedy and crimes, and he had the most opportunities for resistance. So, if Yakir had not been so zealous in shooting starving people, the Communists would not have been able to drive people into collective farms by any means, it was beyond their power to extinguish the flames of people's anger. Except for Yakir's machine guns, there were no other means against the people. If Yakir had not shown his zeal

in raskulachivaniya and food confiscation, there would have been no collectivization, no famine.

Once again, the question of this man's motives arises. Why did Yakir become a revolutionary? Why did he fight for the Reds? Under the tsar, nothing like the famine of 1933 happened anywhere in the Russian Empire. Why did Yakir establish a cannibalistic regime? For the sake of what Yakir's Chinese burned officers in steam locomotive furnaces? For the sake of a bright future in which people would boil each other in pots? Why did Yakir seek power? To organize a famine that had never happened before?

If Yakir wanted to come to power to protect the people, then here it is, the people - protect them! It doesn't even need to be protected. Just don't take grain from the people, don't slaughter cows and pigs, don't fill meat with chlorine, don't burn bread.

But the bread was burned. But meat was covered with chlorine. But cattle were driven into wagons and kept for weeks without water or fodder, so that they would die of sickness. So that the people wouldn't have it all. So that the people would submit. To drive the people into collective farms. But if Yakir had not shown diligence....

And I don't want to blame everything on poor Yakir alone. All comrade red commanders who served in the Red Army during collectivization were enemies of the people. All of them without exception. All went to the service of Satan's power. All fought against their own. And not for nothing in 1935 were introduced marshal ranks. It would seem, why in peacetime? There seems to be no war. And suddenly they give huge stars to military leaders! For what kind of victories?

For collectivization. For the famine that the Red commanders organized in their own country. For the victory over the peasantry. For treason against the Motherland. The backbone of the peasantry was broken by famine. But the backbone of the peasantry is the backbone of Russia. And Ukraine. And Belarus. After that, Russia is humped. And Ukraine. And Belarus.

But Yakir could have stood at the head of the people. After the first wave of confiscations of livestock, poultry, grain and, in general, everything edible, the country went into a frenzy of terror and rage. Yakir had the most powerful of all military districts of the Soviet Union, the best divisions, the most modern weapons. And here - tens of millions of hungry people, who are doomed to death, who have nothing to lose. If Yakir had declared himself an opponent of this crime, the army would have obeyed him. And the people

would have supported him. His success was guaranteed. But if it had not been possible to defeat the Communists, Yakir would have died in battle, and then grateful Ukraine should have put a monument to him.

But Yakir was a punisher and executioner. He allegedly changed his profession from executioner to commander, but he never became a commander, but remained an executioner. Yakir did not become a revolutionary to protect the people. He had other intentions.

4

Soviet propagandists said that if in 1937 Stalin had not removed from power the commander of the Kiev Military District Commander 1st rank Yakir, Yakir would have saved Ukraine from the German invasion, would have crushed the 2nd tank group of Guderian, would not have let Gauleiter Koch into Kiev.

Maybe so. But is the difference great: party power or Aryan power? Was Yakir's power better than Hitler's? I agree: under Yakir, some were destroyed and others were merciful, and under Koch, vice versa. But their methods were not too different. And the scale is the same. And the brutality was beyond insanity. Both of them. Communist Yakir and Hitler's Koch are twin brothers. Both are socialists. Under the socialist rule of Gauleiter Koch, it was even decided to restore collective farms. So that not to clarify relations with an individual man, but to impose tribute on the whole village, and there you can sort it out yourselves, drink each other's blood.

An interesting detail: during Hitler's occupation of Kiev, the Gestapo was located in the house number 33 on Vladimirska Street. In the building of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. Leaving, the Chekists did not blow up their building and did not burned, although they blew up Khreshchatyk and Lavra. But the Gestapovs, leaving, burned everything around them, and kindly left their temporary residence undamaged to the Chekists. The Chekists and the Gestapo passed the house of torture, torture and shootings to each other like a baton.

And one more detail. Koch, the executioner of Ukraine, had a residence outside Vyshgorod, in Mezhyhirya. Before the war there were estates of Kosior, Postyshev, Petrovsky and Khrushchev. But for some reason, Koch took a fancy to Yakir's palace.

Tukhachevsky called his way of ruling Russia an occupation. He recognized that "*the war had to be waged mainly not with gangs, but with the*

entire local population." (Fighting counter-revolutionary uprisings. War and Revolution. 1926. No. 7-9.) Tukhachevsky believed that "*we have to wage not battles and operations, but perhaps a whole war, which must end in complete occupation*" (ibid.).

Yakir was in full solidarity with his friend and comrade-in-arms and did the same in Ukraine: he waged a real war against his people, which ended in occupation. Like Tukhachevsky, Blucher and other traitors of the Motherland, Yakir was an occupier. And if we put a monument to Tukhachevsky, Blucher and Yakir, we should not forget Gauleiter Koch. How is he worse than Yakir and Tukhachevsky?

5

Yakir's defenders say that he was not only a sadist and executioner, but in some ways a bit of a strategist. I have heard such statements, but no one has come up with any confirmation. Yakir never won any victories on the fronts. Punitive operations don't count. He never wrote any theoretical works. He did not prove himself in military science. The Kiev district under him was the most powerful, but it and before Yakir, and after him has always been the most powerful grouping of forces of the Red Army. Not because Yakir was here, but because it was more convenient to strike the West from here.

Yakir had no military fundamentals. He passed through the chain of command by leaps and bounds: battalion commander, division commander, army commander. From an undergraduate student to commander - two years. Such leaps did not go in vain for anyone. All his combat experience - three months with a shameful end. B

did not immortalize his name in theoretical research. He did not enrich military science with brilliant discoveries.

In 1927, Yakir studied at the German Academy. And he was praised by General Field Marshal Hindenburg. And now we are announced: here it is - evidence of genius!

Let us not be tempted. We will not support the shout of enthusiasm. Praise for the Hindenburg? It's no honor. Hindenburg also considered Hitler a great statesman and strategist. Let's forgive him. The Field Marshal, out of his mind, was wrong. And he represented a country that started and lost two world wars.

In 1927, Hindenburg had already failed in one world war and was preparing generals for the next war, preparing them so that they also

shamefully failed. They object: Germans know how to fight, only they do not win. You could say that. But for me, inability to win means inability to fight. Let's imagine: a great boxer, muscles - you can admire, excellent technique, red underpants, he runs into the ring spectacularly, to the sound of drums and the sound of kettledrums, starts the fight with a theatrical swing. Except he gets punched in the face every time. Otherwise, everything is perfect. That's how it always turns out with German field marshals: amazingly wise people, and chest in orders, and memoirs - you can't tear yourself away. Only their faces are beaten. Regularly.

So the praise of such strategists didn't mean much. And we had nothing to learn from the Germans in 1927. At that time we were already laying (in the absence of Yakir) the foundations of "deep operation", and in Germany and in 1933 there was nothing like that. It is enough to look at the German statute "Driving of Troops" of the corresponding year.

And if Field Marshal Hindenburg praised Yakir, it does not follow that the praise was sincere. Yakir had worked with the Chinese and should know the ancient Chinese wisdom: beware of being praised by your enemy.

6

It is said that Yakir opposed Stalin's terror and for that he paid with his head. Indeed, they do say that. But the case was just the opposite. To Colonel General D. A. Volkogonov.

I happened to read Stalin's documents (Volkogonov D. A. Triumph and Tragedy. Book. 1. Ch. 2. P. 213).

The story goes like this. 1937, the February-March plenum of the Central Committee. The same plenum, which served as the official beginning of the purification of the top of the party, the army and the NKVD. Comrade Yezhov, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, speaks and proposes to expel former Politburo members Bukharin and Rykov from the Central Committee and the Party, to try them and shoot them.

The Communist Party was a real mafia clan. And here's the proof. If a man is guilty, he should be taken to court. But that's not how it worked in the Communist Party. A plenum of the Central Committee was gathered, which secretly decided not only the questions of guilt or innocence, but also passed sentences, including death sentences. After that, the case was submitted to the court, which would openly examine the case and pass the very verdict that had been passed in advance at the party meeting.

It should be emphasized: Yezhov made the proposal.

Stalin was present, but he had nothing to do with it. Stalin stood as if above it all, he did not interfere in this case: the proposal to execute Bukharin and Rykov was made - well, discuss it, comrades.

Who is Rykov? Lenin was the first head of the Soviet government, Rykov was the second.

And who is Bukharin? By Lenin's definition, a party favorite.

And here is the personal file of the named comrades. And the proposal: not a strict reprimand with a note, but a firing squad. Who is in favor of this proposal? Please vote, comrades.

And individual comrades have trembled. And not in small numbers. Not for the favorite of the Party and not for Rykov, who replaced Lenin, but for their precious skins: today the favorite of the Party and the former Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars went under the axe, and tomorrow who?

Among those who trembled and those who supported Stalin always, everywhere and in everything - Shkiryatov and Khrushchev. The vote is roll call. Everyone writes his opinion on paper. Some - as commanded: expel from the party, try and shoot. And those who trembled - more cautious: expel from the Party and judge. And then, they say, as our native Soviet court decides. Comrade Stalin did not interfere in the case, but carefully observed what was happening. The resistance is emerging, albeit hidden, but resistance. Not the leaders were in a hurry to give up their former comrades. No matter what happened.

What should Stalin do?

On the one hand, Stalin does not want to lose the support of those who are in favor of terror, on the other hand, Stalin does not bet against the cautious resistance of those who trembled. Stalin's decision is worthy of the ancient sages: let's take our time, comrades. Let's return the case to the NKVD. We'll conduct an additional investigation. The NKVD will sort it out. Then we'll decide.

And everybody's happy.

Well, say the supporters of terror, the NKVD will sort it out, then we'll shoot Bukharin and Rykov.

Well, think the cautious, Bukharin and Rykov will not be shot. At least not now.

Stalin's personal secretary Boris Bazhanov had long ago realized Stalin's

simple but extremely effective tactic. Stalin favored only those decisions that would be unconditionally accepted. If there is a possibility that a decision favorable to Stalin will not be taken, it is postponed for later. Thus, Stalin (unlike Lenin) never lost in the voting. And now: the comrades have doubts - well, let's not rush to a decision, let the NKVD still work, let Comrade Yezhov collect additional material, clarify the situation, then we will decide, and for now we will not judge or shoot Bukharin and Rykov. Who is in favor of this proposal, comrades? The majority is in favor of this proposal. Both supporters of terror and cautious opponents like Stalin's proposal.

But there were extremists in the Central Committee. Two. The main Komsomol member of the country Kosarev and the commander of the Kiev Military District Commander 1st rank Yakir. Stalin's position: Let the NKVD sort it out. Kosarev - Yakir's position: kick out of the Central Committee, from the party, to be tried and shot.

Isn't that interesting? Yakir and Kosarev demand both a trial and a firing squad. In other words, they pass the death sentence even before the trial, knowing ahead of time that the trial is only a way to give legal form to a foregone murder. Neither

Yakir and Kosarev are not embarrassed by this. They know that the court will pass the sentence it is ordered to pass.

7

Fate takes revenge on the executioners.

Bukharin and Rykov were sentenced to death. But only a year later, on March 13, 1938. And Yakir's personal carriage was unhitched in Bryansk on May 28, 1937 - a couple of months after Yakir demanded Bukharin and Rykov be shot. Yakir received the executioner's bullet almost a year earlier than those for whom he demanded death.

Stalin's behavior in this situation requires special evaluation. Stalin's goal is to destroy his political enemies. In this case - Bukharin and Rykov. Those who spoke out, albeit very cautiously, against such actions (Khrushchev and Shkiryatov), Stalin did not shoot. But those who were particularly bloodthirsty (Kosarev and Yakir), Stalin shot first of all.

Stalin was indeed purging the highest echelons of power of blood intoxicated madmen.

GLAVA 13.

Perfectly accurate definition

As for the motives of repression against the top commanders of the Red Army, then, no doubt, not the least among them is the former involvement of this or that commander in Trotskyism, communication with Trotskyists.

H. Yakupov. Tragedy of military leaders. Moscow: Mysl, 1992. C. 20

1

Every year on May 1, the troops were read an order from the People's Commissar of Defense (or, later, the Minister of Defense) and an order from the district commander. These orders contained nothing but requirements to strengthen military discipline, to keep the powder dry, and to learn military science in a real way. The order is prepared by the chief of staff. Or rather, one of his assistants. The chief of staff corrects the text of the order with his commander's hand and gives it to the typist to type. Then the order is carried to the commander for signature. The commander reads, grumbles, throws inarticulate remarks. Now the text of the order will be reprinted, taking into account the comments of the commander, he will sign, and on the festive morning the order will be read out, as is customary, "in all companies, batteries, squadrons, squadrons and ships.

On the last day of April 1937, the draft of such a festive order was brought for signature to the commander of the troops of the Kiev Military District, Commander 1st rank Yakir. The order is standard: under the leadership of the great Stalin forward to the victory of communism! Yakir read all this, Stalin crossed out and gave the paper to reprint. "Red Star" (February 4, 1989 and August 14, 1996) admires Yakirov's action: here he is, a fighter against the cult of personality! Here it is, courage! Here it is, courage!

I personally do not see any bravery in this act. If Yakir felt that Stalin was being overly exalted, he, as a member of the Central Committee, should have said so at the February-March (1937) plenum. At the very least, he should have been among the cautious ones

opponents of terror, such as Khrushchev and Shkiryatov. But Yakir demanded blood. Yakir at that plenum showed more bloodthirstiness than Stalin himself.

If Yakir considered himself an opponent of Stalin, then it was necessary to fight against Stalin. You can fight openly - to stand up with weapons in your hands, to raise the troops and Ukrainian men. Or you can fight secretly - prepare a conspiracy and wring the neck of Comrade Stalin.

On the open speech against Stalin Yakir did not go.

If he was in a conspiracy against Stalin, he ruined the whole affair by his action.

Yakir's act is not just stupidity, but more than that.

2

Yakir is a member of the Central Committee, and he has some political combinations of his own. If you want to do politics - do it, but do not put others in harm's way. By his actions Yakir put the Chief of Staff at risk - after all, he is responsible for the preparation of the order. The Chief of Staff is a military man, and he may not need big politics. But the Chief of Staff must be responsible for Yakir's kukish in his pocket. Why should he?

Good for Yakir. He himself is a member of the Central Committee, and he is free to do whatever he likes. But the Chief of Staff does not have such a position, such influence and such power. And Yakir, without asking the opinion of the Chief of Staff, makes him an accomplice in a political action, an accomplice in a speech, however small, against the highest political leadership of the country.

Yakir plays his political games, but he drags the girl typist along with him, without asking for her consent. If someone finds out about what happened, she will also be taken to the proper place. And why, tell me, why should she, young and beautiful, get involved in these matters?

The Chief of Staff, having received the order back and having seen what was crossed out in it, was simply obliged to report to the proper place: here, comrades, is my text, and here is Comrade Yakir's edit, I have nothing to do with it. I don't play these games. He's the one who rules.

And the comrades from the Special Department are obliged to report it to higher authorities. Just to save their own skin. This information should reach Comrade Stalin very soon. Whoever

will hold on, he'll lose his head. Chief of Staff and all others were obliged to report on what happened through all channels: what if it is a provocation? And what if it is Comrade Stalin through his friend and drinking buddy Central Committee member Yakir just vigilance checks: who will report, and who

will keep silent?

And the girl typist was obliged to report through her own channels. She had printed one text praising Stalin, and now she was ordered to reprint the same text, only with Stalin crossed out. When people were dying by the millions, Comrade Yakir didn't show Stalin his fingers. But now he's getting bolder. Why should the typist become an accomplice? So she should have dialed the appropriate number and informed whoever needed to be informed. Did Comrade Yakir think about it?

But even not ordinary girls kept Comrade Stalin in the typists-telephonists-ciphering near his comrades-in-arms, great commanders, fiery revolutionaries. The girls had special training and special systems of subordination, control and communication. Did Comrade Yakir think about it? Did he guess?

At one time or another, each of us smeared glue on our favorite teacher's chair, put buttons underneath, stained the edge of the table with chalk, threw carbide into the inkwell, let out a mouse during class. Or a snake. And each of us had the sense to think about our own safety. So I should have poured a bottle of ink into her bag, so that she wouldn't know what kind of scoundrel had dared to do it, so that she wouldn't suspect!

And Yakir didn't have the intelligence to harm discreetly. Yakir's behavior is that of a feisty woman in the kitchen of a communal apartment who throws soap into someone else's soup. But she behaves in such a way that everyone knows whose handiwork it is.

3

Now some additional information. Ilya Dubinsky, a Chervon Cossack, tells how he got a new office in 1935.

One day Schmidt came to see me. He praised the austerity of the situation and said:

- And Stalin's portrait is a must-have (Dubinsky I. V. Special Account. p. 128).

In 1927, when Trotsky was still listed as a great leader and considered Stalin an "outstanding mediocrity," Yakir's favorite, Schmidt, publicly

promised to cut off Stalin's ears.

In 1935, when Stalin decisively won, the same favorite Yakir Schmidt recommends not only his subordinates and superiors, but also the commander of a neighboring brigade to hang in the offices of Stalin's portraits. And here is what he writes about Yakir himself:

I remember the meeting of the Defense Commission in Kiev. With what love, returning from Moscow, Yakir spoke of Stalin. Such admiration can only fervently loving son of his good father. What is it, the meanness of one or treachery of the other? (Ibid. P. 208.)

In my opinion: the meanness of one.

Let's reason: on the high rostrum of the Defense Commission Yakir - a loyal Stalinist, tender, loving son. Left alone, he is a fighter against Stalin. And the fighter is not very smart. "Loving son" crosses out Stalin's name from the order, and so that the favorite father about this immediately reported.

But here Yakir was arrested. Not for the crossed out Stalin - the reasons for the arrest are much more serious (we will get to them yet). And immediately arrested Yakir again turns into a loving son: "I will die with words of love for you.

How familiar all this is! How similar! In 1934 Hitler was purging the ranks of his Stormtrooper henchmen. Arrested SA leader Ernst Röhm asked to tell Adolf Hitler that he would die with words of love for his Führer. SA Gruppenführer Karl Ernst asked the same thing. Coincidences in everything: after hearing the assurances of love, Hitler called Röhm and his associates prostitutes. And Goebbels responded to these words of the Führer by saying something that could be translated into Russian as: a completely accurate definition!

Another parallel. It was a fashion among our teachers to pierce portraits of Lenin and Stalin on their chests. Not because they loved Lenin and Stalin tenderly, but to save their lives. They thought that if they had portraits of Lenin and Stalin on their chests, they could avoid the death penalty.

The calculation is correct. No one dared to shoot at Lenin and Stalin on a criminal's chest. We didn't shoot at the chest at all. We shot them in the back

of the head. Or they would chase a crowd into a quarry and shoot them with machine guns, not caring who had what on his chest, on his back and below.

The psychology of the communist Yakir and the Nazi Röhm was the same: who would dare to shoot them, if they love the leader-fuhrer?



Mystery of history: did Yakir love Stalin or not?

If he did, there's one less Stalinist. What do we regret?

But it seems more likely that Yakir loved Stalin with a sly love. He worked for publicity. For effect. For show. But he didn't really love him. Only pretended to. Only pretended to love.

What can you call a man who, looking into the eyes of the leader, swears his love for him, and from a high rostrum swears the same, but when left alone, he twists his knuckles in his pocket? He was caught with those dumplings, and he swears his love again.

What do you call someone like that to get a perfectly accurate definition?

GLAVA 14.

Dekavilki, polemostrategy and fronts hundreds of thousands of kilometers long

*We read the writings of a "distinguished military
leader"
Tukhachevsky*

1

Who was the first to declare Tukhachevsky a brilliant strategist? Khrushchev.

Why?

Because he brought the Soviet Union to the knees. Khrushchev promised to show the capitalists the mother lode, but at the same time he was ready to kiss their hands to feed hungry Russia with bread. In peacetime, in a great agrarian country that for centuries had exported nothing but bread, Khrushchev ruled in such a way that there was no bread. Red propaganda announced that under Khrushchev, liberalization supposedly began. Khrushchev gave dachas to five poets and writers, and they shouted with evil voices: "We are the children of the XX Congress! The thaw is coming!"

No one has ever presented any evidence of thawing and liberalization. But the things that happened under Khrushchev were terrible: our tanks crushed people in East Germany, in Poland, in Hungary, liberator soldiers shot people's demonstrations in Novochoerkassk - for the sake of a bright future. And the fed-up loudmouths, the "children of the 20th Congress", shouted that life was better for them, life was more cheerful. Communist fanatic Khrushchev was ready to destroy the whole world for the sake of communism, he put the planet on the brink of destruction in a nuclear war - for the sake of life on earth. The world was

saved by Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, a brave GRU colonel who gave his life to stop Khrushchev's madness^[14].

It's interesting how we are organized: in Moscow, we sculpt a monument on top of a monument. We don't know who else we should erect a monument to. And we consider the man who saved the planet from the world Chernobyl a traitor: the earth has produced such a bastard - he did not allow our dear Nikita Sergeyevich to unleash World War III. Life after World War III would have been wonderful! Without capitalists!

Sure, life would be great. But then who would feed us?

We can say whatever we want about Stalin, but still Stalin did not think of bringing the world to the brink of destruction. Only our dear, our peace-loving and liberal Nikita Sergeyevich reached this point.

In 1961, Khrushchev solemnly announced that "the present generation of Soviet people will live under communism," that everyone will have everything according to their needs. How's that? Everyone will have an apartment as big as their heart desires, and exactly where they like it? And all on the sunny side? And as much furniture as you want? And if everyone wants Karelian birch? There won't be enough birch trees. And each of them as many books as you want? And everyone a summer house with a swimming pool? Everyone will have a car of the brand that meets the needs of the broad Russian soul? And if someone has the need to have more than one car? And everyone will have as much sturgeon caviar as you want? And as much cognac as you want? And sheepskin coats to choose from? And vacations in the Crimea? And medical care like Khrushchev? And a mansion in the center of Moscow, like proletarian writer Maxim Gorky?

Only an idiot would promise such a thing. The thing is, our wants, our needs are always ahead of our abilities. Always. Satisfy all our needs, and we'll have new ones.

It is impossible to satisfy all human needs. That is why we have become human beings, because we have always lacked something. And we will remain human beings as long as we want something, strive for something, dream about something. To create a society in which everyone will have what they need is the dream of Yemelya the Fool lying on a stove.

Only Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Khrushchev could think of such a thing.

Khrushchev promised muddy shores, and the country was lining up for matches and salt. On Khrushchev's orders, two quick Germans stitched together the movie "Russian Miracle" about how bad it used to be and how good it is now, under Khrushchev. At the same time, the country lost bread. We can't be intimidated by the absence of butter and meat. But bread disappeared. And not by spring, but in the fall of 1964, right after the harvest.

That's why there was panic. There were kilometer-long queues for bread. To feed everyone, it was decided to mix peas into the dough. But there wasn't enough bread. There were fights over a loaf of bread. In Moscow, on Khoroshevka, someone sacrificed his ration: he hung a loaf of bread made of chaff and peas on a street lamp and wrote: "Russian Miracle".

And the cleaner the store shelves became, the louder Khrushchev's screamers denounced Stalin. The more peas were poured into the bread, the longer the centipede queues stretched out, the more Khrushchev needed to deflect the people's anger away from himself. In any direction.

And he talked about how bad life is for blacks in America. Didn't help.

He talked about how bad it was for blacks in Africa. It didn't work again.

Every ruler in such a hopeless situation needs a scapegoat to blame for all the country's troubles. Such a culprit was declared, of course, Stalin. And to make the new historical concept look realistic, the public had to show the heroes-"great martyrs" who fought the villain. This is how the myth of the brilliant military commander Tukhachevsky arose.

And it was on. And we started screwing marble planks onto the walls.

The myth turned out to be very foldable: Stalin destroyed Tukhachevsky, the greatest strategist of all times and peoples, decapitated the army, that is why the war went wrong, that is why we killed so many people in the war and lost so much property, that is why the destruction, that is why we can not restore the country, that is why there is no meat, butter and bread.

Hysteria around Tukhachevsky swept the country and the world at that time. Books about this great commander were published in huge editions, articles about him were in all newspapers, veteran Tukhachevs from every crevice

came out and shared their memories. It was ordered to erect a monument to Tukhachevsky. And where? Of course: on Red Square. Where else? But UNESCO was outraged: Red Square was included in the number of architectural monuments of world significance, and it was not allowed to change its appearance. Then where to put the monument? Then next to it. Behind the Historical Museum, on Manezhnaya Square. To gallop.

It was about time Khrushchev was taken down. The budgets for Khrushchev's schemes were cut. Otherwise, the "genius strategist" would be on Manezhnaya Square.

A monument to Tukhachevsky was never erected in the center of Moscow, but the legend remains: the shortage of bread was due to the war, and the hard war was due to the death of the greatest strategist, Comrade

Tukhachevsky. And everything in this legend fits together, and one thing follows from another. But if you take the very first card out from under this house of cards, the house will collapse.

And it's easy to knock out the map: Tukhachevsky was not a strategist.

2

So, the first to declare Tukhachevsky a genius was Khrushchev. This alone is enough to doubt the correctness of the assessment.

Khrushchev could have said anything. He wasn't responsible for his words. Nor for his actions. He had no problem hooliganizing at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, and he could say things that the whole world marveled at. His antics are still remembered today.

Particular caution must be exercised when confronted with Khrushchev's views on strategy. The encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev in September 1941 and near Kharkov in May 1942 can be considered two of the worst disasters in world military history. The immediate perpetrators of the first disaster were Yeremenko and Khrushchev, the second - Timoshenko, Khrushchev and Bagramyan.

Of the four main culprits, only Khrushchev was guilty twice. No one in the world was personally involved in such wild strategic miscalculations. (Let me remind you that Khrushchev was a member of the Military Council of the front, and without his consent no key decision concerning the leadership of troops during combat operations could be taken).

And we would not believe Khrushchev if he pointed his finger at someone: that was a strategist! The track record of "strategist" Khrushchev is too dubious to believe his recommendations.

3

In 1964, the February issue of the Military History Journal published an article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov about Tukhachevsky. Biryuzov told the world that back in 1927 the Chief of Staff of the Red Army (since 1935 - General Staff) Mikhail Tukhachevsky wrote a letter to Stalin and in it outlined a program of deep and complete reorganization of the Red Army. Tukhachevsky insisted on the development of aviation, artillery, airborne and tank troops, on deep technical re-equipment of the army. Marshal Biryuzov emphasized:

In view of the rapid growth of military technology and its influence on the nature of future warfare, M. N. Tukhachevsky showed great concern for the development of new branches of the armed forces, and above all aviation, motor-mechanized and airborne troops... However, these proposals of M. N. Tukhachevsky were not only not appreciated and supported by Voroshilov and Stalin, but were also met with hostility. Stalin's conclusion, which was fully joined by Voroshilov, argued that the adoption of this program would lead to the elimination of socialist construction and to its replacement by some peculiar system of "red militarism" ... After this, Tukhachevsky repeatedly appealed to Stalin with a request to again consider his proposals for the reconstruction of the Red Army... This is the complex and difficult environment in which M. N. Tukhachevsky had to work....

So, Tukhachevsky insisted, Stalin waved him off as an annoying fly. Tukhachevsky persisted. And then Stalin removed him from the post of Chief of Staff of the Red Army and appointed with a demotion commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District. Tukhachevsky's proposals were never accepted. They were not appreciated. They were not

understood. The reorganization was forbidden. Not allowed. Killed at the stage of conception. In 1937, the great strategist Tukhachevsky was arrested. During the trial, among other charges, Tukhachevsky was reminded of his attempts to reform the Red Army. Tukhachevsky's proposals were seen as sabotage and used against him as evidence of subversion.

4

And it went on and on. Feathers squeaked, typewriters rattled with machine-gun bursts with a chime at the end of the line. Rattled speeches from the high rostrums of scientific conferences: Stalin did not understand strategy! Stalin was an enemy of technical progress! Stalin surrounded himself with stupid cavalymen-slaughterers! Stalin focused on the fools who lived yesterday and victories in the Civil War! Cavalymen knew nothing about modern strategy, opposed tanks and planes; except for horses, saddles and harness, recognized nothing: "Pikes to battle! Checkers out! Trot wide, but not spread out! Forward, march, march! Cut down the counterpart!" Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shchadenko envied Tukhachevsky, his broad

education, his deep knowledge, the audacity of his ideas. Incompetent cavalrymen in the leadership of the Red Army in every possible way hindered the implementation of military reform and did everything possible to prevent it from taking place.

Everything that Marshal Biryuzov wrote about Tukhachevsky in 1964 has been repeated thousands of times by the world scientific community. What Biryuzov wrote was repeated word for word by Colonel A. Khorev a quarter of a century later in "Krasnaya Zvezda" (June 4, 1988):

People's Commissar Voroshilov disliked his deputy because he envied his talent and broad education. Together with Stalin, Voroshilov was skeptical and even hostile to some proposals for reorganizing the army. Stalin's conclusion on one of Tukhachevsky's reports stated that the adoption of his program would allegedly lead to the elimination of socialist

construction and its replacement by a system of "red militarism".

And then we have to take a break. Take a breath. We are on the verge of a great discovery!

5

Tukhachevsky is truly unique. Our marshals were reproached and accused of anything: in mediocrity, in drunkenness, in stupidity, in slackness, in moral and domestic decay, in greed, theft, venality. Our marshals were accused of Bonapartism, treason against the Motherland, espionage in favor of Germany, Japan, Britain, Poland, France, accused of passing secrets to all the intelligence agencies of the world, of plotting against Comrade Stalin and against Comrade Khrushchev, of sympathizing with Trotsky, of right-wing bias, of left-wing bias. Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich, among other things, was charged at his trial with the rape of a minor.

But here is a truly unique accusation against our marshal of... "red militarism"!

We spared no money, no time, and no human lives for weapons.

For the sake of weapons, we ruined the country and drove it into the "third world". For the sake of weapons, we polluted Siberian rivers with radioactive

waste for centuries.

For the sake of weapons, we destroyed seas, lakes, forests and steppes.

For the sake of weapons, we have smoked our cities with unthinkable amounts of toxic waste.

For the sake of guns, we have degenerated the country: our life expectancy is at the level of Upper Volta and Sudan.

We've killed millions of people for weapons.

We blocked rivers with monstrous dams for weapons: we need aluminum.

For the sake of weapons, our people starved, dressed in rags, and lived in earth holes.

We robbed our churches for weapons.

We sold the treasures of our museums for weapons.

We have squandered the gold reserve of a great country for weapons.

For the sake of weapons, we turned great designers and engineers into slaves, working only for war and thinking only about war.

And in such circumstances to receive in our country a reproach for "red militarism"? That, it turns out, was the case. No, Tukhachevsky was definitely a great man. In order to receive such a reproach in the Soviet Union, one had to have done something outstanding.

And it turns out that there were people who protested against all this madness, against "red militarism". Who reproached Tukhachevsky for "red militarism"? Comrade Stalin did. Maybe Comrade Stalin was a pacifist? Maybe he wanted peace and friendship between nations? How interesting! Comrade generals and marshals, comrade historians and ideologists, there is something behind all this. Why did none of you draw our attention to such interesting details?

And like at a party meeting when dealing with a personal case of moral and domestic decay (i.e. excessive fascination with the fair sex) you want to yell from the back row: "Give me details! Details!"

But they did not give us any details. It would seem that Tukhachevsky proposed reorganization of the army, Stalin and Voroshilov objected - so publish the documents, so tell us what exactly Tukhachevsky proposed, what exactly Stalin disagreed with.

When the documents were published a few decades later, no one was interested in them anymore; only the stereotype firmly planted in our heads remained.

The first misconception of mankind: everyone thinks that his words are understandable to other people. However, the overwhelming number of conflicts between people arise precisely on the basis of elementary misunderstanding. We mean one thing, but we are understood differently. Low academic performance in schools is not due to the weak intellectual abilities of schoolchildren, but first of all to the inability to

teachers to present the content of the studied material in an easy, simple, clear, lucid and interesting way.

Stalin was one of the very few who could express his thoughts very clearly and extremely clearly. This ability of Stalin was noted by everyone.

Robert Conquest noted that Stalin's strength lay in the absolute clarity of his evidence.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov:

I always appreciated - and it was impossible not to appreciate - the brevity with which he was able to explain his thoughts and set tasks without saying a single superfluous word. This brevity he himself valued in others and demanded reports that were both informative and concise. He could not tolerate superfluous words and forced in such cases to go straight to the essence of the matter (VIZh. 1987. No. 9. P. 55).

Many people wrote about Stalin - Marshals Vasilevsky, Konev, Rokossovsky, Zakharov, Yeromenko, Savitsky, Generals Shtemenko, Yakovlev - it is impossible to list them all. And all descriptions of Stalin coincide: endurance, phenomenal memory, the ability to analyze and generalize, which could not be surpassed by any of his contemporaries, willpower, which knew no limits, and most importantly - the ability to briefly, clearly, understandably and for all clearly express their thoughts.

This clarity Stalin sought from his subordinates. He believed that if a person is not able to speak simply and clearly, it means that in his head in chaos. Special clarity of thought and words are required in war. Let's imagine that the commander meant one thing, but his subordinates misunderstood him. There are many examples of this.

Stalin was preparing for war, so he selected such commanders who thought clearly and equally clearly spoke and wrote. 1937 - this is the moment

when Stalin formed his team for the future war. Fools had to be removed, intelligent elevated. Stalin was up to the task. Stalin chose the right people. An example - Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Y. Malinovsky. He believed that the order should be

write in short phrases, clear and simple, so that the reader understands in any case, even when he did not want to understand.

But Marshal of the Soviet Union MN Tukhachevsky clearly did not meet Stalin's requirements. The intellectual level of Stalin, who spoke and thought clearly and clearly, so exceeded the level of Tukhachevsky that their joint work was impossible. This is a classic case of mental and psychological incompatibility.

Tukhachevsky loved to show his scholarship, he loved incomprehensible words: polemostrategy! Strategy according to Tukhachevsky is one thing, but polemostrategy is something else. It sounds beautiful and mysterious. No one understood this term invented by Tukhachevsky, that is why some people considered him a genius: it is necessary to think of such words! It is incomprehensible, but how great!

Here is another term: decavilions. Tukhachevsky with his characteristic passion proved that in the wars of the XX century decavilki are of great importance. Who would dare to dispute the genius? Personally, I don't argue. I agree. If Tukhachevsky said that decavilions should be developed, then so be it.

Just a small hiccup: I don't know what a decaville is. Without looking in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, I'm willing to bet that there is no such term in it. I don't look in dictionaries on purpose: I believe that a commander should speak in a way that everyone could understand. Even a fool. Besides, it seems to me that not every dictionary will contain those very decavilikas, for the development of which Tukhachevsky advocates.

Or here it is, "railroad electives are increasing." Is that good or bad? If the elective is increasing, should I rejoice? Or should I be sad?

The most noise was around Tukhachevsky's book "New Questions of War". The best fragments of the book were included in the collection "Tactics and Strategy in Soviet Military Writings", they were published by "Military History Journal" (1962. No. 2). And the terms there are amazing. Here, for example, such as this one: non-consolidating defensive curtain. What does it mean? Is the curtain compacted or not compacted? Or another one: harmonic

separation of forces. I confess at once: I can't understand it. Clever people, tell me, what kind of harmonic is this? And Tukhachevsky, without sparing our heads, continues to nail no one understandable terms: airmobile-mechanical combat in the rear of the enemy.

There is a breed of scientific people who like incomprehensible terms. They nod their heads: "That's a strong statement. But I don't want to pretend to be a scientist. I confess: I don't understand it. I can't imagine what air-motor-mech combat is. And even behind enemy lines.

These are just a few examples from two volumes of the writings of the eminent military thinker. There, such examples are quite common in his works. Scholarship shines through. And Tukhachevsky's phrases have a triple meaning: one can understand it this way, one can understand it differently, and one can understand it in a completely different way. Or not to understand at all.

Here is one example out of many thousands. In the 1920s, in the higher echelons of the Red Army there was a discussion that was actually a cover for a struggle between clans. Some military commanders argued that the principles of strategy were inviolable for all armies and states, and only under the influence of circumstances and time slightly refracted. Others argued just as vehemently that the Civil War revealed an entirely new, superior type of strategy that had never been seen anywhere else.

The bickering was just an ordinary fight for the bosses' chairs, and it was all covered up by the beautiful term - discussion. The discussion about the principles of strategy, like many such discussions, had no practical significance. If the first opinion wins, nothing will change in the war in the actions of each particular commander. If the second opinion wins, nothing will change either.

It was not about how to act in battle. It was about something else: you are fools, and we are smart; we should be promoted, and you should be chased out of high offices. And the opponents proved just the opposite: you are the fools, it is you who should be driven out.

They argued, they argued, they broke spears. Intelligent people did not enter into such discussions: what good would they do? But Tukhachevsky did. I wonder how he thought: are the principles of strategy eternal, or in our Civil War was born a completely new, unique, unlike anything else strategy? Here is Tukhachevsky's opinion:

Not denying the eternal aspects of strategy, on the contrary, analyzing the essence of the civil war, we, guided by these eternal truths,

want to point out those new data of the strategy of the civil war, which we previously did not have to consider (Tukhachevsky M. N. Selected Works. M. N.: Voenizdat, 1964. Vol. 1. P. 32).

Understand as you like. On such a question Tukhachevsky could not have thrown himself into a verbal altercation. But if he did, explain it simply and clearly: this point of view, in my opinion, is correct, and this point of view is wrong. Explain why you think so. But in Tukhachevsky's case, any phrase can be interpreted as you like.

Tukhachevsky's greatness lies in the fact that in his writings anyone can find everything he is looking for and interpret the ideas in the way that the attitude of today requires. And tomorrow it will be possible to prove that Tukhachevsky did not mean this, but something quite different.

In discussions about the theory of military art, it passed. But as soon as Tukhachevsky tried to explain himself to his subordinates in war in the same language, immediately divisions, corps and armies, and even the whole front fell into the deepest stalemates.

7

In addition to the use of obscure terms and long phrases, the meaning of which could be understood by anyone, Tukhachevsky had another weakness - he did not understand the meaning of numbers. He always wanted to strike the imagination of his readers and listeners with unprecedented figures. Under Khrushchev, during the heyday of the Tukhachevsky cult, two volumes of his best works were published. They were, understandably, put on the bookshelves of the bosses' offices, but I doubt that anyone ever read these works.

If this is the best that Tukhachevsky wrote, then what does the worst look like? And let's not dive into abstruse scientific theories and terms. Let's pay attention only to the numbers: "*Multimillion-strong armies caused the scene of fronts stretching hundreds of thousands of kilometers.*" This is Tukhachevsky describing the First World War.

Fronts hundreds of thousands of kilometers long? Isn't that nonsense? France, Britain, their vassals from the colonies, and then the United States fought against Germany. The western front is from the North Sea coast to the Swiss border. In a straight line, not even 500 kilometers. The front, of course,

is not drawn in a straight line. But even then, with all the twists and turns, we can't scrape up a thousand kilometers. And all the millions of French, British, Australian, New Zealand, Canadian and then American troops were sitting on these kilometers. And if the front was hundreds of thousands of kilometers long, how many millions of soldiers would it require?

The eastern front is from the Baltic to the Black Sea. That's less than two thousand kilometers. The front is not straight - okay, let's say three thousand kilometers. Where are the fronts hundreds of thousands of kilometers long? If the countries of the northern hemisphere fought against the countries of the southern hemisphere and if the trenches were dug along the bottom of the seas and oceans, then even then it would be only forty thousand kilometers. Did Tukhachevsky know the length of the equator? Where on this small planet to cram the fronts with the length of hundreds of thousands of kilometers?

Let's approach this question from the other side. More than ten million soldiers were mobilized into the Russian army. And they all sat in trenches from the Baltic to the Carpathians. Two thousand kilometers. And if the front was hundreds of thousands of kilometers long, how many millions did it take to mobilize?

Twenty kilometers is the defense front of a division. For a thousand kilometers, we must have 50 divisions. In the first echelon. And in the second echelon. And in reserve. And for 100,000 kilometers, we must have 5,000 divisions. In the first echelon. But the enemy on the same front must also have 5000 divisions only in the first echelon. And if the front is not one hundred thousand kilometers, but several hundred thousand? Where did Comrade Tukhachevsky see such armies?

And so for decades such things have been published not only in Tukhachevsky's "best writings" but also in collections demonstrating the highest achievements of our strategic thought. Example: "Questions of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Works (1917-1940)" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965). On page 117 is an excerpt from Tukhachevsky's articles about fronts hundreds of thousands of kilometers long.

And for decades at scientific conferences from high tribunes big bosses talk about the greatest military thinker Comrade Tukhachevsky. And the half-asleep hall beats its hands. And I sat my pants down at those conferences, and I listened to scientific reports, and I beat my hands. I beat and thought: Comrade speaker, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, have you read Tukhachevsky's genius creations?

What are we talking about? And we are talking about the fact that in 1927 Tukhachevsky wrote a letter to Stalin and proposed a military reform. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov in his laudatory article remarks about it as if by the way:

M. N. Tukhachevsky's posing of these questions was correct and timely; as for the specific indicators, they were subject to further clarification (VIZh. 1964. No. 2. P. 41).

That's it! Everything at the genius Tukhachevsky is excellent, he poses the questions correctly and in a timely manner. Only with the figures he, as always, a little bit unfinished In short, the figures proposed to Stalin needed some clarification.

Let's imagine that a clever boy solved a problem well and correctly. Let's praise him. We pat him on the head. But his answer is a bit off, the answer needs some clarification. Or, let's say, Nyurochka, the barmaid, reports to the revision, and everything is just fine. Only in the financial report the figures don't match. Debit and credit don't match. It's a small thing, isn't it?

And here's Comrade Tukhachevsky. Instead of performing his direct official duties, he went into the development of some project. A genius, that's all. And everything is right, everything is timely and extremely necessary. But there's something wrong with the figures. Should we pay attention to such trifles? I think we should.

The General Staff is the brain of the army. There cannot be a neater person in the state than the Chief of the General Staff. And his neatness is manifested first of all in his work with figures. The Chief of General Staff has thousands of officers of the highest qualification under his command. That is why the General Staff exists to think everything over, take everything into account and calculate, and then, having weighed everything, taking into account thousands of concomitant and counteracting circumstances, to address the head of state. Tukhachevsky comes out with a proposal to reorganize the Red Army, but the numbers....

Did Tukhachevsky himself realize that the figures needed to be clarified? If he understood, if he demanded reorganization, knowing full well that the plan had not been thought out and the figures were not substantiated, then his

actions should be qualified as irresponsibility, if not sabotage. An irresponsible Chief of the General Staff, who proposes an unreasonable and ill-conceived plan, should be kicked out of his high post. He has no business being there.

Or maybe he didn't know that the numbers needed to be refined? If so, then he was a fool. Everyone understood that it was necessary to clarify the figures, but the Chief of the General Staff did not understand it. In this case, he too should have been kicked out of his high post. For the most dangerous person in the General Staff - is a man stupid. A foolish Chief of the General Staff is like a careless operator at a nuclear reactor.

And what figures are we talking about, exactly? What exactly did Tukhachevsky offer Stalin? For decades, scholarly comrades have been praising the innovator Tukhachevsky, but for some reason no one says what exactly he proposed. Perhaps Tukhachevsky's ideas were terribly interesting, but none of Tukhachevsky's admirers tell us what they consisted of.

We will soon find out what exactly Tukhachevsky proposed to Stalin. In the meantime, let us consider this: could a man who could not express his thoughts clearly and did not understand the meaning of numbers offer anything sensible (we are not talking about a school problem, but about the reorganization of the most powerful army in the world)?



Tukhachevsky has crowds of defenders. But it is not difficult to knock any of them out of the saddle. You just have to ask the question: What are have you read Tukhachevsky's work?

It's a chisel punch. It's unstoppable. Like a sledgehammer to the jaw. That's a question I've been asking Tukhachevsky's admirers for years. For some reason, it makes them speechless. It is a rule without exception: if someone praises Tukhachevsky, it means that he knows nothing about Tukhachevsky, it means that he has not read Tukhachevsky. Anyone who has read even ten pages of Tukhachevsky's works cannot praise Tukhachevsky.

And another trick: when I meet a throaty defender of Tukhachevsky, I gently take him by the button of his jacket and ask him affectionately: "And what is a decavilki?"⁽¹⁵⁾.

GLAVA 15.

Politrak Tikhachevsky

It was not enough just to be an honest Communist. One must also be involved in the political life of the unit, one must have experience in political work and be a sufficiently trained Marxist.

M. N. Tukhachevsky. Circular of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front. February 1922

1

We are usually presented with two proofs of Tikhachevsky's genius.

First: he proposed the reorganization and rearmament of the army. Second: many years before the German attack on the Soviet Union, this "great thinker" and "genius of strategy" foresaw such a development and warned of it. But Stalin, as it was explained to us, believed Hitler, and Tukhachevsky did not believe, did not heed the warnings, and ruined the genius of strategy. This is the result - the tragedy of June 22, 1941.

Dozens of historians say that Tukhachevsky "foresaw" and "warned", and millions of historians echo them. Articles, books and dissertations have been written about what Tukhachevsky "foresaw" and "warned". In the library of the Institute of Slavic Studies at the University of London (as well as in many other academic libraries) - a whole shelf of books with the titles "Tukhachevsky", "Marshal Tukhachevsky", "M. N. Tukhachevsky", "Red Marshal", another "Tukhachevsky" and another "M. N. Tukhachevsky", and another, and another, and another, and another. And in each book: foresaw and warned, foresaw and warned, foresaw and....

In addition, there are tons of books about other "geniuses of strategy" - Blucher and Yakir, Uborevich and Dybenko, Putna and Primakov, and every book mentions Tukhachevsky, who "foresaw" and "warned". Each author, glorifying his "genius", pushes him closer to Tukhachevsky - say, Tukhachevsky foresaw it

and warned, and my genius was also present. In addition to books, articles, articles, articles. In all the languages of the world: I foresaw and warned.

It is forgivable for some Western researchers: they write about our country, but they do not speak Russian, they cannot consult primary sources,

and once they hear that Tukhachevsky "foresaw" and "warned", they repeat it. But our researchers have access to primary sources. Tukhachevsky's "foresight" and "warnings" are not secret, there is no stamp on them, but for some reason no one directly refers to them as primary sources.

One after another articles are published about what Tukhachevsky "foresaw" and "warned". In 1995, the newspaper with the anecdotal title "News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence" (No. 40-41) dumbfounded readers with a huge article by Vladimir Kukushkin about how the wisest Hitler's intelligence deceived stupid Stalin and Stalin's hand decapitated the Red Army. Kukushkin explained why Hitlerites had to eliminate exactly Tukhachevsky, and not any other genius of strategy:

The choice of M. N. Tukhachevsky as the main victim of discrediting was quite justified. One of the greatest Soviet military commanders and prominent military theorists of the time, he never concealed his concern about the German threat.

In support of his thesis, Kukushkin cites another "genius of strategy," Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union, who wrote:

Back in the 30s, M. N. Tukhachevsky warned that our number one enemy was Germany, that it was intensively preparing for a big war and, of course, first of all against the Soviet Union.

There's no point in reading any further. We carefully fold the newspaper with intelligence and counterintelligence news and put it in the wastebasket. We'll sit, be quiet, think.

There is much to think about. Comrade Kukushkin does not hesitate to praise the great strategist Tukhachevsky. Thousands of other comrades do the same. But why does Kukushkin, like thousands of his predecessors and followers, refer to the opinion of some Zhukov? What does Zhukov have to do with it? If Kukushkin praises Tukhachevsky and his brilliant foresight and warnings, then it is necessary to refer directly to these warnings, it is necessary to tell the reader where, when, whom and in what form Tukhachevsky warned, it is necessary to publish these warnings. What does

this have to do with the opinion of an outsider, even if he is thrice brilliant?

The approach of some researchers is surprising: they have no opinion of their own, but repeat someone else's - here is what Marshal Zhukov said on this subject. I would like to know why we should read the warnings and predictions of one marshal in the retelling of another marshal?

In 1964, under Khrushchev's sunset, a few months before the overthrow of our dear Nikita Sergeyevich, at a time when Tukhachev's hysteria went beyond all conceivable limits, learned comrades collected the most outstanding works of the "genius predictor", and Voenizdat published a two-volume book "M.N. Tukhachevsky. Selected Works."

So let's open the collection of writings available to everyone and find these warnings of Tukhachevsky ourselves. Let us learn to have our own opinion, let us not repeat someone else's. After all, Marshal Zhukov could have been wrong in his assessment. And it could happen that Marshal Zhukov did not read Marshal Tukhachevsky's books at all and knew nothing about his works. Everyone says that Tukhachevsky foresaw and warned, so Zhukov could repeat what everyone says. Couldn't this have happened?

2

And who was the first to say that Tukhachevsky foresaw and warned? The first was another Marshal of the Soviet Union, Sergei Semyonovich Biryuzov, who wrote the foreword to the two-volume book

of Tukhachevsky's works. He also published an article in the "Military History Journal" (1964. No. 2) and told us the following:

Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky urged the Soviet people and their soldiers to be on guard. In the article "Military Plans of Present Germany", printed in 1935, Tukhachevsky emphasized the special danger of German militarism. Long before the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, he drew attention to the aggressiveness of German fascism and its preparation for war against the USSR.

In 1964, that article and that two-volume book by Tukhachevsky made a lot of noise and was discussed nationwide. I was a young cadet then. Of course, in our Kalinin Suvorov Military School we could not do without a seminar, without a public discussion of the works of the great thinker.

A couple days before the seminar, I had to go on duty. I had to stay up all night. So I decided: let me learn two volumes of Tukhachevsky. The volumes are skinny. Anyway, I wouldn't sleep, but it's a necessary thing, it will be useful for the whole life, in any situation it will be possible to support my opinion with a wise thought of the great commander: Tukhachevsky said so, volume so-and-so, page so-and-so.

I borrowed those volumes from the library, started reading them, and suddenly realized that I didn't need to learn it. Everything that's written here, we've all known for a long time. Without Tukhachevsky.

I opened the volumes, and suddenly the wind of world revolution blew over me. Suddenly Trotsky's goatee beard, a la devil, emerged from behind the poster images and bureaucratic slogans.

I had hoped to find in Tukhachevsky's book something like a chess textbook, or a textbook of military wisdom, like Sun Tzu's: here is a standard situation in war, the commander's options are these and those; this is a bad option, this one is better, and this one is great. And then there's the situation...

Tukhachevsky had no situations, no options and solutions. Tukhachevsky, like Trotsky, has slogans and appeals,

slogans and appeals. We must fight our enemies! You must know how to fight them! Enemies must be defeated! They must always be defeated!

Let's imagine that the world chess champion Garry Kasparov, for example, wrote a book on how to play chess, but instead of describing situations, instead of analyzing them and possible solutions, he would fill the book with such appeals: "You have to play chess! It is necessary not just to play, but to play well! And in order to play well, you have to practise! You have to practice hard! Every day! And if you don't practice, you'll lose!"

Can we imagine a good chess player writing such a book?

We can't.

And Tukhachevsky's books are written exactly in this vein. These books are written not by a military commander, but by a political officer. Here are samples of "strategic thought" of this "great military thinker":

The industrialization of the USSR, the socialist reorganization of the village and the tremendous cultural work in our country give us more and more cultured and class-conscious fighters, as well as more and

more technical means of struggle. The Red Army soldier must take an active part in the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan, in the socialist reorganization of the village and master the techniques with which the Red Army is saturated more and more every year. The Red Army is the greatest force ensuring the construction of socialism".

How does it feel? This is from volume two, page 166. And here's another:

The Party's general line ensures the strengthening of the country's defense capability.

Maneuvers are the highest level of tactical and political training and field hardening of troops, a report on achievements in training. Maneuvers conclude the annual training and educational work, and therefore they are the most

a wide field for socialist competition between military units, for checking the fulfillment of combat training targets.

The international proletariat is on the guard of the USSR. The working class of all countries, waging a fierce class struggle against their bourgeoisie, at the same time prevents the imperialists from attacking our Soviet Union, consciously defending it as a shock brigade of the world proletariat.

And it's all on the same page 166. And there are hundreds of pages like that. And they all have the same thing on them. Hooray! Forward! The Party is our helmsman! Study, study and study! Never be discouraged! Compete! Show heroism! Hooray! Hooray! Hooray! Hooray!

For the mass entertainers, take fragments from Tukhachevsky's works and from the leading articles of Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda, mix them up, and ask someone to guess where they got what from. What a laugh it would be.

3

The main problematics of Tukhachevsky's books is the organization of party-political work in the troops and in the occupied territories.

If we slowly and gradually infuse agitation forces, their influence will be negligible. What is needed is a simultaneous noisy infusion of a fresh revolutionary stream capable of breaking apathy and animating the troops with the desire for battle and the aspiration to victory. But the movement of this stream must necessarily be put on the rails. There must be developed in advance slogans and theses, with which the entire agitation mass must with complete unanimity to pour into the troops. Only under such conditions can a successful propaganda strike take place. These strikes should be accompanied by the most intensive campaigns of literature, posters, etc., with which the entire propaganda mass should be integrated into the troops. The organization of agit-points at all stages, the widespread use of music, the widespread development of the poster campaign, etc., must be accompanied by the most intensive literary and poster campaigns.

system and press, theatricals, etc., all this can and must give brilliant results (Ibid. Vol. P. 104). - all this can and must give brilliant results (ibid. Vol. 1. P. 104).

Then in the same vein: we should hang portraits of the leaders, we should paste posters on the walls, we should set up agit-points. And let the music play!

In Tukhachevsky's two volumes there is not a single recommendation on how to break through the enemy's front. But there are plenty of instructions on how to organize political training:

All this preparation must be regulated by certain theses covering the concepts of: the aims of war, the imminence of revolutionary explosions in the bourgeois states that have declared war on us, the combination of socialist offensives with these explosions, the atrophy of national feelings and the development of class consciousness (ibid. Vol. 1. P. 94).

General Tukhachevsky "did not graduate from academies", had no higher education, and his combat experience is not great. In World War I, Tukhachevsky fought for six months. And the Civil War was not so much a

war as punitive expeditions against the rebellious people. The main tactics then were burning villages, flogging with rifles and mass shootings. The main task of not only the Civil War, but any other war Tukhachevsky formulated clearly: "*To curb the local hostile classes with an iron hand*" (Ibid. Vol. 1. P. 58).

And all of Tukhachevsky's combat orders are not about how to cunning maneuver around the enemy and strike in the flank and rear, but about how many hostages to take and when to shoot them. We will have a special conversation about this ahead. For now, for example, this recommendation to the troops (Russian State Military Archive. Fond 235. Inventory 2. Case 16. Sheet 25):

Order of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Union Central Executive Committee N116

г. Тамбов

June 23, 1921.

The experience of the first combat section shows great suitability for rapid cleansing of known areas of banditry by the following method of cleansing.

Particularly bandit-minded townships are identified, and representatives of the county political commission, the special department, the military tribunal department and the command, together with the units assigned to carry out the purge, are sent there. Upon arrival at the place, the volost is cordoned off, 60-100 of the most prominent persons are taken as hostages, and a state of siege is imposed. Travel to and from the township must be forbidden for the duration of the operation. After that, a full township assembly is gathered, at which orders of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Union Central Executive Committee No. 130 and 171 and the written verdict for the township are read. The inhabitants are given 2 hours to hand over bandits and weapons, as well as bandit families, and the population is informed that in case of refusal to give the mentioned information the hostages will be shot in 2 hours. If the population has not specified bandits and weapons after the expiry of the two-hour period, the assembly shall meet again and the hostages taken shall be shot in front of the population, after which new hostages shall be taken and the people gathered at the assembly shall be asked to hand over the bandits

and weapons. Those who wish to do so stand separately, are divided into hundreds, and each hundred is passed for questioning through an interrogation commission (representatives of the Special Department and the Military Tribunal).

Everyone has to testify, without being dissuaded by ignorance. In case of persistence, new shootings are carried out, etc. After developing the material obtained from the surveys, expeditionary units are created with the obligatory participation of the persons who gave the information and other local residents and sent to catch bandits. At the end of the purge, the state of siege is lifted, a revcom is established, and a militia is installed.

The Plenipotentiary Commission of the VCIC hereby orders to be steadfastly enforced.

Chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission Antonov-Ovseenko
Commander of Troops Tukhachevsky

We see that Tukhachevsky did give recommendations to the troops on how to act, but those recommendations were not included in the two-volume book of the "great strategist", but surfaced seventy years later, and that only because in 1991 the power of the Communists for a short time slightly weakened.

Tukhachevsky and all other participants in that war against their own people declared themselves heroes of the Civil War. Antonov-Ovseenko's son then spent his entire life praising his father, a staunch Leninist: Ah, if it had not been for Stalin, if Antonov-Ovseenko had been in the Kremlin, but with Tukhachevsky, that would have been real socialism!

4

Let us pay attention to the date of Tukhachevsky's order - June 23, 1921. Twenty years later, other invaders would come and do almost the same thing. The only difference is that the Nazis drove the unwanted into a ravine and nailed them with machine guns, while Tukhachevsky, in addition, tied the entire population in a circle of responsibility. Later, this method of working with the population would be called pimping. This is what Antonov-Ovseenko, Tukhachevsky, his deputy Uborevich and all other "strategists" were doing. They sucked up the people, forcing everyone to become snitches and traitors, forcing them to betray their neighbor, cousin, father and brother, and then catch them in the forests. And kill them. Tukhachevsky was introducing universal snitching, pressurizing with fear and destroying the age-

old morals of the Russian village. Morals were replaced by fear for one's own skin and the responsibility of everyone for everyone else. Tukhachevsky's idea: to crush the people's sense of dignity. National and patriotic feelings in all peoples should, according to Tukhachevsky's idea, atrophy.

When we talk about the defeats of 1941, we call Stalin the culprit. But it was Stalin who began to awaken patriotic feelings in people. And he began to do this in the late 1930s, only after he managed to partially cleanse the country of Trotsky, Tukhachevsky and Uborevich. Let's not forget that the pimping of the people took place under the direct leadership of and

on the initiative of the very "strategists" who were removed by Stalin during the purification years.

And in 1941, the mobs, who had been taught by Tukhachevsky to value only their own skin, could not at first show heroism. It was necessary to awaken and re-educate the people's love for the Motherland, patriotism.

And one more thing. It was noticed on Solovki: he who forces people to become snitches is not ashamed of snitching, he himself becomes a snitch, if he was not one before. The one who bribed thieves and himself bribed, the one who, when circumstances changed, gave up everything he believed in and valued.

Uborevich, Korki, and Eidemann could not bitch about the people without bitching themselves. They could not, making everyone a snitch, not fall into the same sin. And the Unschlichts, Tukhachevskys and Yakirs could not be brave men. If they relied on fear, then they knew its power, then they were cowards. And the further course of events showed that in their overwhelming majority they surrendered each other without blinking an eye, they slandered each other and themselves and confessed to everything. Tukhachevsky himself at the investigation cracked at once, showing his bitch nature, cowardice and obsequiousness.

Here is the reason for the purification of the army in 1937. Stalin was preparing for war against Germany and had to get rid of the most bloody executioners - Antonov-Ovseenko, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blucher and others like them. These military commanders called themselves occupiers, and the people hated them. Such commanders could not be put at the head of the masses of people mobilized for war. The people would not follow these strategists into battle, and on occasion would remember them and Tambov, and Kronstadt, and the Crimea, and Warsaw, and Murom, and Rybinsk, and the Don, and Yaroslavl, and all their other "merits" and "feats".

On the other hand, these "strategists" could not lead the people to war. It has long been known that an army stained with the blood of its own people is incapable of fighting against external enemies. Using an army internally against civilians inevitably leads to its decay. Anyone who fought against the citizens of his own country could no longer be a commander.

And here "Red Star" praises the "patriot" Tukhachevsky: he would lead the people to a great war for the Fatherland! Yes, he would have led... "Patriot" Tukhachevsky was proud of the fact that he had atrophied patriotic feelings, he stated this verbally and in print. The "patriot" Tukhachevsky would have led into battle for the Motherland the swindled masses, in whom he etched the feeling of love for the Motherland with incredible cruelty.

When a ruler shows cruelty, the purpose of which is to protect the country, the people accept this cruelty. But Tukhachevsky showed wild cruelty, turning into sadism, in order to exterminate patriotic feelings in the people.

And no matter how much music was played, it could not drown out the people's hatred for the conqueror Tukhachevsky.

5

Here is another "pearl" from the "treasury" of Tukhachevsky's combat experience.

Chief of Staff of the troops Kakurin to give for signature Pre-political commissions of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th districts.

July 8, 1921.

The defeated gangs hide in the forests and take out their impotent anger on the local population, burning bridges, dams and other national assets.

In order to protect the bridges, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee orders:

- 1. Immediately take at least five hostages from the population of the villages near which important bridges are located, who should be immediately shot if the bridge is damaged.*

- 2. Local residents to organize, under the leadership of the revcoms, the defense of bridges from bandit raids, as well as to impose on the population the obligation to fix destroyed bridges no later than within 24 hours.*

- 3. This order shall be widely distributed to all villages and hamlets.*

Troop commander Tukhachevsky

The logic of our strategist is amazing: "defeated gangs hide in the forests and take out their impotent anger on the local population ...", and therefore Tukhachevsky orders to shoot hostages from among the local population.

Tukhachevsky's entire combat experience consisted of taking hostages and shooting them. And to keep the music playing.

Meanwhile, hostage-taking was prohibited by the Hague Convention of 1907. Since then, hostage-taking has been considered a grave war crime. At all times, a general who dishonored his name with this unworthy technique was despised by those around him. At the Nuremberg trials and other trials of Nazi criminals, the practice of hostage-taking was considered a war crime and the perpetrators were condemned to death by hanging.

This is what Tukhachevsky, Antonov-Ovseenko, Uborevich, Primakov and the like were worthy of. But, comparing our socialists with the German socialists, we still note the difference: the Gauleiter were occupiers on foreign territory, while Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Putna, Dybenko and the like were occupiers in their own country.

And after all this, Nikita Khrushchev declared war criminals to be innocent victims. And there are still people who feel sorry for Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Primakov and other enemies of the people. There are still people who are sorry that Stalin stopped the terror, punished the executioners, not allowing them to continue to pour people's blood. There are still people who are sad to hear the names of Tukhachevsky, Unsicht, Yakir and Gamarnik. But why should we share this light sadness?

They try to convince us that our people love to suffer, love the whip and their executioners. And to each of us, as a devilish temptation, they slip the faces of Tukhachevsky and all other bluchers: love your executioner, love your bastard and sadist, love your murderer, love his axe and his whip....

6

For a war against his own people, Tukhachevsky needed commanders of a special kind. It was not professionalism that was important, but

political trustworthiness and willingness to carry out criminal orders. For this reason, the selection of commanders was based on political rather than professional criteria:

It is only necessary to give wide room for advancement and to widely appoint commissars to command positions, giving some of them a brief theoretical training ... It is only necessary to throw the slogan of transition to communist command staff. The 5th Army has long ago put forward this slogan, and the command staff in it is all communist (Ibid. Vol. 1. P. 44).

It is easy to guess that it was written at the time when the 5th Army was commanded by Tukhachevsky himself. He puts the 5th Army as an example, and with it his favorite himself: this is how one should act!

This approach justified itself completely, as long as combat operations were reduced to shooting hostages. The main thing was that the commander considered himself a Marxist and did not spare people's blood for the sake of Marxism. That's why Tukhachevsky called for commissars to commanders' posts! Giving some of them a brief training.

Everything was wonderful until Tukhachevsky and his commissars (some of them had already had short-term training, and most of them had not) in 1920 met the Polish cavalry on the battlefield. And the commissars with short-term training ran far and fast.

This Marxist-Trotskyist approach of Tukhachevsky to the selection of command cadres from among the commissars was later declared brilliant and the only correct one. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov writes:

In all his activities, Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky was guided by the Leninist principle of the leading role of the Communist Party in the construction of the Armed Forces (VIZh. 1964. No. 2. P. 44).

The fascination with Marxism-Trotskyism, like everything in Tukhachevsky's life, was inflated to unbelievable proportions. On January 31, 1926, Tukhachevsky, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, sent a report to People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov, in which he claimed that the Red Army Staff was turning into an "apolitical body" (Krasnaya Zvezda. August 20, 1994).

But why should the most important military headquarters of the country be involved in politics? Parties and governments are in charge of politics, and the Chief of the General Staff and all his subordinates should serve the

Motherland, fulfill their duties and keep their noses out of politics. This is not a soldier's business.

It is interesting that Voroshilov, the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (in 1934-1940 - the People's Commissar of Defense), was a member of the government, that is, a politician. In addition, Voroshilov was a professional revolutionary with a huge pre-revolutionary record of underground work. Voroshilov objected to Lenin at the Fourth Party Congress as early as 1906. Voroshilov was a member of the Central Committee, and from 1926 - a member of the Politburo, that is, three times a politician.

And Tukhachevsky was an appendage. Served the tsar under the tsar. But he didn't even make company commander. And then he joined the Bolsheviks. But he joined only after the Bolsheviks had firmly established themselves in the Kremlin. And now Tukhachevsky, who had joined the Bolsheviks, wanted to show that he was also a revolutionary: he pointed out to the professional politician Voroshilov the insufficient politicization of the General Staff, which should not be politicized at all.

Wasn't it too much for a political officer with atrophied patriotic feelings to get involved in politics?

7

Tukhachevsky's published works are Trotskyism of pure water: appeals, appeals, appeals. And belief in world revolution. Trotsky wrote:

We should put forward the slogan of revolutionary destruction of the nation-state. To the madhouse

capitalist Europe must be opposed to the program of the Socialist United States of Europe as a stage to the United States of the whole world. (Opposition Bulletin. No. 84. P. 14.)

And Tukhachevsky said the same thing: we must forget about the Motherland and patriotism, there are no national interests. There are only class interests. Tukhachevsky's main works are "National and Class Strategy" and "Class Warfare". Tukhachevsky proves that one must fight not for the interests of one's country and people - they must be sacrificed, one must fight for the interests of the world proletariat.

Tukhachevsky viewed any issue through the prism of the class struggle.

He argued, for example, that there are two types of guerrillas: those who defend national interests (these are bad guerrillas) and those who defend the interests of the world proletariat (these are good guerrillas): "*Let us divide partisanship into two categories: national partisanship and class partisanship*" (Tukhachevsky M. N. Selected Works. Vol. 1. P. 50).

What does Comrade Tukhachevsky recommend to do with "national partisanship"? In Tukhachevsky's opinion, "*it could not go hand in hand with our class army of purely class character and spirit. Such partisanship, if it is not suppressed fundamentally, will inevitably have a disastrous effect on our army.*"

It is wild to read all this after the Second World War, which disproved everything Tukhachevsky wrote about. We fought against Germany, which was ruled by a popularly elected socialist party of the working class. German industry was largely placed under the control of the state, in other words, Hitler's Germany was socialist not only in form but also in essence. The German working class is the most advanced in the world according to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the most beloved by Marx, Lenin and Trotsky, but our people felt no class solidarity from the German workers during the war. And neither did other nations. And people were divided in the war not into bourgeois and proletarians, but into Germans and ours. And the partisan movement was not a class movement, but purely national, although Tukhachevsky recommended a "national" movement.

"partisanship" to be suppressed at all costs. And it was not the proletarians of all countries who helped us in the war, but the most important bourgeoisie the world has ever seen - Churchill and Roosevelt. And with them, the Rockefellers, the Rothschilds and the Fords. So much for class warfare.

Politruk Tukhachevsky had long been in the business of making predictions, and none of his predictions came true. In 1920 he predicted that the workers and peasants of Poland would rise up against their oppressors. Tukhachevsky predicted that the proletarians of all the countries of Europe would also rise up. Therefore, T u k h a c h e v e r s i o n's preparations for the march to Europe were limited to the organization of agit-points, the issuance of leaflets and posters: "Over the corpse of White Poland forward to the world revolution!" But contrary to the predictions of this woeful prophet, the proletarians of Poland did not rise up. The proletarians of Germany, France and Spain also ignored Tukhachevsky's brilliant predictions.

Nothing, consoled political officer Tukhachevsky, in the coming war they will rise up:

The defense by the working class of capitalist countries of their international socialist fatherland, the batrachie and the poor of the village - all this will create a broad base for revolutionary insurgency in the rear of our enemies (Tukhachevsky M. N. New Questions of War. Published in the collection "Questions of strategy and operational art in Soviet military writings". C. 126).

Everything that the political officer Tukhachevsky wrote about class strategy, about solidarity, about the fact that the bourgeois rear would burst, that the proletarians would rise - all this turned out to be just the subject of an interesting pre-war political conversation. Nothing more. The rear of bourgeois America and Britain, thank God, did not burst and did not revolt. Nor did the German working class revolt during the Second World War.

Tukhachevsky predicted uprisings by capitalists, but for some reason they broke out in the rear of the Workers' and Peasants' State. All of Tukhachevsky's services to Lenin and Trotsky were reduced to suppression of popular uprisings and occupation of his own country.

Tukhachevsky is an amazing type: he himself writes that in his own country he waged a real war against the whole people, and then he predicts that the proletarians of the whole world will be waiting for him with open arms. If he is an occupier in his own country, who needs him in other countries?

So Tukhachevsky's predictions were not accurate. However, Tukhachevsky's defenders do not stop: but, say, Tukhachevsky foresaw and predicted the German attack. He warned us... He foresaw everything...

When the shouts of the defenders of the great political patrolman-predictor turn to shrieks and roars, I ask the same question:

What could a prophet who was always wrong have predicted?

Tukhachevsky's first warning

We will expand into a socialist coalition when new socialist revolutions break out or when we have to occupy an area under the domination of capital.

M. N. Tukhachevsky. Issues of modern strategy

1

So, historians claim that Tukhachevsky foresaw the German attack on the USSR and warned everyone about it. Is this not a manifestation of greatness?

That's right. Anticipated and warned. I'll say more: he warned not once, but twice. So let's read those warnings.

Tukhachevsky's first warning about the insidious designs of the enemy was published as early as 1931 - ten years before 1941! What perspicacity! The text of this "great foresight" is so serious and important that I quote it verbatim (Tukhachevsky M. N. Selected Works. Vol. 2. P. 165).

Preparing a new war against the USSR

Every day the foundations of the capitalist world are being shaken more and more. A world economic crisis, unprecedented in history, developing on the basis of the general crisis of the capitalist system, has engulfed all bourgeois countries and all the most important branches of production.

The number of unemployed in the capitalist countries has already exceeded 35 million people and continues to grow. There is a widespread attack of the bourgeoisie on the working class: wages are being cut, unemployment benefits are being reduced, the working day is being lengthened etc.

Millions of peasants are being ruined by falling prices of agricultural commodities, high taxes, huge rents and high interest on debts.

The world bourgeoisie, relying on the social fascists, intensifies the already brutal exploitation of the workers, smashes revolutionary and

workers' organizations, shoots demonstrations, drives the communist parties underground. But these measures do not help. The brutal crisis is growing and growing, and the struggle of the working masses of all countries for their liberation from oppression and exploitation is also growing.

The successes of the construction of socialism in the USSR are increasingly convincing the working masses of all countries that only by means of the proletarian revolution can one get out of poverty and oppression. The rapid growth of the USSR arouses the fear and frenzied hatred of the bourgeoisie. A new imperialist intervention is being prepared against the USSR, which is busy building peace and firmly pursuing a policy of peace. Never before has this preparation for a new attack on us been carried out so openly and persistently. The ministers of America, England, France and other capitalist countries are continually traveling from one country to another in search of a way out of the crisis, to save their capitals they are persistently and feverishly putting together an anti-Soviet front. Preparation for war is also carried out in the form of direct armed attacks, as it was on the Chinese-Eastern Railway. The war against the USSR is also being prepared economically, by fighting against the export of our goods abroad. It is being organized by the entire bourgeois press, which is continuously waging a campaign of lies and slander against our Party, our country and our construction. The bourgeoisie appears openly in the form of provocative attempts and attacks on our representatives abroad.

Along with the growing crisis of capitalism, the military danger is also growing. The bourgeoisie is looking for a way out of the situation by means of a new war and a new attack on the Soviet Union. The military industry in the capitalist countries is growing all the time, despite the crisis.

This is such a warning. Further, Tukhachevsky writes much and beautifully that the Party is our helmsman, that the Party is leading us to a bright tomorrow, that the fulfillment of the five-year plan will ensure a happy and joyful life for our people, that the Red Army soldiers must protect the happiness of the working people as the apple of the eye, that the Red Army soldiers at the exercises must compete, and who does not compete, he is ill-prepared for the defense of the homeland of the world proletariat. Tukhachevsky simply and lucidly explains that socialist competition is the key to improving the combat effectiveness of units and subdivisions.

Tukhachevsky strongly recommends to learn military science in a real way, to strengthen military discipline, to obey the orders of commanders unconditionally and clearly. He writes about many other things that have nothing to do with strategy and tactics.

2

Good prediction: name all the countries on the list - you can't go wrong. Don't forget to add at the end: and others! If war with any country of the world happens later, and grateful descendants will remember the genius: but he foresaw it! And he warned us!

But the evil fate had it so that there was no war with any of the countries named by Tukhachevsky. I cannot judge whom Tukhachevsky meant by the meaningful words "and other capitalist countries", but for some reason America, England and France, which he named, did not attack us. They, according to Tukhachevsky, were preparing an intervention, their ministers traveled from one country to another, but they never formed an anti-Soviet front. On the contrary, the U.S. and Britain provided invaluable and gratuitous assistance to the Soviet Union during the war. Our pilots fought not only on Soviet airplanes, but also on British and American ones. And pilots from France fought alongside them. It was with the US, British and French governments that Stalin shared Europe after the war. It was the judges of the USSR, USA, Britain and France who tried Hitler's chief henchmen at Nuremberg.

Tukhachevsky "predicted" everything to the contrary - he named our future allies in World War II as the likely opponents of the USSR. But he did not name Germany among the opponents. A genius, indeed.

And there was a reason why Germany was not named by Tukhachevsky. The reason is that according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was disarmed and deprived of the right to have tanks, airplanes, submarines, heavy artillery. But it was during these years that the Soviet Union was forging the very "fascist sword" that later fell on us. In Kazan we were training German tankers, in Lipetsk - pilots, in Leningrad Germans were designing tanks and submarines, in Moscow, in Fili, the firm "Junkers" tested and built airplanes for the coming conquests. And it was Tukhachevsky, as Chief of Staff of the Red Army, had everything to do with it.

3

But Tukhachevsky in his "warning" spoke of some social-fascists. Who are these social-fascists? Hitler and the Hitlerites? No. The Soviet propaganda called the Social Democrats social-fascists, declaring them the main enemies of the working class.

In his prediction Tukhachevsky said: "and others". Could it be that by "others" he meant Germany? Maybe he warned us all with this hint?

Well, maybe so. Although, on the other hand, if there had been a war with Uruguay later, Tukhachevsky's fans could have declared that the genius thinker meant Uruguay by "others".

And if we talk seriously, in 1931 Tukhachevsky did not warn about the German danger and could not warn, because he himself created this very German danger at that time.

4

If we admit that Tukhachevsky's predictions and warnings are geniuses, then for the sake of restoring historical justice, let us admit that our entire country is populated by geniuses alone. Any of our company petty officers at the morning inspection would begin

from warnings that the enemy was hatching plans, that the enemy had made preparations, and that Private Duraleyev's boots were not cleaned: if something happened, there you go! And our noble milkmaids warned at every collective farm meeting that the enemy was not slumbering, that it was necessary to raise milk yields. And our miners, going down to the face, swore to produce coal above the norm, because the enemy is not slumbering. And Maxim Gorky wrote letters to Stalin about how Soviet workers all of a sudden rushed to enroll in the Party in response to the machinations of the world bourgeoisie, which is preparing a new intervention against the workers' and peasants' state.

We always lamented the fact that we were surrounded by enemies. The longer the queues for pots and kerosene became, the more enemies the Tukhachev-inspired political patrols found ready to attack.

Tukhachevsky warned that Britain, the United States and France were hatching plans to attack the USSR. The timing of this warning coincided strangely with the mass violent devastation of the peasantry by Tukhachevsky's troops. This is the time of collectivization, famine, eviction, destruction and extermination of millions. Here Tukhachevsky is scaring: as long as there is no war! It is nothing that children starve to death like flies in

October, but there is no war! Or look: from beyond the distant seas, from beyond enemy lands, a black force will come!

5

In the 1930s, it was not very difficult to calculate who would be our adversary in the war. Spain? Too far away. Portugal too. America? We could not reach it at that time, and America itself was not so stupid as to attack anyone. America didn't conquer the world with guns, it conquered the world with dollars.

Then who will be our adversary? France? It's walled off with a chain of fortified areas, and its strategy is defensive.

Britain? Again, we can not reach her, and she herself is not to attack us - she already has so many colonies that it is difficult to hold. At that time Tukhachevsky warned of the British danger, and now our General Staff has to admit that at that time there was no

there was no danger from Britain. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General M. A. Gareyev, admits:

England was extremely passively preparing for the war. It had limited ground forces and aviation, so it was unable to seriously influence the course of military operations (Courage. 1991. No. 5. P. 149).

So it turned out that only Japan and Germany could be our serious opponents. There was no one else to fight against us.

I advise everyone to read the works of Lenin's associate Karl Radek. He left to posterity whole volumes about the fact that it was Germany, not any enemy, that would attack us. Radek himself was once arrested in Germany for plotting to overthrow the government and establish communist rule. The Communists always covered their actions with fear: in the early 1920s, when Germany had no army at all, when inflation and anarchy were rampant, Radek prepared a coup d'état in Berlin, while declaring to the whole world that Germany was going to attack us.

The Soviet Union attacked Japan in 1945 with a very cunning declaration of war: first they struck, burned aircraft on airfields, and then at the same hour, but only Moscow time, that is, eight hours after the event, declared war,

breaking all assurances of peace.

That is why our propaganda has been shouting for decades that Japan threatens us, so that one day we could strike it. And the same fate was prepared for Germany. Therefore, thousands of our agitators frightened Germany, but it was only propaganda, because, according to the same Army General Gareyev, the Red Army command was preparing for war only in the enemy's territory, and "*the possibility of military action on its own territory was practically excluded*" (Ibid. P. 247). We pretended to be intimidated, announced to the whole world that we were about to be attacked, but we were preparing to fight on foreign territory.

And while Tukhachevsky was warning that Britain, France and the United States would attack us, thousands of other agitators and political workers were naming Germany and Japan as the most likely adversaries. And writers wrote about the same thing. And poets. And soccer commentators have told us the same thing. And international lecturers. And our judges at show trials started with statements that the enemy is not slumbering. And the enemy was called by name. Here I got a book by chance: K. I. Solntsev, "War Crimes" (Moscow: Yurizdat NKJ USSR, 1938). This same Solntsev begins the book as follows: "*The Red Army at every moment is ready, in case of an attack on our homeland, to defeat any enemy on its own territory*". And further: "*German and Japanese fascism are feverishly preparing a war against the Soviet Union*".

I wish we could erect a monument to him! I wish a plaque could be placed on the wall of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office with the inscription: "Here worked the greatest and most brilliant military prosecutor, Comrade K. I. Solntsev, who in 1938 foresaw and warned that Germany and Japan were preparing a war against the Soviet Union. The problem is that such plaques would have to be installed on practically every house, because everyone warned that Germany and Japan were preparing to attack the USSR.

At the same time Nikolai Shpanov wrote a book "The First Strike. A Tale of the Future War" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1939) about how Germany attacked us. And immediately we defeated her. On her territory. According to Shpanov, the war scenario is as follows: we are all ready to immediately cross the border, only the occasion is missing. But they gave us a reason, and immediately we crossed the border.

By the way, this war scenario is not a fantasy of the writer Shpanov. This

is how the Red Army in the winter of 1939-1940 "ensured the safety of the city of Lenin": first we deployed four armies on the border with Finland, then they allegedly for some reason shot at us from a cannon, that's when we were outraged: "Oh, you're so!". And our valiant army carried the banner of freedom into foreign territory.

And the best movie of that time was "If Tomorrow is War". And the song rang out over the country with the same warning:

*If there's a war tomorrow, if the enemy attacks,
If a dark force comes,
As one man, the entire Soviet people
He will stand up for a free Motherland.*

Chorus:

*On earth, in the heavens and on the sea
Our tune is both mighty and harsh:
If there's a war tomorrow,
If you're camping tomorrow,
Be ready to go camping today!
<...>
We don't want war, but we will defend ourselves,
It's not for nothing that we build our defenses,
And on enemy soil we will defeat the enemy.
A little blood, a mighty blow!*

And this war somehow always ended with our army carrying the red banner of socialism to neighboring nations and countries.



But there was another warning from Tukhachevsky, wasn't there? After all, later Tukhachevsky corrected himself and named not only the United States, Britain and France, but also Germany among the likely aggressors. How can this be denied?

This cannot be denied. Indeed, there was a second warning of Tukhachevsky - in 1935. But is not what we have already learned about Tukhachevsky enough to determine the true value of his "predictions" and

"warnings"?

GLAVA 17.

So what did Tukhachevsky propose?

In general, we have to admit that it is rather difficult to judge from the materials that are now in wide use who among the military leaders advocated for what in different periods of the development of the Armed Forces, who professed what, what discussions were held on issues of military construction. Our military history, alas, is depersonalized.

Red Star. April 4, 1988

1

Found an honest person who told about what exactly the reform proposed Tukhachevsky Stalin. Lieutenant General of Aviation V. V. Serebryanikov revealed (VIZh. 1989. № 7. P. 49. V. Serebryanikov opened (VIZh. 1989. № 7. P. 49) veil of secrecy, which hid the mysterious proposals Tukhachevsky for more than sixty years. It turns out that Tukhachevsky in December 1927, among other things, offered Stalin to produce in one 1928 year 50-100 thousand tanks.

Compare. Evaluate.

There was no Hitler in power in Germany in 1928. There was not a single tank in Germany either. The entire German army at that time - is 100 thousand soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals, and all of this - infantry and cavalry. It turns out that Tukhachevsky proposed to have one of our tanks against each German general, officer, against each German soldier in the ranks and in the stockade, against each German cook at the field kitchen, against each valet and messenger.

On September 1, 1939, Hitler entered World War II with 2,977 tanks, among which there was not a single floating tank, not a single medium tank, not a single heavy tank. We are told: clearly, if Hitler has such a huge number of tanks, as many as 2,977, then it is not for defense, not for Europe alone. If Hitler set up such a large number of tanks, it means that his plan is self-evident - he clearly intended to conquer world domination.

With this I completely agree. But what did Tukhachevsky intend to do in

this case with armadas of 50-100 thousand tanks?

2,977 German tanks were built not in one year, but in all the years before the war. And Tukhachevsky proposed to build 50-100 thousand vehicles in one year only.

It is interesting to compare Tukhachevsky's designs for 1928 with the actual production of tanks and self-propelled guns in Germany during World War II:

Year	Number of tanks and self-propelled guns produced in Germany
1939	743
1940	1515
1941	3113
1942	4276
1943	5663
1944	7975
1945	956

Total - for the formidable pre-war months of 1939 and for all the years of the war - 24,241 tanks (Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two. Arms and Armor Press. London, 1978. P. 261).

Another interesting figure: during all the years of World War II Japan built 3,648 tanks, and all these tanks were light tanks (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Vol. 7. P. 664). And the conclusion is this: ten years before the outbreak of World War II, when neither Germany nor Japan had a single tank, Tukhachevsky proposed to build in one year 2-4 times more tanks than Germany had built in all the years of World War II, and 13-26 times more than Japan had built in all the years of the war. We have been accustomed to the wording: German fascists and Japanese militarists. Indeed, if they produced such a huge number of tanks, 24,241 and 3,648 vehicles, it is clear to everyone - this is fascism and militarism. But the question arises: who then was Tukhachevsky against the background of these fascists and militarists who aspired to world domination?

2

The peak of world tank production, not only during the Second World War, but in the world history in general, was in 1944. By that time, the

economies of the warring countries had reorganized themselves on a war footing and accelerated to maximum speed. So, in this peak year, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada and all other countries of the world combined, to 100 thousand tanks did not reach 100 thousand tanks. And Tukhachevsky wanted to build more tanks in the Soviet Union alone in peacetime in one year than the entire world economy built in the midst of the most terrible war in the history of mankind. This is what our strategist's ambitions were in 1927, *before the beginning of industrialization in the USSR*.

The Soviet Union could not produce 100,000 tanks in peacetime. And neither could 50,000. And no other country in the world could. Already after the war, the Soviet Union, which had become an immeasurably more powerful industrial power, had 50 thousand tanks. And even a little more. But these tanks were not produced in one year, but were accumulated over decades.

Example: the pride of the Soviet tank building IS-8 (aka T-10). The development began in February 1949. The T-10 was adopted for service in 1953. It was withdrawn from service in 1993 (A. Karpenko. V. Review of Russian armored vehicles. 1905-1995. St. Petersburg: Nevsky Bastion, 1996. C. 425). This tank was in service with the army for 40 years.

The secrets of this tank's longevity are two. First, the T-10 was the best heavy tank in the world. Second, for almost all of its long life, our tanks stand in long multi-year conservation. In the 1960s, factories add new vehicles to those produced in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1970s, to those produced in the previous decades. In the 1980s, they add more and more. In the case of mobilization, the first echelons enter on the most modern equipment, and then, as the sides weaken or undermine each other's economies altogether, we will toss in, as we mobilize, new and new divisions, corps, and armies armed with tanks produced ten, twenty, thirty years ago.

But this cautious gradual accumulation also backfired. The great industrial power collapsed. The clay legs of the colossus broke. Not the least role in the collapse of the Soviet Union was played by those very tens of thousands of tanks.

And the genius Tukhachevsky suggested to Stalin not to accumulate tank power little by little, over decades, but to produce at once, in one year, 50-100 thousand tanks. The result of such actions is easy to predict: the Soviet Union would have collapsed immediately.

And how was it possible to produce tanks in such quantities? We had no tank factories at that time. But even if there were, it would have been necessary, first of all, to stop production at all heavy engineering plants, machine-tool factories, automobile, shipbuilding, locomotive, carriage, tractor and all other plants - and to reorganize them to produce tanks. Let's imagine that the plant produces steam locomotives of OV series - "Sheep". An instruction came: stop building "Sheep" and build steam locomotives FD "Felix Dzerzhinsky".

Can a person on the street imagine the cost, complexity and painfulness of switching to a new product? The factory is in chaos. The rhythm that has been established for years is breaking down. Well-established technological chains are breaking down. Everyone is nervous and swearing. The factory is in a fever. In the shops - commission after commission: isn't it sabotage? No one gets bonuses at this time - on the contrary, they put them in jail more often than usual. To adapt, to adjust to the production of new parts and units is about the same as to get used to a new wife, with all her quirks and whims. This habituation takes years. It is better not to split up with the old one.

And now let's imagine that the steam locomotive plant was ordered to master not a new type of locomotive, but something completely unusual for this plant - tanks. And the shipyard - tanks. Not just one, but all of them. And all machine-tool factories - tanks. And railroad car factories. And all sorts of other things.

If we accept Tukhachevsky's proposals, then it was necessary to stop the entire industry of a huge country for at least a year and retool it for the production of tanks. The direct consequence of this

perestroika - huge labor, material, energy and financial costs with a complete shutdown of all major plants in the country for at least a year. In this case, the country will only spend, but will not produce anything. No one has ever made such experiments in the world history, because it is clear to everyone - it would mean immediate and complete collapse of the country's economy. But if we had spent the whole year of 1928 on reorganizing the economy to produce only tanks, and if the whole of the following year, 1929, the country's industry produced only tanks and nothing else, it would mean a complete collapse for the second time.

Then let's say we had produced all those tanks. What should we do with the factories now? Keep the tank production and next year again produce tens

of thousands of tanks? And we don't need so many. Where to put them? Consequently, after the production of the number of tanks required by Tukhachevsky had to stop all the plants again and re-profile them into steam locomotive, automobile, tractor, machine tool and so on. This would mean again wasting huge amounts of money and time to restore the production of steam locomotives, tractors, cars, machine tools, ships and everything else. Practice shows that we can switch to the production of tanks very quickly, but there is no way back. Conversion is a long, painful and ruinous process. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempts to convert military plants to produce peaceful products failed. It is easier to shut down a factory than to convert it into an enterprise producing mass consumption goods.

4

By the standards of any army, 200-300 tanks is a tank division. Recall: in the 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, the U.S. Army - the army of the most powerful country in the world - had 16 divisions, including 4 armored divisions. Hitler rushed to conquer Europe with 6 panzer divisions in September 1939.

In 1927, neither Germany, the United States, France, nor Japan had tank divisions. If we listen to Tukhachevsky and produce 50-100 thousand tanks, we should have deployed in the Soviet Union in one year from 166 to 500 tank divisions alone. The crew of a tank of that time - 3 people. The presence in the army of 50-100

thousands of tanks means that we need to have 150,000-300,000 soldiers in the tank forces. Is that right? No, it's not.

Tankers in a tank division are a small minority. And here is why. First of all, tanks must be constantly and timely provided with liquid fuel and lubricating oil, so each column of tanks must have a column of vehicles with tanks. And tanks also need shells and ammunition, that's why we need a column of vehicles with ammunition. In addition, tanks must be repaired, and repair not in stationary workshops, but where the tanks are operating. For this purpose it is necessary to have mobile tank repair workshops and even mobile tank repair plants. This is again people and machines. A lot of people, a lot of machines.

But in order to repair a tank, it has to be pulled out of a ravine, swamp or battlefield under enemy fire and dragged to a mobile tank repair workshop. This requires special repair and evacuation units. And in order to repair a tank in the field, the necessary spare parts have to be constantly transported to the

battle area. Imagine how much trouble it would cause to deliver one tank engine to the battlefield. And wounded, burned tankers must be extracted from tanks and delivered to evacuation hospitals. So behind our tank column stretches a long tail of support units, without which tank units can not act. The dragon's teeth are important, but he can't live without a tail. He also needs a head. Headquarters. Not just one head. The dragon has many heads. Each battalion has a headquarters. A small one, but still. And every regiment a headquarters, and every division, and every corps. And all this is men and machines. And it all has to be guarded. And all these people have to be fed. And food has to be delivered. That's machines again.

And the dragon also needs eyes and ears - intelligence is needed. It is good when the army headquarters and the front headquarters provide information about the enemy, but it is not enough. Imagine: you are blindfolded, and someone standing next to you advises you how to fight - move your left, now your right, a little higher. It won't work like that. That's why every unit, unit, connection, association needs its own intelligence, its own eyes and ears. And this means people and machines again.

The way to tanks is paved by sappers, they build bridges and crossings, search for and neutralize mines, lay passages in barriers, build shelters and camouflage positions, if necessary, put minefields, provide millions of armies with water and do a lot of other necessary work. That is why tank formations must have a lot of sappers and special sapper equipment.

Tanks must be guarded and defended in close combat, the success of tanks must be consolidated. This is done by the motorized infantry. Each tank division needs its own motorized rifle regiment, and each corps additionally needs its own motorized rifle division. Actions of tanks must be supported by fire. For this we have artillerymen and mortars. The actions of tanks, motorized infantry, artillerymen must be covered. For this we have anti-aircraft gunners. All this must be managed, the actions of all must be coordinated. Troop management is a flow of information through thousands of channels. These messages are provided by communication units and units. It's all machines, machines and machines again. And many, many people.

Red Army standard of 1940: to directly support the actions of one thousand tanks (one mehkors) required 36,080 soldiers and officers, 358 guns and mortars, 266 armored vehicles, 352 tractors and 5,165 cars. This is only directly on the battlefield, not counting reinforcements, not counting aviation, not counting the rear establishments that would feed all this mass of troops.

We thought that one tank needed three tankers, three cheerful friends, but it turned out that we still had to have as many as 36 people in support. Then the war showed that these pre-war calculations were underestimated. To ensure the actions of each tank directly on the battlefield should have 70-80 people, twice as many vehicles than was assumed before the war, and three times more artillery.

But even if we proceed from the underestimated pre-war standards, even then, to fulfill Tukhachevsky's program it was necessary to have in the tank forces from 1.8 to 3.6 million soldiers and officers, from 18 to 36 thousand tractors, the same number of guns and mortars, from 13 to 26 thousand armored cars, from 250 to 500 thousand cars.

In the German armed forces at that time there were 100 thousand soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals. And in the Red Army, Tukhachevsky had to have up to half a million vehicle drivers in the tank forces alone, not counting tank drivers, artillery tractors and armored vehicles, not counting gunners, commanders, signalers, sappers, scouts and everyone else.

Or maybe Tukhachevsky thought that tank troops could do without cars? Tanks are rushing along the road, and in front of them the reconnaissance on dashing horses, and the infantry running after the tanks, commanders on triplets with bells, and behind them, squeaking wheels - carts pulled by oxen, carrying ammunition, gasoline, spare parts.... The Soviet Union at that time could not give half a million automobiles to the tank troops. Couldn't even give a quarter of a million. Not just tank troops, but the entire army could not give such a quantity. And if it had been given, agriculture, industry, transportation, and construction would have been left without cars and tractors. And if all the vehicles were given to the tank troops, how much gasoline, oil and spare parts would those vehicles consume per year?

5

And how to man such tank troops? There was no general military duty in the Soviet Union at that time. To introduce it? This is beyond the competence of the Chief of Staff of the Red Army. Tukhachevsky proposed only a reorganization of tank troops, and this entailed profound changes in the social structure of the country. The Chief of Staff of the Red Army was clearly carried into areas where it is not advisable to go without authorization.

But Tukhachevsky clearly did not intend to get into such areas, he simply did not think about the consequences of his proposals. But he should have

realized: if the army will have 50-100 thousand tanks, what should be its number? On the other hand, if at that time, and introduced universal military duty, still conscripts would not be enough even to staff the tank troops alone. If three million conscripts for the tank troops had been gathered in one year, there would have been no one to conscript in the following years.

There is a time-honored rule of thumb: the armed forces of a state cannot have more than one percent of the population in peacetime. One percent is the critical maximum. Cross this threshold, and there will be nothing to defend - the state will be bankrupt and will be set back in its development for decades. At one time, our wisest strategists, creating various armed formations in the country, tried to deceive themselves and others with bureaucratic tricks: these are the Internal Troops, they have nothing to do with the army, these are the Interior Ministry. And these are border troops, they have nothing to do with the army either, they are the KGB. This is how the American delegation was deceived at the negotiations in Geneva. You can't fool the economy. These stunts turned out badly for the country, its economy and people, and eventually for the army itself.

Did Tukhachevsky know this simple rule? Did he know that in peacetime the Soviet Union could have only one and a half million men in the army, navy, aviation, border, internal and all other troops out of a population of 150 million without damage to the economy? Did he realize that this was the last frontier, above which it was impossible to go higher? Did he know that all great empires perished not under the blows of external enemies, but because of internal tension caused by excessive numbers of armed forces? Okay, let's say that Tukhachevsky did not know this. But did he think about where to train such a large number of soldiers for tank troops? Almost everyone who gets into the tank forces needs special training. They need to be radio operators, repairers, scouts, gunners, tank and gun commanders. Put everyone through the training divisions? How many of these training divisions would be needed?

What about the officers? Suppose we produce tanks. But how many officers will we need to staff at least a hundred new tank divisions? All right, let's start military schools. In peacetime, it took three years to train an officer. Tanks from the factories come now, as planned by Tukhachevsky, in 1928, and officers from schools will graduate in three years, in 1930-1931. And all these officers are young and inexperienced, and we need commanders of battalions, regiments, divisions, corps. And where to live those officers? Even

now Russia cannot build enough housing for officers maybe. And if so many divisions were deployed then, where would the fellow officers go? In tents? Where would you get tents from?

And where to store those tanks? In the war everything was simple: echelons with tanks came from the factories directly to the front and went straight to work. The life of a tank in the war is short, and very soon the tank would be restored or melted down, and new vehicles would take its place. Tanks did not need to be stored, they did not accumulate: while tanks were unloaded from one echelon, tanks from the previous echelon were already burning on the battlefield with bright flames. But here is the situation: in peacetime, suddenly an avalanche of steel poured from the factories. And what to do with it? Keep it in a clear field? In the cold under the snow? Something similar happened under Khrushchev during the rise of virgin lands: let's flood Russia with bread! And we did. We plowed the virgin land, harvested an unprecedented crop, but there was nowhere to put the grain, nowhere to store it. They filled all the roads with grain, all the railroad stations, here the grain rotted. Where to take it? And the plowed lands were blown away by the wind, the whole Europe closed its windows when the wind blew from the east and carried black dust. After that there was neither virgin land nor bread.

Tukhachevsky was of the same breed of reformers who did not care about the consequences.

6

If we have 166 to 500 armored divisions, they must be managed. They have to be combined into corps. Two tank divisions and one motorized rifle division is a tank corps. Therefore, we should have deployed an additional 83-250 motorized rifle divisions and 83-250 tank corps directorates with sets of corps units. In total, we would have from 249 to 750 motorized rifle and tank divisions.

But the tank corps also had to be managed. Therefore, it would have required the deployment of 26 to 83 tank armies, and these were new headquarters. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there were eight tank armies around the world. Needless to say, all eight belonged to the peace-loving Soviet Union. So, the peace-loving Soviet Union could not bear such a burden and collapsed. In the 1920s, Tukhachevsky suggested that the immeasurably weaker Soviet Union should bear an immeasurably heavier load.

But the Armed Forces of that time could not consist only of tank corps and tank armies. For each tank and motorized division it was necessary to have at least three or four infantry divisions. Consequently, it was necessary to have from 847 to 3000 rifle divisions. At that time Germany had only 12 divisions. All kinds of divisions. And we had to have only infantry divisions... a lot of rifle divisions. If in peacetime in each rifle division to have not the full staff, but only half, 6-7 thousand people, then even then it will not be enough.

To lead two or three rifle divisions, one must have a rifle corps headquarters with a set of corps units, including heavy corps artillery regiments, anti-aircraft divisions, communications battalions, and so on. How many of these would be required? Tukhachevsky obviously did not go into such calculations. Who is not lazy, count for this "brilliant commander", how many corps headquarters had to be deployed!

And to control two or three corps, you have to have an army headquarters with a set of army units. How many army headquarters do you have to have to control three thousand rifle divisions? And how to coordinate the actions of those armies? Whoever is not lazy, now praise this "strategist".

In war, the troops lived in trenches, dugouts, dugouts. And in peacetime, where did Tukhachevsky want to keep them? Our army was already gigantic. We already had equipment rusting in the open air. The officers had nowhere to live. "Krasnaya Zvezda" (June 2, 1990) describes the accommodation conditions of those years:

Social and living conditions remained difficult. More than half of the commanders, political and economic officers had no housing. It was absurd. For example, the Central Asian Military District reported that a number of commanders had to arrange their "housing"... in trees, making platforms in their crowns.

I read and recognize the native army, in which I had to serve. And what I know about the modern army is not much different,

what it was then. The Chief of Staff of the Red Army had comrade officers living in trees like monkeys or orangutans, while Comrade Tukhachevsky himself lived in a palace. By the way, the indictment against Tukhachevsky begins with the indication of the size of his official dacha (Vizh. 1990. No. 8.

P. 96). Everyone who visited Tukhachevsky's office (such as Major-General P. G. Grigorenko), was amazed by the size of this room. The proletarian commander loved a beautiful life. He had everything unlimited.

While the Red commanders in Central Asia were living on trees, Tukhachevsky was raving about world revolution. He wanted not only our officers to be happy, he wanted to make the entire population of the Earth happy by force. Our commanders would descend from the trees and bring freedom, equality, fraternity, happiness and prosperity to Europe. The country is unable to provide officers even tents, and strategist Tukhachevsky intends to increase the army tenfold. However, we have a big country, there will be enough trees for all the officers.

M. N. Tukhachevsky not only exposes the true nature of bourgeois military science, he boldly reveals its weakness in strategic and tactical matters. Tukhachevsky's work vividly shows how weak are the positions of Fuller, discounting man and giving his sympathies exclusively to tanks and aircraft.

Thus Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov praises Tukhachevsky (VIZh. 1964. No. 2. P. 41). Fuller is a British military theorist. Fuller, it turns out, did not care about the man. Fuller gave his sympathies to tanks and aviation, and threw away the man from the accounts. Only our General Staff and its chiefs Tukhachevsky, Biryuzov, Ogarkov and Akhromeev cared about man.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeev visited a British regiment during the perestroika period. He was shown a standard British soldier's apartment: a small room, a tiny kitchen, a bathroom, a balcony, and an underground garage for a car.

Marshal could not realize that this was a soldier's dwelling, that a British officer does not live like this. An officer has a house. Always two stories. With a garden, with a garage for two or three cars. Sometimes a swimming pool. I could tell you how a British soldier lives, how much he earns, how he is fed, how he is clothed. But we are not talking here about the British army, but about Tukhachevsky, who supposedly cared about people and did not discount them.

There are two approaches to building military forces.

The first is to have a small professional army, provide it with everything it needs, free it from all side concerns and make it do only what it should be doing - the defense of the country.

The second approach is to beat the enemy not with skill, but with numbers. Have a gigantic army. Give all the money to building tanks, airplanes, submarines. And build so many tanks that it would be ruinous for the country to drive them. And we won't drive them. Let them stand. And we will teach tankers "peshe in tank way" [\[16\]](#).

You don't know what it's like? I'll tell you. We take a tank crew and tell them: here's what, men, imagine you're in a tank, we have to attack that line on the horizon over there. Understand? Understood. To the attack, go on march!

We had the same thing in aviation and in the navy. So many ships were configured, so many airplanes that it was cheaper not to use them. That's why ships were parked in bases, airplanes - on airfields. And the army, so as not to be bored, was thrown into the construction of BAM, on virgin lands, on potatoes, on cleaning the streets. And for the sake of economy we did not provide officers with apartments - let them live on trees. And we rented our soldiers to factories in exchange for bricks, cement, planks, logs and other things. And most importantly, for paint. So that everything would be painted. Closer to demobilization we threw the demobiles into the construction of barracks and warehouses, headquarters and canteens.

The first approach is to train pilots individually. Give a fighter pilot 200 hours of flight practice while still in school. And in war, don't be in a hurry to let him go into combat. Let him fly over the battlefield, but

don't get into any fights, let him get a feel for the situation. Let him get used to it.

The second approach is to stamp out airplanes by the tens of thousands. And pilots, too. Let a pilot fly for a couple of hours, and put him into combat. And increase production of airplanes. And increase the production of pilots, too, reducing the cost of their training.

The first approach is in the USA, in Great Britain, in France, where the crew of a submarine returning from combat duty has two tasks: to restore its strength, i.e. to rest, unload (or load), and having rested, to improve its skills and prepare for the next trip to sea.

The second approach is that because the fleet is so huge, and we save

money on maintenance units, the crew back at base will shovel snow, go on kitchen duty, on patrol, on sentries, on unloading railcars, on coal, on potatoes, on cabbage.

Tukhachevsky was the most ardent supporter of tank production. He did not think about how much land would have to be allocated for the construction of tank ranges and training grounds for so many tanks, how many repair shops, barracks, clubs, apartments, warehouses and so on and so forth and so on and so forth would have to be built. He hadn't thought about how many laborers it would take. Perhaps he was sure that the workers would not be needed, that the commanders would steal what was needed and build everything by the soldiers.

Some people believe that the strength of an army lies in numbers. Tukhachevsky was of the same breed of "strategists" - to fight in numbers. But as we can see, he also had certain difficulties with numbers. He never understood the meaning of numbers. He never learned how to work with them.

Tukhachevsky was unable to make the simplest calculation of the consequences of his actions and proposals. One can only wonder at Stalin's patience: how was it possible to keep such a "strategist" in such high government positions?



It is not that our airplanes are bad or our tanks are the best in the world. It is not that our people are stupid - our people are amazingly talented. The trouble is that some of our commanders have created an army, the cost of maintaining which

exceeded the capabilities of the state. Therefore, our officer was forced to think not about combat training, not about how to beat the enemy in battle, but about where he was to spend the night.

Tukhachevsky was the most ardent supporter of exactly this approach to the construction of the armed forces: all state funds - for the production of weapons, almost nothing - for their maintenance, almost nothing - for their development, nothing - for the people who will use these weapons in battle.

So the world's best weapons were becoming ineffective.

If Tukhachevsky did not understand what his "reorganization" was leading to, then he was a complete and utterly dangerous idiot.

If he understood where his "reorganization" was leading, but still insisted on it, then he was an enemy of the people and a pest.

GLAVA 18.

Within reasonable limits

Tukhachevsky's "Plan" is the result of the fashionable enthusiasm for "leftist" phrases, the result of an enthusiasm for paper, clerical maximalism. That is why analysis has been replaced in it by a "game of numbers", and the Marxist perspective of the growth of the Red Army by fantasy. To "realize" such a "plan" means to ruin both the economy of the country and the army.

Joseph Stalin. Resolution on Tukhachevsky's plan

1

On July 25, 1997, the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" pleased us with the headline: *"Russia's fleet will be reduced to reasonable limits"*.

I'm proud of my country. Not so long ago we sang the praises of our navy as great, mighty, indestructible, invincible. That was something to be proud of. Now it's being cut down to a reasonable size. Something to be proud of again. I wish they'd cut him down sooner. The phrase that it will only be reduced to reasonable limits is an admission that at the moment those limits are unreasonable. Simply put, stupid.

And it would be great if every decision of our leaders were weighed beforehand: are we still within the limits of reasonableness or have we gone a little beyond them? It is from this perspective that we will evaluate Tukhachevsky's proposals. He proposed strengthening the army. He wanted what was best. And everything is right, correct, progressive. Only beyond the limits of reason.

If we produce 50-100 thousand tanks a year, then at the same time we should produce about the same number of airplanes, because without aviation support tanks turn into coffins. And where to build them? In what factories? Turn furniture factories into aircraft factories? We didn't have such a large number of furniture factories then, and we don't have them now.

Let's say they built that many airplanes. 100-120 airplanes is an air division. From 416 to 1000 air divisions? How many flight and technical schools should be opened? How many airfields should be built? We will build airplanes now, but when will the pilots appear? In three years? No, not in three years. First we'll have to spend a few years training instructors, and then the

instructors will train the pilots. The airplanes are now, but the pilots will come in at least five or six years. What to do with tens of thousands of airplanes for which there are no pilots? Let them stand in the field, waiting? Or, maybe, we will not produce airplanes for the time being? Shall we stamp out tanks and leave them without air support? That's a crime. That's sabotage. You should be shot for that.

But even if we do train the flying staff, it is not just the flying staff that is the basis of aviation. Airplanes need technicians, mechanics, engineers, guards. Aviation regiments, divisions, corps and armies need reconnaissance, need communications, need headquarters, repair plants, meteorological and navigational support, need hospitals, barracks, commandant's offices, brig, parachute storage and parachute dryers, and many, many other things.

What kind of army did Tukhachevsky want to deploy? Or did he plan to have only tanks without airplanes and artillery?

So, Tukhachevsky demanded the production of tanks. This raises a lot of questions. Not the least of them: what kind of tanks?

Mass production of tanks requires not only a production base, but also the design of the machine we are going to produce. In 1928, the USSR had neither a production base nor a suitable project. In 1927, the Red Army adopted the MS-1 tank (MS - small escort), aka T-18. The power of its engine says it all - 35 horsepower. Even the Zaporozhets cars were equipped with engines of 30 to 50 horsepower. But "Zaporozhets" does not carry armor, and it is not every day to walk on a plowed field. The armor of the MS-1 tank is on rivets. The maximum speed of the tank is 16 km/h. On Red Square - up to 19 km/h.

It was the first independent Soviet design to be produced in mass series [\[17\]](#). The small (by today's standards) series of these tanks was necessary for the designers to

The first experience of tank development was gained, while the troops were given the opportunity to use real, "live" tanks, albeit still extremely weak and imperfect, in training exercises. For border skirmishes this tank is also an aid to the troops. For want of a better one. But to rivet them many tens of thousands? Who needs them? Maybe buy a foreign model? There was nothing to buy. In 1928, no one in the world could offer a tank model worthy of mass production.

Is this not a plot for a comedy: the great commander Tukhachevsky insists, shouts, demands to produce tanks. Immediately! Right now! Ten thousand! Twenty! Fifty! One hundred thousand!

But he overlooked the smallest thing: there was nothing to produce.

2

Pies should be baked right before the guests arrive. If we bake pies a month before the guests come, they will get a little stale. It is the same with weapons: if we produce a lot of them and there is no war, the weapons will become obsolete. Using outdated weapons in a war is like serving petrified pies to your guests.

A good housewife bakes exactly as many pies as her family needs and has everything she needs to bake lots of them when needed. That's what smart rulers do when planning weapons production. You don't need a lot of it in peacetime. Weapons production requires enormous expenditures. That's why smart people develop weapons, produce them in small series, and have the production capacity and mobilization stocks of everything necessary to ensure mass production of the latest models in a threatened period.

The development of combat equipment is rapid. New samples are constantly appearing, we take them into service, and the old ones are withdrawn. If we have few weapons, the change of samples is not disastrous. Where smart people rule, the army is always respected, because a small army can be kept in order, it can be recruited people of the highest caliber, a small army can be provided with good apartments, you can pay soldiers and officers enough so that the officer and soldier stand on the social ladder higher on the at least homeless vagrants. Such an army can be armed with the most modern weapons.

Where not very smart people rule, the peacetime army is huge. The country works its ass off trying to train, clothe, feed and arm such an army. This army requires a titanic amount of weapons in peacetime. And they're rapidly becoming obsolete. The time comes to change it, and such rearmament becomes a real disaster for the state. The development of technology is fast, monstrous arsenals have to be constantly updated, and the disaster turns into a constant nightmare. The result: we defeat ourselves. After great victories, after decades without war, we suddenly realize that we live in a defeated country. We suddenly discover our backwardness in all areas - and, most surprisingly, our backwardness in armaments. And all these years we have been giving everything to arms production.

That is why in all countries where smart people rule, the smartest of the generals is appointed Chief of the General Staff. The work of the Chief of

General Staff is difficult in wartime, but no less difficult in peacetime. The difficulty of his work is this: it is as if he is walking on a tightrope. On the one hand, it is necessary to ensure the security of the state. On the other hand, not a single extra ruble can be spent on it.

It does not take much intelligence to demand new cruisers by the dozens, new submarines by the hundreds, strategic bombers by the thousands, fighter planes and tanks by the tens of thousands. If we demand all this, the people will tighten their belts, give their last pants, but they will build submarines, tanks and bombers. Time will pass, the armaments will turn into mountains of rusty scrap. And who will give us back our last pants?

Why did Tukhachevsky in 1927 need so many weapons? After all, he proposed to have hundreds of times more than what all potential aggressors had combined. Did anyone threaten us then? Who would have attacked the USSR in 1928? Who, exactly? Romania? Finland? Estonia in alliance with Latvia, instigated by Lithuania? A disarmed Germany?

Japan, maybe? Japan is on the islands. All we had to do to fight it was to prevent Japanese troops from moving to the
It was necessary to build a powerful fleet in the Far East. For this purpose it was necessary to build a powerful fleet in the Far East. But Tukhachevsky was against the fleet. Were 100 thousand tanks needed to confront Japan, which had no tanks at all at that time?

So, 100,000 tanks *for what?*

People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov was not the most intelligent man. But still his intellectual level was immeasurably higher than Tukhachevsky's, and in military matters Voroshilov understood much better than Tukhachevsky. This is impossible to imagine, but let us try: let us imagine that Voroshilov was as stupid as Tukhachevsky, let us imagine that Voroshilov supported Tukhachevsky in his endeavors. Stalin, let's say, did not go into the details and gave the green light to Tukhachevsky's "great leap". In this case, a famine far worse than the famine of 1933 would have broken out in the country. In this case, the Soviet power would have killed more people by starvation than could be lost in war, and the survivors would have turned into secret enemies of this regime and would have waited for the arrival of any aggressor with impatience and hope. By his rearmament Tukhachevsky would have ruined the country more than any war.

Mass production of armaments should be started the moment we decided to attack someone or received information that someone wanted to attack us. In 1928, the Soviet Union was not ready for a big "liberation" war. Therefore, 100 thousand tanks for the "liberation" of Europe were not needed at that moment.

If Tukhachevsky thought that someone was preparing an attack on us in 1929, 1930 or 1931, then Tukhachevsky had miscalculated cruelly, and he could not be kept in high positions. If Tukhachevsky understood that in these years no one would attack us, but at the same time he proposed to produce in 1928 unprecedented in world history masses of weapons, it means that he proposed to waste the material, energy, labor and intellectual resources of the country without getting anything in return. This is malicious and conscious sabotage. Tukhachevsky was proposing to ruin the country for weapons that would not be used in the foreseeable future. With each passing year, the value of these weapons would become smaller and smaller, while storage costs would increase.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Biryuzov wrote that Tukhachevsky's proposals were timely. Really? To rivet primitive tanks in 1928, sew airplanes out of sailcloth and put them for 13 years under rain, wind, snow and frost to repel an invasion in 1941?

Clearly, in 1927 it was difficult to predict when exactly a new major war would begin, but it was clear that it would not be in the next two or three years. And if so, then the moment for mass production of weapons had not yet arrived. Mass production of weapons of the latest models had to begin in 1939. This is exactly what Stalin did later. Everything that was produced before 1939, in the war against Germany was of less value. And the earlier obsolete weapons were delivered to the troops, the worse.

Tukhachevsky miscalculated the deadline for the start of mass production of armaments by two five-year periods. And some people still prove that his demands were timely!

Let them try to prove that pies should be baked a couple years before the guests come. Bigger ones. Enough for everyone.

4

In this whole story, the amazing moments are many. Here is one of them. Five-year plans, as you know, were mainly plans for the development of the Red Army. Industry worked for the war. First, the military department made

requests, how many and what kind of weapons it needed, and then economists, based on this, determined the need for the construction of new military factories, mines, mines, and so on. Weapons are the end product. And in essence, what else did we produce besides weapons? Beds and pots and pans, irons and sickles - all these are by-products of military factories.

The compilation of the first five-year plan for the development of the armed forces of the Soviet Union began at the headquarters of the Red Army in 1927 under the direct supervision of M. N. Tukhachevsky (VIZh. 1968. No. 8. P. 95). The plan was based on the following considerations:

The decisive means of a future armed clash are:

- a) Rifle troops with powerful artillery;*
- b) strategic cavalry;*
- c) aviation.*

Tukhachevsky did not think of tanks at all in early 1927 and did not order them for the industry.

Everything that Tukhachevsky demanded was included in the state plan. On the basis of the army's requests, economists developed a five-year plan. The Central Committee approved this plan. The Party Congress adopted the plan. Guided by the five-year plan, new power plants, blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces, rolling mills, and so on and so forth, and so on and so forth were laid in the USSR. The work boiled over. Not even a year passed, when suddenly Tukhachevsky announces that this plan is wrong, that it is necessary to build 50-100 thousand tanks, and immediately.

First of all, as we've seen, it's impossible. Especially not in the same year. And secondly, what's the race? What's all this jumping? What kind of wobbling? At the beginning of the year Tukhachevsky did not even remember about the tanks and did not include them in the plan, and in the same year, when the plan was made up, approved and began to implement, the "strategist" came to his senses.

It is extremely difficult to draw up a five-year plan for the development of the country's economy. Subsequent experience showed that it was impossible to accurately plan economic development on a national scale at all - we had a constant shortage of everything. Except for weapons, understandably. The root vice of the planned system is that any attempt to change the chosen course leads to the destruction of the plan itself. If someone is not given the million

tons of steel planned by the plan, the devastating effect of this will affect the entire economy of the country. It's like taking one wheel out of a watch. But Tukhachevsky proposed not just the lion's share of the best steel to give to the production of tanks - it was about switching the entire heavy industry to a new, unknown to her products. But if you do not roll rails, and instead roll armor plates, it will affect the entire transportation system of the country, and then the entire economy. If you don't weld pipes, then one day there won't be enough oil for our tanks, and there won't be enough rubber tires for cars. If we reduce or stop production of steam locomotives and railroad cars..... In a word, Tukhachevsky was breaking the plan, which had been drawn up at his own request.

There was no immediate threat of war at that moment, so Comrade Stalin decided correctly: it is not tanks that are needed now. Stalin put steel on the rails. Light rails were replaced by heavy ones, single-gauge railroads were turned into double-gauge ones. The structure of railroad bridges was being strengthened, and new bridges were being built nearby for the second track. The old "sheep" left by Nikolai were replaced by powerful locomotives FD and CO, the fleet of two-axle twenty-ton cars was decisively supplemented by four-axle sixty-ton cars. All this is the steel foundation of the future victory. And also - the Dneproges. This is aluminum for airplanes. This is the future Soviet B-2 tank diesels, the best in the world. All resources - to Uralmash, to Komsomolsk, to Magnitka, to Kuznetsk. We need a base.

5

Let's imagine that Tukhachevsky's plan was adopted. Let us imagine that in 1928 we produced these hordes of underpowered, primitive, extremely imperfect tanks. In 13 years, by 1941, all of them would have rusted through, for there was nowhere to store them. And would be hopelessly outdated. Not only that, but because of these tanks we would have faced the war with a pre-flooded railroad network, steam locomotives and cars. All those economic miracles that the Soviet Union demonstrated to the world during the war would have been impossible. Just imagine how much paint alone would have to be spent each year to paint over the rust on those untold hordes of tanks. Let's imagine that we met the war with these rusty rusty tanks, but without Magnitograd, Tankograd and Kuzbass.

Tukhachevsky's defenders say that everything in his proposals is correct, only the figures should have been specified. But if the figures are clarified,

there will be nothing left of Tukhachevsky's proposals at all. There was nothing in them except crazy figures.

And how can you be more specific? I'm not talking about 100,000 tanks. That's bullshit. 50,000 is also nonsense. So how many then? 49,000? 48,000?

It's not a big difference, the economy would collapse at 47,000. So how much is it? Twice as much? 25,000?

The Soviet Union had approximately that many tanks by the time of the German invasion. The difference from Tukhachevsky's plan was that more than two tens of thousands of tanks were built not in one fell swoop, but gradually. The number of tanks produced was growing, and their quality was improving. Old models were replaced by new ones, and in the course of operation deficiencies were identified and eliminated in the next models.

By the beginning of the war, a truly unique design and production base had been created in the Soviet Union, the world's best tank designs, tank engines, the world's best caterpillar belts, the world's most powerful tank armament, the world's only production of floating tanks, the world's only production of heavy tanks, the world's only production of tank diesels had been developed. And all this did not prevent the equally powerful establishment of the aviation and artillery industries, the modernization of railroads, the creation of a powerful fuel, energy and metallurgical base, and so on - that is, everything that later allowed the Red Army to end the war in Berlin.

Because tanks were produced gradually, we entered the war with a tank fleet in which three quarters of the vehicles were less than five years old. In other words, our tank fleet was the latest both in terms of technical novelty and time of manufacture.

Historians often make fun of Stalin's tanks: they say they were all obsolete by the time the war started. I will not talk about the KV-1, KV-2, T-28, T-34, T-35, T-37, T-38, T-40 tanks - no one in the world had anything like them in 1941. In fact, the Soviet Union had more of these world's best and uniquely designed tanks than all the tanks in all the countries of the world combined.

Let's take the "obsolete" BT-7M tank. It was adopted for service in 1939. In 1941, tanks of this type were 2 years old. The 45 mm gun of this tank penetrated the armor of any foreign tank of that time. Until 1940, no one in the world such a powerful tank gun did not had. British and American tanks received guns of such power in 1942-1943. The BT-7M had a 500 horsepower engine. - twice the power of the best

foreign tank engines of the time. And it was a diesel. No other country in the world, even by the end of the war, had managed to create an engine like this one. The BT-7M had a range of 700 kilometers - three times more than the best foreign indicator of that time. The speed was twice as high as that of any foreign tank of that period. And the armor? Antibullet armor. But at that time only the Soviet Union had tanks with anti-bullet armor, and all other countries of the world had tanks with anti-bullet armor only. And this tank was considered obsolete by Soviet historians - so obsolete that until 1991 they did not include these tanks in the statistics at all. It was as if these tanks did not exist for them. Why take old things into account?

And the whole world laughed at stupid Stalin, at his "obsolete" tanks, and at the same time at all of us: here, they say, ruined the genius, did not save, did not follow his advice, but he suggested modernization, he insisted on rearmament.

So let's assume that the "genius" was protected and all his demands were met. Our country before the war was in pants, albeit patched. And if the "genius" had obeyed, we would have met the war in loincloths, but with a hundred thousand riveted tanks MS-1, which Tukhachevsky dreamed of.

Would a 35 hp gasoline engine be better than a 500 "horse" diesel?

Would 16 km/h be better than 86 km/h?

Is a 100km range better than 700km?

Would a 37mm short-barreled cannon with a rate of fire of two rounds per minute be better than a long-barreled 45mm cannon with a rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute?

Would a tank 13 years old be better than one that came out of the factory last year?

My reader, hold your dear, your favorite car for thirteen winters on the street without a garage - what will be left of it? But our soldiers, who are busy counting the hours and minutes until demobilization, would not have used Tukhachevsky's tanks

the way you take care of your Zaporozhets. So what would be left of those tanks by 1941?

If the leaders of the USSR had obeyed Tukhachevsky, they would have stamped tens of thousands of bombers at 176 km/h and fighters at 209 km/h in 1928.

We didn't have aircraft engines back then. Nor did we have tank engines. We would have had to buy tens of thousands of aircraft and tank engines in

Britain and France, paying for them with our full gold pieces. We would have generously provided the proletariat of Britain, France and America with work, the bourgeoisie with capital, foreign designers with the means to accelerate technical progress, and the entire economy of the West would have prospered. But we ourselves would have stayed in our loincloths. Let's assume that we would have bought those engines, tuned those canvas airplanes on bamboo frames. What would we have done with them in 1941?

And now the whole world is laughing at Stalin's "obsolete" airplanes. And at all of us. And Soviet historians did not write down our long-range bomber DB-3F of 1940 among the newest ones, so it automatically became obsolete. And the Germans did not have such an airplane at all and did not appear until the end of the war. And we entered the war with such planes because Stalin had enough intelligence not to listen to Tukhachevsky; if Stalin had listened to Tukhachevsky, the aircraft fleet of the USSR by 1941 would have an average age of not three and a half years, but three or four times more, and it would have been the equipment of the late 1920s. More precisely, the release of 1928, and the development of 1927 and earlier.

6

Where did human civilization begin? A big beast - no longer an ape, but not yet a man - gathered grains into a handful. There were two ways to do it. The first, simple and attractive, was to put them in his mouth, chew them and swallow them. The second way was less attractive: to dig up the ground with a club, pour the grains there and wait for a year. The big beast took a deep breath and poured the grains into the ground. It was at that moment that he became a man. He sacrificed today for tomorrow, he thought about the future for the first time. By the way, this is also the reason for the eventual collapse of the world.

of our civilization. We devastate our subsoil and destroy nature, we live and breathe freely. We can't think about what will happen tomorrow. Like monkeys.

Tukhachevsky behaved like monkeys: give tanks now! And Stalin thought about tomorrow. But Tukhachevsky persisted. Stalin in 1928 personally explained to Tukhachevsky that we need now not riveted tanks, which anyway have nowhere to store, which before the war will still be obsolete, and it is necessary at this time to create a base for the future production of tanks. But Tukhachevsky was one of those who did not worry

about tomorrow: give 100 thousand, and to hell with it, with the economy.

Stalin patiently explained to Tukhachevsky that the Chief of Staff of the Red Army must also sometimes think. But Tukhachevsky insisted. Stalin removed him from the post of Chief of Staff of the Red Army and sent to command the Leningrad Military District. And Tukhachevsky, instead of performing direct official duties, spoke with new fantasies.

7

In January 1930, Tukhachevsky came out with a new proposal: the peacetime Red Army should have 260 rifle and cavalry divisions, 50 artillery divisions plus high-power artillery and mortars, 225 machine gun battalions, 40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks in service (Krasnaya Zvezda. August 20, 1994).

Evaluate.

40,000 airplanes in service, not counting training airplanes in every combat regiment, not counting training regiments and flight schools. By today's standards, 30-40 airplanes is a regiment. 40,000 airplanes is a thousand regiments. That's a lot. Each regiment has one main airfield and a couple of reserve airfields. That's 3,000 airfields. Try guarding them. Try to organize their defense, cover them with anti-aircraft artillery. Or did Tukhachevsky want to leave them without anti-aircraft cover? That's sabotage.

How many pilots will it take? How many military schools? How will thousands of airfields be cleared of snow? How many vehicles would be needed to maintain this air armada? Or

ammunition, fuel, crews to the planes on carts? How many carts would be needed then? And how many parachutes, fur jackets, radios?

50 artillery divisions? All countries of the world entered World War II without artillery divisions. During the war, only one such division was formed in Germany, the 18th Artillery Division. The number is not taken from the ceiling. The 18th Panzer Division was defeated on the Eastern Front, only the headquarters remained. German industry gave few tanks, Germany was not ready for war, so they decided to restore the division not as a tank, but as an artillery division. It is clear that the German industry could not produce so many guns and shells during the war to provide a whole artillery division. That's why our best in the world 152-mm howitzers-guns ML-20 captured in the first days of the war were used. The 18th Artillery Division existed from

September 25, 1943 until April 1944 (Müller-Hillebrandt B. German Land Army. 1933-1945. In 3 vol. Per. with German. Moscow: Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1956-1958. T. 3. C. 393). "The *shortage of artillery material did not allow further restoration or re-forming of new artillery divisions*" (ibid. P. 300).

In Germany, such a division could not exist for long. It consumed too much ammunition. German industry during the war was not able to supply even one such division with shells. And Tukhachevsky in peacetime proposed to deploy 50 artillery divisions. Not counting artillery of great and special power. Not counting artillery batteries in each rifle regiment, artillery regiments in each rifle division and in each corps, not counting artillery of fortified areas and coastal artillery of the fleet, not counting anti-aircraft artillery. And we said about the Germans that they had guns instead of oil. And what did Tukhachevsky suggest instead of what?

The total number of rifle, cavalry and artillery divisions according to Tukhachevsky's new proposal - 310. That's 25 times more than Germany had at that time. Not exactly 25 times, but more than 25 times. And 50,000 tanks in service. Again, that's without training tanks in every battalion and regiment, without training regiments and divisions, without tank schools and academies.

And here again Tukhachevsky has an inconsistency. He proposes to have 50,000 tanks, therefore, we need tank divisions. But Tukhachevsky forgot about tank divisions. The plan provides to have only 260 rifle and cavalry divisions and 50 artillery divisions. Where to put the tanks? The only solution is to distribute them among rifle and cavalry divisions. It turns out 192 tanks per division. But if a rifle division is given 192 tanks, it will cease to be a rifle division. And if so many tanks are given to a cavalry division, it will cease to be a cavalry division.

That is not all. To ensure the action of tanks it is necessary, as we already know, to have a lot of vehicles - at least five times more than tanks. Therefore, each of these divisions should be given a thousand vehicles. If the divisions to have so many tanks and vehicles, it means that all of them will turn into tank or mechanized. But without pure infantry at that time could not do without. Consequently, it would have been necessary to additionally form ordinary rifle divisions, which Tukhachevsky had not thought of, but without which it was impossible to fight.

We can't argue with Tukhachevsky's defenders. And we won't. We'll

assume that he was a genius. He proposed reforms, proposed modernization.
All he had to do was to refine the figures.
To a reasonable extent.

Tukhachevsky's second warning

Tukhachevsky's "diplomacy" was a direct threat to Stalin's policy and ultimately to his personal security. Since it was apparently not possible either to persuade Tukhachevsky to cease these attempts or to eliminate him alone, it was decided to eradicate the entire Soviet high command, with the exception of Stalin's supporters.

Questions of History. 1989. №6. C. 62-63

1

It is said that Tukhachevsky warned not only of the danger of a French, American and British attack on the USSR, but once warned of a German attack as well. This warning was allegedly contained in Tukhachevsky's article "Military Plans of Modern Germany", published in the 4th issue of the magazine "Military Bulletin" for 1935.

Well, let us open this issue of the "Military Bulletin" and read that very warning ourselves. Anyone who does not have the Military Gazette for 1935 can find this article in the second volume of Tukhachevsky's selected works (pp. 233-239).

So, dear comrades, Tukhachevsky did not warn of a possible German attack.

How can it be so? After all, Tukhachevsky's article is about Germany's aggressive plans!

That's right. But who bothered to read it? Defenders of Tukhachev's "genius" who read this "warning", raise your hand!

Let's pay attention to the title of the article: "Military Plans of *Modern* Germany" - it is not about upcoming plans, but about those that existed in Germany at the time of writing the article. But it is known that Germany had no plans to attack the Soviet Union in April 1935. They could not have been, simply because there were no plans between the Soviet Union and Germany

of the common border. And if Germany had decided to pierce a corridor to the Soviet borders through the territory of Poland, then immediately, as in a kaleidoscope, the whole political and strategic situation in Europe and in the whole world would have changed, a new situation would have developed and

all the prearranged plans of attack on the USSR would have lost their meaning anyway.

Tukhachevsky begins his article by analyzing the state of Germany's armed forces: terrifying military power! Tukhachevsky reports that, among other things, the German Navy has nine battleships. He stipulates that this includes those under construction.

Comrade Tukhachevsky is a little over the top here. In 1935 Germany had no battleships at all. By the way, it entered World War II without a single battleship in service. The battleship "Bismarck" joined the German Navy only in 1940, was fully ready in April 1941, and in May of the same year it was sunk by the British Navy. The battleship Tirpitz joined the German Navy in 1941. When Tukhachevsky wrote about nine German battleships in 1935, the Tirpitz had not even been laid down yet. The other seven battleships - this is from the realm of daring plans of German admirals and the exuberant imagination of the Soviet Marshal.

If we believe Tukhachevsky, in 1935 the German air force had 2,100 bombers and scouts alone. But we will not believe Tukhachevsky. A simple check on available sources shows that even after four years of "frantic arms race" Germany entered World War II with 2,765 combat aircraft of all types, including fighters (Goralski R. World War II Almanac. 1931-1945. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981. P. 89).

Tukhachevsky's reports about German ground forces are more truthful, although even here the truth is abundantly mixed with fiction. Fiction is visible to the naked eye, and the truth could not frighten anyone. Tukhachevsky reports that Germany intends to create a "gigantic army" of as many as 36 divisions. Tukhachevsky reports that each German infantry division will have, among other things, one tank battalion and two artillery regiments. In this message, Tukhachevsky actually "projects" our plans onto the Germans. Exactly such an organization

was envisaged for our rifle divisions in case of war. In 1939, when the secret mobilization of the Red Army began, just such an organization was adopted for our rifle divisions: in each division, in addition to three rifle regiments, there were two artillery regiments, a tank battalion and other units. And in the German army infantry divisions in both peacetime and wartime had many men, many horses, many carts, but few weapons; the Germans had in their infantry divisions only one artillery regiment, and tank battalions had no tank battalions at all. And Tukhachevsky's claim that in 1935 German infantry

divisions included tanks was pure fiction.

Tukhachevsky reports that one of the German divisions is motorized, and in addition, Germany has four mechanized brigades and 12 tank battalions. Tukhachevsky reports how many men are in these units: 15,000 men in the motorized division, 12,000 in the four brigades combined, and 6,000 in the twelve battalions combined. This, according to Tukhachevsky, is the invasion army. And this was the power the Soviets had to fear? One division, four brigades and twelve battalions. We had more troops in any military district.

Tukhachevsky talks about the number of personnel of these formations and units, but the number of tanks does not report. And there is a reason for that: there were no tanks in Germany at that time. There were in that year in the German army 219 machines Pz.Kpfw.I, which according to the classification of all countries of that time would not be called tanks, but tankettes: weight - 5 tons, armor - anti-bullet, engine - gasoline engine with a capacity of 57 horsepower, armament machine gun. Let's divide these 219 tankettes between one division, four brigades and twelve battalions. Ah, that's not much.

Tukhachevsky reports that, in addition, Germany has tank units in infantry and cavalry. This is again from the realm of fantasy. Germany had no tank units in the infantry and cavalry in 1935, before the beginning of the war did not appear, and did not appear until the very end of the war. If the German infantry and cavalry had tank units in 1935, the 219 tank units would have to be divided not only between one division, four brigades and but also between infantry and cavalry divisions. Then these miserable tankettes would have been even more scattered over a multitude of units.

Tukhachevsky himself demanded 50-100 thousand tanks from Stalin, and at the same time frightened Stalin and everyone else with 219 German tankettes.

Tukhachevsky reports that in Germany "*tank units are in the process of being increasingly equipped with tanks of the latest types*". This is again fantasy. There were no "tanks of the latest types" in Germany in 1935, as well as the first types too. Having outlined this amazing "military power" of Germany, adding nine battleships, thousands of non-existent bombers and tanks of the latest types, Tukhachevsky turns to warnings.

That's where the comedy comes in.

No one who wrote about Tukhachevsky's warnings seems to have bothered to read them. If they had, they would not have written about the warnings. For there were none. Tukhachevsky did not believe in the possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union and on this account left a very serious document, written by his own hand in the last days before the trial. To this we shall return. And Tukhachevsky's article does contain warnings, but they are not addressed at all to the Soviet people or the Red Army, but to the French people, the French army and the French Government.

Tukhachevsky writes about Hitler's revanchist plans. But Russia came out of World War I before its end, it was not among the winners of Germany, and therefore any revenge of Germany against Russia was out of the question. The revenge is against France, the victor, sucking blood from the defeated Germany. It is France that Tukhachevsky sends his warnings to:

The French Army, with its 20 divisions and its long mobilization and mobilization time, would no longer be able to act actively against Germany. On the contrary, before such a clash could be initiated, it would have to lose

a lot of time to deploy its forces <...> Hitler seeks to pacify France <...> Hitler puts France to sleep, because he does not want to give rise to an increase in French armaments <...> The anti-Soviet spearhead is a convenient screen to cover revanchist plans in the West (Belgium, France) and in the South (Poznan, Czechoslovakia, Anschluss). Among other things, it cannot be denied that Germany needs French ore. It also needs the expansion of its naval base. The experience of the war of 1914-1918 showed with all obviousness that without firm possession of the ports of Belgium and the northern ports of France, Germany's maritime power could not be built.

So, this article by Tukhachevsky contains warnings to France, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria, but there is not a single word in it that Hitler will lead his armies on the Soviet Union next. There is no such thing. And it is nowhere to be found - neither in the two-volume collection of Tukhachevsky's selected works, nor outside it.

He is a good strategist: in 1931 he publicly announces that aggressive France, "feverishly putting together an anti-Soviet front", is going to attack the Soviet Union (see the quote in Chapter 16, Chapter 1). quoted in Chapter 16, Chapter 1), and in 1935 he declares that France is not going to attack anyone, that it hardly has enough forces for self-defense, and warns of the German threat to this defenseless country (apparently, Tukhachevsky now considers France so defenseless that if it is not warned, it will not even begin to prepare for defense), and with it - Belgium, Poland, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Tukhachevsky does not warn his army, his people. On the contrary, he declares that there is no threat to us: Hitler is only in words against us, but these words are only a screen for the preparation of aggression in quite other directions.

Comrade Tukhachevsky took on too much. Imagine that a stranger starts giving you instructions on how to

You will have to take care of your children and your household. It is quite possible that this will be very useful advice, but unsolicited advisers are usually accepted to send in a known direction. Especially do not tolerate the advice of an outsider in international relations. Even the most valuable but unsolicited advice coming from officials of one state to other states is regarded as interference in internal affairs and an insult. The Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, who recently led the red hordes into Europe with the aim of crushing the European states and turning them into Soviet republics, is now giving advice to five states at the same time: whom to fear and against whom to prepare defense. Of course, this is insulting: do the governments of five sovereign states, like blind kittens, not see the danger? But the wise Tukhachevsky sees it and points it out. And even publicly. In the press.

If Tukhachevsky had a little understanding of psychology, he would not have made public suggestions, he would have realized that unsolicited advice from an outsider is rejected outright. Such advice should be given not through a newspaper or the most aggressive magazine, but through the channels of secret diplomacy, carefully, without revealing your cards to the whole world. But even then, all countries should have been wary of Tukhachevsky's warnings. In 1935, Hitler had not yet shown himself as an aggressor, and the

world knew Tukhachevsky as a red conqueror who was trying to break into Europe. If anyone had to warn about the danger coming from Hitler, it was not Tukhachevsky, and therefore the questions inevitably arose: why are you, Comrade Communist, worried about our bourgeois security? Have you been replaced or have you been re-baptized? On your breast is the Order of the Red Banner, and on it is a golden inscription: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" Do you refuse the slogan written on your chest? If you refuse, why do you wear it? And if you do not refuse, then swim, dear comrade, with your advice past our shore.

Such warnings must have sounded especially savage to the Poles. In 1920 Tukhachevsky had openly urged "over the corpse of White Poland" to rush to the walls of Berlin and Paris. Now he suddenly Poland is beloved, concerned for her safety, and warns her of the German threat.

4

Comrade Tukhachevsky allowed himself a lot. In order to give valuable instructions to foreign countries, anyone occupying an official post must be authorized to do so. An ambassador, arriving in a foreign country, pays a visit to the head of state and presents his credentials: believe me, I have been authorized by my government to speak on his behalf, that is why the credentials are called credentials.

If an ambassador deviates from his government's instructions by a single word, he will be immediately recalled and apologized for his conduct: he has said things of his own accord that he was not instructed to say.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy was determined by the national government and implemented through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and other state structures. Comrade Tukhachevsky, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, could speak to other states only if he was appointed to a delegation and given authority. Every cricket knows his own mouth. It is extremely imprudent for the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense to meddle in matters which are not within his competence, in matters in which he is not supposed to meddle according to his rank.

Tukhachevsky gave valuable instructions to sovereign states and thus put sticks in the wheels of our propaganda. For many years the entire agitprop had been proving that our enemies wanted to attack us, and Tukhachevsky himself had been doing the same, and suddenly he announced that Hitler did not

threaten us, that Hitler's attacks against the Soviet Union and anti-Soviet plans were only a screen for preparing an attack on other countries, a screen to put France's vigilance to sleep. That's how Tukhachevsky put it: a screen. Tukhachevsky did not call our people to defense, but, on the contrary, relaxed. His whole article is that Germany will fight against France. If so, then who will attack us?

Comrade Stalin calls on the people to maintain revolutionary vigilance, the people sing songs:

*If new wars come to our peaceful land.
In a torrential machine gun rain.....*

There are posters on every corner: "Don't talk! The enemy is listening!" And then suddenly a big boss appeared, who publicly declares that nobody threatens us, the real threat is to France, Hitler cannot do without French ore and French ports. And the fact that Hitler sometimes speaks out against us, so it is a diversion, to put the French to sleep.

Tukhachevsky played dangerously. The most interesting thing is that he did not notice his stupidity. He did not realize that he was going against the entire state policy.

5

There was something worse in Tukhachevsky's behavior. Stalin's plan: let Hitler the icebreaker crush Europe, let him destroy all the armies, parties, governments, and then we will "liberate" Europe. Clearly, no one in the world expected France to fall so quickly. Neither the French nor the Germans themselves expected it. For Stalin, it would have been better if Hitler would have fiddled with France for two years. But in any case, for Stalin the fall of France was favorable - let Hitler go as far west and south as possible, in Britain, in Spain, to Gibraltar, in Africa. The farther away, the better. Tukhachevsky did not understand Stalin's plan and meddled in France with his unsolicited advice, which was aimed at ensuring that France in the war with Germany to resist.

Should Stalin then have created an "Icebreaker of the Revolution" that would stall at the French borders? If France and other countries had heeded Tukhachevsky's advice and strengthened their defenses, Hitler's ice-breaker actions would not have been as effective and destructive, not as useful to Stalin. Tukhachevsky was as much an aggressor as Stalin, only Stalin's plans

were cunning and wise, while Tukhachevsky's were primitive and foolish. Because of his limitations, Tukhachevsky prevented the fulfillment of Stalin's

plans. I was interfering without realizing it. As they say in Ukraine, he tried to go against the father in law.

If a subordinate does not understand his commander's plan, and if he also lacks the intelligence to keep silent when he is not asked for advice, such a subordinate should be removed. Simply to remove him, so that he would not in the future hinder the fulfillment of the plan by his lack of understanding.

Did Stalin execute Tukhachevsky immediately after this stupid article was published? Not at all. To shoot him immediately means to reveal his cards.

Stalin smiled favorably. That same year, Stalin invented a military rank - Marshal of the Soviet Union - and conferred this title on five of his commanders, including Tukhachevsky: beautify yourself!

For the time being.

6

Tukhachevsky was not alone. The defeat of the Chervona clan of Cossacks was not due to the fact that they were arguing with the Pervokonniki about their merits in the Civil War. No, the matter was much more serious. Pervokonniki, from Budyonny, Voroshilov, Apanasenko and below, did not meddle in international politics and did not publicly tell France and Poland whom they should fear. Pervokonniki were military men, disciplined, and kept silent. It was not their business. And Tukhachevsky and the Chervon Cossacks had their own special plan for the future war. It consisted in repeating everything as in the First World War: Germany in the middle, and on both sides Russia and France. France would defend itself, and we would attack and crush Germany.

Tukhachevsky repeatedly hinted at such an option to his French colleagues. At Tukhachevsky's insistence, French officers and generals increasingly appeared in Soviet divisions and corps. Delegations, trainees and other forms of exchange became fashionable. Chervonets Ilya Dubinsky describes one such trainee from France. His name was Louis Leguest. Dubinsky tells about the mood of those years in the entourage of Yakir and Primakov:

Judging by the situation, by the beastly roar of the Berlin radio, all

of us, the entire Kiev garrison, and not only it, have a long way to go to the west, to meet the fascist army. And while we reach there, our allies - Czechoslovakian and French divisions - will clash with it. And maybe somewhere on the Rhine we will meet our trainee Leguest (Dubinsky I. V. Special account. p. 116).

According to the plan of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Primakov, Dubinsky and other Chervona Cossacks, France will sit back behind its fortifications on the Rhine, and we will have to advance through all of Poland, through all of Germany.

Russia in the First World War has already tried to implement this option, and broke its neck. For three years Russian armies rushed to the West, laid millions of the best soldiers, and the rear men, who sat out the entire war in the capital, at the last moment did not want to go to war. That's the recipe for revolution and the collapse of the monarchy. Germany was exsanguinated by the Eastern Front, and Britain and France took advantage of this and became the winners.

Stalin decided not to repeat this scenario. Stalin had a much better idea. He intended to enter the war last, and only after "*capitalists will fight among themselves*" [\[18\]](#).

For the first two years of the Second World War, it went quite according to Stalin's plan. But then it went wrong.

Tukhachevsky and the Chervon Cossacks did not listen to Stalin, did not understand his plans and did not try to understand. They did not think of anything better than a repetition of the scenario of the First World War.

Let's imagine that a gang leader has planned a brilliant combination in which his rivals from other gangs will shoot each other. All is well, but one of the gang leader's cronies starts talking nonsense, disrupting the brilliant plan. What should we do with this blabbermouth? In my opinion, it is necessary to shut his talking mouth, and shut it so that this chatter does not attract attention. Otherwise, the questions will start: what, in fact, did he say wrong?

Everything was going according to Stalin's schedule, but suddenly announced Tukhachevsky, who through Stalin's head appealed to Germany's neighbors to prepare a defense against Hitler.

Tukhachevsky got involved in matters he didn't understand.

To get into things he wasn't asked to get into.

That he had no right to get into.

GLAVA 20.

German trace?

Master class on exposing falsifiers of history

1

For too long, the story has gone around the world that German intelligence planted a falsehood on Stalin about a plot by Soviet military leaders.

We shall approach this question from afar. The whole history of Bolshevism is a history of purges. Bolshevism began with a split: these are our Bolsheviks and these are not our Mensheviks. Lenin did nothing but purge his party of those who were inconvenient to him. If we leaf through the volumes of Lenin's writings, we will not be able to contain our surprised groans: Lenin, like a dog in a pack, relentlessly bickers with his associates and comrades in the struggle and seems to spend more time and energy on this than on the struggle against tsarism. The volume of Lenin's invective against like-minded socialists is hundreds of times greater than the volume of invective against Tsar Nicholas.

Having seized power, Lenin was all about purges. The Leninist Party grew up in struggle, and that's the absolute truth. The royal family was exterminated. The bourgeois were exterminated. Exterminated the nobility, the merchants, the intelligentsia, the Cossacks, the peasantry ... And Lenin's comrades-in-arms, every last one of them was engaged in purges. They exterminated their allies, the Social Revolutionaries. They exterminated the anarchists. And the Mensheviks.

Then the fight against nationalism and religion began. The Industrial Party case was fabricated. Whoever we fought against! And we destroyed everyone. That's why they killed Kirov, to avenge him. And at once, the NKVD was purged: you didn't protect Kirov! And the purge of Leningrad - Kirov's stream: you bastards will answer for Kirov! And all over the country - the search for malefactors who were preparing an assassination attempt

on Kirov. Thousands of criminal organizations were uncovered, and all of them, as it turned out, were after Kirov.

And in the Communist Party itself there were arrests: let us not leave Kirov's death unanswered! In general, in the Party, the struggle against enemies never ceased. Comrade Stalin invented a right-wing bias and drove right-wing dodgers out of the Party. Then he invented a left-wing bias and chased left-wing evaders out of the Party. And how to hit those who remained fully loyal and fluctuated with the general course of the party? The ingenious Stalin found a solution here too: he announced that the party has a terribly dangerous right-leftist bias. Here no one can escape Stalin's blow: who can not be found in the right-wing bias and can not be found in the left, can be found in the right-leftist perversion of the party line. And then there were the centrists. Those who couldn't be picked on at all were asked: Why do you stick to the center? And indeed it was suspicious: everyone hesitated and evaded, but you were always with the Party. That's how you showed your hostile nature!

But in all these purges, the army was an exception. It was bypassed. Comrade Stalin only made sure that at the very top was his man. Stalin's efforts to remove Trotsky from the post of Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. His deputy Sklyansky was sent to America as chairman of "Amtorg" - the only representation of the USSR in the U.S. at that time, which served as a trade mission and a base for the underground work of the Comintern and GPU. There, Sklyansky drowned in Longlake Lake while riding in a motorboat with Isai Khurgin, his predecessor as chairman of Amtorg. According to Bazhanov, Stalin's secretary, Sklansky was killed on Stalin's orders, and the "accident" was organized by one of Stalin's secretaries, Grigory Kanner, whom Bazhanov calls "Stalin's assistant in dark matters," and Yagoda (B. Bazhanov. Notes of Stalin's Secretary. Chapter 6. In the Bolshevik Tops).

In Trotsky's place came Frunze. He was operated on by order of Stalin, although Frunze fought back. The operation was unsuccessful. The doctors didn't save Comrade Frunze. For which they were held accountable to the full extent of our laws. Here, perhaps, are all the most important personnel movements in the People's Commissariat of Defense in the first years of the war.

the years of its existence. But Comrade Stalin had to get to the army one day! Would he not have gotten there? Could it be that, having failed to get the German counterfeit, he, having cleaned everything and everyone, would have

left the army unclean?

Purges are a means of consolidating power. A means of preserving it. It is a means to ensure the personal security of the leader. Purges are a means of preventing coups. And coups have always and everywhere, as a rule, been committed by the military. That is why we call them so: military coups.

Wouldn't Stalin himself have thought of shielding himself from the main danger?

Couldn't you have figured it out without a German clue?

2

There are many techniques and methods used in power struggles. There are good ones, great ones, brilliant ones. But there are also bad, stupid, idiotic ones. The most stupid one is to declare to all your fellow rivals that you are smarter than everyone else, that your merits surpass those of everyone else, and therefore it is you, and not someone else, who should be the most important.

This is exactly what Lev Davidovich Trotsky did. In 1924 Lenin died, and in the same year Trotsky published an article about the October 1917 coup in which the Communists seized power. The article was titled "Lessons of October." Trotsky begins his article with the statement that October must be studied, because not everyone has yet realized who was the most important hero of October. Here and there remarks like "Lenin did not understand or appreciate", "Lenin had doubts", "Lenin did not know" slip into the article. Trotsky's Zinoviev and Kamenev are traitors, and Stalin is not mentioned in the article at all. The main hero of October, who understood everything and did not doubt anything, was, understandably, Lev Davidovich himself.

If this was true, then for purely tactical reasons it was not necessary to shout about it to the whole world. This is not about the lessons of October, but about claims to power. By declaring himself the main hero and the number one contender for honors (and for power), Trotsky united all the other contenders against himself.

A crushing reply immediately followed - the book "On the 'Lessons of October Revolution'" (Leningrad: Workers' Publishing House "Priboy", 1925). The authors were Zinoviev, Kamenev, Quiring, Kuusinen, Sokolnikov, Stalin, the editorial board of Pravda and the Central Committee of the Komsomol (RLKSM). This book marked the beginning of the open harassment of Trotsky in the press, which never stopped, even after Trotsky's

assassination. Interestingly, Stalin's article in this book is the most peaceful: "There is talk of repression against the opposition..... As for repression, I am firmly opposed to them" (P. 95). That is how kind Comrade Stalin was.

Other authors were not characterized by Stalinist softness. They ridiculed and denounced Trotsky. For the entire Party bureaucracy this was a signal: the horde had risen against yesterday's leader. Therefore, everyone was in a hurry to testify his loyalty to the pack and his hatred for the bitten leader.

3

Tukhachevsky did not learn the lessons of Trotsky. He sought power in the same way - the most foolish way. In the Civil War, Tukhachevsky disgraced himself like no one else, and yet it was he who declared that he was the main hero in that war. He himself decided to edit the three-volume book "The Civil War. 1918-1921", exposing himself as the greatest strategist and blaming others for his defeats. It should be emphasized here: Tukhachevsky sought to edit history, not write it. Anyone who has read Tukhachevsky's book "The Campaign for the Vistula" (Moscow: Novosti, 1992. The book was published under the same cover as Józef Piłsudski's book "The War of 1920"), will agree: Tukhachevsky was unable to present his thoughts coherently. Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who defeated Tukhachevsky, in his book "The War of 1920" showed both Tukhachevsky's inability to fight and his inability to talk about what happened:

The excessive abstractness of the book gives us an image of a man who analyzes only his brain or his heart, deliberately refusing or simply not knowing how to relate his thoughts to the daily life activities of the troops, which do not

not only does not always correspond to the commander's plans and intentions, but often contradicts them.... Many events in the operations of 1920 happened in this way and not in another way precisely because of Mr. Tukhachevsky's tendency to manage the army by just such an abstract method.

Piłsudski was the first to ridicule Tukhachevsky's attempts to blame the defeat at Warsaw on someone else's head.

But Tukhachevsky could not rest. He did get the opportunity to edit the

history of the Civil War and praised himself. He praised himself to the point of obscenity. But it was not about praise. There was a struggle for power, and in this struggle disputes about former merits were only a cover for the gnawing for positions.

Stalin understood better than anyone that behind this flaunting of Tukhachevsky's past merits hides a much more powerful swing. It was a bid for power. Therefore, besiege Tukhachevsky should be his own weapon. Stalin himself did not get into a fight, but every attempt by Tukhachevsky and his friends to extol his merits met with an inexplicably coming from nowhere a soft but powerful rebuff.

Now let's compare the dates.

The German version of subsequent events looks like this: in December 1936, Hitler gave his spies a reprimand and demanded results. In January 1937, the idea to plant Stalin fake. Then the fake was long prepared, looking for an engraver, looking for a typewriter, "such as in the Kremlin," wrote false documents, spread rumors. These rumors reached the president of Czechoslovakia, then Stalin, then there were negotiations between Yezhov's department and the Nazis, and in early May 1937 the document arrived on Stalin's desk. This version was outlined by Walter Schellenberg in his book "Labyrinth. Memoirs of Hitler's intelligence officer".

Here's a different chronology.

In January 1935, Vladimir Ivanovich Nevsky, director of the Lenin Library, was arrested. The reason: the wrong books are kept in the main library of the country, the wrong heroes are glorified in books. Nevsky's arrest was accompanied by arrests of directors of leading publishing houses and of the country's libraries. This was a signal to Tukhachevsky: calm down! You are too shameless a hero!

On July 13, 1935, Komkor Gai Dimitrievich Gai was arrested. In the battle of Warsaw, Tukhachevsky's main striking and maneuvering force was the 3rd Cavalry Corps, commanded by Gai. In 1935, Gai was the head of the Department of Military History at the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. In those days, apart from the history of the Civil War, we had no other military history. Everything that preceded the Civil War was only prehistory. The reason for the arrest: history (that is, the history of the Civil War) taught maliciously. Guy's arrest was another "call" to Tukhachevsky.

April 17, 1936 was arrested Nikolai Ivanovich Muralov, who became commander of the Moscow Military District back in 1917, that is, a few months before the birth of the Red Army. It was under the cover of Muralov

that the Lenin-Trotsky government fled from Petrograd to Moscow. In 1936, Stalin began to clamp down on those who had been chosen by Lenin and Trotsky, who had been at great heights under them.

In July 1936, Dmitri Arkadyevich Schmidt, a friend of Tukhachevsky, who had once promised Stalin to cut off his ears, was arrested. From that moment the fate of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Primakov was sealed.

On August 14, 1936, Komkor Primakov himself, the chief chervonets, was arrested. Primakov would be tried and shot along with Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevich. Primakov had been associated with Tukhachevsky for many years; he had been under Tukhachevsky's command as early as 1920 in the "campaign for the Vistula".

On August 20, 1936, Komkor Putna, the military attaché in Great Britain, arrived in Moscow on a summons and was arrested. This is another future accomplice of Tukhachevsky. Two of the eight defendants of Tukhachevsky's group are already sitting. The trial is underway.

September 2, 1936 Komkor S. A. Turovsky was arrested.

September 25, 1936 arrested Kommdiv Yu. V. Sablin.

And only after that, in December 1936, Hitler allegedly demanded from his intelligence services to intensify their work. And while Hitler's spies were thinking about what they should do.

come up with, on January 24, 1937, a party conference of the Belorussian Military District, commanded by Commander 1st rank Uborevich, was held. Uborevich's subordinates were as if off the chain: all as one rushed to expose their commander, accusing him of all possible and impossible sins. Anyone who has ever attended a party meeting in the Soviet Union, knows that subordinates do not throw themselves at their boss so easily, for a good living. Especially not on the commander of one of the most powerful military districts.

By a strange coincidence, it was on that very day that a blow of monstrous force was dealt to Tukhachevsky himself. On January 24, 1937, Karl Radek, a former member of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Communist International, who was accused of espionage, sabotage, and plotting, mentioned Tukhachevsky in open court.

Anyone who knows anything about Stalin's open trials, anyone who has thought about the meaning and purpose of these trials, will agree: no one was mentioned there by accident. According to the accused Radek, Tukhachevsky sent Putna to Berlin, where he negotiated with the Trotskyists. Tukhachevsky himself has not yet been accused of anything: he sent Putna to Berlin on

official business, and Putna took advantage of the opportunity.

But if Tukhachevsky had nothing to do with all these dark machinations, why, in open court in the presence of foreign observers, should his name be mentioned in direct connection with the actions of the conspirators? One could have said: "While on a business trip, Putna was doing something unauthorized..." But no, someone needed to specify: being on the orders of Tukhachevsky.

From that moment Tukhachevsky could shoot himself - his fate was not only decided, but officially announced.

At this time, German intelligence was still just looking for the engraver. You didn't have to look for an engraver. Without your engraver, gentlemen, everything will be done properly. It was enough for Hitler's intelligence to have a good analyst in the German embassy in Moscow. One mention of Tukhachevsky's name at the show trial was enough to draw conclusions.

Meanwhile, arrests in the army increased.

On February 19, 1937, the divisional commissar I. S. Nezhichek was arrested.

February 20, 1937 - divisional commissar A. A. Gusev.

On March 11, 1937, the entire high command of the Ural Military District was arrested, including the commander of the troops Komkor I. I. Garkavy and his deputy Komkor M. I. Vasilenko.

On March 25, 1937 the divisional intendant P. I. Kurkov was arrested.

The list is very long, the dates of arrests are known, everyone can complete the list and draw a conclusion. And the conclusion is simple: Stalin in May 1937 received a fake from German intelligence or not received, but the purification of the top command staff of the Red Army was already in full swing, the main victims have already been selected, their names were publicly announced, and the witnesses gave the first deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs Frinovsky those testimonies that were required of them.

4

Fictions about the "decapitated" Red Army have been circulating for half a century. Here is one publication on this subject in a magazine with the anecdotal title "News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence" (1995. No. 40-41) - a huge article by Vladimir Kukushkin ""Tukhachevsky's Case" - a fake of Nazi special services".

What news did Comrade Kukushkin tell us? Everything that Schellenberg said fifty years ago, Kukushkin repeats word for word, passing off the fascist's

ravings as his scientific discoveries. Comrade Kukushkin recounts gossip that by that time had already been discussed for fifty years by the entire world tabloid press as if it were the latest intelligence news.

Reading the article, one can no longer understand where Schellenberg is and where Kukushkin is. The article is full of quotes from Schellenberg; Kukushkin believes him in everything, agreeing with all the wild inconsistencies. The Schellenberg-Kukushkin version reads:

This sinister action was initiated in December 1936 at a meeting at Hitler's home, where Hess, Bormann and Himmler were also present. The Führer irritably ...

Stop. Here I have to interrupt Comrade Kukushkin's exciting story and make a small digression. The four top leaders of Germany have been named. Four conspirators, with whom everything began. Among them - three politicians and one representative of the intelligence services, Reichsführer SS Himmler. At the end of the war Himmler tried to sneak out, but he was identified, and he committed suicide: took an ampoule of poison. What happened was this. German soldiers by the hundreds of thousands and even millions surrendered to the Americans and British to avoid being taken prisoner by the Soviets. In the hands of the Western Allies were immense masses of German prisoners of war, who were kept in huge fields, fenced with barbed wire. It was in these masses and decided to get lost Himmler. He disguised himself as a soldier, prepared documents. He did not cost anything to order a soldier's book in the name of some Hans or Fritz. They made him a beautiful document.

That's how Himmler got his money. The documents of front-line soldiers are frayed and worn out. A front-line soldier burned in a tank, swam across rivers, fought his way through swamps and forests, lay in mud and blood. During the years of war, the document of the front-line soldier was soaked with the smoke of dugouts, soldier's sweat and tobacco, soaked with the smell of front-line hospitals, mobile traveling brothels and field kitchens, crinkled, broken, and mangled. And one soldier in this immense crowd had the right-right document, new-new-new, crisp and typographically fragrant. And they noticed this soldier in the human anthill, and demanded the document because all the front-line soldiers were dirty with the dirt of the last battles, soaked with the soot of the defeat, all of them torn, smelly, shaggy, with torn sleeves, epaulettes and pants, covered with bandages and dirty rags. But one elderly

soldier with a graying hair - all new, his boots squeak, clean, washed, haircut and smelling of French cologne. That's when they said to him: "Turn around, son! How funny you are!"

The SS Reichsführer, with his stupid police brain, did not realize that his boots should be stomped on, his documents should be torn, and the stamps on the documents should be blurred. And now Comrade Kukushkin tells us an amazing story that this great professional and three amateurs in December 1936 intended to deceive Comrade Stalin himself, they decided to plant a fake.

Kukushkin continues his story about how the great professional and three amateurs called Heydrich, gave him a scolding, and this same Heydrich and came up with the idea to commit a forgery. The meaning of the forgery is as follows: Soviet generals led by Tukhachevsky snookered with German generals. The Soviets are preparing a coup against Stalin, German - against Hitler. German security services allegedly learned of the plot, obtained the relevant documents and are ready to sell them to Stalin.

Soon an emissary of Yezhov arrived from Moscow, who declared his readiness to buy material about the "conspiracy".... Heydrich demanded three million gold rubles ... The sum named was paid... The initiators of this political forgery from the SD boasted that they had dealt the heaviest blow to the Red Army's fighting ability and, in addition, earned three million rubles.... Part of the "Judas money" V. Schellenberg ordered to put under the knife after several German agents were arrested by the GPU, when they paid with these bills. Stalin made payment with large banknotes, all numbers of which were registered by the GPU.

That's the story. We will laugh at it below, but first let us look at the situation from Stalin's office.

So, Stalin reports: Hitler's secret police uncovered a conspiracy of German and Soviet generals. German generals intend to overthrow Hitler, Soviet - Stalin. What, in Stalin's mind, in this situation, Hitler should do? He must strike a blow against his conspirators. He should arrest, try, shoot and hang his generals.

But the amazing thing: report that Hitler knows about the conspiracy of German generals, but nothing like the defeat of the conspiracy in Germany does not happen, all Hitler's generals in their places, they are not even demoted. And it is strange: Hitler's intelligence cares about Stalin's safety, documents get, encourages Stalin to shoot his generals, but about their own safety neither Hitler nor his intelligence services do not care and his generals do not intend to shoot. And Stalin was supposed to believe this nonsense?

Second point. If Hitler really learned of the collusion between German and Soviet generals, he should have approached Stalin. Urgently and personally. Let's imagine a situation: two rival gangs in a city. Or gangs, if you prefer. And here middle-level brothers from one and the other gang sniffed, without informing the chiefs, and decided not to fight among themselves anymore, and the chiefs, who hinder peace and friendship, to slaughter. Suppose one gang leader got wind of the conspiracy. What should he do? Where would he look for protection and help? Only from the other gang leader. Nowhere else. Their feud is temporarily ended. They are friends in need. The two of them are in clear danger, and there's no one else they can rely on. There's no money involved, they've got to save their own skins. So one of them says to the other: Tell me everything you know about the case, and I'll tell you what I know. Then each man puts his own house in order. And then we can go on fighting among ourselves.

So, if Hitler found out about the collusion of Soviet and German generals, he had to go out to Stalin, not trusting anyone else. Hitler is under threat, and Stalin is under the same threat. But Hitler doesn't make contact. Instead, some con artists are trying to sell Stalin kompromat on Tukhachevsky and ask for money, but materials on the German generals-conspirators in return do not ask. And this does not look like the truth.

Conclusion: the attempt to deceive Stalin, if it really took place, was clearly foolish, the legend - implausible and unsupported.

Unlike Lenin and Trotsky, Stalin attached great importance to the legal formalities of a trial. Stalin did not want to be known as a villain, especially in the eyes of the army. In Stalin's courts admitted all - and in open trials, and in closed trials. Those who did not confess, simply did not get to the trial. But if someone was brought to trial, he confirmed his guilt. If someone suddenly became stubborn, a break was announced for a couple of hours, and after the break there were no problems with confession. For some reason Stalin pulled confessions from everyone. It was important to him. Stalin wanted everyone to believe that he was really destroying the real conspirators and spies. And if Stalin received a document from German intelligence, it should have been presented to the court. The court is closed, and the judges - the highest commanders of the Red Army, which are trained to keep secrets.

The transcripts of the trial of Tukhachevsky's group have been published. No German documents were presented in court, no one even mentioned them. The protocols of interrogations and confrontations are also partially published, but there is no mention of a German document there either.

What document are we talking about? We are talking about a letter Tukhachevsky allegedly wrote to German generals. We are told that Stalin believed this forgery. Let's assume that's true. Suppose that Stalin believed that Tukhachevsky really wrote this letter. Why then does Stalin's court bring knowingly far-fetched charges against Tukhachevsky, but does not bring a letter that directly exposes treason, a letter that Stalin himself believed?

The killer question is: why doesn't Stalin show this letter to anyone? Why hide it? Who needs it?

Soviet historians thought for a long time, but they came up with an answer: the letter was received through agent channels! Stalin did not want to reveal his agents!

That's a nice touch. But our agency had nothing to do with this case. Our official representative allegedly met with the Germans, allegedly bought this letter from them and left for the capital of the world proletariat. If we show Tukhachevsky's letter to our commanders, who and how will we reveal it? On the contrary,

By presenting Tukhachevsky's letter, Stalin would only demonstrate his power by such a gesture: I see everything! I know everything!

Without revealing the channels of receipt of the letter, it would have been possible to hint to their marshals not to think of plotting, because all their letters are intercepted and laid on Stalin's desk. But for some reason this was

not done.

If there was any agency involved in this case, it was only Hitler's. If German intelligence really sold Stalin the letter Tukhachevsky, then by doing so she gave the right to fully dispose of it. Stalin paid for the letter and could now do with it whatever he wanted. The Germans, giving the letter, did not care that someone on the content of the letter will reveal their agency, and Comrade Stalin, it turns out, cared not to reveal Hitler's agency!

6

Now let us return to the Schellenberg - Kukushkin story. The first interesting point: Schellenberg states in his memoirs (followed by Kukushkin) that Heydrich demanded three million gold rubles from the Russians for materials on the "conspiracy", and Stalin's special emissary paid this sum in mid-May 1937. A paragraph later Schellenberg claims that Stalin made the payment in large banknotes, which Schellenberg ordered to be put under the knife after several German agents were arrested paying with these bills. Let us not be picky about this discrepancy and assume that there was a misunderstanding and Schellenberg simply failed to specify that Heydrich, who had demanded a reward in gold, eventually agreed to receive it in Soviet treasury notes.

The second interesting point: the money received was used by German intelligence for agent operations, and immediately there were failures, because the numbers of banknotes were overwritten.

An intelligence agency cannot operate without money, just as a steam engine cannot move without water, but an intelligence agent cannot simply get money from a bank and pay his agent. Only "filtered" money can be used for an undercover operation,

that are traded in special, top secret ways by someone somewhere for such a purpose.

But the valiant German intelligence received the money not in a bank, but from the Soviet secret services, and this money was immediately used in its agent operations on Soviet territory.

One of two things: either Walter Schellenberg never wrote about it, and this nonsense was invented by some idiots who did not serve in the intelligence service and did not even read detective stories, or the head of German intelligence really were idiots who did not know the simplest things known not only to novice spies, working on the backup, but also just fans of

spy novels.

The third interesting point: the German scouts failed, Schellenberg found out about it and.... Nonsense again. Our guys aren't stupid enough to arrest a spy immediately. The spy is on Soviet territory, it's not easy to escape from here, the border is sealed. The identified spy should be "led" long and carefully, it is necessary to observe him carefully to reveal his connections. Then it would be good for him to set up an interesting source of information so that he does not know that he is working for us, so that he believes that luck is coming to him. A real spy detected on our territory is of great value to us. It's our channel of disinformation. It's a trump card stolen from their deck. They arrest a spy as a last resort, but even then, they use it to play against enemy intelligence. Even if the enemy has guessed that we have covered his agent and he plays by our notes, then even then it is of benefit to us: our behavior makes the enemy doubt the credibility of the reports of those sources that we have not yet identified. The enemy doesn't know who we have caught and who we haven't yet. So he doubts all of them. In short, if ours had really spotted German agents, Schellenberg could only learn about it after the war.

The Germans showed astonishing stupidity, giving the spies the money received from the Soviet special services, so it made sense for the Soviet counterintelligence to wait until all the money appeared on our territory, when other spies would show themselves in the same way. Why arrest the first ones who appeared immediately?

The fourth moment: with the agency nonsense turned out, and Schellenberg orders to put the money under the knife. Why? Can't it be used for legal purposes? For example, to pay salaries to German diplomats in Moscow, to buy soda water on Tsvetnoy Boulevard, pirozhki at Kazansky station, newspapers of all kinds. Couldn't the German intelligence officers think of any other use for these banknotes than to use them for spy operations on the territory of the Soviet Union?

Whichever way you look at this story, it still looks comical. If I am a spy, if I sell a counterfeit, I must demand big and serious money for it in order to put a price on it. In those days (and even now) it was dollars, Swiss francs, pounds or gold in bullion (gold, by the way, often paid Comrade Stalin), in extreme cases - diamonds or gold coins of tsarist minting. Why did the wisest German intelligence agreed to paper rubles in large denominations? Why did they give them to their agents without thinking that the numbers could be rewritten?

And finally, one more discrepancy. The operation was conceived in December 1936 and carried out in 1937. The cunning Germans deceived Stalin and received money from a representative of the GPU, which... existed until November 15, 1923. After that day there was no GPU, but there was OGPU (United State Political Department under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR), and since July 10, 1934 it did not exist and it - OGPU became part of the NKVD of the USSR and became known as the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB NKVD of the USSR). It turns out that the valiant German intelligence deceived the organization, which at the time of deception already 13 years as did not exist.

So maybe Schellenberg just misspoke? Not at all. Throughout his book, this very term - GPU - runs through his book. The great German intelligence officer did not even know the name of the organization he was fighting against, did not know the main enemy even by name. And this cretin, who knew nothing about Russia at all, tells us that he fabricated such a forgery, which was believed by Stalin himself!

I once bought Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* in a new Oxford University Press translation, reinterpreted, with new commentary. This great Chinese man lived two and a half thousand years ago, but everything he wrote about war should be known to everyone. It is interesting that anyone who translates Sun Tzu from that ancient Chinese language understands him differently, in his own way. That is why I am collecting different translations of this book, and I already have a dozen and a half of them.

I'm sitting here, reading, floating off into the clouds with happiness. Here is a chapter on intelligence. And suddenly, in the conclusion, I find a comment by an Oxford professor: intelligence is of great importance - for example, German intelligence planted a forgery on Stalin.

German intelligence in World War II did such stupid things that deserve a multi-volume novel in the spirit of "The Travels of the Brave Soldier Schweik". German intelligence knew nothing at all about the Soviet Union. This topic I single out in a special production. Hitler himself intelligence did not like, did not understand and was squeamish of it. And so Hitler and his intelligence is brought to us as an example. And Stalin, who appreciated, understood, loved extraction, provision and processing, who found the highest pleasure in communicating with the best intelligence of his time, is considered a fool and brought to us as a negative example: stupid, gullible.

It should be borne in mind that the archives of the German intelligence services on the eve of the fall of the Reich were burned, and the top leaders were liquidated. It is impossible to verify anything from the documents. That's where the space for liars! And went unkilld Hitlerites, who had no idea about intelligence even at the level of tabloid reading, to make up amazing stories. Stalin shot Tukhachevsky? It was me who planted the document! I was the one who deceived Stalin! It was me who decapitated the Red Army by Stalin's hand, and for that I received three million rubles!

And we are repeating with glee the fabrications of these liars. And we laugh at Stalin.

But we should laugh not at Stalin, but at some highbrow experts. The chronology of Stalin's actions is known to all and documented, and the chronology of Hitler's actions is known only from the unsubstantiated account of Schellenberg, who has been repeatedly accused of lying and total incompetence.

Even a simple comparison of dates shows that Stalin's real actions were

more than a year ahead of Hitler's imaginary actions. Schellenberg, making up his stories, did not even bother to leaf through all available materials about the Moscow trials. If he had, he would have moved the date of the meeting with Hitler in his story a couple of years into the past.

But if the purification of the Red Army was carried out by Stalin not according to his own plans, but at the suggestion of Germany, then even then the actions of the Germans would have been stupidity. In this case, it turns out that they helped Stalin to get rid of the stupid stale executioners and open the way for a new generation of real commanders, who broke the back of Hitler and his boastful intelligence.

It was not Stalin who believed the German lies, but some of our respected historians. It was you, scholarly comrades, that Schellenberg planted the falsehood about the rubles received from the GPU in large bills with overwritten numbers.

GLAVA 21.

About a warlord with an analytical mind.

Some Communists themselves did not know very well what was what. Their political outlook was sometimes limited to a very simple notion: "All the bourgeois are enemies of the revolution. Therefore, they can be dealt with without ceremony."

Lieutenant General S. A. Kalinin. Reflecting on the past

1

After the Civil War, the Soviet Union had one but very formidable adversary in the east - Japan. In peacetime, the Far Eastern Front was deployed against Japan.

During the two interwar decades, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Konstantinovich Blucher was the supreme military ruler of the Soviet Far East almost without fail. In the list of Soviet marshals he was the very first. As we already know, Colonel General D. A. Volkogonov, advisor to the Russian President, in his books describes Blucher as a "strong military commander" who "possessed an analytical mind." To this General Volkogonov added that "Stalin hardly needed such people".

Indeed, Stalin didn't need such people. But for another reason.

Marshal Blucher was arrested on October 22, 1938. He did not have to sit for long. "Military History Journal" (1993. No. 2) reports that Blucher "died in prison" on November 9, 1938.

Such a quick death has a simple explanation: he died under torture. From this fact make seemingly indisputable conclusions. If Stalin is a villain, then killed in Stalin's prison Blucher - an innocent victim. If Stalin is a tyrant, it means that Blucher - a good genius, defender of widows and orphans. If Stalin started the war badly, then Blucher would have started it well.

Instead of Marshal Blucher, Grigory Mikhailovich Komkor Grigorii Mikhailovich took the post of commander of the Far Eastern Front

Stern, who had previously been Blucher's chief of staff. From May 1940, Stern was a colonel general. In early 1941, Stern went for promotion, then was arrested and shot.

To assess the "loss" of Blucher and Stern, we must get acquainted with the one who replaced them. And they were replaced by a veteran cavalryman - Budyonovets, a veteran of the 1st Cavalry Army, Colonel-General Iosif Rodionovich Apanasenko. He was appointed commander of the Far Eastern Front in January 1941, and already on February 22, 1941 Apanasenko was awarded the military rank of General of the Army. Apanasenko is from among the highest-ranking first commanders. When Budyonny commanded the corps, Apanasenko was his division commander, that is, stood only a step lower. His picture is in the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" (Vol. 1. P. 216): it is the face (or, rather, the face) of a ferocious caveman.

Army General Apanasenko was best described by Major General Pyotr Grigoryevich Grigorenko in his book "Only Rats Can Be Found in the Underground" (New York: Detinets, 1981). Before the war, Lieutenant Colonel Grigorenko was an officer of the Operational Directorate of the Far Eastern Front Headquarters. The Operational Directorate is the most important division of the headquarters. It analyzes the situation, develops solutions for the commander, translates them into plans and orders, controls and directs the course of combat operations. All other divisions of the headquarters work for the Operational Directorate just as all the shops of a factory work in the interests of one assembly shop.

It was in this, the most important department of the headquarters and served Grigorenko. He had a unique opportunity to observe the commander of the Far Eastern Front, Army General Apanasenko, not on the parade podium, not at a party conference or even at a drinking party after a successful wolf hunt, but in the silence of the main working room of the concrete bunker, where the options for combat operations are discussed over the map, where plans for operations and war are developed.

I am compelled to quote large portions of Grigorenko's book. In my opinion, they deserve it. So.

A few months before the outbreak of war, Army General Iosif Rodionovich Apanasenko was appointed commander of the Far Eastern Front. Even by his appearance he was unpleasant to us, not to mention the fact that behind him and ahead of him was the fame of an autocrat and a man uneducated and unintelligent. In appearance he was like an axe chopped out of the trunk of an oak tree. He had a mighty, but somehow unshapely figure, rough facial features, his voice was loud and

hoarse, and in conversation with most people he had a mocking tone. When swearing, he does not choose expressions, as a rule, he does it in an insulting tone and with the use of swear words. And one more thing - not restrained. Can quickly get into a frenzy, and then the culprit of mercy do not wait for mercy. And the worst thing is that this state is observable. Suddenly from under the collar of the tunic neck begins to redden, this redness quickly spreads upwards, the whole neck, chin, cheeks, ears, forehead. Even the eyes become bloodshot.

In general, all of us were not thrilled with the change of commander. However, very soon those who stood closer to Apanasenko became convinced that the fame that followed him was largely based on nothing. First of all, we soon noted the colossal natural intelligence of this man. Yes, he is not educated, but he reads a lot and, most importantly, is able to evaluate the proposals of his subordinates, to select what is most appropriate under the circumstances. Secondly, he is courageous. If he considers something expedient, he decides and does it, taking full responsibility for himself. He will never blame the performers, will not put a subordinate at risk. If he considers any of them guilty, he will punish himself. Neither the People's Commissar, nor the tribunal to reprisal does not give. I could say many more good things about him, but let's move on to examples.

Almost simultaneously with Apanasenko arrived many top-level employees of the front office, who were selected by him himself. All these people are intelligent, which in itself speaks in favor of Apanasenko. After all, he managed to recognize them somehow. Arrived and the new head of the Operations Directorate Major General Kazakovtsev Arkady Kuzmich. Grigory

Petrovich Kotov, as soon as the opera plan was handed over to him, left for his new duty station in Ukraine. The operplan was reported orally and in writing to the Chief of Staff and then to the Commander. Apanasenko immediately wished to personally familiarize himself with the operplan. We started with the cover plan. I reported, as I was responsible for this part of the operplan. Kazakovtsev stood next to me. As the report Apanasenko threw individual remarks, made judgments. When I began to report on the location of the front reserves, Apanasenko said:

- That's right! This is the most convenient place to maneuver from. If

there is a threat here, we'll maneuver our reserves here, - and he moved his hand to the south. And if there is a threat here, we will maneuver here, - he moved his hand to the west.

Kazakovtsev, who had been silent as Apanasenko's hand moved southward, now dropped it calmly, as if about something insignificant:

- We'll maneuver if the Japanese will let us.

- What do you mean? - Apanasenko was wary.

- And so. There are 52 small tunnels and big bridges on this railroad. If we blow one of them up, we'll never get anywhere.

- We'll switch to motorized transport. We'll maneuver on the ground.

- No way. There's no dirt road parallel to the railroad.

A red stripe appeared above Apanasenko's collar, which quickly crept upward. With a red face, with bloodshot eyes, he bellowed:

- How could it be so! They shouted: The Far East is a fortress! The Far East is a fortress! But it turns out that we are sitting here like in a mousetrap! - He ran to the phone, picked up the receiver: - Molyova to me immediately!

A few minutes later, Lieutenant General of Engineers Molyev, the anxious chief of engineers of the front, ran in.

- Molyov! Do you know that there is no highway from Khabarovsk to Kuibyshevka?

- Known.

- So why don't you say anything? Or do you think the Japanese will build it for you! In short, one month for preparation, four months for construction. And you, - Apanasenko turned to me, - on September 1, get into a "gazik" and go to Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya. Call me from there. If you don't make it, then, Molyev, I don't envy your fate. And the list of those who are guilty that the road is not built, have in your pocket. It won't make your fate easier, but it won't be so boring where I'll drive you. But if you're serious, here's my advice. Determine all those who can participate in the construction - military units and the local population - all of them cut the plots and set deadlines. What you need for the construction, make a request. I'll give you everything. And keep strict control. On my desk every day should be a summary of plan fulfillment.

And separately, a list of those who did not fulfill the plan.

On September 1, 1941, I arrived by "gazik" from Khabarovsk to Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya and called Apanasenko. I had 946 kilometers

added on the speedometer. I saw what was done, and at the beginning and at the end of this road I would put busts of Apanasenko. Any more educated person would have stopped before the difficulty of the task. Apanasenko, on the other hand, saw only the necessity and looked for ways to achieve the goal, struggling with difficulties and not stopping before them. In connection with this road, the legend of his autocratic behavior was enriched with new facts. During the construction, he surrendered two secretaries of district committees to soldiers, which was later used against him as evidence of his dictatorial tendencies.

When he took command, the road network, especially in Primorye, was already relatively developed. But the units were not stationed on the roads. And the access roads were not highway. That's why in the slush many units could be reached only on horseback. Apanasenko drove a car into the very mud of the access roads, abandoned it there, and drove away in another car, declaring in public: "I do not go to such slackers". Then he would summon the commander of the unit to himself. Rumors of severe penalties, of removal from posts and demotion in ranks quickly spread through the units. Everyone dropped everything and started building access roads. In a matter of a month, all the towns had beautiful highways leading to them, and the towns themselves - streets, technical parks, and farmyards - were graveled and in some places asphalted. All this was not arrogance. Till now it was impossible to leave the towns in the thawing weather on alarm. Now - at any time of the year and day go into battle. In general, roads were Apanasenko's weakness. I confess, I - General Staff - theoretically understood the importance of roads, but so feel them, so care about them, as Apanasenko, could not. Only Apanasenko instilled in all of us, Far Easterners, a true respect for roads. The time of his command of the Far Eastern Front can be reasonably called the era of road construction and excellent road maintenance.

This commander was not as formidable as he seemed. His terrible orders about removals, demotions and rank were known to everyone. But few knew that none of those punished were forgotten. Some time passed, Apanasenko called the punished and set a probationary period: "I'll look at it myself, if you do well, we'll forget everything, and the order won't get into your personal file. If you fail, blame yourself!" And I don't know of a single case when a person was not corrected.....

Now let's return to the murdered commanders. The first question: what did the "strong military commander", "possessing an analytical mind" Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Blucher, do for 17 years in the Far East?

The Far East is our second front. And it could have happened that it was our first. And it turns out that if the alert in the Far East had coincided with rain, our divisions would simply not have been able to get out of their military camps. Anyone who has not been to the Far East does not know what it is to be off-road and muddy. Some people think that the roads in the Far East are the same as in the European part of Russia. No, dear comrades, it is worse there. In Primorsky Krai there are hills, and

between them are swamps. And on the tops of the hills there are also swamps. And where there are no swamps - taiga. Rains start in May and end in September. The roads are heavy, steep, viscous sours or lakes with sour shores. At the end of summer - wild floods.

And here sat in the Far East "a strong military commander with an analytical mind" Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Blucher. He had been sitting there since the Civil War. Sitting there for almost twenty years. And didn't do a damn thing. God forbid he should fight. Not a single division could have left his town because of the mud. And even if they did, there'd be no way to help them. If the Japanese had blown up any bridge on the Great Siberian Railway, or blocked any tunnel, our commanders would not have been able to bring reinforcements to the place of fighting, would not have been able to bring even shells. Not only that: if the Japanese blew up one bridge or tunnel, supply from the center would become impossible, and not only would the entire Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet be disrupted, but also the connection of the central regions of the country with Northern Sakhalin and the Kolyma Territory would be interrupted, the production cooperation with the military industry of the Far East, including Komsomolsk, where the world's most powerful aircraft factory and one of the largest shipyards were located.

Marshal Blucher, a strong commander with an analytical mind, was sitting on the high banks of the Amur River and could not realize that the entire Far East was a mousetrap and that the Japanese could slam this mousetrap shut with a couple of saboteurs and a dozen kilograms of dynamite.

And in his headquarters "analyst" Blucher kept such "strategists", who simply did not see all this and did not prompt his commander.

What did the great strategic analyst Comrade Blucher think about for almost twenty years? Nothing. The brilliant strategist had a small weakness. A passion. "Literaturnaya Gazeta" (July 19, 1996) about this weakness says softly and affectionately: Blucher drank. Sometimes.

Our people treat this weakness with indulgence. Our people have not learned to notice this weakness in people like themselves. And in order to remember this weakness 50, 60, and 70 years later, Comrade Blucher must was drinking quite heavily and regularly, drinking to excess. And so it was. Blucher drank so much that the whole country knew about his parties.

I don't believe in miracles. An alcoholic Blucher couldn't have been a strategist. A real strategist has no time for drinking, a real strategist values his time too much to waste it on drunkenness.

Comrade Blucher made no discoveries in military science. He left no works for posterity. In the field of theory - zero. In the field of practice - a negative value. In 1938, a trifling conflict with the Japanese over two hills, and the entire Far Eastern Front, led by a "strong commander" disgraced the whole world, despite the "analytical mind" of the great strategist. We will talk about it in the future.

Where did he come from, this sipping military thinker?

4

Marshal of the Soviet Union Blucher Vasily Konstantinovich had no military education. And in general, education did not shine. He worked in trade. In 1910 he went to jail for incitement to a strike. Term - two and a half years. In August 1914 he was drafted into the army. Got on service in the Moscow Kremlin (VIZh. 1989. № 3. P. 95).

I read about it and marvel: a man who had been convicted on a political article was taken to serve in the Kremlin. The Petrograd garrison seemed to be recruited on the same principle. This is how the Russian Empire was ruined: all these "fighters" did not want to go to the front - and they supported Lenin-Trotsky, who called for the defeat of their own country.

But Blucher made it to the front. There he was promoted to junior non-commissioned officer. Then the magazine reports that Blucher in 1916 it was clear that the war Russia lost. The upcoming strategist cruelly miscalculated. A prolonged war, above all, was disastrous for Germany.

It is Germany that has no natural resources for war. Germany had a small territory, which with the technology of the time could not feed such a large population. It was Germany that was caught in a pincer, that had to fight on two fronts. All the great Germans considered this situation ruinous. You only have to look at

Germany is cut off from the world and surrounded on all sides. And the supply by sea is blocked by the British navy. There was no need for any battles and operations - Germany would collapse on its own. Realizing this, the German Kaiser on December 12, 1916 addressed the Russian Tsar with a proposal for peace.

For Russia at that moment, contrary to the opinion of the future strategist Blucher, the war was not lost. The echoes of the war were coming from somewhere in the Carpathian Mountains and Belarusian swamps, and the entire vast territory of the largest country in the world was unaffected by the war. In 1916, the sluggish Russia was finally rocked. It was the year when the war industry produced twice as many guns, machine guns, rifles, shells and cartridges as in the two previous years of the war combined. The front became saturated with ammunition for the first time.

Throughout World War I, battles were named after rivers, towns, and districts: the Masurian Lakes, Galicia, Verdun, and the Somme. There is one exception to this rule: one battle is named after a commander - the Brusilov Breakthrough. It was carried out by the Russian army, and it was in 1916. We finally learned how to fight. Subsequent events showed that even after completely losing the production potential of 1916, we could still fight and fight. And fight we did. On the remnants of military reserves of 1916 we fought until 1921 and beyond, suffering immeasurably higher losses than in the First World War. So not everything was lost in 1916.

But because Blucher and his kind were impatient to stick a bayonet in the ground and run home, Russia voluntarily withdrew from the war in disgrace. This surrender in the face of the already dying German monarchy did not mean peace at all, but meant, as Comrade Lenin taught, the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war.

Because defeatists like Blucher were in a hurry to lose World War I, because they followed Lenin and Trotsky, our country got exactly what Lenin and Trotsky promised: a fratricidal war from Brest to Vladivostok, with the destruction of millions of people, with the extermination of incalculable wealth. Because of the defeatists, our country had to fight the longest and

suffered more losses in the Civil War than all the countries combined in the First World War.

And so in the fratricidal Civil War, the defeatists distinguished themselves. Blucher became a legendary hero and earned many orders. Interestingly, he himself his combat awards as if shy, and was proud of awards punitive. One of Blucher's wives testifies that he did not wear all the orders and not always, but always carried the sign "Honorary Worker of the All-Union Cheka-GPU" (VIZH. 1990. No. 1. P. 81). And we must admit that this award Chekist Blucher wore deservedly: among the executioners and punishers he was in great prestige. If the Soviet Union had established the honorary title "Honored Executioner of the Republic" or "People's Executioner of the USSR", then Blucher could have competed not only with Tukhachevsky, but also with Yakir himself for the right to be the first to receive this title.

In the history of the Soviet Union the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was awarded 41 times. Only two of these Marshals were awarded the badges "Honorary Worker of the VChK-GPU" - Beria and Blucher. Blucher received his badge #773 on February 22, 1932. That year in our country millions of people died in terrible agony during artificially organized famine.

5

Grigory Mikhailovich Shtern was the second "strategist" from the Far East. His service in the Red Army began in 1919. Why Stern did not join the Reds in the harsh 1918, but joined in the victorious 1919, "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" does not explain. Stern, like many other "strategists" like him, was neither a soldier, nor a cadet, nor a cadet, nor a junker, nor a non-commissioned officer, nor a junior commander, nor an intermediate commander.

He's a commissar. From the get-go. His first position was regimental commissar. Not a dusty job - to supervise the commander, to shoot soldiers, to tell about the bright future. Further - without delay: commissar of a brigade, an employee of the political department of the 46th rifle division. After the Civil War there was a reduction of the army. So Stern - again commissar of the regiment, commissar of the staff of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Corps. In 1923-1925 - commissar of the punitive brigade and commander of special purpose units (that is, punitive formations) of the Khorezm group of troops. Then again political work - head of the political

department of the division. And in 1929

he was swept up, and Stern became Voroshilov's handmaiden - an errand boy. There were two of them: R. P. Khmelnitsky (described in detail in the book "M-Day"^[19]) and G. M. Stern.

And here we must make a special note of one point: Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov was characterized by many people as a man of little intelligence. So, he had Commissar Stern serving for seven years in a clownish position of a bailiff. From this I conclude, and try to argue: Stern could not be mentally very different from Voroshilov.

First of all, they do not keep highly literate people in menial positions as aides and errand boys. But they keep the very understanding ones, who, like dogs, understand their master's wishes without words. This job - for the brave soldier Schweik. And secondly, strategy is like poetry. A strategist is always a poet. At least in his soul. A real poet couldn't spend seven years in the clerks' office. And even in Voroshilov's stupid office.

Stern and Voroshilov lived soul to soul. Stern could have stayed with Voroshilov all his life, like Khmelnitsky, but Stern was carried high up. He must have pleased Comrade Voroshilov. He was appointed chief military adviser to the republican government of Spain. I do not know what the chief military adviser Comrade Stern advised the Spaniards, but their case ended in a deep and complete collapse. And Stern became Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Front.

Back in January 1937, he was Voroshilov's lieutenant, and in May 1938 - already the chief of staff of the front. Not just any front, but the only one at that time. No one had such an upsurge. Stern had no experience of commander's work. He had no experience of staff work either. All his experience - commissar, punisher, lackey, counselor.

It is well known today how Blucher and Stern "crushed" the Japanese aggressors on Lake Khasan. Blucher for those "victories" were tortured to death, and Stern passed ^[20]. Always and everywhere we have a chief of staff for all failures are equally responsible with the commander. And Stalin ruined Commander Blucher, but spared Chief of Staff Stern and even promoted him, putting him in command of the front.

What kind of commander he was, we have already seen on the example of the same road along the Great Siberian Railway. Stern served in the Far East for three years as Chief of Staff of the front, Commander of the 1st Army, Commander of the Far Eastern Front, but did nothing to ensure that the troops

had the opportunity to leave the military camps after the rain. He did nothing to ensure the movement of reserves to combat areas on a huge thousand-kilometer front. And a new promotion awaited him - the post of the head of the Main Air Defense Directorate of the USSR NKO.

And then there was an embarrassment that could not be hushed up: on May 15, 1941, a German military transport plane U-52 crossed the air border of the USSR near Bialystok, passed unhindered over Minsk, Smolensk and landed in Moscow. The air defense system headed by Stern showed complete slackness. Neither the head of the Air Defense Department himself, Comrade Stern, nor the apparatus headed by him knew anything about the unauthorized flight of the German aircraft. It was impossible to keep such a person in such a responsible position, and even on the eve of war. So he was hired.

In the field of military theory Stern did not prove himself in any way. In combat work, he showed negative results. But in political work...

Stern was an ardent supporter of terror. Immediately after the purge, in March 1939, the XVIII Congress of the Party was held, which summarized what had been done and outlined new tasks. But purification as such was no longer discussed at the Congress. They talked about the coming war. All the Chekists, all the Party leaders, members of the Central Committee and Politburo were silent about purification, and, understandably, the comrade commanders were silent about purification. Comrade Stalin himself was also silent.

Comrade Stern could not keep silent, he spoke of the great benefits of the purification and counted himself among its organizers, inspirers and executors: "*you and I have destroyed a bunch of trash...*" (Transcript of Stern's speech at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.) Comrade Stern had something to be proud of. He had a hand in the matter. Soon, however, he himself found himself in this very pile of trash.

6

Sometimes you find a pebble and don't know whether it is a diamond or not? How do you check? Just scrape it on the granite. If it scratches a groove, it's a diamond. And if it falls apart, it's not a diamond, but some fossilized dinosaur excrement.

That dirt road along the Great Siberian Railway is a piece of granite on which we test the quality of our commanders: diamond or excrement? And one cannot forget Comrade Tukhachevsky himself. Tukhachevsky, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, had the whole Far East hanging on a string, which any

saboteur could cut. Chekhov's intruder could unscrew the nut, and Comrade Tukhachevsky, who headed the General Staff of the armed forces, the brain of the army, did not realize it. In the Far East, regiments and divisions are not able to leave the military camps on alert, and the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Comrade Tukhachevsky did not care about that. He was preparing projects to produce 100 thousand tanks. And why to have 100 thousand tanks, if they will not be able to leave the military towns after the rain anyway? Why have all these tank armadas, if after the explosion of one tunnel they can not be moved to the area of military operations? Why have these tanks if they cannot be supplied and supplied with ammunition and fuel?

But strategist Tukhachevsky didn't think about such trifles. And he should have. All great catastrophes happened because of trifles.

7

And now the wisest historians tell us that Stalin was a moron, because he did not need strong commanders with analytical minds. Stalin needed fool cavalymen. We are told that Stalin killed the brilliant commanders, and in their place put inept, illiterate, uneducated people.

However, here is a reverse example. Unlike Marshal Blucher, who never studied anywhere, Army General Apanasenko, who after the purge took up the post of commander of the Far Eastern Front, brilliantly graduated from higher academic courses, and then from the Frunze Military Academy.

Unlike Stern, who never commanded a squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division, or corps, Apanasenko went through all the steps of the service ladder. All to one, without missing anything. And he commanded divisions for more than ten years, three years - the corps, three years was deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District and three years - the commander of the Central Asian Military District. So he was prepared for the post of front commander both theoretically and practically.

It will be argued that this is only one example. No, this is not the only example. There will be others. But even if this example were the only one, even then this one exception would disprove the rule. After all, we are not talking about nothing, but about our second front, which was avoided. The point is not that Stalin instead of strategist-alcoholic Blucher and strategist-commissar Stern sent to the Far East smart, experienced, competent, decisive, persistent and persistent commander Apanasenko. The fact is that the smart general Apanasenko, in turn, brought smart people behind him. It Apanasenko

somewhere found, appreciated at face value, elevated and brought with him to Khabarovsk, the head of the Operations Department, General Kazakovtsev, who saw a weakness in the operational plan. During the reign of Blucher and Stern, there were simply no such generals in the headquarters of the Far Eastern Front, they kept "geniuses" who did not understand the simplest things and Blucher and Stern did not suggest anything.

An amazing thing: before the purification, the Far East was incapable of fighting. But it was necessary to remove a couple of "strong military commanders with analytical minds", and instead of them to appoint a cavalryman from the 1st Cavalry Army, and immediately the troops were able to leave the military camps after the rain, that is, they were able to fight. And immediately it became possible to move strategic reserves to where they could be needed, that is, it became possible to use the principles of tactics, operational art and strategy not only in the quiet of the office, but also on the fields of possible battles.

GLAVA 22.

Shift

A ruler's intelligence is first judged by the kind of people he brings close to him. Niccolo Machiavelli.
Sovereign

No one doubts that Russia is capable of giving birth to Zeidlitzes, Murats, Rommels - many Russian generals in 1941-1945 were undoubtedly on that level.

Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin.
Tank Battles. 1939-1945

1

Major-General Grigorenko continues his story about the commander of the Far Eastern Front. Here is another excerpt from his book:

The beginning of the war highlighted Apanasenko in a special way. I cannot say now on what day from the outbreak of war, but certainly at the very beginning of the war, an order came to ship immediately to the West the entire mobilization stock of arms and ammunition. Smorodinov, who had long been a leading mobilizer of the General Staff,

was indignant: "What kind of a fool takes weapons from one front for another? We are not a rear district, we can go into battle at any minute. We must go to Apanasenko. He's the only one 'there' can listen to."

As soon as Apanasenko realized what the matter was, he would not listen to further explanations. His head quickly filled with blood, and he growled:

- Oh, come on! It's a mess. It's a wreck! And we're going to prove something private? Start shipping immediately! You, - he turned to the head of the rear, - your head is responsible for the speed of shipment. Mobilize all railway rolling stock and with courier speed.

to throw out the front. Load day and night. Report the loading and dispatch of each echelon to the center and to me personally. <...>

The order came to immediately send eight fully manned and armed divisions to Moscow. The rate of dispatch was so high that troops from the camps left for the loading stations on alarm. At the same time, some of the people who were outside the unit, were not in time for the loading, in some units there was a shortage of weapons and transportation. Moscow demanded full staffing, and Apanasenko was not the man who could allow violations of the order. Therefore, was organized check-out station - Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya - the residence of the headquarters of the 2nd Army. At this station was created a reserve of all weapons, transportation, means of traction, soldiers and officers. Commanders of the departing divisions and regiments through the chiefs of echelons and specially appointed officers checked the presence of shortages in each echelon. This was reported by telegraph to the 2nd Army. There all the missing was fed to the appropriate echelons. Personally responsible for this before Apanasenko was the Chief of Staff of the army. Each echelon from the check-out station had to go out and came out actually in a complete set. <...>

Without asking anyone, Apanasenko began to form new divisions in place of the lost divisions. A general mobilization of all ages up to and including 55 was announced. But it was still not enough. And Apanasenko ordered the prosecutor's office to check the cases of campers and all those who could be released and sent to the troops. <...>

There was a superfast dispatch of eight divisions to save Moscow.

Then they ordered to send four more, then one by one, two by two sent another six. In all, 18 divisions, out of a total of 19 divisions that were part of the front. Only the 40th was not sent, and that, apparently, because it was very difficult to take it out of Posyet. Instead of each one sent to the front Apanasenko ordered to form a second-order one. For these formations Apanasenko also deserves a monument. After all, he led all the formations on his own initiative and under the authority of his responsibility, with the disapproving attitude of some of his closest aides and the complete indifference and even irony of the center. The center knew about the formations, but was convinced that it was impossible to form anything in the Far East without the help of the center: there were no men, no weapons, no transport, and nothing at all. Therefore, the center, knowing about the organizational efforts of the Far Eastern Front, pretended that it knew nothing about it. Let them play mobilization there. But Apanasenko found everything. <...> In general, despite the absolutely incredible difficulties, to replace the left divisions were formed second-order divisions. They were formed even more by two or three. When the new formations became a reality, the General Staff finally "cut through the voice". All newly formed divisions were approved and given numbers. Moreover, the center was so confident in the seriousness of the new formations that it took into the active army four more divisions, already from among the second priority divisions.

Thus, during the period from July 1941 to June 1942 the Far East sent to the active army 22 rifle divisions and several dozens of marching reinforcements. Now we know already that during the first year of the war between the Japanese and the Germans was a serious skirmish. German intelligence claimed that the Soviets "from under the noses" of the Japanese take divisions and transfer them to the West. Japanese intelligence insisted that no Soviet divisions had left their places of deployment. It is difficult to even imagine how events would have unfolded in the Far East if a man-executor had commanded there. He would have sent all the troops, as Moscow demanded, and would not have formed anything, since unauthorized formations are strictly forbidden. One remaining division, three army headquarters and one front headquarters, even together with border guards, not only to defend, but also to monitor the vast length of the border of the Far East

is impossible. Apanasenko showed statesmanship and great courage in this endeavor.

It is generally believed that in 1941 Moscow was saved by Siberian divisions. They were powerful, well-trained, fully manned units, they came from somewhere far away, along the Great Siberian Railway, that's why they were called Siberian. But most of them were not Siberian, but Far Eastern divisions. The most famous of them are the 32nd and 78th.

The 32nd (later the 29th Guards) Rifle Division of Colonel V.I. Polosukhin, having arrived from Khasan, unloaded under fire and entered the battle right on the Borodino field. If Apanasenko had delayed loading just a little, the German troops would have broken through to Moscow.

The 78th (hereafter - 9th Guards) Rifle Division of Colonel (later - Army General) AP Beloborodov arrived from the Ussuri River and entered the battle near Istra.

An extra straw breaks the camel's back. The whole science of war comes down to having that very straw at the right moment and placing it on the appropriate spine. It was Apanasenko who presented these straws to Stalin.

Just in the nick of time.

2

Here is another story, and all about him, about General Apanasenko. And the time is the same - the fall of 1941. And the theme is the same - sending troops from the Far East to save the capital. Witness E. A. Borkov, who during the war was the first secretary of the Khabarovsk Regional Committee:

I got a call from Stalin on the top-secret control room.

Saying hello, he says:

"We have the gravest situation between Smolensk and Vyazma... Hitler is preparing an attack on Moscow, we do not have enough troops to save the capital. ... I urge you to fly to Moscow immediately, take Apanasenko with you, persuade him to be compliant so that he does not struggle, I know his stubbornness."

During the years of my work in the Far East and elsewhere, Stalin never called me. So I was

I was extremely surprised to hear his voice on the phone..... We have long been accustomed to the fact that his word is law for us, he never

asked anyone for anything, but ordered and demanded. Therefore, I was surprised by the tone, it was as if I was not that I was informed, but reported on the situation in the west of the country. And therefore, when Stalin said out of the ordinary "persuade Apanasenko to be compliant" - this literally shocked me At the end he repeated once again: "Fly out immediately with the fastest military aircraft..."

We arrived in Moscow on the first or second of October at midnight. They were waiting for us at the airfield. They put us in a car and brought us straight to the Kremlin. We were brought to the reception room. The general accompanying us went into the office to report on our arrival, immediately returned, opened the door wide and said: "Comrade Stalin asks you to come in."

The master of the office greeted us warmly by the hand, congratulated us on our safe arrival and invited us to sit down at the long table covered with green cloth. He did not sit down at first, silently walked around the office, stopped against us and began to talk: "Our troops on the Western Front are engaged in very heavy defensive fighting, and in Ukraine a complete rout The Ukrainians are generally badly behaved, many are surrendering, the population welcomes the German troops."

A short pause, a few steps back and forth across the office. Stalin stopped beside us again and continued: "Hitler has launched a major offensive on Moscow. I am forced to withdraw troops from the Far East. I ask you to understand and enter into our situation."

A frost ran down my back, and cold sweat broke out on my forehead from this terrible truth, which the leader of the Party and the State had told us.... It was not only about the loss of Moscow, and perhaps the death of the state ... Stalin did not try to ask our opinion, he spread his papers on the table and, pointing his finger at the information on the available troops of our front, turning to Apanasenko, began to list the numbers of tank and mechanized divisions, artillery regiments and other particularly important formations and units that Apanasenko must immediately ship to Moscow.

Stalin dictated, Apanasenko carefully wrote down, and then immediately, in the office, in the presence of the owner, smoking cradle, signed the order and sent an encrypted telegram to his chief of staff for immediate execution.

It was obvious from everything that our short, clear, business meeting was coming to an end. Strong tea was put on the table. Stalin asked about life in the Far East. I answered. And suddenly followed a question to Apanasenko: "And how many anti-tank guns you have?" The general answered immediately.

I don't remember the figure specifically now, but I remember that he named some paltry figure compared to what the Red Army already had then. "Load these guns for shipment!" - Stalin commanded softly but clearly. And then suddenly a glass of tea, standing opposite Apanasenko, flew across the long table to the left, the chair under the general as if jumped back. Apanasenko bounced off the table and shouted: "YOU what? What are you doing? Motherfucking tak- peretak! And if the Japanese attack, what will I use to defend the Far East? With these leggings?! - and slapped his hands on his sides. - "Take me off my post, shoot me, I won't give up my guns!"

I was stunned. Though everything went round and round in my head, I was pierced by the thought: "This is the end. Now he will call Beria's men, and we will both die. And here I was again struck by Stalin's behavior: "Calm down, calm down, Comrade Apanasenko! Is it worth worrying so much about these guns? Keep them."

Saying goodbye, Apanasenko asked to go to the active army - to the front.

"No, no," replied the Supreme Commander-in-Chief friendly. - Brave and experienced men like you are needed by the party in the Far East."

This story was recorded and sent to me by Fyodor Trofimovich Morgun, Hero of Socialist Labor, who for more than fifteen years was the first secretary of the Poltava regional committee of the CPSU, then the first chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nature Protection. This story is now published in his book "Long before fireworks" (Poltava, 1994. P. 6771).

To add to this, the action took place in October 1941 - before Japan went to war against the US. At that moment, anything could be expected from Japan. The fall of 1941 was indeed a threatening period for our Far East.

Army General Iosif Rodionovich Apanasenko commanded the Far Eastern Front during the two most difficult years, in 1941 and 1942. Personally, I have no doubt that in the event of a Japanese attack on our Far

East, the Japanese generals in the person of Apanasenko would have gotten a worthy opponent. Even without enough troops, combat equipment and ammunition, Apanasenko would have managed to make life for the conquerors not the most pleasant.

General Apanasenko managed to break out into the active army only in 1943. To the decisive front. The Kursk Bulge. He was mortally wounded in the battles near Belgorod during the Battle of Kursk and died on August 5, 1943 on the day when the capital of our Motherland Moscow first saluted the troops who won an outstanding victory at the Kursk Bulge, which decided the outcome of the war.

And now historians tell us that Stalin exterminated the best of the best, that around him there were only semi-literate morons, lacking initiative dullards and obsequious sycophants. But let's imagine: if in 1937 Apanasenko was arrested, sentenced to death and waited for his fate in a cell, would he have written letters to Stalin with declarations of love? We know very little about Apanasenko, but can we imagine that this buffalo would have written to the leader "I will die with words of love for you"? Not a damn thing like that! If he had been put on death row, he would have been swearing at Stalin, as it happened to him once, he would have gnawed the bars and locks with his teeth. I don't know if he could chew up two or three executioners, but he wouldn't lick their boots.

3

Immediately after the war, German generals flooded the book market with memoirs. In the late 1950s, these memoirs flooded into our country: Westphal, Blumentrit, Zeitzler, Zimmerman,

Manteufel, Guderian, Goth, Rendulich, Tipelskirch, Kesselring, Schneider, Mellenthin.

I confess: I liked the memoirs of German generals much better than those of Soviet generals. A Soviet general recalled how Private Ivanov blew up a German tank with his last grenade, how Sergeant Petrov destroyed the attacking Hitlerites with his last shell, how under a barrage of fire Political Officer Sidorov raised the soldiers in the attack, how Lieutenant Semyonov directed his burning airplane at a cluster of enemy tanks. And our generals told our generals about what Private Ivanov said, dying: he asked to join the Communist Party. And Sergeant Petrov also asked to join the Communist Party. And all the others.

And for some reason no one from the Germans made any feats, showed no heroism. There's no room for heroism in their memoirs. For them, war was work. And they described the war from the point of view of professionals: I have so many forces, the enemy, presumably, so many. My task is this. The fulfillment of the task is hindered by such and such factors, and accompanied and facilitated by such and such. In this situation there could be three solutions, I chose the second one. For such and such a reason. This is what I got out of it.

Memoirs of German generals are like a set of fascinating instructive puzzles. Each wrote in his own way, but all - interesting. And the memoirs of our generals seem to have been composed by the same group of chief typists, who only rearranged the numbers of divisions and regiments, the names of places and the names of heroes. For some reason our soldier always lacked ammunition, shells, grenades, and all general memoirs - about how our guys rushed to the tank with an axe, shoot down an airplane with a rifle and pierce the gas tank of an armored personnel carrier with a pitchfork. It was as if everything was reduced to hand-to-hand combat, as if there was no art of war, no tactics.

Memoirs of Soviet military commanders - school of courage.

Memoirs of German military commanders are a school of thought.

Soon, however, I had a doubt: they are all very smart, Mr. German generals, and Hitler in their descriptions - a complete idiot. If so, how could these clever people allow an idiot to command them?

The thought first occurred to me when I was reading the memoirs of Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler. He was Chief of the General Staff during the Battle of Stalingrad. He describes Hitler as a complete moron: "*The first part of my report was presented in a form accessible to a person ignorant of military matters*" (Collection "Fateful Decisions". Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958. P. 159).

The Chief of the General Staff wrote reports for his Supreme Commander-in-Chief as if he were a man in the street who did not know the difference between a corps and a brigade. To make it clear. Further Zeitzler on many pages describes his decisions (really interesting) and Hitler's reaction to them. It was the reaction of a stupid, stubborn Efreeter.

That's when it occurred to me: But you, Herr Zeitzler, had a way out. In such cases, the Chief of the General Staff should say to his favorite leader or Führer: fight as you like, but I am not responsible for all this before my

country and history. Fire me, father-in-law. Send me to any position, put me in a corps or a division, or even shoot me if you like, but be responsible for your stupidity.

Well, no. Wise Zeitzler didn't say so. And the other generals kept quiet. That's why they all bear full responsibility for Hitler's bullshit.

4

And here is the conflict in the German High Command in August 1941: what to do - to go straight to Moscow or turn to Kiev? Frankly speaking, both are deadly.

If the German troops go directly to Moscow, all their rear will be left open, and then from under Kiev will be struck, which will cut off the German troops from the supply bases.

If the German troops will turn to Kiev, it will be lost time, and Moscow will have to advance on the mud and snow, and for this German troops are not ready.

So what to do? Hitler considers it necessary to turn to Kiev. Guderian disagrees. Then he will insist that it was a fatal mistake that led to the collapse. If you think so, protest!

But the wise and cautious Guderian follows orders without protesting. I love Guderian's books. He was a smart man. But in addition to intelligence, a general needs character, will and courage. Memoirs of all German generals are imbued with one idea: Hitler was a fool and forced us to follow stupid orders. That's exactly what happened. But only that general becomes great and invincible, who does not follow stupid orders. The bravery of a soldier is to go to the enemy's bayonets, to carry out the orders he has been given. And the bravery of a general is to think with his head and follow only those orders that lead to victory.

Western generals, politicians and historians often boast: we have a thinking soldier! But you have Vanya the fool, he is not trained to think.

You gentlemen have a thinking soldier? That's splendid. We have thinking generals who are also brave. They had the courage to have an opinion and to stand up for it. A German general would follow any order. And that's not a sign of strength. It's a sign of weakness. Our generals don't follow any order. That's strength!

If a general has a brilliant head, but follows the idiotic orders of the Führer, who leads the country to disaster, then the genius head is worthless.

What good is it? Such a head is good only for writing great memoirs after the war. But that head is of no use in war. If a general follows stupid orders, then he's not a general, then he's a simple soldier.

Amazing thing, after all. Stalin exterminated generals before the war, but still there were those who, like Apanasenko, could, at the risk of their lives, send in a known direction genius of all times and peoples.

The worst thing for a ruler is to find himself in a situation when everyone around him is agreeing with your decisions and praising them. Any smartest man in this situation loses his bearings, any wise man loses the ability to notice his mistakes, and therefore repeats and multiplies them. It was to this impasse that Hitler's personnel policy led him. Hitler did not shoot his generals before the war, but they somehow turned out to be intimidated into complete soldiering.

If Hitler had objectively and impartially evaluated his generals before the war, and having evaluated them, would have expelled them from the army with a firm hand

the most worthless and weak-willed, then, perhaps, after such a purification and he had at least a couple of commanders who could not only think, but also oppose the Fuhrer.

5

Apanasenko was not the only one who could argue with Stalin. There were others. Army General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky could argue not only with Stalin alone, but with Stalin and his entourage. Here is just one situation. May 1944. The most powerful operation of the Second World War and of all human history - the Belorussian offensive - is being prepared. Stalin and his two deputies, Zhukov and Vasilevsky, have thought everything over, weighed everything, planned everything. Now call one by one commanders of fronts and set them tasks. It's General Rokossovsky's turn. And Rokossovsky has his own decision, better than the decision of Stalin-Zhukov-Vasilevsky. But very unusual.

To argue with Stalin is a mortal risk. And here - not only Stalin, he is here with his closest aides and advisers. And all at the same time. But Army General Rokossovsky order of three marshals - the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his two deputies - do not intend to fulfill.

Well, the stubborn general is asked to go to another room and think about his behavior.

General Rokossovsky comes out. Thinking. There's a lot to think about. He has already been through the torture chambers, already sat on death row. Wouldn't want to do it again.

And here he is again summoned to Stalin's office and again set the task.

But no. Rokossovsky will not perform such a task. Take him down. Take him down. Rip off the epaulettes. Send him to a penal battalion as a private. Execute him. He won't do it.

Again he is asked to go out and think. He goes out again. He thinks again. It's possible not to risk it. It is possible to fulfill Stalin's and Zhukov's order. The outcome of the war is already clear, it's only a question of the price and timing of victory. You can not resist, and then after Stalin's death to write memoirs: bad Stalin set bad tasks, and I had a solution in that situation, which Stalin did not understand and appreciated.

Rokossovsky thinks for a long time. Thinking? Come in. Well? Shall we carry out the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's order?

No. We won't.

To hell with you! Do as you please.

6

And Rokossovsky acts. He acts brilliantly. Lieutenant General Siegfried Westphal testifies:

During the summer and fall of 1944, the German army suffered the greatest defeat in its history, surpassing even Stalingrad. On June 22, the Russians went on the offensive on the front of Army Group Center..... This group of armies was destroyed. Due to the defeat of Army Group "Center" in the Baltics, Army Group "North" was cut off (Fateful Decisions. P. 257-258).

Colonel General Heinz Guderian testifies:

The defeat began on June 22. On the first day, 25 German divisions simply disappeared.... Not only Army Group "Center", but also Army Group "North" fell into disaster (Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. London: FPL, 1974. P. 352).

Major General Friedrich von Mellenthin testifies:

On June 22, the Russians celebrated the third anniversary of our invasion of Russia with a grand offensive by four fronts of 146 rifle divisions and 43 tank brigades ... For some inexplicable reason, Chester Wilmot, in his book "The Battle for Europe," forgot this operation. And it was one of the most grandiose events of the war, in its scope and importance incomparably more important than the landing of the Allies in the

Normandy. From June 1 to August 31, 1944 the losses of German troops on the Western Front were 293,802 men, on the Eastern Front for the same period - 916,860 men (von Mellenthin, F. W. Panzer Battles, London: Futura Publishing, 1977. P. 339).

This was the moment in the war when the Western Allies expressed doubt about the accuracy of Soviet reports on the number of captured prisoners. And then Comrade Stalin, the Supreme Director, ordered the German prisoners to be shown to the whole world. And powerful columns of German soldiers (not emaciated, from the camps, but fresh from the battlefields) were driven through the streets of Moscow. At the head of the columns were German generals and whole regiments of officers, followed by untold hordes of soldiers.

The procession was closed by sprinklers mobilized from all over Moscow. During the years of war, Moscow had gotten used to such luxury. Everything for the front, everything for victory. That's why gasoline is for the front. That's why Moscow streets were not cleaned by cars and watered by cars for a long time. But for such an occasion the Supreme Director ordered to allocate gasoline from the reserve of the VGK Stavka. As for a combat operation. Stalin ordered to wash and clean the Moscow streets following the columns of captured conquerors. So that no dirt and stench from their soles remained on the streets of the capital.

And behind the columns the cleaning jets were making noise. And a never-ending string of new water tanks, as if with new ammunition, were drawn up and lined up in a moving queue to go into action immediately,

replacing their predecessors who had used up their ammunition.

Already on the second day of the Belorussian Offensive Operation, Stalin realized that Rokossovsky's decision was not just magnificent, but brilliant. A week after the start of the Belarussian Offensive Operation on June 29, 1944, Army General Rokossovsky received the diamond star of Marshal of the Soviet Union. But even this did not seem enough for Stalin, and on July 30.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky receives his first Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Stalin did not give him the Gold Star for Smolensk, or for Moscow, or for Stalingrad, or for Kursk, although he should have. But the brilliance of Rokossovsky in the Belorussian operation (contrary to Stalin, Zhukov and Vasilevsky) could not be overshadowed. He became a candidate for command of the Victory Parade.

Rokossovsky during the preparation of the Belorussian offensive operation, during its conduct, as well as in all other defensive and offensive operations - the very embodiment of wisdom, determination and courage. The Marshal Star to him - for the talent of a military leader, for strategic breadth of thinking, for victories over Hitler and his field marshals. The Hero's Star - for personal soldierly bravery in the face of Stalin's tiger fury.

This is heroism of the highest order.



Always - and at the beginning of the war, the fateful summer and tragic fall of 1941, and during its victorious end - in the Red Army there were generals who had a head on their shoulders and enough courage in their hearts to defend their point of view even before Stalin.

Hitler had generals of very high caliber, but Hitler did not have generals like Stalin at the beginning or end of the war.

Not one.

Germany lost the war because Stalin's generals were immeasurably superior in training to Hitler's generals.

Courage is the most important quality of a military leader.

Was Stalin afraid of Hitler?

The secret trains are going to the borders again, And communism is so close again, As in the nineteenth year.

Mikhail Kulchitsky. The Most Such (Poem about Russia). 1940-1941.

1

Our legends of war are tangled and twisted into a ball. Lies feed on lies and breed lies. The legend that the best commanders of the Red Army were exterminated during the years of purification is inextricably linked to another legend - that the Soviet Union was not ready for war. If geniuses were exterminated and replaced by illiterate dullards, what kind of readiness can we talk about?

And from this thesis another fiction follows quite naturally: Stalin was afraid of Hitler.

These myths, intertwined, support each other. If any historian recalls one of these myths, the crowd will immediately recall the others. Just pull one thread, and the whole sordid tangle of Soviet myths about World War II will follow. Just say the name of Tukhachevsky, and immediately the crowd, without further hints, recalls the unpreparedness of the Red Army and the frightened Stalin. And it is worth remembering 1941, and immediately in the minds of many people the name of the brilliant Tukhachevsky, who warned ...

The claim that Stalin was afraid of Hitler is the common denominator of all these fictions. In these three words is concentrated all the dirt, all the lies about the war. These three words crown all the fictions of Soviet propaganda. From this short phrase it follows that Stalin was weaker and more stupid than Hitler. A smart man cannot fear a fool, and a strong man cannot fear a weak man. From this phrase it follows that the Red Army was weaker than the Wehrmacht, that our generals

were stupider than Hitler's, that the Soviet Union was worse prepared for war than Germany, that it was someone else, not us, who won the war.

This way we are told: we were not ready for the war, our army was decapitated, we had a cowardly Stalin and illiterate inexperienced idiots at the

head of the army and the state. It turns out that everything that Stalin did before the war and during the war, he did with a fright. And our historians for some reason find a special pleasure to repeat again and again that Stalin was afraid, terribly afraid, afraid to the point of trembling. Our agitators for some reason like to highlight and savor it.

For example, the "Military History Journal" (No. 4, 1995) publishes Goebbels' diaries as a very serious and valuable source of information. Moreover, the most important abomination of Hitler's propaganda minister the magazine puts in the headline and typed in large print on two pages: "Stalin feels fear of the Wehrmacht." The quoted phrase is longer, and they shorten it, not shying away from the dotted line in the title, gluing the screaming headline together in two parts, as publishers of tabloid newspapers do.

"Military History Journal" is published by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Yes, the Russian Ministry of Defense published Goebbels' diaries in its journal! Did the editorial board indicate its position, its attitude to the published material? No. And the position in this case can be only one: look at Goebbels! How stupid he is! How much he underestimated us! Look where he's going!

In 1996, the "Military History Journal" again put the entry from Goebbels' diary of April 29, 1941 in the title, typing it in capital letters and spreading it over two pages: "Russia is holding very still, feeling surrounded" (VIJ. 1996. No. 1. P. 42-43).

Read, they say, about the intimidated surrounded Russia! But that's nonsense! Surround Russia? Who could do that?

I wonder if our military historians learned geography in school? Did their teacher show them Russia on a map? Do they realize the size of Russia? And who was it that surrounded poor Russia in 1941? Wasn't it Adolf Hitler with three thousand outdated, pre-flood weapons?

of primitive tanks? Were not Hitler's super-powerful allies, Finland and Romania, encircling Russia on the perimeter, squeezing it in their pincers?

Dear comrades, if any of you can find Russia on a geographical map, assess the situation! Estimate the size of our country, and now try to find Germany on the world map. Despite all her conquests, she on the world map in 1941 - just a patchwork, which in addition was already burning under Hitler's ass. It was Germany that was surrounded and blockaded in the spring of 1941. It was Germany that had already been cut off from many sources of strategic raw materials, without which warfare was impossible. And the

Soviet Union was the richest country in the world, and our wealth was the envy of the whole world. In addition, back in 1939, the wise Stalin secretly secured unconditional, free, unlimited help from America. Why doesn't the "Military History Journal" write about this? Why do our historians turn the truth about the war inside out? Why do they portray the Nazis as wise, strong, confident in a speedy, inevitable victory, while they paint us as surrounded on all sides, weak, frail, stupid, backward, trembling with fear?

2

On April 29, 1941, shortly before Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Goebbels noted in his diary that the Russians had shown incredible amateurism in Finland and expressed confidence that they would soon be finished.

"Military-historical magazine" also publishes this. Comrade historians, forgive the stupid Hitlerites such records, history has punished them for their stupidity and hubris. But do you realize that Goebbels was wrong? Here's a reason to laugh at him. So why don't you laugh? Why do you publish this crap without smiling and laughing? Goebbels' predictions have been disproved by the courage of our people, the valor of our army. It turns out that you continue to believe Goebbels' predictions, which did not come true!

In his diary entry of May 4, 1941 Goebbels describes his impressions of the military parade in Moscow on the occasion of May Day. He states that in the fiery speeches and dithyrambs to the great Stalin, an attentive person will easily hear the fear of the coming and

calls the Russians poor people who have lost their minds. On May 7, he writes that Stalin and his cronies continue to remain inactive, like rabbits before a boa constrictor. There are many such remarks in Goebbels' diary. And the "Military History Journal" repeats the same about our people: poor people who have lost their minds. No comment.

Goebbels made a monstrous mistake by underestimating our country, our people, our army and its Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But then Goebbels repented. Hitler made a mistake, but at the end of his despicable life he realized his mistake. And what is there under the sunset! Already in 1942, Hitler spoke differently. Already in July 1941 he was enlightened. The war had taught both Hitler and Goebbels a lot. They realized they were wrong. It was as if they had had an epiphany.

But here's what's surprising. Goebbels' diary entries can be divided into

two parts - before this epiphany and after. The 1941 diaries were written by Goebbels, who was wrong. He was not just a deluded liar, but a deluded liar. The diaries of 1941 are Goebbels' stupidity, which he himself did not realize at that moment. For some reason, Soviet historians published and quoted this deluded Goebbels intensively.

The diary entries of 1945 are the thoughts of an enlightened Goebbels. In these entries is the truth about our army, our people, the truth about our commanders and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. For some reason the "Military History Journal" never published these records.

3

But in "Krasnaya Zvezda" (September 19, 1995), director Grigory Naumovich Chukhrai spoke: "*We are not of the fearful generation*". This is such a headline. Grigory Naumovich tells us:

Today, many "smart people" in the press paint the time of my generation as a time of fear and submission. That's a lie. We were not so fearful.... My meetings with Zhukov were memorable for the rest of my life. My questions were both primitive and stupid. Zhukov usually listened to them attentively, did not hurry with his answers, apparently looking for a simple, understandable form for me, and remained silent,

he would answer. His answer was as precise as a formula. I was interested in Stalin's personality. I wanted to show it in my movie.

- And yet," I asked, "what explains Stalin's actions before the war and in the first months of the war?

Georgy Konstantinovich looks at the floor. I think: tactless question (at that time not everything was clear and known about the beginning of the war). Probably, he doesn't want to talk about it.

Georgy Konstantinovich raises his eyes to me and says clearly: "Stalin was afraid of war. And fear is a bad adviser.

Oh, that's it! Chukhrai's generation is not a fearful generation. Chukhrai himself is terribly brave. Zhukov, of course, also did not consider himself a coward. So Chukhrai and Zhukov say that Stalin was the only one who was afraid. The main message of this article is as follows: Stalin - a coward, and I,

Chukhrai - not of the fearful generation. It turns out that Chukhrai is braver than Stalin. And meanwhile...

Grigory Naumovich, in this case one cannot rely on Zhukov's honesty. During the XX Congress of the CPSU Zhukov was the second man in the state after Khrushchev, if not the first. All of Khrushchev's "exposures" of Stalin were possible only with Zhukov's consent and with his active support. And when Khrushchev said that Stalin led the war on a globe ^[21], former Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zhukov somehow did not object.

Where did Zhukovsky's praised directness and bravery go at that moment? And when Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in his report "On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences" lied about the fact that the Red Army had few tanks and airplanes, that there was not even enough rifles, Zhukov somehow kept silent. Not only that, sitting in the presidium of the Congress, beating his hands. If there were not enough airplanes and tanks, it should have been said how many of them there were. If there was a shortage of rifles, they should have mentioned their number. But for some reason Khrushchev did not do this. And Zhukov did not show any desire for the truth. In his memoirs, the number of our of tanks and airplanes, for some reason he didn't even mention. Nor did he mention the number of rifles.

Under Stalin, Zhukov was a Stalinist. Under Khrushchev, he suddenly became an anti-Stalinist Khrushchevite. It was he who brought Khrushchev to power, it was he who gave the green light to all Khrushchev's "exposures". And after Khrushchev Zhukov suddenly became a Stalinist again, denied Khrushchev's fictions about the globe, and supported and strengthened the fictions about Stalin's cowardice. Because this line was set by the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee: to refute the globe, and to confirm Stalin's cowardice.

If Zhukov's memoirs had been published under Khrushchev, they would have been very different from the version published under Brezhnev.

4

And Khrushchev, and Goebbels, and Nekrich, and Zhukov, and Chukhrai tell us that Stalin was afraid of Hitler.

We'll question it. We'll point out the inconsistency.

We have been told for seventy years about the thousands of warnings that flowed to Stalin through all channels. Stalin did not believe the warnings of a German attack. There's no doubt about it.

Let us try to reconcile the two provisions of Soviet propaganda:

1 . Stalin was afraid of being attacked.

2 . Stalin did not believe he would be attacked.

One of two things: either I believe that I will be attacked, so I am afraid and sit quietly, like a mouse, behind the stove, or I do not believe that I will be attacked, so I am not afraid of anyone, I sit on the stove and play the balalaika.

In whose head could have been born such a blatantly contradictory statement: *Stalin was terribly afraid of the very attack, in the possibility of which he categorically refused to believe!*

But it hit someone's head. More than one head. And the engineers of human souls have been screaming for decades: Stalin didn't believe in a German attack, but he feared it.

We paint Stalin as deathly frightened and explain that all his actions were dictated by fear. And then we are shown the same Stalin, in the same days and hours: careless leader does not react to the impending threat. In the "Military History Journal" Stalin.

and all our people then portrayed as frightened rabbits, and then suddenly you read: *"Stalin slept peacefully on that tragic night of June 22. He was sure that the war would not start"* (VIZh. 1989. № 6. P. 42).

And in Zhukov's memoirs: he reported to Stalin about the impending attack, and Stalin did not believe in the possibility of an attack, but was afraid of it. The Germans attacked, Zhukov at night can not wake Stalin. Woke up, reported that the attack, and Stalin still does not believe in the attack, but afraid that they will attack.

If tough brothers are sharpening axes under your window to chop you into pieces, will you sleep well? He who is afraid of attacks doesn't sleep like a bogatyr. He who wakes up at every rustle. He who believes at once the news of an attack, for he fears it and waits for it.

Here is our main saboteur of the war, Professor, Colonel IG Starinov in the book "Mines are waiting for their hour" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964) tells how he reported to the commander of the Western Special Military District Army General D. G. Pavlov that something is going on on the other side of the border, and Pavlov replied, referring to Stalin: "Don't panic! G. Pavlov about the fact that on the other side of the border something is going on, and Pavlov answered him, referring to Stalin: "Don't panic! Calm down! The master knows everything!"

And the British historian John Erickson describes Stalin as a man who

remains Olympic calm and does not react to warnings: do not panic! He describes Stalin with a sneer: how stupid Stalin is - he is warned, and he does not believe in the attack! And then John Erickson describes a terrified Stalin, who believes in the inevitable German attack and fears the attack to the point of total panic. And he describes it with contempt: how cowardly Stalin is!

Let's remember what a confused kitten looks like, cornered by a dog: tail cocked, fur puffed, ready to tear the dog's face with his claws, defending his cat's life. But the same lazy kitty is basking in the sun, eyes blissfully closed, purring carefree. These are two different situations. Two different states. And it is impossible to confuse them, and it is impossible to combine them. One excludes the other.

Descriptions of a confused Stalin and descriptions of an extremely calm Stalin, who advises everyone not to panic, often coexist peacefully on the same page, and sometimes even in the same sentence.

One of my very respected critic in the rank of Colonel-General argued that Stalin was mortally intimidated, and as confirmation cited the famous resolution of Stalin, imposed on the agency report less than a week before the German attack: *"Tov-schu Merkulov. You can send your "source" from the German aviation headquarters to hell. This is not a "source" but a disinformant. I. S."*

The abbreviation in the text is not mine. This is Comrade Stalin so abbreviated, so as not to offend the Commissar of State Security, Comrade Merkulov. And this resolution is cited to me as a confirmation of Stalin's fear.

Let's tell a little boy that a wolf is sneaking up on him. What will the boy do? Will he hide under the blanket or will he send us away? If he hides, it means he's afraid. And if he sends us, it means he doesn't believe in our wolves and isn't afraid of them.

Comrade Stalin is warned by a source of special importance, the People's Commissar of State Security sounds the alarm, and carefree Comrade Stalin sends them to such-and-such a mother. Here and dock Stalin's resolution with Stalin's fear of an inevitable and imminent attack.

I don't get it.

5

Now let us evaluate the words of Marshal Zhukov that Stalin's actions were dictated by fear.

What kind of behaviors are these?

Stalin had a line of fortified areas from the Baltic to the Black Sea - the

Stalin Line. It is not a question of whether the fortifications there were bad or good - any fortifications are better than none. And it is not that the fortifications on the old border were disarmed and destroyed, but they were not built on the new border. If the fortifications on the new border were built, why should the fortifications on the old border be broken? Two lines of defense are better than one. But Stalin disarmed and destroyed the fortifications on the old border.

If you are afraid of bandits, will you break the brick wall around your house out of fear? Let's remember Pushkin's Captain's Daughter. A rundown fortress in the steppe. Fortifications - only to save from wolves. And here comes the villain Pugachev. Fear. Terror. Panic. From

of fear, people can fortify a fortress, and they did. They may do nothing, paralyzed by fear. But can we imagine them breaking their fortifications, however pathetic, feeble and decrepit, out of fear?

If you are scared at night in an empty dark apartment, have you ever tried kicking in the front door? Marshal Zhukov had a great idea: Stalin was afraid of Hitler, so he broke down his fortifications in fear.

The question then arises for Zhukov himself: where was he looking? If the confused Stalin was destroying the defense of the state right on the eve of a probable German attack, why did not Chief of the General Staff Zhukov protest? Or was also frightened and with a fright helped Stalin to break the defense?

Stalin didn't just destroy fortifications. Partisan warfare has always been an effective weapon of the weaker side. Those who are not ready to fight in a clear field, hide in the forest, and at night cut the throats of sleeping enemies. If Stalin was afraid of Hitler, it should have been in peacetime to create partisan bases in the forests - let the enemies come, let them learn what a protracted guerrilla warfare in the Bryansk forests, in the swamps of Belarus. Stalin had partisan detachments, bases, secret hideouts and secret weapons stores were created, but he right on the eve of the German invasion ordered to liquidate it all. Let's say out of fear. Let's say Stalin is a coward, and Zhukov - a brave man. So why didn't the brave Chief of the General Staff Zhukov prevent it?

The German army was tied to the roads. It could not operate off the roads. Blow up all the bridges from the western border to the Dnieper and on the Dnieper itself - and there would be no blitzkrieg. All the bridges were mined and ready to be blown up. But right on the eve of the war they are being

demined in mass and everywhere. Also out of fear?

The great river Dnieper is a powerful defensive frontier. On the Dnieper is our flotilla. Bridges must be blown up, and the flotilla, acting from behind the islands, from the channels of the left bank, will not allow to build crossings. We have to hold out until winter, and in winter the Germans are not ready to fight. But in 1940, the Dnieper Flotilla (with a base in Kiev) was disbanded. Just as the commander of the Kiev Military District

before his appointment to the General Staff was Zhukov. Not otherwise the flotilla was disbanded because of Stalin's fear. And the ships of the former Dnieper Flotilla transferred to the Danube and Pripyat, where they could not strengthen our defense, but could act in the offensive war up to Berlin and Vienna. If all this Stalin did with fear, then why Zhukov did not object to him?

Tactical supply of the German army was carried out by automobiles and road transport, strategic - by railroads. To supply a multi-million army it is necessary to transport hundreds of thousands and millions of tons of cargo. Neither cars nor carts could transport such amount of cargoes from Germany to Voronezh and Stalingrad, to Kiev and Cherkassy - only by rails. It was necessary to remove the rails in the border areas at a depth of 100-200 kilometers from the border and take them beyond the Dnieper. That's all. And you should not be afraid of Hitler after that. There was no such stock of rails in Germany. And if there were, it would have taken a long time to restore the railroads in many different directions under the fire of the Red Army and partisans. Blitzkrieg would have been impossible, and Germany had no resources for a long war. Out of fear, it would have been possible to remove the rails 500 kilometers from the border.

But the Red Army did not remove the rails. On the contrary, at the insistence of Zhukov, on the orders of Stalin, intensive railroad construction was carried out in border areas, bridges were strengthened, the capacity of separations was increased, new highways were laid. Let's assume that Stalin did this because of terrible cowardice. And Zhukov for what reason? Yes, and ten railroad brigades Zhukov formed on the border areas to quickly re-stitch the railroads of Western Europe on the broad Soviet standard. With Stalin's full approval. With his support.

And if Stalin was so afraid, he should have kept the troops away from the borders. And they were secretly driven to the borders on the orders of Stalin and Zhukov. At the very moment, when Goebbels in his diary compared Stalin and his associates with paralyzed by fear rabbits, the Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army secretly advanced behind the line of the old state

border of the USSR. Neither Hitler nor Goebbels knew anything about it. The wisest

Hitler's intelligence failed to notice the most powerful troop movement operation in all of human history. If the secret movement of the seven armies had been dictated by Stalin's fear, these armies should have taken up defenses along the eastern banks of the Western Dvina and Dnieper and burrowed into the ground. They should have rebuilt fortifications on the old border that existed before 1939, dug trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, erected dugouts and firing points. But they did not occupy the defenses. Out of fear?

And the aviation should not have been kept on the border airfields in huge masses, then it would not have fallen under the first blow. But Zhukov forced it to the border airfields.

And if Stalin's fear is to blame for everything, it should have kept the stocks of food, ammunition, coal, liquid fuel over the Dnieper, or even over the Volga, but on the orders of Stalin and Zhukov all this was brought from over the Volga and over the Dnieper right to the western borders.

And airborne corps we did not need at all in the defensive war, but they were formed in the spring of 1941 by order of Zhukov and with Stalin's permission. Is that from Stalin's fear? And the maps of Lorraine were driven by wagons to the borders. And Russian-German phrasebooks. And boots. And many, many other things.

The 9th Rifle Corps of the Red Army was preparing to land in Romania. Is this also a manifestation of Stalin's fear? And the 14th Rifle Corps was preparing to cross the Danube in its lower reaches (and successfully crossed it in the first days of the war). And the border guards also cut the wire out of fear.

Stalin's actions Zhukov explained easily and simply: all this is from fear. All this is because Stalin was afraid of Hitler.

We agree.

Now it remains to explain the same actions of Zhukov himself.



This is not about Stalin. Whoever believed the fiction of Stalin's fear, believes all the other fictions: about the Soviet Union's unpreparedness for war, about the decapitated army, about the ruined strategists. And if there was such a desperate situation, when there are no tanks, no airplanes, no commanders, then not only Stalin, but the entire Soviet people had to be afraid of Hitler. That is why anyone who believed in Stalin's fear, this belief immediately

extends to all of us, to the whole people, to the whole country, calling us poor people who have lost their minds, and comparing us to rabbits mad with terror.

Did Stalin have reason to fear Hitler?

1

We have been so inured to the idea of the staggering superiority of Hitler and his army in the early years of World War II that the thought of Stalinist fear is accepted by us without protest.

However, why should Stalin have been afraid of Hitler?

Germany did not have the resources for a prolonged war. Everyone knew and understood this, including Hitler himself and his generals. They were left with only a lightning war - blitzkrieg.

But blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union was impossible because the Soviet Union is more than 10 thousand kilometers from west to east. If Hitler could capture a thousand kilometers a month, which is even theoretically impossible, then even then we should have counted on a year of war.

Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union was also impossible because for the European armies of the twelve months for fighting on our territory are favorable only four - from May 15 to September 15, and that if there is no rain.

If it were possible to take over the whole country in these months, what will we do when the fall comes, followed by winter? It is easy to enter Russia, but difficult to leave. Entry is a ruble, exit is two. The great military thinker Major General Karl Clausewitz, a Prussian in the Russian service, a participant in the battles of Smolensk and Borodino, warned that if someone manages to capture Russia, it will not be possible to control it. Bonaparte once took Moscow by blitzkrieg. How long did he hold it?

A blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union was impossible, for in June 1941 the peacetime Red Army had 5.5 million soldiers and commanders. Not counting the NKVD troops.

If Hitler killed and captured a million Soviet soldiers every month (which is impossible), then even then the war would stretch for six months, and it should have been planned to end in December. And we should have counted on snow, on frost, on blizzard. They should have prepared sheepskin coats for the army.

But that was not all. Even in the supercritical conditions of the summer of 1941, the Soviet mobilization system worked smoothly, and during the first week of the war until July 1, 1941, an additional 5.3 million people were drafted into the ranks of the Red Army (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Vol. 5. P. 343). This is already ten and a half, almost eleven million fighters and commanders. If Hitler would continue to destroy a million a month (and this was beyond his power), then the war would stretch for a year. And our mobilization continued in July, August, September "Our forces are incalculable," said Comrade Stalin. Isn't it so? Didn't Hitler himself realize it? That's what he wrote in "Mein Kampf".

The mobilization resource of the Soviet Union is 10 percent of the population. Let's see. This resource was fully utilized during the war. And even over-utilized. So how long did it take to exterminate such an army? What kind of a fool would have the idea to defeat such an army? And in three months!

2

Germany was not ready for war. Stalin knew that.

When it comes to Hitler's "readiness" for war, Hitler's scum prefers to keep silent. But if we look closely at Hitler's "readiness", it is inevitable to doubt it. Hitler had turned America and the rest of the world against him long before 1939. Is this a sign of readiness for war? Let us look at Hitler's allies and then at Stalin's allies and answer the question: who was better prepared?

Hitler appeared before the whole world as an aggressor, conqueror, robber and murderer. Stalin's propaganda portrayed the Soviet Union as an innocent victim. These are by no means minor issues - what does the world consider you to be, a villain or a defender of the oppressed, what do you think you are?

whether the population of the planet wishes you death or victory. On Stalin's side were the sympathies of the whole world, all countries, all peoples, all governments. The Soviet Union, the Red Army, and Stalin were wished success by both proletarians and bourgeois. And what did they wish Hitler?

There was one exception: the peoples of the Soviet Union wished Hitler success. The Nazis were greeted with music, flowers, smiles, bread and salt in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn and Kiev. But Hitler and his wisest generals behaved in such a way that after them the whole Europe met Stalin and NKVD with flowers.

From the very beginning Hitler found himself in a situation in which it

was impossible to win at all. He dealt with France easily, but how to fight Britain without superiority at sea and in the air? And so Hitler threw himself at the Soviet Union. It's explained to us that he wanted land in the East. Surprisingly, Hitler defeats France, but he does not have the strength to take over defeated France in its entirety. Especially he doesn't have the power to take over the derelict French colonies. Hitler didn't have enough troops to occupy Holland. It was necessary to have two divisions in Holland, and Hitler could only allocate one. But Holland is a tiny country, and its colonies are immense. In front of Hitler lay no one controlled colonial possessions of Holland and the Belgian Congo. But for some reason he didn't seize them. Instead, Hitler went to war for new lands in the East.

In front of him - the defenseless south of France with resorts, vineyards, wine cellars, with beautiful roads, with hot women, damn it, and he rushed to conquer the Arkhangelsk drowns and Astrakhan reeds. Is that from a great mind or what?

And now Stalin is accused of stupidity: how could he not have guessed that Hitler in 1941 would need Konotop, Kobelyaki and Arzamas with Akhtyrka? In 1941 Hitler could no longer control what he had managed to grab, he already had Yugoslavia burning under his feet, Hitler was hand and foot bound by the war against Britain (behind which stood "neutral" America), Hitler's troops were already scattered from Northern Norway to North Africa, and the navy was fighting in waters from Greenland to the coast of Argentina and the Cape of Good Hope. What analyst could have thought that he would also go to Russia, to seize new lands?

3

Two and a half thousand years ago, the great Chinese Sun Tzu gave a commandment to all commanders of future generations: do not fight on two fronts! No one should fight on two fronts. And Germany especially. Because of its geographical location and lack of resources, Germany is doomed to defeat in a two-front war. The Second World War proved it once again. All the great Germans warned against fighting a war on two fronts, and Bismarck believed that Germany should not fight on one front, if on that front its opponent would be Russia.

Was Hitler prepared to fight on two fronts?

So why should Stalin have feared this option? So why doesn't anyone laugh at Hitler? Why doesn't anyone laugh at Hitler's brilliant ministers, diplomats and generals?

Let's open a document available to all - the diary of the Chief of General

Staff of the German Army, Colonel General Franz Galder (Galder F. Military Diary) - and our surprise will not be limited. It seems that all German preparations for war were based on three whales: if only, if only and somehow. Here are just a few entries from this diary, very few of the truly immense material.

August 9, 1940: *"The flow of papers is increasing to such an extent that it threatens to completely overwhelm us."*

September 29: *"Vehicles are insufficient to meet even the most essential needs of RGC units."*

October 7: *"A two-front air war is impossible."*

October 21: *"Chaos in Transportation Management."*

November 18: *"Traffic jams on railroads. 547 echelons idle in the East and Berlin."*

November 26: *"Horse-drawn harnesses for anti-tank guns. We don't have front lines... It is impossible to provide our troops in Bulgaria with mountain equipment ... There are no snowplows.... To maintain strict control over the major cities [of France] is impossible.... The imperial railroads in the future will not be able to operate with such tension as they do now."*

November 27: *"Covering operations in the endless expanse of Russia will not succeed."* The whole theory of blitzkrieg is a deep tank envelopment of the enemy. German strategists clearly understood that on the vast expanses of Russia such coverage of the desired result will not give. And they could not think of anything else. And now they are planning these very covers, which are known to be unsuccessful.

3 December: *"The fuel situation is bad. The situation with tires is very bad"*.

4 December: *"Too little artillery."*

13 December: *"The capture of Moscow is of no great importance (Hitler's opinion) ... The air forces will have to fight a war on two fronts."* Let's return to the record of October 7 that air war on two fronts is impossible. The German leadership realizes this and nevertheless decides to start this very war on two fronts. Not only Galder, but Hitler himself realizes that the capture of Moscow does not mean the end of the war. But Hitler's whole plan comes down to capturing Moscow, and there, maybe, everything will fall apart by itself. And if it does not fall apart, then what to do?

14 December: *"Combat training has been initiated."*

23 December: *"The rubber situation is difficult."*

January 16, 1941: *"Army anti-aircraft divisions. 40 divisions. Special*

personnel for them will still have to be trained. This is only feasible by the fall." Here it is, readiness. The war against the Soviet Union is planned to be completed by the fall. And then, after the victory, to complete anti-aircraft divisions gunners, calculators, gun commanders, platoons and batteries.

January 28: *"By the end of February our rubber reserves will be exhausted. 25,000 tons of rubber have been purchased by the French, but the Japanese do not allow its export..."* They have Japan as an ally. Rubber in those years could not be replaced by anything. Germany had to run out of rubber four months before the beginning of hostilities against the Soviet Union. Germany had acquired some rubber through front persons, but Japan (a good ally!) did not allow to export it.

The same day, January 28: *"Fuel: the situation is serious. We can count on the provision of fuel during the period of concentration and deployments and two months of operations.... Car tires. The situation is very serious..."* Hitler's generals plan to defeat Russia in three months, but they have gasoline for two months.

And on the same day, January 28: *"Operation Barbarossa". The meaning of the campaign is not clear. We're not affecting England in any way. Our economic base will not improve at all. If we will be constrained in Russia, the situation will become even more difficult The riskiness of Operation Barbarossa.* So, it's not clear to them why they're going into Russia. Stalin had an iron logic, and when he was warned of a possible German invasion, he asked: "And why?" Stalin could not understand why the Germans would come into Russia. And the logic, it turns out, there was no logic. The chief of Hitler's General Staff, which is planning the war, also did not understand why Germany is climbing into Russia.

By reasoning logically, one can calculate the opponent's moves. But no genius can calculate the actions of an idiot who has no logic, whose actions are not conditioned by good reasons.

1 February: *"Italian troops make an unfavorable impression: there is no will or possibility of resistance."*

8 February: *"Peasants' wagons: allocate 15 thousand with harness and carriage drivers from Poland".*

18 February: *"The fuel situation is unclear and difficult."*

13 March: *"Motor gasoline and diesel fuel are very tight. Without Russian supplies, we will be able to hold out for two to two and a half months on the existing stocks in case of a major offensive".*

17 March: *"You can't count on Romania. Hungary is unreliable. She*

has no reason to act against Russia" (here Halder quotes Hitler's opinion).

3 April: *"The Imperial Railroad Administration reported a catastrophic situation on the roads."*

5 April: *"The question of machine gun battalions cannot be solved."*

7 April: *"It should be recognized that the grouping of Russian troops quite admits a rapid transition to the offensive, which would be extremely unpleasant for us".*

11 April Hitler is hysterical: *"Heusinger^[22] has apparently managed to ease a nervous fit."*

April 23: *"Rommel is completely inadequate to the task assigned to him as commander."*

26 April: *"Lack of spare vehicles. There is nothing at the disposal of the Quartermaster-General".*

5 May: *"The troops can't stand the cold at night very well. The situation with ammunition is tense."* This is about the German troops in Bulgaria. They are cold in May, in Bulgarian resorts. And after that German commanders were drawn to Russia.

7 May: *"Spare parts. Requirements are satisfied only 10-15% Rommel disperses his troops in the most savage way".*

May 11: *"The situation in North Africa is bleak. By violating the order, Rommel created a situation with which we will not be able to cope with logistically. The command of troops in North Africa is clearly not up to Rommel."*

May 15: *"The situation on the railroads. unsatisfactory."*

May 17: *"The OKW [Wehrmacht High Command] has just demanded a second division for Holland. We don't have it."* What are you gentlemen going to occupy Russia with?

May 20: *"Motorized formations for Operation Barbarossa will not be manned by the deadline...". The situation with fuel: in June - enough. In July there will be a shortage of 10%".*

May 21: *"There is a very great need for uniforms."*

May 22: *"The 17th Armored Division has 240 types of vehicles in its ranks."*

May 29: *"Shortage of fuel! Reserve of officers is limited".*

May 31: *"The situation with vehicles in the units of reconnaissance aviation is very difficult."*

June 13: *"Fuel supplies will be exhausted in the fall."*

And this is what we're supposed to call war preparedness?

4

However, Hitler's true "readiness" became apparent after June 22, 1941. I continue to quote from Galder's diary entries.

4 July 1941: *"The headquarters of Gotha's tank group reported that only 50% of the regular number of vehicles remained in service."*

9 July: *"Our losses in tanks are insignificant, but the human losses are great."*

12 July: *"The effectiveness of Soviet shells is good, the moral effect is strong. Many newer artillery systems, unknown to us until now"*.

13 July: *"Tank losses average 50%."* (Compare this entry with the July 9 entry above).

17 July: *"The troops are badly exhausted."*

July 20: *"Decline of spirit in our governing authorities. This was especially evident in the completely depressed mood of the commander-in-chief"*.

July 23: *"In some compounds the loss of officer personnel reached 50%."*

1 August: *"In the reserve of the main command of divisions - 0"*.

7 August: *"With the current fuel situation it is impossible to conduct major operations"*. They planned the defeat of the Soviet Union in three months, knowing that they had only two months' worth of fuel, and it ran out in a month and a half.

5

I have quoted only some fragments from the diary of only one Hitler general. The entire diary of Galder - a cry about the blatant unpreparedness of Germany for war. Let's leaf through the pages of memoirs, which left Z. Westphal, G. Blumentritt, K. Zeitzler, K. Tippelskirch, W. Picht, E. Middeldorf, W. Mellenthin, L. Rendulich, G. Goth and many others. In all the books - the same thing: Germany is completely unprepared for war.

Heinz Guderian even said: *"Our command surpassed in reckless obstinacy Charles XII and Napoleon I."* (Results of the Second World War. M.: Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1957. C. 123.)

Г. Teske: *"The Great German Empire had a much smaller fleet of steam locomotives and railroad cars in 1939 than the Kaiser's Empire had in 1914."* (Ibid. P. 402).

German generals planned to use 320 railroad ammunition trains to defeat the Soviet Union. Halder testifies that in a couple of weeks of fighting in the Soviet Union, German troops used up more than what was planned for the entire war. On August 16, 1941, he wrote in his diary: *"Ammunition consumption. For the period since August 1, delivered such a quantity of ammunition, which is provided by the entire plan "Barbarossa".*

Already on November 24, 1941, Halder wrote: *"An armistice is necessary."* And the Russian winter is still ahead.....

At that point, Halder believed that Stalin no longer had any reserves. About this he makes a record on December 2, 1941. German intelligence, as always, was wrong. Stalin had reserves, and on December 5, 1941, he threw fresh divisions, corps, and armies into a grand counteroffensive. But even before that, Halder realized the need for an armistice.

And here is the record of December 12, 1941: *"The situation with the production of tanks. It is currently such that we will not be able to continue the war at all.*

And here it is not clear to me: why historians do not quote all this? And here a certain Gorodetsky with the active participation of the Russian Ministry of Defense, with the open and demonstrative support of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service issued a book, and in it about the German "readiness" for war - not a single bad word, and about us - not a single good word: Russians are represented by cowards and stupid [\[23\]](#). I wish Gorodetsky could laugh at Hitler! But he doesn't.

In the past, Asians were able to conquer Russia, Europeans could not do it. Not in any time frame. Conquer Russia in three months? That's nonsense!

6

I don't dispute that Germany succeeded in blitzkrieg in Poland and France. But by what means did Hitler intend to carry out a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union?

Blitzkrieg is tank warfare. Hitler has 3,410 obsolete tanks, and we have a territory of 22.4 million square kilometers. One German tank for every 6,568 square kilometers of our territory.

territories. Not much. Out of 22 million square kilometers, 17 million are not suitable for the action of tanks, and on the rest of the territory the action of German tanks is possible only in summer, otherwise they get stuck in impenetrable mud and snow. And Hitler has gasoline for a month and a half.

What kind of an idiot does one have to be to plan a blitzkrieg under such circumstances?

And why should Stalin have feared such a blitzkrieg and the "genius strategists" who thought of such a thing? What did they count on when they planned to end the war in three months? And where did they get this term - three months? They didn't have three months. Hitler started the war on June 22, three months expire on September 21, which is already a muddy mess. And September could be rainy from day one. Was it foreseen in Hitler's plans? In 1812, snow fell on October 15, old style. But we can have snow in October according to the new style. Was the possibility of such a turn of events taken into account?

Tanks are not a force in and of themselves. A tank that has gotten far ahead is vulnerable. The tank must be supported by infantry, tanks must be supplied. And the case was as follows: *"In 1941, the German army still consisted mainly of purely infantry divisions, which were moving on foot, and in the transport used horses"*. This is the testimony of German General Gunther Blumentrit (Fatal Decisions. p. 74).

Here is a statistic: on June 22, Hitler had 750 thousand horses in the East Front (Goralski R. World War II Almanac. P. 164). It turns out that for each German tank there was a cart of 220 horses. With carts. Was it on carts that they were going to carry out the blitzkrieg? On carts they were going to ride to Vladivostok? In three months?

Speaking of horses. In what American historical movie do we see a German in a cart? In the movies, the Germans are on tanks. And the historical truth is that they had a hundred times fewer tanks than carts. Out of 190 divisions thrown by Hitler against the Soviet Union, only 17 were tank divisions, and in them everything that came to hand was collected. Let us imagine how a division can be provided with spare parts if it is assembled 240 types of different vehicles: cars, trucks, buses, military, civilian from Belgium, France, Greece, Yugoslavia and so on. Who can repair all this, and even in the field, hundreds of kilometers away from repair bases?

In all thirteen German motorized divisions did not have a single tank. In the only cavalry division - also none. And the rest was infantry, infantry, infantry. With carts.

When Stalin was reported that such a military force was going to attack the USSR, Stalin simply did not believe it. And Stalin was right: no logic can explain Germany's decision to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler had no

resources for a protracted war, so he decided to blitzkrieg, for which, as it turns out, he also had no resources. He started the blitzkrieg with a catastrophic shortage of automobile tires, with a shortage of fuel and ammunition.

Molotov said just before the attack: "You'd have to be an idiot to attack us." Vyacheslav Mikhailovich simply could not assume that the leadership of the Third Reich was really filled with idiots.

From any point of view, under any circumstances, an attack on the Soviet Union was suicide for Hitler in the truest sense. Even in the best of all possible ways of starting the war Hitler still ended up committing suicide. To what level of moral decay must those Hitler's assholes descend, who even after such a shameful end continue to shout: Hitler was smarter anyway! He could have won anyway! In three months!

The decision to attack the Soviet Union was a stupid decision. Hitler himself admitted that it was not the winter that was to blame, but the German army's unpreparedness for winter. Henry Picker, who recorded Hitler's conversations, testifies that on May 29, 1942 the Fuhrer admitted that the clothing of German soldiers, the level of their equipment and motorization in no way corresponded to the conditions of the Russian winter, and the General Staff of the land forces in time did not prepare stocks of frost-resistant fuel and winter clothing. Why, gentlemen of Gorodetsky and Steinberg, do you not quote these words? It was clear even to Hitler that the degree of motorization of the Wehrmacht did not correspond to the impossible tasks that were set before it.

General Blumentritt stated after the war, *"By deciding to attack Russia, Germany lost the war."*

Field Marshal General von Rundstedt stated in May 1941: *"War with Russia is a senseless venture which cannot have a happy ending."* (Fatal Decisions. p. 76.)

But Hitler himself said it best of all, and long before he came to power. In his book "Mein Kampf" (Part 2. Chapter XIV), he admitted that the mere fact of an alliance between Germany and Russia would mean the inevitability of a future war, the outcome of which is predetermined, and that such a war could only mean the end of Germany.

As if in water! He wrote it himself, and he himself signed the pact with Stalin and thus ensured Germany's defeat in the war and his own suicide! Let's think about it: Hitler realized that if you sign the pact with Stalin, then after that you can no longer fight, the very fact of signing the pact leads Germany to

disaster and defeat. What an epiphany!

And so modern historians continue to yell that Hitler had it right, that it was possible to win with insufficient motorization of troops, on carts. They shout that winter is to blame for everything.

Hitler had everything right. Except the result.

7

To fight a war, one must at least have weapons. By the time the USSR was attacked, Germany had 3,410 tanks on the Eastern Front. All of these tanks were light tanks. All of them were obsolete. Germany didn't have a single heavy tank at that time. There were medium tanks, but they were just light tanks that had extra armor put on them. Protection from this increased, but decreased running qualities: speed, maneuverability, cross-country - exactly what is required for maneuver warfare in the vast expanses. Hitler did not have a single floating tank, not a single tank with anti-shell armor, not a single tank with a rational layout, not a single tank with a powerful gun, not a single tank with a diesel engine, not a single tank with wide tracks.

Stalin had 24,000 tanks. According to the most conservative estimates. And not counting the tanks in the NKVD troops. Among others, Stalin had the world's best tank models, which concentrated the highest achievements of tank construction of the time: powerful long-barrelled guns, wide tracks, anti-sniper armor, diesel engines and so on. And Stalin also has - almost unlimited possibilities of production of such vehicles. One floating tanks Stalin had more than Hitler had all the tanks combined.

Stalin had long-range bomber aviation (FBA), Hitler had none. In 1940-1941, Germany was already being bombed by British strategic aviation. And Stalin was ready to involve his DBA in this endeavor. Hitler planned to "bomb" Britain out of the war, but nothing came of it, as Germany had no strategic aviation. After that Hitler decided to capture the European part of the USSR up to the line Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan, and everything to the east, to crush long-range bombers. The problem was that Hitler had no such bombers. Not one.

But guns alone don't solve anything. We need soldiers, we need officers and generals.

I value the German soldier very highly. A German officer, too. But Germany had no luck with generals. German generals chose their own enemy - the Soviet Union, they chose the place, time and method of combat

operations. The war began according to their scenario. And it ended badly for them. Who can be blamed for that?

Stalin in 1941 already had full knowledge of the fact that the German high command was not ready for war, that the German generals are not capable of leading the war. Blitzkrieg in Poland, the lightning defeat of France, the capture of almost all of Europe could deceive the faint-hearted journalists. But for a real strategist, the picture was quite different. German generals only shouted about blitzkrieg, but no blitzkrieg they did not get. Lightning were only some operations, and the entire war since the fall of 1939 has taken a protracted - that is, fatal for Germany - character.



Germany's "readiness" for war deserves special study. But the result of the war gives an unambiguous answer to the question of readiness.

According to Stalin's calculations, an attack on the USSR would mean suicide for Hitler and his empire. And it was a correct calculation. It was fully confirmed by the results of the war, and for Hitler himself, an attack on the USSR meant suicide in the literal sense. Stalin simply did not believe that the leaders of the Third Reich would dare to commit suicide in such an exotic way.

It is not a question of whether Stalin was afraid of Hitler or not. Stalin had no reason to be afraid. Stalin considered Hitler and his generals to be smart people, and smart people would not go on such a venture. And even under these circumstances. And with Britain at their backs. And in the long run, America. Smart men wouldn't fight on two fronts. Smart men wouldn't have gone blitzkrieg on carts. Intelligent people could not plan the defeat of the Ural and Siberian industrial centers by long-range bombers, without having long-range bombers.

That's a different question. A question that no one has answered. A question that no one has tried to answer. No one has even asked that question.

Why did Hitler attack the USSR?

GLAVA 25.

What was Stalin really experiencing in the first days after Germany attacked the Soviet Union? Union?

The Stalin era is gone, condemned, ridiculed, spat upon, and caricatured, but not understood.
Alexander Zinoviev. The flight of our youth

1

In a report at a closed session of the XX Congress of the CPSU on February 25, 1956, "On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences," Khrushchev told shocked delegates about Stalin's behavior in the first days after the German attack on the USSR:

After the first heavy setbacks and defeats on the fronts, Stalin believed that the end had come. In one of the conversations in these days he stated:

- What Lenin created, all this we have irrevocably lost.

After that he did not actually direct military operations for a long time and did not get down to business at all, and returned to the leadership only when some members of the Politburo came to him and said that it was urgent to take such and such measures in order to improve the situation at the front.

Soviet ideologues developed this idea of Khrushchev's, enriched it with details and turned it into a dramatic story about how Stalin,

upon learning of the German attack, was terribly frightened, went to his dacha-fortress near Moscow, abandoned state affairs, did not call anyone to him, did not meet with anyone, did not receive anyone, was not interested in affairs at the front, did not answer telephone calls, for more than a week was in a state of depression and deep apathy, completely withdrew from state and party duties, and only on July 1, members of the Politburo forced him to once again take the reins of power of the country in his own hands.

This legend was picked up by many historians and repeated in hundreds of books, in thousands of articles and speeches. This legend serves as the most important proof of Stalin's "unpreparedness" for war: he knew better than anyone that the army was not ready for war, that the army was decapitated, he was afraid of war, wanted to postpone it, and when he learned about the attack, he was finally frightened and hid.

This legend seems to take on a new life every decade. In 1993, a book was published in Britain that presented parallel biographies of Hitler and Stalin [\[24\]](#). The author of the book argues that Stalin focused on solving the country's internal problems, while Hitler rushed to conquer the world. Well, understandably, Stalin was terribly afraid of Hitler, and when Hitler attacked, he was scared to death. The crowd forgets yesterday's sensations amazingly quickly. That is why such a book is a kind of discovery for the new generation of philistines.

Some time will pass, the book will be forgotten, but a new researcher will be found who will repeat the legend, and it will again look like a great historical discovery.

It's useless to argue. The answer is one: the Russians were completely incapable of fighting, they were not prepared for war, the army was decapitated, Stalin knew this better than anyone else, and it is not by chance that when he learned of the attack, he was frightened and hid. Meanwhile...

After the worst has already happened, no one acts like that.

In theory, Stalin could have feared a German attack before it took place. But once it had begun, Stalin should have been reassured.

This is the way we are: we are afraid of what is to be accomplished. And what has already happened or is happening at the moment is not so scary or not scary at all. Remember how people behave in the theater during the demonstration of a horror movie. The auditorium hushes in fear when the

screen suspiciously creaks stairs and slams doors, when the danger is near, but we do not know what it is, what it is, and it is scary. But when a villain (or a rubber shark or some other monster) appears on the screen, the audience is enlivened, and the horror loses its sharpness, because the audience now knows what it is.

The famous submariner Captain 2nd Rank Pyotr Grishchenko, who had the highest combat score among Soviet submariners, describes this condition as follows:

The danger that awaits us is scary only until it is unknown. As soon as it becomes clear, you mobilize all your forces to fight it. Here it is not up to worrying (Grishchenko P. Grishchenko. Battling under water. Moscow: Young Guard, 1983. p. 123).

The equally famous test pilot Mark Gallai flew one hundred and twenty-four types of aircraft. It was said of him that he could fly anything that flew, and a little bit of anything that theoretically should not fly. Gallai describes the state of the pilot at the moment of encountering danger (and in the work of a test pilot, danger is often deadly):

All the pilot's moral forces are mobilized to meet any surprise. He does not know which one (if he did, it would no longer be a surprise, and would be excluded altogether). When, finally, it reveals itself, the pilot, however paradoxical it may be, immediately calms down (Gallai M. Through invisible barriers. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1965. p. 98).

Let's think back to the books of our childhood. Robinson Crusoe is walking on his island and suddenly sees a barefoot human footprint. Robinson himself was never barefoot, and the print is clearly larger than his own. Terrified, he hides in his cave. (A two-page description of the horror follows.) There is danger on the island, but Robinson does not know what it is. Then he learns that it is only cannibals, several dozen of them, who cut up their captives, roast them on a fire, and devour them. Then Robinson calms down and considers a plan of action.

Walter Scott in his novel Ivanhoe has this condition described several times in different situations. For example, the extortionist knights have captured the merchant Isaac of York and are preparing to use boiling oil, red-hot tongs and other exotic tools and methods to force him to pay a ransom for his release:

But now, in the face of actual danger, he was much calmer than he had been before, when he was at the mercy of imaginary terrors.

And in the same novel we read:

Amateur hunters claim that hares feel more fear when dogs chase them than when they get them in their teeth.

3

From the books of our childhood let's go to the books of our youth and in them we will find the same rule: when the worst has already happened, a person forgets his fears and calms down. Here is a description of an arrest in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel "In the Circle of the First":

The arrest was rough, but not at all as frightening as one expects it to be. It was even calming - there was no need to be afraid anymore <...> Strangely, but now, when the lightning arrests

had already struck into his life, Innocent felt no fear. On the contrary, his inhibited thought was again working out and thinking over the

blunders he had made.

Solzhenitsyn knew very well what he was writing about. This is the story of those who were arrested by the Communists and those who were arrested by the Nazis. The first night in the cell is a sweet, soothing sleep after many sleepless nights waiting to be arrested. Now the unknown is behind us, we can sleep well.

Let us reread the books that are considered classics and find that Shakespeare, Pushkin, Byron, Gogol, Dickens, Dostoevsky, Goethe, Tolstoy, Schiller, Remarque, Sienkiewicz, Zola, Zweig - all speak of one thing: when the worst has happened, man calms down. This is a universal property of human nature, it is characteristic of Germans and Russians, French and Americans, Poles, Bulgarians, Jews, Chinese and Indians.

For the sake of an experiment, I interviewed patients at an oncology clinic. Every day in the emergency room of the clinic, people wait with bated breath for the results of the examination: whether there is cancer or not. People sit in the arms of fear, fear reads in their eyes, fear hovers over them. And then the person is called to the doctor and announced: yes, cancer. The uncertainty is gone. Everything is clear to the person now. And he calms down.

And I've also talked to people who received death sentences but for various reasons stayed alive. The result was the same. The most frightening thing for everyone was waiting for the sentence: fifteen years or a bishak? And then: stand up, the court is coming, in the name of the Russian Soviet... to the capital punishment - firing squad. I asked those who had gone through it all: how was it? They answered: it is perceived with relief; you make a noise for order, but quickly comes to calm down. Eduard Kuznetsov ^[25] testifies: "*You realize your new position as a person sentenced to death quickly and get used to it easily.*"

I was not on death row myself, I received my death sentence in absentia. I was summoned to the British Foreign Office and received a "fiery greeting" from the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court. I will share my impressions: the night after the verdict, I was asleep. I was in a sweet sleep and had happy dreams, and I was completely relieved and at peace, which I have been for many years. Many worries and fears have disappeared from my life since then.

So, waiting for death is more terrifying than death itself. That's why Goering killed himself three hours before his execution.

Both Stalin and Stalin's courts knew that the verdict itself was not as terrible as the anticipation of it. For example, the fate of former Politburo member Nikolai Bukharin (the party's favorite, as defined by Lenin) had been decided by Stalin personally, and no judge would dare to object.

But notice one detail! Stalin's court "withdrew for a meeting" and "deliberated" for seven and a half hours. Then the citizen judges returned, and one of them read for a long, long time an almost endless sentence, listing many unnecessary details. And at the end - as is customary: a bombshell.

In the hall, instead of an audience, sat comrades in civilian clothes. Thirty-three years later, one of them, now an honored veteran, spoke at our Military Diplomatic Academy. He spoke cheerfully about the trial: he said that the Supreme Director was talented, he knew how to put on a show - a comedy with a verdict looked better than a public flogging.

And it's the same in war. Ask any front-line soldier and they will tell you: it is scary to wait, but in battle the fear passes, you wait for battle as a relief. Lieutenant General of Artillery G. N. Kovtunov recalls: "Although it may show that. N. Kovtunov recalls: *"Although it may seem paradoxical, we waited for the enemy to move to active operations"* (VIZh. 1981. № 7. P. 58). There is evidence of Marshal Rokossovsky's impatience before the beginning of the Battle of Kursk: he wanted the waiting to end, for the Germans to strike. Vladimir Vysotsky expresses all possible human experiences in his songs, and this is also true: "We are waiting for the attack until longing..."

That's what soldiers, officers and generals say. And not only generals. June 16, 1941, when before the beginning of the German invasion of the USSR were just days away, Goebbels noted in his diary that in the top leadership of Germany reigned nervous expectation and that

Hitler was in indescribable tension. Goebbels wrote that this was always the case until hostilities began; Hitler confided to him that he became completely calm as soon as the battle began, and Goebbels himself observed this change of state of the Führer countless times.

The moment Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Stalin's fear (if any) should have passed. Stalin should have calmed down. The confirmation of this is all world literature, all human history, and human (and animal) nature itself. Any psychologist will confirm this to you. But you know it without a

psychologist.

There is a special breed of strong people who are commonly referred to as natural born leaders. Stalin was the most vivid representative of this type. Such people are inherent severity and authority in any normal situation, and when the situation deteriorates, they do not show signs of panic and cowardice, but, on the contrary, become cheerful and joyful. It is this feature that distinguishes them from mere mortals and attracts other people to them. Such, for example, was the aircraft designer Colonel-General of Aviation A. N. Tupolev. N. Tupolev. Here is how he is described:

And our grandfather is always very calm when something is not glorious - he doesn't make noise, doesn't scold anyone... Well, when everything is in order, then he shouts, makes noise, spreads mischief... (Gallai M. M.: The Third Dimension, M.: Soviet Writer, 1979, p. 72). (Gallai M. The Third Dimension. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 1979. p. 72).

Stalin was exactly like that. Stalin's referent on aviation issues, aircraft designer Colonel-General of Aviation A. S. Yakovlev testifies: "Stalin's aviation referent, aircraft designer, Colonel-General of Aviation. S. Yakovlev testifies:

During the war I noticed in Stalin such a feature: if things at the front are good - he is angry, demanding and harsh, when trouble - he jokes, laughs, becomes malleable (Yakovlev A.. C. The Purpose of Life: Notes of an Aircraft Designer. Moscow: Politizdat, 1968. C. 503).

So, Stalin could not be afraid when the war had already begun. Stalin's behavior in the first days of the war was, to put it mildly, unconventional, but he behaved as no one behaves in a state of fear. Moreover, he was not like himself either. The testimony of Colonel General Yakovlev is not the only one. There are many more. In the first, most terrible days of the war Stalin had to smile, joke, laugh.

But he was silent. He didn't talk to anyone, wasn't interested in anything. What is the explanation for Stalin's behavior?
Anything but fear.

Fear paralyzes for a short time, but is quickly replaced by intense activity. A frightened person speaks a lot and quickly, he looks around, looks around, his body is mobile and his hands are looking for something to do. A frightened person rubs his hat in his hands, twists buttons, bites his nails, looks at his watch, constantly looking for something in his pockets. All these are signs of intense brain activity. Fear is one of the manifestations of the instinct of self-preservation. Fear dramatically increases physical strength, increases mental clarity. In fear, a person is able to undertake what in the normal state he seems impossible. In fear, a person can invent something that in normal life would never have thought of. We know that it was fear that made Alexander Kerensky disguise himself and flee from the Winter Palace. If Stalin had glued on a beard and fled to Tibet or Paraguay, we could say that he did it out of fear. But neither in the years before the war, nor in the first days and weeks after the German attack on the USSR, nor in all subsequent times in Stalin's behavior there were no manifestations of fear.

After 1991, when the archives opened up a little bit, the researchers got access to the logs, which from 1927 to 1953 registered all visitors who came to Stalin. It turned out that Stalin in the early days of the war worked, and worked in a way that few people can work. Here is an entry in this journal from June 21, 1941: "The last came out at 23:00." This does not mean at all,

that Stalin's working day had come to an end. After the last visitors had left, Stalin worked with documents, conducted telephone conversations - not only in his office, but also in the Kremlin apartment and at the dachas.

On June 22, 1941, Stalin began receiving visitors at 5:45; the reception lasted 11 hours without breaks. Visitors: Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis, Zhukov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Vyshinsky, Kuznetsov, Dimitrov, Manuilsky, Shaposhnikov, Vatutin, Kulik.

Then Stalin has one continuous working day for a whole week, with small breaks. Reception of visitors begins at 3:20 a.m. (June 23), then at 1 a.m. (June 25) and ends the next night: then at 1:25 (June 24), then at 2:40 (June 27), then at 00:50 (June 28). The reception of visitors continues for five, six, twelve hours without breaks. Sometimes Stalin's working day lasts twenty-four hours with few breaks. But, I repeat, we know only that in the moments of breaks in Stalin's office there were no outsiders. This does not mean that Stalin himself did not work at that time.

But after this week, there are two days missing from the visitor log: June

29 and 30.

Khrushchev used to say that the Germans attacked and Stalin was frightened and ran away. Now it turns out that after the Germans attacked, Stalin worked for seven days at and beyond the limits of human capacity. And then suddenly disappeared...

If Stalin was afraid of Hitler, then after the attack, he could not be even more afraid. It turns out that he was not afraid on the first day of the war - Stalin was working, and in the intense work forgets everything, emotions are in the background.

If Stalin was not frightened at the first moment, could he have been frightened on the eighth day?

6

The mystery of Stalin's behavior in the early days of the war tormented me for a long time. I found the solution in the Tretyakov Gallery. You may agree with me, you may object, but personally I am satisfied with the answer I have found.

So, the Tretyakovka. I usually came here in the evening. That's the way it is. You can't get into the Borodino Panorama in the morning, but a couple hours before closing time, no problem. And the Tretyakovka, too.

I love the second floor. Most of all, landscapes. I spend hours jealously examining other people's canvases: aspen trees, birch trees, fir trees. On each landscape I look for a place where I could better put an anti-tank gun to hide it from the enemy's eye.

And my favorite painting is "Moonlight Night on the Dnieper" by Kuindzhi. I have never seen this painting in reproductions. It is impossible to copy it qualitatively: black night, 41 shades of black color, greenish moon, the edges of black clouds illuminated by it. What a night! What vastness! What power! The most suitable moment to force the Dnieper. And even better on such a night to quietly withdraw the 3rd Guards Tank Army from the Bukrinsky bridgehead and regroup it on the Lyutezh bridgehead under the nightingale's trills. So that no one would find out. And then from Lyutezhsky, where the enemy doesn't expect the tank army to appear, with a sudden blow... Ah, Kuindzhi!

My favorite sculpture is "Peasant in Distress" by M.A. Chizhov. A man sits on the ashes, a boy next to him. It is impossible to take your eyes off the sculpture. The sculpture is white marble, the ashes are extremely sparingly

marked. But the tragedy is expressed so sharply that the consciousness completes and restores everything that the sculptor could not fit on a small pedestal: all his life the man plowed like an ox, built a house, stood on his feet and now.... And the white marble heads are perceived as black. And grief oozes from the cold stone. The boy touches his father's hand. He has not yet realized the depth of the misfortune.

Sometimes, coming to the Tretyakovka, I would look at these two mournful figures from the far corner of the hall for a long time.

And once I wandered through the halls, mentally hid anti-tank guns behind hills, moved tank armies from bridgehead to bridgehead and suddenly found myself at the very white marble statue of Chizhov. I almost knocked it down with my shoulder. I looked up and was stunned:

That's Stalin! Stalin in the first days after the German attack on the Soviet Union.

7

Let's go back to that terrible June 1941. Hot summer, somewhere far away there is a war, and in the Moscow region in the forest silence smells of pine resin, outside the window bumblebees buzzing. Stalin, forgetting about time, sits in a simple room on a soldier's bed, propped his head with a hand. He is not interested in what is happening at the fronts, what is happening in his country and in the world. He doesn't want to run anywhere. It's a quiet, suicidal despair.

He has dedicated his entire life to the pursuit of a single goal.

He exterminated all his enemies in order to subdue a great country and raise it to the greatest cause.

He exterminated millions of people to force the rest to do his bidding, he purged the army of the enemies of the people and subjected it to his indomitable will.

He gave everything the country had to the war industry.

He supported Hitler in his time, helped him get back on his feet.

He pushed Hitler into war and waited for war to ravage Europe.

He spent thousands of tons of gold to buy advanced technology - German, French, British, American, Italian, Swiss.

He converted industry to wartime mode, he personally supervised the creation of tanks and airplanes for the coming war, he produced them in sufficient quantities and concentrated them at the borders. Here he also amassed gigantic stocks of ammunition, fuel and everything needed for a

victorious war on foreign soil: highway tanks, assault aircraft, gliders and paratroopers. And just when the great enterprise was ready, Hitler thwarted it.

Everything Stalin had is oriented toward seizure, nothing toward defense. And Stalin's retreat was not a manifestation of fear. It was simply the collapse of everything he lived by.

Stalin found himself in the ashes.

Stalin at that moment was like the greatest shipbuilder whose finest, most luxurious, biggest, fastest ship in the world, the Titanic, had just sunk.

Stalin was like a designer whose rocket, the most powerful in the world, had just exploded on launch, threatening not only the spaceport, a lot of people and all the space plans, but the whole point of the designer's life.

Stalin was like a gambler who was always lucky, who never lost a ruble to anyone. All life is a game. All life is winning. And the stakes in the game get steeper and steeper. Every time, it's all in the bank. And already the world looks at Stalin as a player in the casino, raking piles of gold coins and assignments. Whatever number he bet on, Stalin always won. Whatever card he pulled from the deck, it always turned out to be a trump ace. Whatever combination of cards he was dealt, it was always 21.

He has already won himself the biggest and richest country in the world, he has won the unquestioning obedience of all the people in this country.

And this is his last game. Now the whole world is at stake. Stalin is ready to play. He has so dealt the cards that all the trump cards are in his hands.

Suddenly he gets hit with the ace of trumps.

The same one that was stolen from his deck.

And there's no way to win back: the stakes are too high.

It's all lost.

Stalin always deceived all his enemies and dealt them sudden death blows. And now for the first time in life in the most important case, someone figured out Stalin's plan. And struck first.

And it's all gone. It's all gone. There's nothing to be done.

In the first moments, Stalin simply could not believe that Hitler had attacked. Stalin had calculated all the moves and all the options: Hitler should not have attacked.

Then, without sparing himself, Stalin worked beyond the limits of human strength, as a man who extinguishes his own house, engulfed in fire, without sparing his belly. Stalin all the first week of the war drives troops on the

offensive. He would give the order to stand in defense. But no! Offensive, offensive, offensive! Soviet airplanes burned on the airfields, and to attack without air support - suicide, but Stalin throws troops in suicidal attacks.

And here on June 28 - the message: the Western Front is surrounded, the 4th Army is defeated, the 3rd, 10th and 13th armies are surrounded.

Only now Stalin finally realized that the liberation of Europe has finally failed. And nothing can be undone. A socialist state can defeat anyone, but a socialist state

it was incapable of competing with normal countries in peaceful competition, and therefore, on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union was doomed to perish. To disintegration. Sooner or later.

The Soviet Union could only survive by exterminating everything around it and converting everyone to its state. Otherwise, collapse. The Soviet Union could exist only under one condition: if the people would not be able to compare their lives with the lives of surrounding countries. That's why Stalin's main idea is to destroy the capitalist environment. That is why all of Stalin's works are so simple, logical and clear: the complete victory of socialism is possible in one country, but the final - only on a global scale. This permeates all of Stalin's speeches and all of his plans.

But Hitler understood this: in "Mein Kampf" (Ch. 2. Ch. XIII), he argued that the Bolshevized world will be able to hold only if it encompasses the entire globe.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler dealt communism a fatal blow that killed both himself and the Third Reich he had created. No matter how events developed after that, Stalin could no longer conquer the whole world. And this for the Soviet Union was tantamount to death.

Stalin realized that everything was lost. And he retired from business - like a man who could not save the last barn, when the house, the stable and the barn had already burned down.

Two days later, on June 30, 1941, Beria, Molotov, Malenkov and other associates of the leader entered Stalin's room. There must have been many of them, and they must have entered silently, like executioners on death row. Perhaps at this moment in the eyes of Stalin flashed fear. In his grief, he forgot about himself, forgot that it is necessary to save himself. His companions took him by surprise. He was not ready for death.

But that's not why they came. They cared less about world communism. The liberation march to Europe had failed, and that did not matter to them

now. Now they need to save their own skins and heads, and for that they need to save the country. They need Stalin as a symbol, as a banner around which the remnants of a defeated regiment gather in battle. They probably told Stalin about the need to save the country, but this Stalin was not interested at all. For without conquering Europe, without expanding its borders, the Soviet Union will sooner or later perish anyway. It will collapse anyway.

Before June 22, 1941, everything was so logical and simple.

Marx created a great doctrine.

Lenin turned Marx's dream into a reality in one country.

And Stalin was to realize the greatest unification of the world in history under the banner of communism. Stalin was preparing to make Germany, Austria, France, Spain, China, Korea, Vietnam, Greece, Turkey, Libya, Tunisia, India, Italy... into republics of the USSR.

But everything failed. The state that Lenin left behind, the state that had become the hearth of the world revolution, Stalin fucked up. He knew it. This is the word he used when describing the situation to the members of the Politburo [\[26\]](#), not the delicate expression "irretrievably lost", which was attributed to Stalin Khrushchev in his report "On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences" at the closed session of the XX Congress of the CPSU.

The closest associates did not understand Stalin.

And Stalin knew that, no matter how the situation turned out, he would not see the whole of Europe. That's why in 1945 he refused to take the Victory Parade. Victory in the war was a triumph for all the people, for the country, but not for Stalin. In 1945, Stalin felt like Bonaparte after the Battle of Borodino: it would seem and won, and the road ahead is open, but only so torn forces in that battle that the victory of neither joy nor strategic prospects did not bring joy. Still ahead - defeat. Hitler crushed Europe, as Stalin wanted, but Stalin could not take full advantage of it.

In 1941, the significance of the German attack was fully appreciated only by Stalin.

In 1941, the members of the Politburo simply did not understand what Hitler's invasion meant for the future fate of the Soviet Union, or did not realize its historical consequences fully.

And it meant death.

Members of the Politburo and Stalin's associates are the boy on the ashes, who does not understand the depth and tragedy of what has happened. He touches his father's hand: wake up!

His associates persuaded Stalin to return to running the country, and Stalin, waving his hand indifferently, agreed, knowing that the cause to which he had given his life was dead.

Bristol
1997-2015

Photo materials

П Avel Efimovich Dybenko (1889-1938). The picture was taken at the end of

1917 and early 1918, when Dybenko was part of the first member of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia as a member of the Committee on Military and Maritime Affairs.

I German soldiers moving towards Petrograd on the road in Livonia (today's Estonia) in the second half of February 1918. Germany was able to fight against the Entente until November 1918 only because in March 1918 Lenin signed the Brest Peace with the Kaiser and gave Germany the Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic States, and also paid it huge reparations in gold and bread. Already by the beginning of 1918, the German army was completely exhausted by the war, and the Germans were operating on the Eastern Front in small scattered detachments of 100-200 men, but because of the spreading rumors about the approach of German units and the prevailing panic in the ranks of the Bolsheviks, they left the settlements without a fight, often before the arrival of the enemy.

When in February 1918 a member of the Soviet government Comrade Dybenko and his Baltic sailors were ordered to stop the Germans near Narva, they shamefully fled to Gatchina (120 km from Narva) and then reached Samara by train. People's Commissar for Maritime Affairs Dybenko abandoned Petrograd without any defense, but the Germans simply did not have the strength to capture it. In Samara, Dybenko, together with his detachment, was finally detained for the unauthorized abandonment of a fighting position near Narva, his detachment was disarmed, and Dybenko was expelled from the Party, deprived of all posts and put on trial, but the court for some reason acquitted. It is about these events should be remembered in connection with the celebration of the Day of Defender of the Fatherland on February 23 (until 1946 - the Day of the Red Army).

Army and Navy Day, from 1946 to 1993 - the Day of the Soviet Army and Navy). The first battles of the newly created Red Army with German troops near Pskov and Narva in February 1918 ended with the occupation of these cities by the Germans, and the interpretation of those events as "the victory at Pskov and Narva" and the date of February 23, 1918 as the day of repulsion to the troops of German imperialism and the birthday of the young Red Army, was introduced personally by Stalin in 1938. In the same year, these theses were enshrined in the "Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", and in the order of February 23, 1942 Stalin expressed himself even more boldly, stating that on February 23, 1918 "Young detachments of the Red Army, who first entered the war, defeated the German invaders at Pskov and Narva".

Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai (Petrograd, March 1919). Born in St. Petersburg into a well-to-do noble family, she received a versatile education and enjoyed great success with men. From the 1890s, she took an active part in the socialist movement. After the February Revolution of 1917, she became a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and campaigned among soldiers and sailors. She participated in the meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), which decided to hold the October Uprising in Petrograd. On October 30, 1917, she was appointed People's Commissar of Public Welfare in the first Council of People's Commissars.

In January 1918, with the help of a detachment of sailors, she attempted to requisition the Alexander Nevsky Lavra in Petrograd, which provoked mass resistance of believers and caused Patriarch Tikhon to issue an "Appeal" anathematizing the Bolsheviks. In March 1918, she opposed the Brest Peace Treaty and resigned from the government in protest.

It was like a magical fairy tale. Him and her. Both in the first government of the young Soviet Republic. The marriage of Pavel Dybenko and Alexandra Kollontai was recorded in the first civil status book of the young Soviet Republic. The first Soviet marriage was a failure: both spouses valued the charms of free love too much. It was not the time for marriages. The Revolution!

II Pavel Dybenko and Nestor Makhno (Ukraine, spring 1919). In February 1919, Dybenko was instructed to create the First Zadneprovsky Ukrainian Soviet Division from insurgent and partisan detachments of Northern Tavria as part of the Ukrainian Front and to lead it. Alexandra Kollontai was appointed head of the political department of the division. The division included many thousands of detachments of the most famous partisan atamans in Ukraine - Nikifor Grigoriev and Nestor Makhno (Makhno at that time had about 50 thousand fighters). Later, Dybenko took part in the suppression of "Grigorievshchina" and "Makhnovshchina".

Workers' strikes and rallies began in Petrograd, demanding re-election of the Soviets, freedom of speech, assembly and unions for all parties, freedom of trade and the elimination of the food dictatorship. The Petrograd Committee of the RCP(b) regarded these unrests as mutiny and imposed martial law in the city, arresting labor activists, which served as an impetus for the Kronstadt garrison and the crews of some ships of the Baltic Fleet to oppose the Bolsheviks.

To the right of Dybenko in the photo is Ivan Fedko, commander of the 187th Cadet Rifle Brigade, who was awarded the third Order of the Red Banner for his services in suppressing the Kronstadt Uprising. Fedko also participated in the suppression of the Tambov Uprising. On October 17, 1933 he was appointed assistant commander of the troops of the Special Far East Army of Vasily Blucher. From May 1937 to January 1938 he commanded the troops of the Kiev Military District, from January 1938 he was First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Arrested on July 7, 1938, under torture he confessed to participation in the "military-fascist conspiracy", on February 26, 1939 he was sentenced to death and shot the same day.

II Avel Dybenko (third right) and members of his staff at a map during the suppression of the Kronstadt Uprising (March 1921). On the wall behind their backs is a map of Kotlin Island in the Gulf of Finland, where the Kronstadt fortress is located. On March 5, 1921, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council the 7th Army was restored, commanded by Mikhail Tukhachevsky. The main striking force of the army was a combined division under the command of Dybenko.

Interview with a captured sailor at the headquarters of the Southern Group of Troops during the Kronstadt Uprising (Oranienbaum, March 1921). From the first days of the uprising, the Bolsheviks not only refused any negotiations or concessions to the rebels, but also began to take relatives of the leaders of the uprising hostage. For example, in Petrograd, the family members of General Kozlovsky, chief of artillery of the Kronstadt fortress, and all their relatives (more than 25 people in all) were arrested.

Infantry units of the Red Army advancing on the Petrograd gate of the Kronstadt fortress on the ice of the Gulf of Finland (.March 1921). This photo is one of the many evidences of falsification of history in the USSR: the photographer did not shoot the real events, but staged the assault; staged photos were taken for publication in the press and were passed off as photos of real events. In fact, the offensive was not going so smoothly: the deputy chief of the special department Yudin reported that the 561st regiment, having withdrawn one and a half versts to Kronstadt, refused to go on the offensive, after which Dybenko ordered to deploy a second chain and shoot at those returning in order to force them to go on the offensive. The first assault on Kronstadt, which began on March 8, 1921 was repulsed.

У Red Army troops entering Kronstadt after the suppression of the uprising (March 17-18, 1921). Ivan Fedko is on the left in the center. The second assault on Kronstadt began on the night of March 17, in the morning the troops stormed the city, and by March 18 the rebels were finally defeated. The Bolsheviks massacred not only those who held arms, but also the population of Kronstadt: all the inhabitants of the rebellious city were considered collaborators of the rebels. More than 2 thousand people were sentenced to execution, more than 6 thousand - to various terms of imprisonment.

B Presentation of awards to Red Army soldiers who distinguished themselves in the storming of Kronstadt, at a ceremonial assembly after the capture of the city (March 1921). Second left - Dybenko. In a white papakha with his back to the photographer is Alexander Sedyakin (kissing the decorated Red Army man), appointed commander of the Southern Group of troops, which played the main role in the storming of the fortress. The commissar of the group was Kliment Voroshilov (far left in the picture). After the Civil War, Sedyakin's second wife was Valentina Dybenko, the former wife of Pavel Dybenko, whom he divorced for the sake of his marriage to Alexandra Kollon-tai. Sedyakin was arrested in December 1937, under torture pleaded guilty to participating in an anti-Soviet conspiracy, and on July 29, 1938 was sentenced to capital punishment and shot the same day.

Hawarding wounded Red Army soldiers with the Order of the Red Banner after the capture of Kronstadt (March 1921). Dybenko is the third from the left. Alexander Sedyakin (in a white papakha in the foreground) is presenting the orders.

I A group of Chervona Cossacks shortly before the assault on the fortifications of General Wrangel's Russian army on the Perekop Isthmus (Crimea, October 1920).

In the course of the Civil War, three super-powerful cavalry associations emerged in the Red Army: the 1st Cavalry Army, the 2nd Cavalry Army and the Chervona Cossacks. Accordingly, there were three groupings, three cavalry clans, whose commanders divided the men into their own and strangers.

From the ranks of the Chervona Cossacks came Marshal of the Soviet Union P. K. Koshevoy, Marshal of Armored Forces P. S. Rybalko, Marshal of Communications Forces I. T. Peresypkin, Air Marshal S. A. Khudyakov, Army General A. F. F. Zhmachenko and many others. V. Gorbatov, Colonel-General F. F. Zhmachenko and many others. The leaders of the Chervon Cossacks were mostly chosen, supported and arranged by Comrade Trotsky.

Komkor Vitaly Primakov (1897-1937). During the Civil War he commanded the 1st Cavalry Corps of the Black Cossacks and was on trial by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "for unauthorized shooting of bandits". To be put on trial by the highest legislative and administrative authority of the RSFSR for such trivialities in those years, one had to show a special passion in this case.

Arrested on August 14, 1936, testified under torture in the "Tukhachevsky case", sentenced to death on June 11, 1937 and shot on the night of June 11-12. Posthumously rehabilitated in 1957.

Ihe author of the books "Iron Fighters", "The Armor of the Soviets", "Cavalry Raid", "Perelom", "Rebellious India" (the Trotskyist Cossacks could not wait to rush into battle for oppressed India!) Under the command of Vitaly Primakov he served as a brigadier in the 8th Cavalry Division of the Chervona Cossacks.

Arrested on July 10, 1937, was under investigation for three years and was sentenced to 10 years in camps. In 1954, he was rehabilitated, reinstated in the Party and in military rank.

Kommanders of the 1st Cavalry Army (September 1922). First left - Kliment Voroshilov, second left - Semyon Budyonny. It happened that Comrade Stalin in the Civil War was there where the 1st Cavalry Army was operating. Stalin got acquainted with the future leaders of this army even before its appearance: with Budyonny they fought together in 1918 in Tsaritsyn (future Stalingrad), and Voroshilov Stalin knew even before the October coup. The leaders of the 1st Cavalry Army were mostly supported and nominated by Stalin. And when in 1922 Stalin took the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), the veterans of the 1st Cavalry Army took the highest steps in the military hierarchy of the Soviet Union. They stayed together and did not like to let outsiders near the commanding heights.

The First Connick clan had great power in the military from the mid-1920s through the mid-1970s. The power of this grouping can be judged by the life path of its members. Marshals of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, and S. K. Timoshenko emerged from the ranks of the 1st Cavalry Army,

G. I. Kulik, K. S. Moskalenko, K. A. Meretskov, A. I. Yeremenko, Air Chief Marshal P. F. Zhigarev, Marshal of Armored Forces Ya. N. Fedorenko, Army Generals I. R. Apanasenko, A. V. Khrulev and many other Soviet military leaders. The USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko - from the same company.

The revolution could not give everyone who wanted the highest government posts. There are always more victorious revolutionaries than ministerial chairs. Any revolution always gives rise to aggrieved fighters: one ended up as a division commander by the end of the Civil War, but wanted to be a corps commander, another ended the war as a corps commander, but thought he deserved more, the third became People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, but this position clearly did not satisfy him.

Such a man was Lev Trotsky. He declared that the revolution must continue, the revolution must be permanent. The pervokonniki, having obtained power, thought that they should calm down for the time being and deal with the internal affairs of the country, while the unsatisfied chervonts rushed into battle for awards and positions under the slogan of the continuation of the revolution.

У The photo was taken in 1919 or 1920. The photo was taken by the extraordinary visiting commission of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the 1st Cavalry Army, appointed to deal with cases of banditry in the units of the 1st Cavalry Army. During the Civil War, the country's leadership fought against the phenomenon that was officially called partisanship. However, in reality it was not partisanship, but real banditry: the Red Army grew out of small and large gangs, whose leaders did not want to obey anyone. It was necessary to force them to obey the new authorities. In 1937, when Stalin began to restore order in the army, had to fight insubordination already at the level of high and medium command staff of the Red Army.

Kitayan Red Army detachment from the Smolny guard (October 18, 1918). Comrade Lenin valued his life very highly and did not trust anyone else with it. The very first circle of guards

Lenin had 70 Chinese bodyguards. The Chinese guarded both Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Bukharin, but now this is not something to be proud of. Yakir was the first organizer of Chinese units in the Red Army. At the height of the Civil War in the Red Army numbered more than 40 thousand Chinese mercenaries, and Yakir was the first commander of the very first Red Army Chinese battalion. Yakir tells about his Chinese mercenaries (yes, exactly about mercenaries, not about volunteer internationalists, as they used to be presented) in his memoirs "Memories of the Civil War" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957).

У Iona Yakir (front row, center) with a group of soldiers and commanders of the 8th Army of the Southern Front (19181919).
г.). In the most difficult period of formation

Yakir did not seek a command position under the communist dictatorship. The year 1918 and the beginning of 1919 did not promise loud victories. Therefore, Yakir did not ask to be a commander. He commissaril - controlled the work of others. He was more and more on the political side: commissar of the brigade, head of the political department of the Southern section of the curtain units, a member of the 8th Army Revolutionary Military Council.

Portrait of Jonah Yakir. The picture was taken in 1925-1930, when Yakir commanded the troops of the Ukrainian (later Kiev) District.

K Commander of the Kiev Military District, Commander 1st Rank Yakir (standing) and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine Stanislav Kosior (left) in the presidium of one of the meetings (Kiev, 1935). One of Kosior's tasks was the collectivization of agriculture in Ukraine, which was followed by the famine of 1932-1933. In 2010, the Kiev Court of Appeal recognized Kosior as one of the organizers of the genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933. Yakir was complicit in this terrible crime: the Chekists alone were not enough for this, and the Red Army in Ukraine was subordinate to Yakir.

ЯKir, Budenny and Tukhachevsky (1935).


IOsif Stalin, his wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva, Kliment Voroshilov (first row, left to right) on vacation (early 1920s).

1 5 years of struggle:

Stalin in 1918-1932

Stalin in 1918 at the Tsaritsyn front. In September 1918, after the creation of the Southern Front, Stalin becomes a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of this front and takes part in the defense of Tsaritsyn. In October, there is a sharp conflict between Stalin and Trotsky. Stalin and Voroshilov demand from Lenin to discuss in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the issue of Trotsky's actions, threatening the collapse of the Southern Front. October 17, 1918, having suffered heavy losses, the Whites retreated from Tsaritsyn.

In Tsaritsyn, Stalin became "famous" for mass shootings of military officers (officers of the tsarist army, recruited to serve in the Red Army) - he so overreached with repression, even by Bolshevik standards, that he was even sharply criticized for it by Lenin at the VIII Party Congress.

 Stalin's portrait (1932). By this time, Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, had suppressed all opposition in the party. In 1934, the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, dubbed the "Congress of Winners," stated for the first time that there was no longer any opposition in the party. Many former oppositionists were welcomed back into the party after publicly "admitting mistakes".

Mikhail Tukhachevsky (center) and members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front Ivar Smilga (left) and Grigory Ordzhonikidze in the Caucasus (1920). February 4, 1920. Tukhachevsky assumed command of the Caucasus Front, created specifically to complete the defeat of the General Denikin's Volunteer Army and the capture of the North Caucasus. In late February - early March 1920, the 1st Cavalry Army under the command of S. M. Budyonny, which was part of the Caucasus Front, defeated Denikin's Cossack cavalry in the largest cavalry counter-attack in the entire Civil War. M. Budyonny defeated Denikin's Cossack cavalry in the largest counter cavalry battle of the entire Civil War in the area of Sredne-Yegorlykskaya and Egorlykskaya villages (Egorlyk Battle), which involved a total of 25,000 horsemen.

K Tukhachevsky, commander of the Western Front (on the far left), appointed to this post on April 29, 1920, receiving a parade of units of the Western Front, which at that time was considered the most important front of the Soviet Republic (May-July 1920).

II The First Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Army at the Rostov Hippodrome before being sent to the Polish Front (as the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921 was called in Soviet documents of that time) in April 1920.

On August 2, 1920, the 1st Cavalry Army and the 12th Army were transferred from the South-Western Front to the Western Front. They were to reinforce the Red Army forces sent south of Warsaw to encircle the Polish capital from the south.

B Members of the 1st Cavalry Army after the defeat of Mikhail Tukhachevsky's Western Front troops in the battle of Warsaw (September 1920).

The 1st Cavalry Army left Lvov too late to help the other forces of the Western Front, which was one of the reasons for the Bolsheviks' defeat at Warsaw.

P German President Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg greeting a group of Soviet officers invited to the Reichswehr maneuvers near Frankfurt am Oder as part of military cooperation between the USSR and Germany (September 22, 1932). Third from left: Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs M.N. Tukhachevsky.

By the way, within the framework of this cooperation in 1927-1928 in Germany at the Higher Military Academy of the General Staff studied Jonah Yakir, to whom President Hindenburg presented a book by Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1905, "Cannes", with a gift inscription "In memory of Yakir - one of the most talented military commanders of our time". At the request of the German generals

Yakir gave a course of lectures on the Civil War in Russia (Shikman A. P. Shikman Russian history. Biographical dictionary-guidebook. In 2 vol. M: ACT, 1997).

Isn't this evidence of recognizing the genius of Soviet military commanders? Not at all. By that time, Hindenburg had already lost one world war and was preparing generals for the next war, preparing them in such a way that they shamefully lost the second war as well. Therefore, the praise of such a "strategist" was worthless, and there was nothing for Soviet commanders in 1927 to learn from the Germans. Yakir, who had worked extensively with the Chinese, should have known the ancient Chinese wisdom: beware of being praised by your enemy.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky with his wife Nina (1930s). Tukhachevsky's first wife, Maria Vladimirovna Ignatyeva, the daughter of a Penza depot machinist, accompanied her husband to the Civil War fronts and committed suicide in 1920. The second wife, Nina Evgenievna Grinevich, came from an ancient Polish noble family and married Mikhail Tukhachevsky in 1921. After her husband's arrest, she too was arrested and exiled, and then, in 1941, shot. It can be seen that the photograph was torn in half: most likely, after Tukhachevsky's arrest, the owner of this photo wanted to destroy the image of the "enemy of the people" while preserving the portrait of Nina Grinevich.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky (right) greets Polish military diplomats at the May Day parade on Red Square on May 1, 1935, 15 years after the Polish army defeated the Soviet Western Front under Tukhachevsky's command near Warsaw.

Ⓐ USSR leaders and Soviet military commanders from the rostrum

Lenin's Mausoleum watching a column of T-27 tankers at the Red Square parade on May 1, 1930. The T-27 tankette was developed in 1930 and mass-produced between 1931 and 1933; more than 3,300 vehicles of this type were produced. Its prototype was the British Carden-Loyd Mk.IV tank, the technical documentation and license for the production of which the Soviet Union acquired in 1930.

According to the tank-building program adopted on August 2, 1931, the T-27 was to become the most mass-produced tank in the event of war: 16,000 such vehicles were to be produced in the first year of the war. Tukhachevsky, appointed Chief of Armaments of the Red Army in 1931, actively promoted the idea of producing tankettes; he even ordered to make a training film to promote this weapon, the script for which he personally wrote.

The tank crew consisted of 2 men (mechanic-driver and commander-gunner), armament - one 7.62 mm DT machine gun, combat weight - 2.7 tons. In the upper part of the hull there were 3 hinged hoods, which covered access to the power plant and the seats of mechanic-driver and commander-gunner (on the photo the hoods above the crew seats were raised). The T-27 could be used to support infantry on the offensive in inaccessible terrain, where heavier tanks simply could not go.

could pass through (mountains, swamps, rural areas where low capacity bridges prevailed), but in defensive warfare, when it was necessary to stop enemy tanks, this tank was useless.

K Army soldiers on a T-27 tank after maneuvers of the Moscow Military District (1936). By the mid-1930s, the concept of the tank, which was actually an armored self-propelled machine gun, had become obsolete. The armor of the T-27, which provided protection only against small arms bullets and mine and shell fragments, and not in all cases, was satisfactory for the late 1920s, but with the appearance of small-caliber anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles in the armies of various countries in the mid-1930s, the T-27 became completely defenseless. If the leaders of the USSR had listened to the opinion of the "outstanding military commander" Tukhachevsky, the country would have stamped tens of thousands of such tankettes, which in a couple of years would have been completely useless on the battlefield.

MNovember 1935, Tukhachevsky was awarded the highest military rank - Marshal of the Soviet Union (thus, he became one of the first five Soviet marshals; in addition to him in this five included Blucher, Budyonny, Voroshilov and Egorov), and in April 1936 he was appointed First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

The photo, taken on May 11, 1937, may have been the last official portrait of Tukhachevsky. A day earlier, on May 10, 1937, Tukhachevsky was transferred from the post of First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense to the post of commander of the troops of the Volga Military District. On May 22 he was arrested in Kuibyshev, on May 24 he was transported to Moscow, and on May 26, after confrontations with Primakov, Putna and other figures in the "Tukhachevsky case" gave his first confession. The investigation lasted less than a month, and on June 11, 1937, all eight defendants were sentenced to execution with confiscation of property and deprivation of military ranks. The sentence was carried out immediately after the conclusion of the trial on the night of June 12, 1937 in the building of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

B Asili Blucher (sitting on the steps on the right) at the headquarters of the 151st Brigade of the 51st Infantry Division of the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front (October 1919) On July 6, 1919, Blucher was appointed chief of the newly formed 51st Infantry Division, which had fought its way from Tyumen to Lake Baikal and to the north. participated in almost all of the final operations to liberate Siberia from the Kolchakovs.

Che Soviet military advisers in China Vasily Blucher (foreground left) and F. Macelik (right of Blucher) at the front near Nanjing on October 29, 1926. From October 1924 to August 1927 (with a break to go to the Soviet Union for medical treatment from July 1925 to May 1926), Blucher was in China as Chiang Kaishi's chief military adviser and participated in the planning of the Northern Campaign and its implementation.

K Vasily Blucher, commander of the Special Far East Army, talking to the editor of the newspaper "Rote Fane" (German: "Red Banner") during the stay in Vladivostok of the delegation of the German Communist Union of Red Front Workers (19301932).

Vasily Blucher, commander of the Special Far Eastern Army. The photo above was taken in 1935, the photo below - September 11, 1936.

HIn the picture below the four Orders of the Red Banner on the flap of Blucher's uniform pocket is the sign "Honorary Worker of the All-Union Cheka-GPU". In the history of the Soviet Union, the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was awarded 41 times, and only two of all Soviet marshals were awarded the badge "Honorary Worker of the VChK-GPU" - Beria and Blucher. Blucher received his badge number 773 on February 22, 1932. That year in our country millions of people died in terrible agony during the artificially organized famine. And it must be recognized that this award Chekist Blucher wore deservedly: among the executioners and punishers he was in great prestige. If the Soviet Union had established the honorary title "Honored Executioner of the Republic" or "People's Executioner of the USSR", then Blucher could have competed for the right to be the first to receive this title not only with Tukhachevsky, but also with Yakir himself.

H Kliment Voroshilov (left), commander of the USSR defense, Grigory Stern (right) and Voroshilov's adjutant Rafail Khmelnitsky (Moscow, 1938). r.). Stern commanded

Far Eastern Front from June 1940 to January 1941. He's a commissar. The work is not dusty - to supervise the commander, to shoot soldiers, to tell about the bright future. He began his career in 1919 with the post of regimental commissar. In 1929 he was noticed by Voroshilov, and Stern became his assignee along with Khmelnitsky. They didn't keep shibko literate people in such menial positions, but kept shibko comprehensible ones, who, like dogs, understood their master's wishes without words.

«Commander 2nd rank Stern on the Khalkhin Gol (July 1939).

In 1939, Stern headed the front office that coordinated Soviet troops during the fighting at the Khalkhin-Gol River in May-August 1939. Stern served with Voroshilov for 7 years, and could have served him further like Khmelnitsky, but he was carried high up. As early as January 1937, he was at Voroshilov in the assignees, and in May 1938 has already become Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Front. No one had such an upsurge, although Stern had no experience in command or staff work.

After the arrest of the commander of the Far Eastern Front Blucher Stalin chief of staff of this front Shtern even promoted, putting him in Blucher's position, although always and everywhere the chief of staff for all failures were equally responsible with the commander. Having served in the Far East for three years in the positions of chief of staff.

Front headquarters, the commander of the 1st Army and the commander of the Far Eastern Front, Stern did nothing to ensure that the troops had the opportunity to leave the military camps after the rain, to ensure the movement of reserves to the areas of combat operations on a huge thousand-kilometer front.

K2nd rank Commander Stern speaks at a banquet in honor of the commanders of the 1st Army Group, who took part in the fighting on the Khalkhin-Gol River (first half of 1940).

Б Lücher and Stern were replaced by a hardy cavalryman, a veteran of the 1st Cavalry Army, Colonel-General Iosif Rodionovich Apanasenko (the photo was taken in 1938-1939, when Apanasenko was still a komkor). He began to command the troops of the Far Eastern Front in January 1941, and on February 22 he was already was promoted to the rank of General of the Army. Major General PG Grigorenko, who served at that time in the Operations Directorate of the Far Eastern Front headquarters with the rank of colonel, writes about Apanasenko as follows: "In appearance, he was like an axe cut from the trunk of an oak tree. Mighty, but some kind of rough figure, rough facial features, voice loud and hoarse <...> We soon noted the colossal natural intelligence of this man. <...> Secondly, he is bold. If he thinks something is appropriate, he decides and does it, taking full responsibility for it."

KA portrait of the Far East of the USSR, Northern China (Manchuria) and Mongolia, published by the state company Transreklama of the People's Commissariat of Railways in 1930. On the left is a portrait of Commander of the Far Eastern Army Blucher, on the right is a portrait of the representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Khabarovsk A. Simanovsky, who took part in the settlement of the Soviet-Chinese armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. Taking command of the Far Eastern Front, Apanasenko found out that on the section of the railroad from Khabarovsk to Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya (the map shows the previous name, Aleksandrovskeye, now - Belogorsk) about 600 kilometers long (underlined with a white line) there was no parallel road, neither highway nor dirt road. There were 52 tunnels and bridges on this stretch - if the enemy had blown up at least one of them, and the movement of reserves to the areas of combat operations on a huge section of the front would have become impossible. To get by car from Khabarovsk to Kuibyshevka, it was necessary to go bypass and make a path of 946 kilometers. Apanasenko organized the urgent construction of a highway; in general, the period of his command can be called the era of road construction in the Far East.

Hhe Apanasenko alone could argue with Stalin. In May 1944, Stalin and his two deputies, Zhukov and Vasilevsky, having planned the Belorussian Offensive Operation, the largest operation in history, call the front commanders and set them tasks. General Rokossovsky, commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, insists on his own decision. Before the war he had already been through torture chambers, but he refuses to carry out the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's order. "To hell with you! - they tell him in the end. - Act as you know how." Rokossovsky acts, and acts brilliantly. In the summer of 1944, the Wehrmacht suffered the greatest defeat in its history, surpassing even the Stalingrad: Army Group Center was completely destroyed, and the losses of German troops on the Eastern Front from June 1 to August 31, 1944 amounted to more than 900,000 men. Already on the second day of the Belorussian offensive operation, Stalin realized that Rokossovsky's decision was brilliant, and a week after the start of the operation Rokossovsky receives a diamond star Marshal of the Soviet Union. But even this did not seem enough to Stalin, and on July 30, Rokossovsky receives the first Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. Rokossovsky's firmness in defending his point of view is heroism of the highest order. Hitler had no such generals either at the beginning or at the end of the war.

On the photo: Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky (foreground), member of the Front Military Council, Lieutenant General Konstantin Telegin (right) and Head of the Operations Department of the Front Headquarters, Major General Ivan Baikov at the command post during preparations for the Belorussian operation on June 10, 1944.

II German prisoners being led down Gorky Street on July 17, 1944. Many in the world doubted the reliability of Soviet reports about the defeat of the Germans in Belorussia, and then Comrade Stalin ordered the German prisoners to be shown to the whole world. Fifty-seven thousand German soldiers and officers captured by the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, including 19 generals, who walked through the streets of Moscow wearing the orders and uniforms they had left behind.

Π The olival cars symbolically wash the Garden Ring from mud from the boots of Hitler's prisoners after the columns of prisoners passed through Moscow on July 17, 1944.

Kolkhozniki in the field (Rostov Region, 1930).

Б BA-20 rocket-propelled vehicles on parade after tactical exercises of the Moscow Military District (Moscow Region, 1936).

Byednyaki (Russia, 1920).

3

K cadets of the First Moscow Machine Gun Courses charging in the Kremlin in June 1923. Machine gun courses, established in December 1917 on Lenin's personal instruction as the 1st Moscow revolutionary machine gun school, were relocated to the Kremlin in 1918. The cadets were assigned the tasks of guarding the Kremlin, ensuring the security of state leaders and implementing a pass regime; they replaced the Latvian riflemen guarding the Kremlin, who had been sent to the front.

⌘ Army soldiers capture a sentry during tactical exercises (1939).

⌘ German troops moving through Poland in the fall of 1939.

Of the 190 divisions Hitler threw against the Soviets. Union, only 17 were tanks, and they contained all the 240 different types of vehicles: cars, trucks, buses, military and civilian vehicles from Belgium, France, Greece, Yugoslavia and so on. Imagine what it was like to provide spare parts for all this equipment and repair it in the field, hundreds of kilometers away from repair bases. Moreover, Hitler did not have the resources for a protracted war, so he decided to blitzkrieg, for which, as it turns out, he also did not have the resources. Germany started the blitzkrieg with a catastrophic shortage of automobile tires, fuel and ammunition. Hitler's generals had planned to defeat Russia in three months, but in March 1941 they had only enough gasoline and diesel fuel for the following two months of a major offensive.

General Blumentrit admitted after the war: "*Having made the decision to attack Russia, Germany lost the war*". Field Marshal General von Rundstedt stated as early as May 1941: "*War with Russia is a pointless venture that cannot have a happy ending.*"

In tanks seized by the Germans in Poland for the Wehrmacht (October 1939). Tanks by themselves are not a force, they need infantry support, they need to be supplied. And in 1941, according to the German General Blumentrit, the German army consisted mainly of infantry divisions, moving on foot with a supply of carts. On June 22, 1941

Hitler had 3,410 tanks and 750,000 horses in wagons on the Eastern Front, that is, for every tank there was a wagon load of 220 horses and carts. Was it on carts that the German generals were going to blitzkrieg? Where did they expect to ride to in three months? When Stalin was informed that such a military force was going to attack the USSR, he simply did not believe it.

H German servicemen trying to drive cars through the occupied territory of the USSR (April 1942). They did not know that we call *this* a road.

Note that the road is still slick, and imagine what this place becomes like after a good rainstorm.

H Germans at Kursk (March-April 1942). Germany succeeded in blitzkrieg in Poland and France. But on the territory of the USSR blitzkrieg is possible only in the summer, because with the onset of fall, the equipment will be stuck in mud and snow. What did the "brilliant strategists" of the Wehrmacht count on when they planned to finish the war with the Soviet Union in three months? They didn't have three months. Hitler started the war on June 22, three months expire on September 21, and it is already impenetrable mud, and in fact September can be rainy and with of the first day.

C Matvey Chizhov's "Peasant in Distress" perfectly captures Stalin's mood in the first days after the German attack on the Soviet Union - the deep despair of a man who had worked all his life for the one goal that would now forever remain unattainable. Stalin realized that the liberation campaign in Europe will not take place, and now the Soviet Union is doomed to perish, for it could only survive by establishing socialism on a world scale. The closest associates did not understand Stalin. They behaved like this boy, who, not realizing the depth and tragedy of what happened, touches his father's shoulder: wake up! The associates persuaded Stalin to return to the management of the country, and Stalin, indifferently waving his hand, agreed, knowing that the cause to which he gave his life, died.

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Notes

1

In 2011, by court decision, the book was included in the federal list of extremist materials and banned in the Russian Federation. Joseph Goebbels kept a diary since October 1923; it contains more than 6 thousand handwritten and 50 thousand typewritten pages. Various fragments of this diary were published at different times in the FRG and other Western countries. The most complete edition of the diaries, containing 98 percent of the texts written or dictated by Goebbels, was published in the FRG after 1992 in 29 volumes. Goebbels' diary is considered by many historians to be the most important source for the study of German history in the first half of the 20th century and the history of World War II. - *Author's note.*

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2

From *German*. Gau (party district, territorially coinciding with the electoral district for the Reichstag elections) and Leiter (leader), the highest party position of the National Socialist German Workers' Party at the regional level. The Gauleiter reported directly to the Führer and exercised political leadership of the district. - *Ed.*

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3

In contrast to the common Russian spelling of this surname (Churchill), I use its spelling with the letter "ë" (Churchill), corresponding to the correct pronunciation of this surname in English. - *Author's note*.

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4

Sturmabteilung (*German*: Sturmabteilung), paramilitary formations of the NSDAP. - *Editor's note*.

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5

The Chekists proudly called themselves a combat unit of the Communist Party and were constantly, everywhere and anywhere looking for enemies of the people, so in the army and special services they were often called "friends of the people". - *Author's note.*

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6

In 1935-1940 in the USSR there was a military rank of flagship, assigned to the highest commanding staff of the Navy. The rank had four steps: flagship of the fleet of the 1st and 2nd rank, flagship of the 1st and 2nd rank. In 1940, these ranks were replaced by the rank of admiral. - *Editor's note.*

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The official name of the German Navy in 1935-1945. - *Editor's note.*

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8

Alexander Ivanovich Todorsky (1894-1965) was a Soviet military figure, lieutenant general. In 1933-1936 he was the head of the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy, from 1936 he was the head of the Department of Military Educational Institutions. In 1938 he was arrested on charges of participation in anti-Soviet conspiracy, sentenced to 15 years in camps. In 1953 he was rehabilitated and reinstated in the Soviet Army. In 1955 he was retired. He spent the rest of his life fighting for the rehabilitation of his former comrades; he compiled a reference on the number of repressed people in some categories of the RKKA's senior officers, known as Todorsky's list, which was published in samizdat and often cited by foreign historians. - *Ed.*

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9

Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet. Created on April 28-30, 1917 by sailors to coordinate the activities of fleet committees, the Central Committee had real power in the Baltic Fleet after the abolition of the post of fleet commander in December 1917. - *Ed.*

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This was the name of the holiday until 1946. - *Editor's note.*

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11

Marshals of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov (First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in 1977-1989), I. I. Yakubovsky (First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in 1967-1976), S. G. Sokolov (Minister of Defense of the USSR in 1984-1987) and other prominent Soviet military commanders who held top leadership positions in the Soviet Army in the postwar period.), S. G. Sokolov (USSR Minister of Defense in 1984-1987) and other prominent Soviet military commanders who held top leadership positions in the Soviet Army in the postwar period, commanded tank units and formations of the Red Army during World War II. - *Author's note.*

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12

December 6, 1920. The 2nd Cavalry Army was reorganized into the 2nd Cavalry Corps, which significantly reduced its status. In February 1921, the former commander of the 2nd Cavalry Army, Filipp Kuzmich Mironov, was arrested. He was accused that he deliberately stopped the defeat of Makhno's army, because Makhno had his own brother as the commander of the corps, although in fact Makhnovists were completely defeated, and only Makhno himself and a small group of associates managed to leave. Mironov was killed by a sentry in the courtyard of Butyr prison under unclear circumstances; after that the case of his preparation of an armed uprising on the Don was falsified. Mironov's son-in-law Alexander Golikov was also arrested, then released and arrested again in 1937 and shot. - *Author's note.*

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13

The veil was a group of Red Army units defending the demarcation line established after the Brest Peace Treaty by Soviet Russia and covering the central parts of the country from possible invasion by German troops. For political reasons (due to the obligations assumed under the peace treaty), Soviet Russia did not want to call the units covering the border "armies" or "fronts"; the word "veil" seemed to indicate that these units would not engage in active military operations. In the event of an enemy invasion, the veil troops were to withdraw, destroying bridges and roads to delay the enemy until the evacuation of valuable property and mobilization of troops in the interior of the country were completed. - *Ed.*

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Read more about it in Viktor Suvorov's book "Kuzkin's Mother" (Moscow: Good Book, 2011). - *Editor's note.*

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After the release of this book, one of my many nitpickers thunderously announced: but I know what decaville is! Bravo! I know too. And I will indicate the source of my knowledge. In 1964, during the heyday of Tukhachevsky's personality cult, Voenizdat published the "brilliant" works of the "great strategist". Some of the thinker's terms were explained. But that's the thing, at the time when Tukhachevsky was at the helm of the Red Army, there were no explanations in his books. Tukhachevsky himself was unable to express his thoughts clearly and did not find it necessary to explain the meaning of the terms he used. He was preparing the Soviet Union for war, he addressed not to posterity, but to contemporaries. What good would it do for posterity, many years later, to decipher his wise instructions if he could not explain himself to his contemporaries? - *Author's note.*

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16

The Soviet Army often used a method of combat training which was called (depending on units and equipment) "pedestrian by machine", "pedestrian by tank", etc., and which dates back to the days of cavalry training ("pedestrian by horse"). The method, as is clear from the name, consisted in the fact that soldiers and commanders practiced all their actions on the battlefield without equipment or horses. There is nothing wrong with this, but this method was often abused, which affected the quality of combat training. - *Author's note.*

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17

The first Soviet tank was the Tank M (also known as the Russian Renault, Renault-Russian, Tank KS), which was an almost exact copy of the French Renault FT-17 light tank, several copies of which were captured by the Red Army in 1919. In addition, in the 1920s the USSR created several prototypes of tanks and tankettes that were not put into mass production. - *Editor's note.*

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19

Victor Suvorov. Day M. When did the Second World War begin? M.: Dobryaya kniga, 2015. C. 239. Chapter 22. The unusual twist in the career of General Khmelnitsky as another clue to the unraveling of Stalin's plans. - *Editor's note.*

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Blucher, who commanded the Far Eastern Front from July 1, 1938, made many mistakes, as a result of which during the clashes with the Japanese at Lake Khasan the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. August 3, 1938 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense LZ Mekhlis, who arrived at the headquarters of the front, reported to Moscow that Blucher is unable to perform the duties of commander, after which he was removed from command of the troops, in his place was appointed Stern. After summing up the results of the fighting at Lake Hasan, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense in Order No. 0040 of September 4, 1938 noted: *"Even after receiving instructions from the Government to stop fiddling with all commissions and investigations and the exact implementation of the decisions of the Soviet Government and orders of the People's Commissar Blucher does not change his defeatist position and still sabotages the organization of the armed repulse of the Japanese. It came to the point that on August 1 of this year, during a direct wire conversation between Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov and Blücher, Comrade Stalin had to ask him the following question: "Tell me, Mr. Blücher, honestly, whether you have any desire to fight the Japanese. If you do not have such a desire, tell me directly, as befits a Communist, and if there is a desire, I would consider that you should have left for the place immediately.""* On October 22, 1938, Blucher was arrested on charges of military conspiracy. - Ed.

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"And it must be said that Stalin planned operations on a globe. (Excitement in the hall.) Yes, comrades, he would take a globe and show the front line on it." (Report of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. S. Khrushchev "On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences" at a closed session of the XX Congress of the CPSU on February 25, 1956). - Author's note.

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This is probably Colonel Adolf Heusinger, who at that time headed the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Land Forces and was the third person in the hierarchy of planning military operations of the Wehrmacht Land Forces after Chief of the General Staff Halder and 1st Ober-Quartarmeister Paulus. - *Ed.*

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It is about the book "The Myth of the 'Icebreaker'" (Moscow: Progress-Academy, 1995).

Gabriel Gorodetsky is Professor of History and Director of the Cummings Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies at Tel Aviv University. In this book, Gorodetsky, speaking of the Red Army command staff on the eve of the war, states that "*commanders are 40% hats, characterless, cowards, etc.*" (P. 125.) For more on Gabriel Gorodetsky and his critique of The Icebreaker, see the new edition of Viktor Suvorov's The Last Republic (Moscow: Dobrayaia kniga, 2015). - *Editor's note.*

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Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. Vintage Books, 1993. -
Author's note.

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One of the participants in the conspiracy of so-called "refuseniks" - citizens of the USSR who wanted to emigrate from the country and were denied exit visas. Mass denials of exit visas in the 1960s-1970s caused a conflict between the Soviet state and those wishing to emigrate. "Refuseniks" believed that the state was violating their right to free emigration enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1970, a group of Jewish "refuseniks," who decided not to wait any longer for official permission to leave for Israel, planned an airplane hijacking operation to escape abroad. They were going to hijack a small passenger plane departing from Leningrad and land in Sweden or Finland. A total of 16 people took part in the action; in order not to endanger other passengers, the members of the group bought all the tickets for one flight. The explanation for the Jewish appearance of most of the passengers was that they were all flying to a wedding (hence the codename of the action - Operation Wedding). According to the organizers' plan, the action was also intended to draw attention to the situation of Jews in the USSR and to the authorities' ban on the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. Most of the participants in the action were arrested by KGB officers on June 15, 1970, at the Smolny airport. Kuznetsov was sentenced to capital punishment (death penalty); six months later the death sentence was commuted to 15 years in camps, and in 1979 Kuznetsov, along with four other political prisoners, was exchanged for Soviet intelligence officers detained in the United States. - *Ed.*

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Anastas Mikoyan. So it was. Reflections on the past. M.: - *Author's*
Vagrius, 1999. *note*.

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